Neelawwa W/o. Malleshappa Talageri v. State of Karnataka
2021-02-26
N.S.SANJAY GOWDA
body2021
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : 1. This is a petition filed by the tenant challenging the rejection of his Form No.7. 2. One Mallappa Bheemappa Talageri, who is also known as Malleshappa Talageri claiming to be the tenant of Block No.39, filed a Form No.7. In the said Form No.7, he stated that the landlords were Rudrawwa W/o Bheemappa Talageri and Shivawwa W/o Shivappa Tontagere, were the land owners. In the Form No.7, he had stated that the above mentioned landlords were the owners of only 1/3rd of the property and he was consequently a tenant only in respect of 1/3rd portion on 10.05.1977. 3. On the same day, he also filed another Form No.7 seeking for registration of occupancy rights in respect of Sy.No.37/3, measuring 7 acres 28 guntas. In this Form No.7, he stated that Basavaraj Shivappa Tontagere was the landlord. 4. The Land Tribunal in the first instance conferred occupancy rights. The said order was however set aside, by an order of this Court in W.P.Nos.1375455/1977, and the matter was remanded to the Land Tribunal. 5. The Land Tribunal once again granted occupancy rights in favour of the tenant. This was challenged by the landlord in W.P.Nos.643435/1979. This writ petition was also allowed and the matter was once again remanded to the Land Tribunal. 6. On remand, the Land Tribunal proceeded to reject the Form No.7. This was challenged in an appeal before the Land Reforms Appellate Authority. In this appeal, an application was filed by the respondents requesting the Appellate Authority to permit him to crossexamine the appellant. The application was allowed and the matter was set down for the cross-examination of the appellant. Since the appellant was not present, the appeal was dismissed for non-prosecution. 7. The appellant immediately filed a petition seeking for restoration. However, before his petition could be considered, the Appellate Authority itself stood abolished and he thus filed an application before this Court requesting this Court to treat his petition as a Writ Petition as provided in Act 17/1990. 8. This Court treated the miscellaneous as a writ petition in W.P.Nos.512324/1993. However, this Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground that an application under the Act 17/1990 was not maintainable, since the appeal had been dismissed and the application under the Act 17/1990 could be made only in respect of a pending appeal.
8. This Court treated the miscellaneous as a writ petition in W.P.Nos.512324/1993. However, this Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground that an application under the Act 17/1990 was not maintainable, since the appeal had been dismissed and the application under the Act 17/1990 could be made only in respect of a pending appeal. Liberty was however granted to the appellant to challenge the order of the Appellate Authority, by which the appeal had been dismissed for default. 9. The appellant however did not prefer a writ petition challenging the order of the Appellate Authority by which his Appeal had been dismissed for default. 10. The appellant, on the other hand, has filed the present writ petition challenging the order of the Land Tribunal, dated 26.09.1984, which had been impugned by him in the appeal before the Appellate Authority. 11. Thus, technically, by virtue of dismissal of the appeal of the petitioner before the Appellate Authority and the fact that the petitioner has not challenged the order dismissing the appeal for default in this writ petition, the rejection of his Form No.7 by the Land Tribunal has become actually attained finality. 12. However, since the petitioner has challenged the order of the Land Tribunal dated 26.09.1984 and this petition has been pending for last past 15 years before this Court, rather than taking a technical view of the matter, this petition is taken up for consideration on merits also. 13. Smt. Sona Vakkund, learned counsel for the petitioners in her elaborate submissions did not dispute the following facts: 14. That the 1/3rd of the land bearing Sy.No.37/3 and the entire land bearing Sy.No.39 belonged to one Balappa Fakirappa Paloti and this Balappa Fakirappa Paloti had only two daughters namely Rudrawwa and Shivawwa. 15. Rudrawwa is none other than the mother of Malleshappa Talageri, the petitioner herein who had filed two Form No.7’s. Shivawwa is none other than the aunt of the petitioner, Malleshappa Talageri, the person who was claiming to be the tenant. 16. Balappa Fakirappa Paloti during his life time executed a registered gift deed on 06.09.1968 in favour of his two grandsons i.e., Malleshappa (the tenant/writ petitioner) and Basavaraj. In other words, Balappa Fakirappa Paloti gifted the entire extent of Sy.No.37/3 equally and jointly to the sons of his daughters Rudrawwa and Shivawwa. 17.
