JUDGMENT: Ujjal Bhuyan, J. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. This appeal has been preferred by the Principal Secretary to the then Government of Andhra Pradesh in the Transport, Roads and Buildings Department and the then Andhra Pradesh Road Transport Development Corporation Limited (Corporation) under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (briefly, ‘the 1996 Act’ hereinafter), assailing the legality and validity of the order dated 18.11.2019 passed by the Commercial Court-cum-XXIV Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, rejecting the petition filed by the appellants under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, being registered as C.O.P.No.12 of 2018. 3. Shorn of details, we may briefly narrate the facts leading to filing of the present appeal. 4. A work for construction of four high level bridges on Hyderabad-Guntur road was taken up by the Roads and Buildings Department of the then Government of Andhra Pradesh as a single package under the Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) Scheme during the year 2002. The work was awarded to respondent No.1 i.e., Contec Syndicate Private Limited (briefly referred to hereinafter as ‘the contractor’), following which agreement dated 26.02.2003 was entered into between the parties. 5. According to the appellants, one of the salient features of the BOT contract was a concession period of 12½ years and out of which, the contractor was permitted to collect toll tax at Government approved rates for a period of 11 years. 6. It is stated that the contractor had completed construction of all the four bridges by 12.07.2004 and it collected toll tax at the Government approved rates for the period from 01.08.2004 to 31.07.2015. 7. There was a Terms of Reference for daily collection which was appended to the bid document. As per para 6 of the Terms of Reference, detailed procedure was laid down amongst others for revision of daily fee which could be altered with the prior approval of the Government. 8. Contractor made a representation to the Government under para 6.7 of the Terms of Reference for upward revision of the toll rates. The first representation was made on 18.11.2010, which was followed by the subsequent representation on 10.12.2010. 9. A steering group was constituted which made recommendation to the Government on 18.12.2013 calling upon the contractor to furnish revised proposal for prior approval of the Government. 10. The first representation was made on 18.11.2010, which was followed by the subsequent representation on 10.12.2010. 9. A steering group was constituted which made recommendation to the Government on 18.12.2013 calling upon the contractor to furnish revised proposal for prior approval of the Government. 10. When the contractor approached the Engineer-in-Chief, he made an endorsement on 23.12.2013 to the Managing Director of the Corporation to take up further necessary action. However, the Government, after gathering inputs, declined to grant prior approval to the contractor and rejected the request vide letter dated 27.06.2015. 11. Contractor invoked arbitration clause 19.2 (a) of the agreement dated 26.02.2003 on 03.07.2015 appointing a retired Judge of this court as its Arbitrator and requesting the appellants to appoint their Arbitrator as the second Arbitrator. When this was not done, the contractor filed an application under Section 11 of the 1996 Act before this court, which was registered as Arbitration Application No.95 of 2015. This court, by order dated 10.06.2016, constituted an Arbitral Tribunal under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act for resolution of the dispute that arose between the parties in terms of the agreement dated 26.02.2003. 12. Following the aforesaid order of this court, appellants nominated a retired Judge of this court as their Arbitrator. The two Arbitrators i.e., one by the contractor and the other by the appellants viz., Justice R.Kantha Rao and Justice G.Bhavani Prasad, in turn, nominated Justice C.V.Ramulu as the third/Presiding Arbitrator of the Arbitral Tribunal. 13. Arbitral Tribunal commenced arbitral proceedings on and from 29.08.2016. While the contractor filed its claim statement, appellants filed written arguments. As per the claim statement, the contractor claimed compensation towards revised toll fee from 18.10.2010 to 31.07.2015 along with interest. Fee of each Arbitrator was fixed at Rs.8 lakhs. While the claimant (contractor) paid its share of Arbitrators’ fee to all the three Arbitrators, appellants did not pay any fee to the Arbitrators, but learned counsel for the appellants made a statement before the Arbitral Tribunal that the fee payable to the Arbitrators may be included in the Award. Arbitral Tribunal, upon considering the claim petition and the written arguments of the appellants, framed the following issues for consideration: (1) whether the objections raised by the respondent under Section 16(2) and Section 16(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 are open for consideration and tenable? Arbitral Tribunal, upon considering the claim petition and the written arguments of the appellants, framed the following issues for consideration: (1) whether the objections raised by the respondent under Section 16(2) and Section 16(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 are open for consideration and tenable? (2) whether the terms of reference formed part of the agreement and whether the Memo dated 27.06.2015 of the first respondent is in tune with the conduct of the parties? (3) whether Article 6.7 of the terms of reference provides for periodical revision of rates and at what rates? (4) whether the respondents are estopped from resisting the claim of the claimant? (5) to what relief? 14. Insofar issue No.1 was concerned, Arbitral Tribunal held that taking recourse to clause 19.1 (b) is not a condition precedent to take recourse to clauses 19.2(a). Dispute was rightly referred to arbitration. Thus, the plea under Sections 16(2) and 16(3) of the 1996 Act was rejected. 15. As regards issue Nos.2 to 4 were concerned, Arbitral Tribunal held that even assuming that Article 6.7 did not form part of the formal contract, the same did not make any difference to the liability of the appellants. Article 6.7 of the Terms of Reference has to be considered binding on the parties either as part of the concession agreement or on the basis of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Thus, the above three issues were answered in favour of the claimant (contractor). 16. As far as issue No.5 was concerned, Arbitral Tribunal held that the principal amount calculated by the steering group at Rs.6,13,10,319.00 was not questioned by the appellants as unreasonable or unjust or without any basis. Therefore, the said principal amount was accepted and an Award was passed for the aforesaid amount with interest at 9% per annum which was quantified at Rs.4,41,13,338.00 from 01.08.2015 till the date of the Award and from the date of the Award till realization at 6% per annum. 17. Appellants questioned the aforesaid Award before the Commercial Court-cum-XXIV Additional Chief Judge by filing petition under Section 34(2) of the 1996 Act. The same was registered as C.O.P.No.12 of 2018. After considering the materials on record and the submissions made by both the sides, learned court below framed the following points for adjudication: 1. 17. Appellants questioned the aforesaid Award before the Commercial Court-cum-XXIV Additional Chief Judge by filing petition under Section 34(2) of the 1996 Act. The same was registered as C.O.P.No.12 of 2018. After considering the materials on record and the submissions made by both the sides, learned court below framed the following points for adjudication: 1. Whether the findings of the Arbitral Tribunal regarding its competence in response to the objections of the employer (applicant) can be interfered by the Court under Section 34(ii) or Section 34(ii)(v) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996? 2. Whether the award of the Arbitral Tribunal regarding the revision of the toll tax (rates) can be interfered with? 3. Whether the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal can be set aside? 18. Insofar point No.1 is concerned, learned court below opined that the finding of the Arbitral Tribunal as to its competence could not be interfered either under Section 34(2) (2) or Section 34(2)(5) of the 1996 Act. Therefore, this point was answered in favour of the contractor. While answering this point, learned court below referred to the order passed by this court in the application filed by the contractor under Section 11 of the 1996 Act. 19. As regards point No.2, learned court below noticed that the Arbitral Tribunal had allowed revision of the toll fee and thereafter found that the contractor was entitled to Rs.6,13,10,319.00 with interest thereon. After due deliberation, learned court below held that there was no patent illegality, violation of public policy of India or contravention of the terms of the contract. It was also held that the Award was not contrary to substantive provisions of any law, not contrary to the provisions of the 1996 Act or against the contract entered into between the parties. Thus, rejecting the contention of the appellants, learned court below answered point No.2 in favour of the contractor. 20. On point No.3, learned court below held that the Arbitral Tribunal clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the dispute and the findings of the Arbitral Tribunal required no interference. Accordingly, the petition filed by the appellants under Section 34 of the 1996 Act was rejected. 21. Thereafter, the present appeal has been preferred under Section 37 of the 1996 Act. 22. On point No.3, learned court below held that the Arbitral Tribunal clearly had jurisdiction to entertain the dispute and the findings of the Arbitral Tribunal required no interference. Accordingly, the petition filed by the appellants under Section 34 of the 1996 Act was rejected. 21. Thereafter, the present appeal has been preferred under Section 37 of the 1996 Act. 22. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that Clause 6.7 of the Terms of Reference was not a part of the agreement dated 26.02.2003 and could not have formed a basis for arbitration. The second contention is that the fee of the Arbitrators was fixed at Rs.8 lakhs each which was quite high and in contravention to the provisions of Schedule IV of the 1996 Act. In this connection, he has placed reliance on a decision of the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of PUNJAB STATE POWER CORPORATION LIMITED v. UNION OF INDIA, decided on 21.07.2017. 