JUDGMENT (per Hon'ble The Chief Justice Sri Raghvendra Singh Chauhan) Mr. Manjul Kumar Tyagi, the appellant, party in- person, has challenged the legality of the order dated 22.02.2021 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (M/S) No. 413 of 2021, whereby the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant, party-in-person. In the writ petition, the appellant had challenged the omission on part of the Human Resource, AstraZeneca Pharma India Limited, the respondent in not paying the appellant's salary since the year 2010. 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that on 30.01.2009 the petitioner was appointed in the respondent-company. He was stationed at Dehradun. He was required to promote the sales of the respondent company's brands i.e. to generate the company's medicines business/sales in the assigned areas of Dehradun, and in the nearby towns. According to the petitioner, the respondent-company is a multinational giant, as it is an affiliate of subsidiary of AstraZeneca Plc, United Kingdom. According to the petitioner, the respondent-company is not paying the petitioner's salary since the year 2010, and is indulging in unfair labour practices. Therefore, the Trade Union of the respondent-company raised an Industrial Dispute before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Dehradun against the respondent-company. During the period when the dispute was under consideration, as a retaliatory measure, the respondent-company transferred the petitioner. The Trade Union challenged the petitioner's transfer during the proceedings pending before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Dehradun. The said challenge underwent a process of conciliation before the Conciliation Officer- cum-Deputy Labour Commissioner, Dehradun. Since the conciliation proceedings failed, the industrial dispute was referred to the learned Labour Court, Dehradun; a Labour Case, namely Case No. 21 of 2012, was registered with the learned Labour Court. 3. According to the petitioner, party-in-person, since he refused to follow the transfer order as it was against the provisions of law, namely against Section 6(E) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, read with Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, and against the Uttarakhand Model Standing Orders, w.e.f. 01.06.2010, the respondent-company has not paid the petitioner's salary since 2010. Hence, the writ petition before this Court. 4. Hence, the writ petition before this Court. 4. However, the learned Single Judge has dismissed the Writ Petition by the impugned order, inter alia, on the ground that the industrial dispute, with regard to the transfer order, is pending before the learned Labour Court ever since the year 2012. Moreover, even the non-payment of the salary is an industrial dispute that the petitioner, or the Trade Union, is free to raise before the learned Labour Court. Hence, the petitioner has ample efficacious alternate remedy. Therefore, the writ jurisdiction should not be invoked by this Court. Lastly, that the writ petition has been filed against a private company; a writ of mandamus cannot be issued to a private company. Thus, the petitioner has approached the wrong forum. 5. Mr. Manjul Kumar Tyagi, the petitioner, party-in-person, has raised the following contentions before this Court :- Firstly, although the respondent-company is neither a State, nor an instrumentality of the State, as the respondent-company performs a “public duty", it would necessarily fall under the words “other authority" contained in Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In order to buttress his case, the petitioner, party-in-person relies on the case of A. Umarani v. Registrar, Cooperative Societies and others, [ (2004) 7 SCC 112 ; Binny Ltd. and another v. V. Sadasivan and others, [ (2005) 6 SCC 657 ); and K.K. Saksena v. International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage and others, [ (2015) 4 SCC 670 . Secondly, since the non-payment of salary is a violation of the fundamental right of the petitioner, the petitioner does have a right to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court. Thirdly, merely because the case, with regard to the transfer, is pending before the learned Labour Court, the petitioner cannot be relegated to invoke the legal remedies before the learned Labour Court. Thus, the impugned order deserves to be set aside by this Court. 6. Heard Mr. Manjul Kumar Tyagi, the petitioner, party-in-person. 7. The scope and ambit of the interpretation of the words “other authority" has taxed the judicial imagination. However, the judicial thinking bears a striking consistency in its opinion as to who would fall within the words “other authority". Repeatedly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been faced with the issue whether a writ of mandamus can be issued against a private company, or not? 8. However, the judicial thinking bears a striking consistency in its opinion as to who would fall within the words “other authority". Repeatedly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been faced with the issue whether a writ of mandamus can be issued against a private company, or not? 8. In the case of Praga Tools Corporation v. Shri C.A. Imanual and others, [ (1969)1 SCC 585 ], the company had two Trade Unions, namely the Praga Tools Corporation Mazdoor Sabha, and another Trade Union. The company had entered into certain agreements with the Trade Union, but not with the Praga Tools Corporation Mazdoor Sabha. Therefore, the members of the Praga Tools Corporation Mazdoor Sabhahad challenged the validity of these agreements entered between the company and the Trade Union. Therefore, the issue arose before the Hon'ble Supreme Court whether a writ of mandamus could be issued against a private company, or not? The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under :- But it is well understood that a mandamus lies to secure the performance of a public or statutory duty in the performance of which the one who applies for it has a sufficient legal interest. Thus, an application for mandamus will not lie for an order of reinstatement to an office which is essentially of a private character nor can such an application be maintained to secure performance of obligations owed by a company towards its workmen or to resolve any private dispute. 9. Therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court concluded as follows:- The company being a non-statutory body and one incorporated under the Companies Act there was neither a statutory nor a public duty imposed on it by a statute in respect of which enforcement could be sought by means of a mandamus, nor was there in its workmen any corresponding legal right for enforcement of any such statutory or public duty. The High Court, therefore, was right in holding that no writ petition for a mandamus or an order in the nature of mandamus could lie against the company. 10. In the case of K.K. Saksena (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court opined that “under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the power of the High Court is not limited to the Government, or authority which qualifies to be “State" under Article 12. In fact, the power is extended to issue directions, orders or writs “to any person or authority". In the case of K.K. Saksena (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court opined that “under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the power of the High Court is not limited to the Government, or authority which qualifies to be “State" under Article 12. In fact, the power is extended to issue directions, orders or writs “to any person or authority". This power of issuing directions, orders or writs is not limited to enforcement of fundamental rights conferred by Part III, but also “for any other purpose". Thus, power of the High Court takes within its sweep more “authorities" than stipulated in Article 12, and the subject-matter which can be dealt with under this Article is also wider in scope. However, the Hon'ble Supreme Court cautioned that a writ petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, would not lie to enforce private law rights. According to the Hon'ble Supreme Court, “a private law is that part of a legal system which is a part of common law that involves relationship between individuals, such as the law of contract or tort. Therefore, while issuing a writ of mandamus, the Court would have to satisfy itself that action of an authority is in the domain of public law, as distinguished from private law". Therefore, according to the Hon'ble Supreme Court, “the contractual and commercial obligations are enforceable only by ordinary action, and not by judicial review". 11. While dealing with the concept of public function, in the case of Binny Ltd. and another (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has opined that “it is difficult to draw a line between public functions and private functions when they are being discharged by a purely private authority. A body is performing a “public function" when it seeks to achieve some collective benefit for the public, or a section of the public, and is accepted by the public, or that section of the public, as having authority to do so. Bodies, therefore, exercise public functions when they intervene or participate in social or economic affairs in the public interest. There cannot be any general definition of “public authority" or “public action". The facts of each case decide the point". 12. Moreover, in the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court distinguished between the public duties enforceable by a mandamus, and the duties arising merely from a contract. There cannot be any general definition of “public authority" or “public action". The facts of each case decide the point". 12. Moreover, in the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court distinguished between the public duties enforceable by a mandamus, and the duties arising merely from a contract. According to the Hon'ble Supreme Court, “contractual duties are enforceable, as a matter of private law, by ordinary contractual remedies such as damages, injunction, specific performance and declaration. In contractual matters even in respect of public bodies, the principles of judicial review have got limited application. The interpretation and implementation of a clause in a contract cannot be the subject-matter of a writ petition. If a term of a contract is violated, ordinarily, the remedy is not a writ petition under Article 226. There must be a public law element, and it cannot be exercised to enforce purely private contracts entered into between the parties". The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that “in the matter of employment of workers by private bodies on the basis of contracts entered into between them, the Courts have been reluctant to exercise the powers of judicial review and whenever the powers were exercised as against private employers, it was solely done based on the public law element involved therein." 13. Since the case of Binny Ltd. and another (supra) dealt with the termination of services of the workmen by the company, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that “the decision of the employers in the present cases, to terminate the services of their employees, cannot be said to have any element of public policy, and the remedy available to the respondents is to seek redressal of their grievance in civil law or under the labour law enactments, especially in view of the disputed questions involved as regards the status of employees and other matters. Their cases were purely governed bythe contract of employment entered into between the employees and the employer." 14. In the present case, the respondent-company is not performing any “public duty". It is strictly a company incorporated under the Companies Act. Therefore, the company is neither a State, nor an instrumentality of the State, nor falls within the words “other authority" used in Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 15. Moreover, the relationship of an employer and employee, between the respondent-company and the petitioner, is entirely based on a contract. It is strictly a company incorporated under the Companies Act. Therefore, the company is neither a State, nor an instrumentality of the State, nor falls within the words “other authority" used in Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 15. Moreover, the relationship of an employer and employee, between the respondent-company and the petitioner, is entirely based on a contract. The salary of the petitioner is governed by the contract. If there is a breach of the contract, the remedy for the petitioner lies either before the Civil Court, or before the Labour Court. Considering the fact that the petitioner is a workman, even on an earlier occasion the Trade Union had raised an industrial dispute on behalf of the petitioner while challenging his transfer order passed during a conciliation proceeding. The said challenge has been raised before the concerned Labour Court. Therefore, even the present issue, with regard to the alleged nonpayment of salary from 2010 onwards, can easily be raised as an industrial dispute either by the Trade Union, or by the petitioner himself. Therefore, the petitioner has sufficient efficacious alternate remedy. 16. Furthermore, the reason for non-payment of salary would necessarily involve disputed question of facts. For, certain assertions would be made by the petitioner, which ordinarily would be denied by the respondent-company. Such disputed question of facts cannot be gone into by the writ Court. 17. Therefore, the learned Single Judge was justified in concluding that a writ of mandamus cannot be issued against the respondent-company, which is a private entity, and not a public one. 18. Moreover, since the petitioner does have a sufficient efficacious alternate remedy, there is no reason for this Court to invoke its writ jurisdiction in the present case. Furthermore, the earlier dispute with regard to the transfer is already sub-judice before the learned Labour Court. Therefore, the petitioner is well aware of the fact that he can raise even the present dispute, with regard to the non-payment of his salary from 2010, before the learned Labour Court. Thus, the petitioner is unjustified in invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court by filing the present writ petition before the learned Single Judge. 19. For the reasons stated above, this Court does not find any merit in the present Writ Petition. It is, hereby, dismissed. 20. No order as to costs.