JUDGMENT : 1. Heard the parties. 2. Petitioners have approached this Court with a prayer for a direction upon the respondents to immediately and forthwith pay the arrear of revised pension as per 6th Pay Revision for the period from 01.01.2006 to 31.03.2010 with statutory interest. 3. Shorn of unnecessary details, all the members of petitioner No. 1 were duly appointed by Ranchi University and after serving for more than 30 years in GL.A. College, Daltonganj under the Ranchi University and on attaining the age of superannuation, they have already been superannuated. It is further stated that GL.A. College is a Constituent College and it was initially under the Ranchi University, Ranchi. However, upon bifurcation of Ranchi University, Nilamber Pitamber University came into existence w.e.f. 17.01.2009 and G.L.A. College Daltonganj became a constituent unit of newly created Nilamber Pitamber University. It is the specific case of the petitioner-Association that all of its members have retired much prior to 2009 and as such Ranchi University, Ranchiis liable to pay arrears of revised pension under 6th PRC. By memo No. 660/A dated 28.02.2009, the Govt. of Jharkhand implemented the recommendations of 6th Pay Revision Commission and consequently, the pay and pension of the teachers working in different Universities of the State of Jharkhand were fixed/revised. However, due to delay in implementation of the recommendation of 6th PRC, though the notional fixation of pension was done w.e.f 01.01.2006 but actual payment were made w.e.f 01.04.2010 and as such arrear of revised pension for the period from 01.01.2006 to 31.03.2010 were not paid to them. 4. It is further case of the petitioners that teachers of the Birsa Agriculture University, Ranchi who have retired prior to 01.01.2006 were paid the revised pension and arrears accrued thereupon from 01.01.2006 to 31.03.2010 vide notification issued under memo No. 3280 dated 07.11.2012 but in case of present petitioners they have been deprived from getting the arrears of revised pension under 6th PRC for 51 months in most arbitrary way for the reasons best known to the respondents. The members of the petitioner-Association though submitted several representations before the respondent-authorities for payment of arrears of revised pension for the period from 01.01.2006 to 31.03.2010 but till date no action has been taken by the respondents in this regard. Hence, the petitioners have been constrained to knock the door of this Court for redressal of their grievances. 5. Mrs. The members of the petitioner-Association though submitted several representations before the respondent-authorities for payment of arrears of revised pension for the period from 01.01.2006 to 31.03.2010 but till date no action has been taken by the respondents in this regard. Hence, the petitioners have been constrained to knock the door of this Court for redressal of their grievances. 5. Mrs. I. Sen Choudhary, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits the respondents cannot deny the payment of arrears of revised pension payable under 6th PRC on frivolous ground of financial crisis. Learned counsel further argues that members of petitioner No.1 are Septuagenarian retired Professors or widows of deceased Professors and are running from pillar to post for more than one decade for getting their legitimate claim and it is unfortunate that the respondents in a whimsical manner are not paying the same to these Septuagenarian retired teachers who have put in about 35 years of their golden time in teaching and guiding the students for making their future bright. Learned counsel submits that Respondent-State has extended the benefits of 6th PRC to similarly situated retired teachers of the Birsa Agriculture University and arrears of revised pension for the entire period has already been paid to them vide notification issued under memo No. 3280 dated 07.11.2012 but in most arbitrary and discriminatory manner payment of arrears of revised pension for the period from 01.01.2006 to 31.03.2010 to the present petitioners has been denied which is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and the respondents are bound to pay the legitimate dues of the petitioners. Learned counsel further argues that the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of State of Rajasthan & Ors. Vs. Mahendra Nath Sharma, reported in (2015) 9 SCC 540 has clearly held that the retired employees who have retired prior to 01.01.2006 will get the benefits of 6th PRC. Learned counsel further argues that it is well settled principle that Pension is succour for post-retirement period. It is not a bounty payable at will, but a social welfare measure as a post-retirement entitlement to maintain the dignity of the employee, the respondents cannot sit tight over the matter for such a long period of time. Learned counsel further submits that the issue involved in the instant case has fell for consideration before a Co-ordinate Bench of this Hon'ble Court in W.P.(S). Learned counsel further submits that the issue involved in the instant case has fell for consideration before a Co-ordinate Bench of this Hon'ble Court in W.P.(S). No. 4863 of 2015 and this Court, after hearing the parties, vide order dated 03.02.2021, disposed of the aforesaid writ petition with a direction to the respondents to consider the cases of the petitioners of aforesaid writ petition and extend the same and similar benefits what has already been extended to the employees of Birsa Agriculture University vide notification issued under memo No. 3280 dated 07.11.2012. Learned counsel accordingly submits that suffice it would be if a similar direction is given to the respondents to consider the cases of the present petitioners also taking into account the order passed in the aforesaid writ petition and also in view of notification dated 07.11.2012. Ld. Counsel lastly submits that the Petitioners are Septuagenarian and suffering from various age related problems and due to discriminatory approach of the respondents, huge monetary loss has been incurred by them and as such they are entitled for the statutory interest @ 18 % per annum accrued upon the due amount. 6. On the other hand counter-affidavit has been filed. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State vehemently opposes the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners and submits that claim of the petitioners cannot be entertained by the Department of Higher Education since the Department has already taken a policy decision which has been notified in the Sandal vide memo No. 1188 dated 20.11.2010, that the pension as recommended by UGC to the retired teachers of Universities/ Colleges shall be implemented w.e.f. 01.01.2006 notionally but the actual payment shall be made w.e.f. 01.04.2010. Accordingly, the pension of retired teachers of the Universities and Colleges are being paid as per the aforesaid resolution. Learned counsel further argues that pay-scales and service conditions of the teachers are governed by the rules framed/ resolution taken by the UGC and hence, they cannot claim parity with the gazetted employees of State Government. Learned counsel further argues that letter dated 07.11.2012 is a decision taken by the Department of Agriculture and Sugarcane Development, which is not at all binding upon the Department of Higher Education. However, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submits that since the issue involved in this case has already been decided by this Court in W.P.(S). Learned counsel further argues that letter dated 07.11.2012 is a decision taken by the Department of Agriculture and Sugarcane Development, which is not at all binding upon the Department of Higher Education. However, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submits that since the issue involved in this case has already been decided by this Court in W.P.(S). No. 4863 of 2015, if a direction is given in this case also, the cases of the present petitioners shall be considered and an appropriate decision, in accordance with law, shall be taken regarding entitlement of the petitioners for the benefits as prayed for by them in the instant writ application, within a stipulated period of time. 7. Be that as it may, having heard the rival submissions of the parties and upon perusal of the documents brought on record, this Court is of the considered view that the case of the present petitioners needs consideration. The pensionary provisions must be given a liberal construction as a social welfare measure. The very basis for grant of such pension is to facilitate a retired Government employee to live with dignity in his/her winter of life and, thus, such benefit should not be unreasonably denied to an employee. Admittedly, the Govt. of Jharkhand has already granted the benefits of 6th PRC including arrears to the retired teachers of Birsa Agriculture University vide notification issued under memo No. 3280 dated 07.11.2012. The State being an instrumentality of statute cannot discriminate Persons discharging identical duties in the matter of their pay/pension, merely because they belong to different departments of Government. 8. The issue regarding 'equal pay for equal work' fell for consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court and in catena of decisions the Hon'ble Apex Court summarized the issue to the effect that parity of pay can be claimed by invoking the provisions of Articles 14 and 39-D of the Constitution of India. The Hon'ble Apex Court in para-30 in case of SAIL Vs. The Hon'ble Apex Court in para-30 in case of SAIL Vs. Dibyendu Bhattacharya, reported in (2011) 11 SCC 122 has held that: "30............................., the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that parity of pay can be claimed by invoking the provisions of Articles 14 and 39(d) of the Constitution of India by establishing that the eligibility, mode of selection/recruitment, nature and quality of work and duties and effort, reliability, confidentiality, dexterity, functional need and responsibilities and status of both the posts are identical. The functions may be the same but the skills and responsibilities may be really and substantially different. The other post may not require any higher qualification, seniority or other like factors. Granting parity in pay scales depends upon the comparative evaluation of job and equation of posts. The person claiming parity, must plead necessary averments and prove that all things are equal between the concerned posts. Such a complex issue cannot be adjudicated by evaluating the affidavits filed by the parties. " In case of State of Punjab & Ors. Vs. Jagjit Singh & Ors., reported in (2017) 1 SCC 148 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under: 42.1 The 'onus of proof, of parity in the duties and responsibilities of the subject post with the reference post, under the principle of 'equal pay for equal work', lies on the person who claims it. He who approaches the Court has to establish, that the subject post occupied by him, requires him to discharge equal work of equal value, as the reference post (see the Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology case [ (2003) 5 SCC 188 ], Union Territory Administration, Chandigarh v. Manju Mathur[ (2002) 6 SCC 72 ], the Steel Authority of India Limited case [(2011) 11 SCC 452], and the National Aluminum Company Limited case[ (2014) 6 SCC 756 ]). 42.2 The mere fact that the subject post occupied by the claimant, is in a "different department" vis-a-vis the reference post, does not have any bearing on the determination of a claim, under the principle of 'equal pay for equal work'. Persons discharging identical duties, cannot be treated differently, in the matter of their pay, merely because they belong to different departments of Government (see - the Randhir Singh case [ (1982) 1 SCC 618 ], and the D.S. Nakara case[ (1983) 1 SCC 305 ]). Persons discharging identical duties, cannot be treated differently, in the matter of their pay, merely because they belong to different departments of Government (see - the Randhir Singh case [ (1982) 1 SCC 618 ], and the D.S. Nakara case[ (1983) 1 SCC 305 ]). 42.3 The principle of 'equal pay for equal work', applies to cases of unequal scales of pay, based on no classification or irrational classification (see the Randhir Singh case(supra). For equal pay, the concerned employees with whom equation is sought, should be performing work, which besides being functionally equal, should be of the same quality and sensitivity (see - the Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers (Recognized) case [ (1988) 3 SCC 91 ], the Mewa Ram Kanojia case [ (1989) 2 SCC 235 ], the Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers' Union case [ (1991) 1 SCC 619 ]; and the S. C Chandra case [ (2007) 8 SCC 279 ]) 58. In our considered view, it is fallacious to determine artificial parameters to deny fruits of labour. An employee engaged for the same work, cannot be paid less than another, who performs the same duties and responsibilities. Certainly not, in a welfare state. Such an action besides being demeaning, strikes at the very foundation of human dignity. Any one, who is compelled to work at a lesser wage, does not do so voluntarily. He does so, to provide food and shelter to his family, at the cost of his self-respect and dignity, at the cost of his self-worth, and at the cost of his integrity. For he knows, that his dependents would suffer immensely, if he does not accept the lesser wage. Any act, of paying less wages, as compared to others similarly situate, constitutes an act of exploitative enslavement, emerging out of a domineering position. Undoubtedly, the action is oppressive, suppressive and coercive, as it compels involuntary subjugation. " 9. For equal pay, the employees concerned with whom equation is sought, should be performing work, which besides being functionally equal, should be of the same quality and sensitivity. For understanding the controversy, it is necessary to understand the ingredients which govern the principle of 'equal pay for equal work'. " 9. For equal pay, the employees concerned with whom equation is sought, should be performing work, which besides being functionally equal, should be of the same quality and sensitivity. For understanding the controversy, it is necessary to understand the ingredients which govern the principle of 'equal pay for equal work'. The principle of 'equal pay for equal work' would not automatically be invoked merely because the subject and reference posts have the same nomenclature but the duties and responsibilities has to be examined. It appears that the members of petitioner no. 1 were discharging the duties as Professor though in a different University but their educational qualification, mode of recruitment and nature of duty are same and similar to the Professors working in Birsa Agriculture University. Similarly situated persons, who were retired from Birsa Agriculture University have already received the benefits of 6th PRC from 01.01.2006 itself but the present petitioners have been discriminated by the State Govt., which is against the provisions enshrined under Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Arindam Chattopadhyay & Ors. [ (2013) 4 SCC 152 ] has held as under: "10. We have considered the respective submissions. The applicability of the doctrine of equality, enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, in the matter of pay and allowances was explained in Randhir Singh v. Union of India (1982) 1 SCC 618 in the following words: It is true that the principle of "equal pay for equal work" is not expressly declared by our Constitution to be a fundamental right. But it certainly is a constitutional goal. Article 39(d) of the Constitution proclaims "equal pay for equal work for both men and women" as a directive principle of State Policy. "Equal pay for equal work for both men and women" means equal pay for equal work for everyone and as between the sexes. Directive Principles, as has been pointed out in some of the judgments of this Court have to be read into the fundamental rights as a matter of interpretation. Article 14 of the Constitution enjoins the State not to deny any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws and Article 16 declares that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. Article 14 of the Constitution enjoins the State not to deny any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws and Article 16 declares that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. These equality clauses of the Constitution must mean something to everyone. To the vast majority of the people the equality clauses of the Constitution would mean nothing if they are unconcerned with the work they do and the pay they get. To them the equality clauses will have some substance if equal work means equal pay. Whether the special procedure prescribed by a statute for trying alleged robber-barons and smuggler kings or for dealing with tax evaders is discriminatory, whether a particular governmental policy in the matter of grant of licences or permits confers unfettered discretion on the Executive, whether the take-over of the empires of industrial tycoons is arbitrary and unconstitutional and other questions of like nature, leave the millions of people of this country untouched. Questions concerning wages and the like, mundane they may be, are yet matters of vital concern to them and it is there, if at all that the equality clauses of the Constitution have any significance to them. The Preamble to the Constitution declares the solemn resolution of the people of India to constitute India into a Sovereign Socialist Democratic Republic. Again the word "socialist" must mean something. Even if it does not mean 'to each according to his need', it must at least mean "equal pay for equal work". "The principle of "equal pay for equal work" is expressly recognized by all socialist systems of law, e.g., Section 59 of the Hungarian Labour Code, para 2 of Section 111 of the Czechoslovak Code, Section 67 of the Bulgarian Code, Section 40 of the Code of the German Democratic Republic, para 2 of Section 33 of the Rumanian Code. Indeed this principle has been incorporated in several western Labour Codes too. Under provisions in Section 31 (g. No. 2d) of Book I of the French Code du Travail, and according to Argentinian law, this principle must be applied to female workers in all collective bargaining agreements. Indeed this principle has been incorporated in several western Labour Codes too. Under provisions in Section 31 (g. No. 2d) of Book I of the French Code du Travail, and according to Argentinian law, this principle must be applied to female workers in all collective bargaining agreements. In accordance with Section 3 of the Grundgesetz of the German Federal Republic, and Clause 7, Section 123 of the Mexican Constitution, the principle is given universal significance " (vide International Labour Law by Istvan Szaszy p. 265). The Preamble to the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation recognises the principle of 'equal remuneration for work of equal value' as constituting one of the means of achieving the improvement of conditions "involving such injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperilled". Construing Articles 14 and 16 in the light of the Preamble and Article 39 (d), we are of the view that the principle "equal pay for equal work" is deducible from those Articles and may be properly applied to cases of unequal scales of pay based on no classification or irrational classification though those drawing the different scales of pay do identical work under the same employer. 15. With a view to recapitulate the legal position, we may briefly refer to some decisions of this Court apart from those relied upon by the High Court. In a decision reported in Jaipal v. State of Haryana (1988) 3 SCC 354 it has been held to be a constitutional obligation to ensure equal pay for equal work where the two sets of employees discharge similar responsibilities under similar working conditions. The plea of temporary or casual nature of employment or full-time and part-time employees had been negated. Similarly, in the case reported in Dhirendra Chamoli v. State of U.P. (1986) 1 SCC 637 it was held that casual workers could not be denied same emoluments and benefits as admissible to the temporary employees on the ground that they had accepted the employment with full knowledge of their disadvantage. Similarly, in the case reported in Dhirendra Chamoli v. State of U.P. (1986) 1 SCC 637 it was held that casual workers could not be denied same emoluments and benefits as admissible to the temporary employees on the ground that they had accepted the employment with full knowledge of their disadvantage. In Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers' Union v. Union of India (1991) 1 SCC 619 though on facts no discrimination was found but the principle of "equal pay for equal work" was upheld and recognized where all were placed similarly and discharging same duties and responsibilities irrespective of the casual nature of work. This right had been held to have assumed the status of a fundamental right in service jurisprudence having regard to the constitutional mandate of "equality" in Articles 14 and 16. In Daily Rated Casual Labour through Bhartiya Dak Tar Mazdoor Manch v. Union of India (1988) 1 SCC 122 right of daily-rated casual workers in the P & T Department was recognized and they were directed to be paid in minimum of the scale as was admissible to the regular workers as both discharged similar work and responsibilities." 10. Further, the Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court in its judgment delivered on 18.05.2020 in case of State of Jharkhand & Anr. Vs. Prashant Kumar Mishra & Ors. (L.P.A. No. 22 of 2018) has held that: "18. This Court has also gone across the judgment of the learned Single Judge on the touch stone of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, since the ground has been agitated by the learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioners that by extending the lesser pay scale to that of all the other employees holding the post of Reader is nothing but a hostile discrimination and as such, this Court after going across the Article 14 of the Constitution of India as also the various judgments rendered by the Hon 'ble Apex Court in the context of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and by making reference of one judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Hon 'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of D.S. Nakara & Ors. Vrs. Vrs. Union of India, reported in 1983 AIR 130, their Lordships of the Hon 'ble Apex Court has been pleased to hold that Article 14 forbids class legislation but permits reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation but the classification must satisfy the twin tests of classification being found on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from those that are left out of the group and that differentia must have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The thrust of Article is that the citizen is entitled to equality before law and equal protection of the law. In the case of Ramana Dayaram Shetty Vrs. International Airport Authority of India & Ors., reported in AIR 1979 SC 1628 , wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to observe that a discriminatory action of the Government is liable to be struck down, unless it can be shown by the Government that the departure was not arbitrary, but was based on some valid principle which in itself was not irrational, unreasonable or discriminatory. 11. So far as claim for payment of statutory interest accrued upon arrears of revised pension is concerned, this Court is of considered view that due to discriminatory approach adopted by the respondent-state, the Petitioners have been subjected to hardship and have suffered monetary loss which makes respondents liable to pay interest on the due amount at an appropriate rate to compensate the petitioners. The said issue has already been decided by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its recent judgment delivered on 08.02.2021 in case of State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. vs. Dinavahi Lakshmi Kameswari [Civil Appeal No. 399 of 2021 (arising out of SLP(C) No. 12553/2020], wherein it is held that salaries and pensions are "rightful entitlements" of government employees and in case of delay, they should be paid with interest at an appropriate rate. The relevant paragraphs of said judgment is reproduced herein below: "14. The direction for the payment of the deferred portions of the salaries and pensions is unexceptionable. Salaries are due to the employees of the State for services rendered. Salaries in other words constitute the rightful entitlement of the employees and are payable in accordance with law. The relevant paragraphs of said judgment is reproduced herein below: "14. The direction for the payment of the deferred portions of the salaries and pensions is unexceptionable. Salaries are due to the employees of the State for services rendered. Salaries in other words constitute the rightful entitlement of the employees and are payable in accordance with law. Likewise, it is well settled that the payment of pension is for years of past service rendered by the pensioners to the State. Pensions are hence a matter of a rightful entitlement recognised by the applicable rules and regulations which govern the service of the employees of the State. The State Government has complied with the directions of this Court for the payment of the outstanding dues in two tranches. Insofar as the interest is concerned, we are of the view that the rate of 12% per annum which has been fixed by the High Court should be suitably scaled down. While learned counsel for the respondents submits that the award of interest was on account of the action of the Government which was contrary to law, we are of the view that the payment of interest cannot be used as a means to penalize the State Government. There can be no gainsaying the fact that the Government which has delayed the payment of salaries and pensions should be directed to pay interest at an appropriate rate. 15. We accordingly order and direct that in substitution of the interest rate of 12% per annum which has been awarded by the High Court, the Government of Andhra Pradesh shall pay simple interest computed at the rate of 6% per annum on account of deferred salaries and pensions within a period of thirty days from today. ........................................." 12. It is important to note here that to avoid multiplicity of cases and since matter of payment of arrears of revised pension is a policy decision, it is desirable from the side of the Respondent-state that whatever decision with regard to payment of arrears of revised pension under 6th PRC is taken, the same shall be extended to all the eligible retired teachers of the concerned College/University in accordance with law. The Hon'ble Apex Court in its recent judgment delivered on 30.01.2020 in case of Civil Appeal No. 852 of 2020 (U.P. Power Corp. Ltd. & Ors. Vs. The Hon'ble Apex Court in its recent judgment delivered on 30.01.2020 in case of Civil Appeal No. 852 of 2020 (U.P. Power Corp. Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Ram Gopal), while dealing with aforesaid issue, has held as under: "17. Similarly, in Vijay Kumar Kaul v. Union of India [ (2009) 2 SCC 479 ] this Court while considering the claim of candidates who, despite being higher in merit, exercised their right to parity much after those who were though lower in merit but were diligently agitating their rights, this Court observed that: "27. ...It becomes an obligation to take into consideration the balance of justice or injustice in entertaining the petition or declining it on the ground of delay and laches. It is a matter of great significance that at one point of time equity that existed in favour of one melts into total insignificance and paves the path of extinction with the passage of time. " 18. We may hasten to add that these principles may not, however, apply to judgments which are delivered inrem. The State and its instrumentalities are expected In such category of cases to themselves extend the benefit of a judicial pronouncement to all similarly placed employees without forcing each person to individually knock the doors of courts. This distinction between operation of delay and laches to judgments delivered inrem and in personam, is lucidly captured in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava, (2015) 1 SCC 347 ], laying down that: "22.1. The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. 22.2. However, this principle is subject to well-recognised exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. 22.2. However, this principle is subject to well-recognised exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim. 22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the court was judgment in ram with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons. Such a situation can occur when the subject-matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 721 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 226) On the other hand, if the judgment of the court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence." (Emphasis applied) 13. As a sequel to the aforesaid observations, rules, guidelines, legal propositions and judicial pronouncements, I hereby direct the Respondent-State to take a policy decision with regard to payment of arrears of revised pension under 6th PRC for the period from 01.01.2006 to 31.03.2010 to all the eligible retired teachers of the concerned University and the same be extended to the concerned teachers along with statutory interest @ 6% per annum from the date it has fallen due till the date of actual payment, within a period of three months from the date of receipt/ production of a copy of this order. 14. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the writ petition stands disposed of. 15. Pending I.A. No. 3975 of 2019 also stands disposed of.