16. Balappa Fakirappa Paloti during his life time executed a registered gift deed on 06.09.1968 in favour of his two grandsons i.e., Malleshappa (the tenant/writ petitioner) and Basavaraj. In other words, Balappa Fakirappa Paloti gifted the entire extent of Sy.No.37/3 equally and jointly to the sons of his daughters Rudrawwa and Shivawwa. 17. On the very same i.e., on 06.09.1968, Balappa Fakirappa Paloti also gifted the 1/3rd share that he possessed in respect of Sy.No.39 to his two daughters i.e., to Rudrawwa and Shivawwa jointly. 18. Thus, Balappa Fakirappa Paloti executed 1/3rd of Block No.37 in favour of his two daughters and the entire extent of Block No.39 to his two grandsons, born through his two daughters. It is to be noted here that the said gift was in favour of his two daughters and two grandsons jointly. 19. Malleshappa, on coming into force of the Land Reforms Act, filed two Form No.7, both on 10.05.1977. 20. In the first Form No.7, he indicated that the land owners were his mother and his mother’s sister Shivavva. 21. In the second Form No.7, he indicated that the property which he was a tenant under his maternal aunt and his maternal aunt’s son Basavaraj. 22. It is therefore clear that even in respect of the land which had been jointly gifted to him and Basavaraj, he set up the plea that he was in possession of half of the extent of the land as the owner and as a tenant in respect of the remaining extent and in respect of the land gifted to his mother and his aunt, he claimed that he was a tenant under his mother and his aunt. In essence, Mallappa was setting up tenancy under his mother, his aunt and his first cousin Basavaraj. 23. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner had produced abundant evidence to prove that his aunt Shivawwa and her son Basavaraj were not at all residents of the village and he was the person cultivating the land. It was stated the Malleshappa was paying a rent of Rs.1,000/per year, but having regard to the relationship, receipts were not issued. It was also submitted that the revenue records also indicated the name of the petitioner’s mother, his aunt and his first cousin and since the family were closely related, the petitioner had not taken any steps to challenge the entry. 24.
It was also submitted that the revenue records also indicated the name of the petitioner’s mother, his aunt and his first cousin and since the family were closely related, the petitioner had not taken any steps to challenge the entry. 24. Learned counsel contends that since it had been clearly established that Shivawwa and Basavaraj were not residents of the village, it will have to be presumed that the petitioner Malleshappa was in possession and was therefore entitled for conferment of occupancy rights. She also put forth a contention that neither Shivawwa nor her son Basavaraj stepped into the box and subjected this into cross-examination. He submitted all along a GPA holder had adduced evidence on behalf of them and therefore, it would have to be considered as there was absolutely no evidence to indicate that they were in possession. 25. Lastly, she submitted that the appeal was set down for cross-examination of the appellant and at that stage, the appeal was dismissed for non-prosecution and the same deprived the petitioner from exercising his valuable rights to adduce evidence and therefore the matter required remand. 26. Shri F.V. Patil, learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand contended that this was a classic case where the son was trying to claim tenancy against his mother and his aunt and he could never be considered as a tenant by any stretch of imagination. He submitted that as the gift in favour of Balappa Fakirappa Paloti’s daughters had been jointly made and the gift in favour of the grandsons had also been made jointly, the question of the petitioner being a tenant of just one of the donees would never arise, since admittedly the subject matter of the gift had not be subjected to a partition. He submitted that essentially Malleshappa was seeking to be a tenant in respect of the property which was owned by his mother and his aunt jointly and in respect another property which was owned by him and his first cousin jointly. 27. He submitted that Malleshappa had himself filed declaration under the Urban Land Ceiling Act and in this declaration he had clearly stated the Rudrawwa and Shivawwa constituted a joint family and the declaration also indicated that he had mentioned Basavaraj as his first cousin and that he was a member of the family.