23. This court, in the proceedings held on 08.07.2021, prima facie took the view that none of the pleas taken by the appellants would strictly fall within the parameters of a challenge under Section 37 of the 1996 Act. Order dated 08.07.2021 reads as follows: “1. The appellants are aggrieved by the judgment dated 18.11.2019 passed by the learned Judge, Commercial Court-cum-XXIV Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Courts, Hyderabad where under, a petition filed by them under Section 34 (2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act (for short, A & C Act) assailing the Award dated 07.07.2017 passed by the Arbitral Tribunal in favour of the respondent No.1, has been upheld. 2. On hearing the arguments addressed by Mr. T.Ramulu, learned counsel for the appellants at the stage of admission, we have indicated that none of the pleas that are being urged by him before this court would strictly fall within the parameters of a challenge maintainable under Section 37 of the A & C Act, as the appellate court’s jurisdiction is fairly limited and only requires a judicial review of the judgment of the court below, under Section 34 of the A & C Act. 3. After addressing arguments for some time, learned counsel for the appellants states that he may be permitted to examine the impugned judgment afresh. 4. 3. After addressing arguments for some time, learned counsel for the appellants states that he may be permitted to examine the impugned judgment afresh. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent No.1 states that the respondent No.1 has filed an execution petition for seeking enforcement of the Award. It is made clear that any amount that the appellants pay to the respondent No.1 in terms of the orders that may be passed in the aforesaid execution petition shall be subject to the outcome of the present appeal. 5. At the request of learned counsel for the appellants, list for admission on 12.08.2021”. 23.1 Subsequently, in the order dated 28.10.2021, we had also indicated our prima facie agreement with the view expressed in the order dated 08.07.2021. 24. After hearing learned counsel for the parties at length, we are not inclined to entertain this appeal for more than one reason. Firstly, Section 7 of the 1996 Act refers to arbitration agreement. As per sub-section (1), “arbitration agreement” means an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not. Sub-section (2) is relevant and it clarifies that an “arbitration agreement” may be in the form of an arbitration clause in the contract or in the form of a separate agreement. 25. Insofar the present case is concerned, the parties are bound by contractual relationship in view of the agreement dated 26.02.2003. Article 19 of this agreement provides for dispute resolution. While Article 19.1 (a) provides that the parties should attempt to amicably resolve the dispute at the first instance by referring to the steering group, failing which the procedure prescribed in clause (b) should be followed, however, as per clause (b), either party may require the dispute to be referred to the Engineer-in-Chief and the Chairman of the Board of Directors for amicable settlement. If the dispute is not amicably settled within 15 days, then either of the two parties may refer the dispute to arbitration in accordance with the provisions contained in Article 19.2. 26. Para 6 of the Terms of Reference provided for the procedure for levy, collection, appropriation and revision of toll fee. If the dispute is not amicably settled within 15 days, then either of the two parties may refer the dispute to arbitration in accordance with the provisions contained in Article 19.2. 26. Para 6 of the Terms of Reference provided for the procedure for levy, collection, appropriation and revision of toll fee. As per para 6.7, revision of fee may be allowed every year, following commissioning of the facility for traffic, but such revision of fee has to be linked to the wholesale price index and imposed after the prior approval of the Government. 27. The contractor had made representation under para 6 of the Terms of Reference to the Government for upward revision of the toll fee. That was rejected by the Government. Upon such rejection, the contractor had invoked arbitration. The Terms of Reference was appended to the bid document. As an annexure to the bid document, it was part of the tender. Therefore, to say that such terms of reference could not form the substratum of dispute would not be correct, as it was part of the contract document and was binding on the parties. 28. Arbitral Tribunal noted that the contractor had moved the High Court for constitution of Arbitral Tribunal for resolution of the dispute under Section 11 of the 1996 Act. Having regard to Article 19.1 and 19.2 of the contract agreement, the High Court allowed the prayer of the contractor by order dated 10.06.2016 by directing constitution of Arbitral Tribunal. It is, thus, evident that the Arbitral Tribunal came into existence following the order of this court. From a reading of the said order, it is evident that the said order was passed with the consent of the parties. Therefore, to contend that the Arbitral Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to arbitrate on the claim of the contractor would be a totally untenable proposition. 29. Regarding the contention of the appellants that without exhaustion of the procedure laid down under Article 19.1 (b), the contractor could not have invoked the arbitration clause under 19.2, the Arbitral Tribunal held as follows: “In the present case, a steering group was constituted between the parties. It made its recommendations and the same were rejected by the Government of Andhra Pradesh. It was only after the said orders of rejection the claimant took recourse to invoking the arbitration clause under 19.2 on 03.07.2015. It made its recommendations and the same were rejected by the Government of Andhra Pradesh. It was only after the said orders of rejection the claimant took recourse to invoking the arbitration clause under 19.2 on 03.07.2015. Even if the requests of the claimant for revision of toll fee were to be considered not literally in tune with Article 19 of the agreement, undoubtedly there were attempts to have the demand resolved amicably through a steering group, the recommendations of which were rejected by the first respondent. That it is only 19.1(a) regarding the attempt to resolve amicably through a steering group that was stated to be “shall’, while the reference under 19.1(b) was indicated to be optional in the use of the word ‘may’, requires to be noted. Article 19.2(a) provides for final settlement by a binding arbitration when the dispute is not resolved amicably as provided in Article 19.1(a). It does not refer to Article 19.1(b) or any causes or reasons leading to the failure to have an amicable resolution under Article 19.1(a) and a plain and unambiguous language of 19.2(a) may indicate that whatever be the reason for the dispute not being resolved amicably as per Article 19.1(a), such dispute shall be finally settled only through arbitration without any reference to Article 19.1(b) being invoked or not. A conflict sought to be read into Article 19 by the respondents does not appear to be substantial or real. Any lack of clarity due to any inartistic drafting cannot be so construed as to deprive the parties of their legitimate rights. The right to arbitration conferred by Article 19.2(a) unrelated to the reasons for which amicable resolution of the dispute under Article 19.1(a) became not possible cannot be denied to the parties. Article 19.1(b) can be safely considered to be an extra option for the parties for amicable settlement before resorting to arbitration under Article 19.2(a). The copies of correspondence filed by the respondents did not add any further relevant information except by a letter dated 22.07.2015 in response to the letter of the claimant dated 03.07.2015. The second respondent intimated that it proposes to refer the dispute under Article 19.1(b) and therefore the appointment of an arbitrator with reference to 19.2(a) does not arise. Article 19.1(b) provides for the matter being referred to the Engineer-in-Chief (R&B) (Admin. The second respondent intimated that it proposes to refer the dispute under Article 19.1(b) and therefore the appointment of an arbitrator with reference to 19.2(a) does not arise. Article 19.1(b) provides for the matter being referred to the Engineer-in-Chief (R&B) (Admin. & E), A.P., and the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the concessionaire if there was failure of resolution of the dispute amicably by the steering group. However, in the present case, the Engineer-in-Chief (R&B), State Roads, was the representative of the department in the steering group along with the representative of the claimant and there was no failure of arriving at an amicable settlement by the steering group. The steering group made a unanimous resolution of its recommendations and Article 19.1(a) does not refer to the refusal of the State Government to accept the amicable resolution by the steering group to be leading to the procedure under Article 19.1(b). The Government cannot take advantage of its own action of not accepting the amicable resolution by the steering group to compel the claimant to submit itself to another attempt for resolution under Article 19.1 (b) again involving another Engineer-in-Chief working under the same Government. The claimant waited for more than considerable time and as the reference to arbitration under Article 19.2(a), became a compulsive necessity because of the rejection of the amicable resolution suggested by the steering group under Article 19.1(a), any recourse to Article 19.1(b) would be a futile exercise to the detriment of the reasonable interests and legitimate rights of the claimant. In any view, once the Hon’ble High Court speaking through the Hon’ble the Acting Chief Justice considered Article 19.1 and 19.2 in detail and after reading the provisions carefully opined that it is open to the parties to seek appointment of arbitrators/Arbitral Tribunal and even the learned counsel for both the parties after perusing the provisions carefully nominated their respective arbitrators, this Arbitral Tribunal is neither competent to go behind the conclusions of the Hon’ble Court/Hon’ble the Acting Chief Justice nor is it justified even on facts and terms and conditions of the agreement to consider itself incompetent to arbitrate. Learned counsel for the respondents referred to Delhi and Finance Housing and Construction v. Brij Mohan Shah (AIR 1956 (P & H) 205 in which the arbitration clause used the word ‘sole arbitrator’ while names of two persons were mentioned in the alternative as eligible to be appointed as an arbitrator. The Court held that in the absence of any provisions as to how the choice was to be made between the two persons, the clause is invalid as being vague and uncertain. It is difficult to comprehend how that decision can be of any application, when here there is no ambiguity in the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal under 19.2(a) which prescribes an arbitrator each to be nominated by the parties who in turn will nominate a third arbitrator. The reference to the steering group under Article19.1(a) and to the Engineer-in-Chief and Chairman of the claimant under Article 19.1(b) was with reference to the attempts for amicable settlement to be made at two levels failing which arbitration can be resorted to, which arbitration clause has absolutely no vagueness or uncertainty and though Article 19.1(b) refers to reference to arbitration under Article 19.2(a), Article 19.2(a) only refers to failure under Article 19.1(a) but not 19.1(b). Hence, it may also be that taking recourse to 19.1(b) is not a condition precedent to take recourse to 19.2(a) and 19.1(b) is provided as giving one more opportunity for amicable settlement which the parties may or may not avail. In any view thus, the respondents cannot resist the arbitral proceedings under Section 16(2). Therefore, the plea under Section 16(2) has to squarely fail”. 29.1. On this aspect, learned court below held as follows: “The Law is very clear that if the Hon’ble High Court has decided the preliminary issues and did not give any direction to the Arbitral Tribunal for considering the said issues further, the order of the Hon’ble Chief Justice or his designate becomes final and it cannot be reopened. In this case on hand the Hon’ble Chief Justice in Arbitration Application No.95/2014 has decided the preliminary aspects and did not give any direction to the Arbitral Tribunal to reconsider any issue on competence of the Arbitral Tribunal. Hence, the applicant cannot re-agitate the same. In this case on hand the Hon’ble Chief Justice in Arbitration Application No.95/2014 has decided the preliminary aspects and did not give any direction to the Arbitral Tribunal to reconsider any issue on competence of the Arbitral Tribunal. Hence, the applicant cannot re-agitate the same. In view of my above discussion, I am of the opinion that the finding of the H.A.T regarding its competence in response to the objection of the Employer cannot be interfered with by this court, either under section 34(2) (2) or 34(2) (5) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996.” 30. Insofar the fee paid or payable to the Arbitrators is concerned, it was held by the Arbitral Tribunal as follows: “Another question which the respondents raised under Section 16(3) is a question about the arbitrator’s fee fixed by the Arbitral Tribunal. Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 specifically refers to an arbitration with three arbitrators, one to be appointed by each party and the third presiding arbitrator to be appointed by the other two arbitrators and the very definition of the word “Arbitral Tribunal” under Section 2(d) makes it mean a sole arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators. The amendment to Section 11 by the 2015 Amendment Act incorporated subsection (14) which made the rates specified in the IV Schedule to be taken into consideration for determination of the fees of the Arbitral Tribunal. The IV Schedule which gives the model fee with reference to the sum in dispute specifically states in the appended Note and if the Tribunal is a sole arbitrator, he shall be entitled to an additional amount of 25% of the fee payable as per the Table which obviously means that when the Arbitral Tribunal consists of a panel of arbitrators, it is evident that each of the arbitrators will be entitled to the model fee specified in the IV Schedule. Otherwise, if the interpretation adopted by the respondents were to be accepted, a sole arbitrator will get 125% of the model fee, while a panel of three arbitrators get 1/3rd of the model fee each, which would not have been considered reasonable or just by any means of interpretation. Otherwise, if the interpretation adopted by the respondents were to be accepted, a sole arbitrator will get 125% of the model fee, while a panel of three arbitrators get 1/3rd of the model fee each, which would not have been considered reasonable or just by any means of interpretation. Reading Section 11 as it originally stood and as it stood amended and reading it together with the IV Schedule and other provisions of the Act, the contention of the respondents has to be straight away rejected and the fee fixed by the Arbitral Tribunal is perfectly in tune with the Statute including the IV Schedule. The respondents did not pay any fee to the arbitrators and their learned counsel stated on the date of final hearing that the fee payable by the respondents may be included in the award. Sections 31 and 31A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (as amended in 2015) make the Arbitral Tribunal fix the costs of the arbitration etc., and Section 31A left the determination and the details to the judicial discretion of the Arbitral Tribunal. Under the circumstances, the claimant can be directed to pay the fees and the ministerial expenses of the Arbitral Tribunal and recover the same from the respondents. The claimant has to therefore pay Rs.4,00,000/- each to the arbitrators apart from Rs.50,000/- towards ministerial expenses and recover the same from the respondents as part of the award. The Hon’ble High Court ordered in Arbitration Application No.95 of 2015 that each party will bear the expenses of the arbitration proceedings in all respects in equal share. Therefore, the objection raised by the respondents under Section 16(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 also has no legs to stand”. 30.1. Regarding fee payable to the Arbitrators, the following finding was rendered by the learned court below: “The another contention regarding the fees of Arbitrator is also fragile. Schedule No.4 basing on which the fee is fixed makes it clear that if the sole Arbitrator is there, he is entitled 25% more than the amount fixed and this leads to conclusion that if there are more than one Arbitrator, each of them is entitled fees as per Schedule 4. I do not find any infirmity regarding the fixation of fee by the arbitrator. I do not find any infirmity regarding the fixation of fee by the arbitrator. Even if the Employer could contend that the fixation of the fees is illegal, only on that ground the Court cannot set aside the entire award.” 31. Section 11 of the 1996 Act deals with appointment of arbitrators. Sub-section (14) says that the arbitral institution shall determine the fees of the Arbitral Tribunal and the manner of its payment to the Arbitral Tribunal subject to the rates specified in the IV Schedule. The IV Schedule provides for the model fee of arbitrator(s) vis-à-vis the sum in dispute. At serial No.4 of the Schedule, where the sum in dispute is above Rs.1,00,00,000.00 and up to Rs.10,00,00,000.00, then the model fee is Rs.3,37,500.00 plus 1 per cent of the claim amount over and above Rs.1,00,00,000.00. Considering the claim of the contractor i.e., Rs.6,13,10,319.00 with interest, fixation of fee at Rs.8 lakhs per each of the arbitrators is well within the model fee prescribed under the IV Schedule. 32. We further find that there is a note below the IV Schedule. The note provides that if the Arbitral Tribunal consists of a sole arbitrator, he shall be entitled to an additional amount of 25% on the fee payable as per above. This provision was examined by a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of PUNJAB STATE POWER CORPORATION LIMITED (supra) wherein it was held as follows: “Evidently the intent of the aforesaid is that in the eventuality of a sole Arbitrator being asked to enter upon an arbitration he would be entitled to an additional amount of 25% of the fee table, as per the table set out above (i.e Fourth Schedule). It cannot thus be interpreted thatsince sole arbitrator is entitled to 25% additional amount over and above the Schedule it should be construed to mean that other members of the Tribunal would be entitled to the model fee as per the Fourth Schedule with the principal Arbitrator getting 25% additional fee thereto. It means only that in the eventuality of Arbitral Tribunal consisting of a solitary member it could entitle him to additional fee of 25% of the model fee but if it is a multi member body then they would be entitled to a composite fee as set out in the Schedule”. 33. It means only that in the eventuality of Arbitral Tribunal consisting of a solitary member it could entitle him to additional fee of 25% of the model fee but if it is a multi member body then they would be entitled to a composite fee as set out in the Schedule”. 33. We fail to understand as to how the aforesaid decision can come to the aid of the appellants. 34. While dismissing the petition filed by the appellants under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, learned court below held as follows: “There is no patent illegality, violation of public policy of India or contravention of the terms of the contract. The award is not contrary to substantive provisions of Law, not contrary to the provisions of Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 or against the terms of the contract between the parties. The Employer could not find out any specific aspect to contend that the award is contrary to fundamental policies of Indian Law, notions of justice and morality. The Employer therefore is not able to convince the court that the award under dispute needs to be interfered by this court.” 35. Judicial interference in awards passed by Arbitral Tribunals should be minimal. In SWISS TIMINGS LTD., v. ORGANIZING COMMITTEE, COMMONWEALTH GAMES, 2010 DELHI, (2014) 6 SCC 677 Supreme Court referred to Section 5 of the 1996 Act and observed that the said section provides that the court shall not intervene in the arbitration process except in accordance with the provisions contained in Part I of the 1996 Act. This principle of least interference in arbitration proceedings recognizes the general principle that the function of courts in matters relating to arbitration is to support the arbitration process. 36. For the aforesaid reasons, we find no merit in the appeal. Appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. 37. Miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.