27. He submitted that Malleshappa had himself filed declaration under the Urban Land Ceiling Act and in this declaration he had clearly stated the Rudrawwa and Shivawwa constituted a joint family and the declaration also indicated that he had mentioned Basavaraj as his first cousin and that he was a member of the family. He submitted that this declaration by itself was conclusive proof that the family was joint and one of the members of the family was trying to take advantage and trying to claim that he was a tenant of the family and thereby usurp the entire property to himself. 28. He submitted that the order of the Land Tribunal in rejecting the Form No.7 could not be found fault with since the Land Tribunal had noticed the above facts and had also recorded a finding that the RTCs do not reflect that the petitioner was in possession as a tenant and he had not adduced any credible evidence to prove his tenancy. 29. I have considered the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the parties and also considered the materials on record. 30. It is not in dispute that both Block Nos.37 and 39/3 belonged to Balappa Fakirappa Paloti. It is also not in dispute that Balappa Fakirappa Paloti executed two registered gift deeds, one in favour of his daughters and one in favour of his grandsons born through his two daughters. Both the gift deeds were made in respect of the lands jointly. 31. In other words, Balappa Fakirappa Paloti did not choose to gift the lands individually or exclusively to his daughters and grandsons. Thus, this would indicate that he considered both his daughter and his grandsons to the part of joint family and he was gifting the property to them since he had no male issues. In fact it has been recited in the gift deeds that he was gifting the properties since he had no male issues. 32. If the lands were gifted jointly and which have admittedly not been subjected to partition, these lands would be jointly owned and the petitioner who was also a co-owner in respect of one property and his mother was a co-owner in respect of another property, the petitioner cannot obviously claim tenancy under one of the co-owners alone. 33.
32. If the lands were gifted jointly and which have admittedly not been subjected to partition, these lands would be jointly owned and the petitioner who was also a co-owner in respect of one property and his mother was a co-owner in respect of another property, the petitioner cannot obviously claim tenancy under one of the co-owners alone. 33. The petitioner cannot obviously claim to be a tenant under his mother and he cannot also claim to be a tenant under his cousin when he and his cousin owned the entire land jointly. In my view, essentially, the petitioner was claiming to be a tenant of a property that was owned by his own family and this is clearly impermissible. 34. The fact that Malleshappa, the tenant/writ petitioner, also considered the entire lands to be the property of the family and that his family comprised of his mother, his AuntShivawwa and his cousin Basavaraj, is also evidenced by the declaration that he has submitted that the Urban Land Ceiling Authorities. 35. This declaration, which is available in the Tribunal’s records, clearly indicates that Rudrawwa and Shivawwa and their sons were considering themselves to be a one family and all the properties owned by them were reflected in this declaration. 36. In my view, having regard to the fact that gift was made jointly in favour of the petitioner’s mother and his aunt and the other gift was made jointly in favour of the petitioner and his cousin Basavaraj, the petitioner cannot by any stretch of imagination, set up tenancy against his own aunt and his cousin, especially when they were admittedly joint owners of the property along with his mother and himself. I am therefore of the view that the rejection of the Form No.7 cannot be found fault with. 37. As far as the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding denial of an opportunity to adduce evidence before the Appellate Authority is concerned, it is to be stated here that the petitioner did not actually file any application to adduce additional evidence in the Appeal. The application, in fact, was filed by the landlords i.e., that aunt and the cousin of the petitioner requesting the Appellate Authority permitting them to cross-examine the petitioner on the evidence that they had adduced before the Land Tribunal.
The application, in fact, was filed by the landlords i.e., that aunt and the cousin of the petitioner requesting the Appellate Authority permitting them to cross-examine the petitioner on the evidence that they had adduced before the Land Tribunal. This indicates that the petitioner never sought to adduce any additional evidence before the Appellate Authority. Therefore, the contention that there was denial of opportunity to the petitioner to adduce his evidence cannot be accepted. 38. It is also to be noticed here that the rejection of Form No.7 was challenged by filing an appeal and the said appeal was dismissed for non-prosecution on 08.11.1999. The Miscellaneous petition for restoration was filed against the said petition and was pending when the Appellate Authority itself was abolished. The petitioner made an application to this Court and requested that this miscellaneous application be treated as writ petition. This Court in W.P.Nos.512324/1995 refused the said request and dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable, reserving liberty to the petitioner to challenge the order of the Appellate Authority, by which the appeal was dismissed. 39. For the reasons best known to the petitioner, he has not chosen to challenge the order of the Appellate Authority dismissing the appeal for default. However, for the reasons stated earlier, since the validity of the order of the Land Tribunal which was the subject matter of the appeal has been impugned in this appeal, this writ petition is considered on merits. 40. For the reasons sated above, I find no reason to entertain the writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed.