JUDGMENT : Ashwani Kumar Singh, J. The issue "Whether it is a complaint or an FIR which would lie under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940" has engaged the attention of this Court again and again. 2. Initially, the issue was settled by this Court in Hindustan Lever Limited Vs. State of Bihar & Ors., reported in 1997(1) BLJ 899 . In that case, a learned Single Judge held that the prosecution for the offences under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 can be instituted by the Drug Inspector or by any person aggrieved by filing a complaint. The learned Single Judge further held that the police have no jurisdiction to institute an FIR in respect of the offences under the provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 or investigate it in view of Section 32 of the Act. 3. The ratio laid down by the learned Single Judge in the case of Hindustan Lever Limited (Supra) that the FIR cannot be instituted for any offence arising out of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 was doubted by another Single Judge of this Court in Cr. Misc. No. 50246 of 2006 (Om Prakash Singh Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors.) and he referred the matter to the Division Bench vide order dated 04.01.2008 for an authoritative pronouncement. 4. The Division Bench upheld the decision rendered in the case of Hindustan Lever Limited (Supra) vide its order dated 09.08.2011. It held that the institution of an FIR by a police officer for an offence arising out of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 would be in the teeth of the provisions of the said Act. 5. The issue "whether it is a complaint or an FIR which would lie under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940" became relevant once again after the amendment to the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 by the Drugs and Cosmetics (Amendment) Act, 2008 (Act 26 of 2008) following the recommendations of the Mahaselkar Committee and the suggested amendment to the 2005 Bill by Parliamentary Standing Committee on Health and Family Welfare. Not only did the amendment provide for enhanced and stringent penalties for (i) Manufacturing or selling adulterated/spurious drugs leading to grievous harm or death; (ii) Manufacturing or selling a drug which is adulterated or without a licence; and (iii) Manufacturing or selling spurious drug, but it also made many of the offences triable by the Court of Sessions which were to be designated as the Special Courts (Section 36-AB). The Act 26 of 2008 also made most of the offences relating to adulterated and spurious drugs cognizable and non-bailable. (Section 36-AC). 6. The amendment of the year 2008 in the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 again brought to life the said issue. A learned Single Judge of this Court (Coram : Aditya Kumar Trivedi, J.) in Cr.W.J.C. No. 887 of 2013 (Bablu @ Rajesh Kumar Vs. The State of Bihar) again doubted the correctness of the judgment rendered in Hindustan Lever Ltd. (Supra) in his inimitable style stating therein :- "22. It is evident that while deciding Hindustan Lever Ltd. (Supra) the earlier decision Raghunath Bhagat & Anr. Vs. State of Bihar reported in 1991 Cr.L.J. 2054 has not been considered. In likewise manner, while testing correctness of Hindustan Lever Ltd. (Supra) the D.B. under Cr. Misc. No. 50246 of 2006, Om Prakash Singh Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. had not considered the relevant provisions of law on this score and in likewise manner, another DB in Cr.W.J.C. No. 719 of 1998 with Cr. Misc. No. 808/1998 happens to be. Furthermore, the Om Prakash Agrawal case (Supra) also neither been referred nor considered. Moreover in light of relevant provisions visualizing under Drugs and Cosmetic Act along with the principle propagated by the Honble Apex Court as referred above, the view needs reconsideration. On account of which, the matter is referred to Division Bench." 7. The learned Single Judge held that the previous Division Bench judgment had not considered the earlier judgment rendered in Raghunath Bhagat & Anr. Vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. reported in 1991 Cr.L.J. 2054. He was of the opinion that the institution of a police case was not anathema to the scheme of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. While passing the order, the learned Single Judge had also referred to judgments rendered in Assistant Electrical Engineer Vs. Satyendra Rai & Anr. Vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. reported in 1991 Cr.L.J. 2054. He was of the opinion that the institution of a police case was not anathema to the scheme of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. While passing the order, the learned Single Judge had also referred to judgments rendered in Assistant Electrical Engineer Vs. Satyendra Rai & Anr. reported in 2012(1) PLJR 476 (SC) as well as Vishal Agrawal & Anr. Vs. Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board & Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC 1539 . 8. Pursuant to the reference made by the learned Single Judge, Cr.W.J.C. No. 887 of 2013 was placed before a Division Bench (Coram : Dharnidhar Jha, J. and Gopal Prasad, J.). The Division Bench vide its order dated 12.08.2015 referred to different Chapters and Sections of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and was of the opinion that the three Chapters, namely, Chapter III, Chapter IV and Chapter IV-A enumerate different offences and different sentences within the lay of the Chapter. The Division Bench took note of the fact that only Section 32 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 provided for taking cognizance of offences, which falls within Chapter IV of the Act and there is no similar provision under any other Chapter. It also took note of the fact that Section 36-AC declares several offences under Chapter III and Chapter IV as cognizable and non-bailable. The Division Bench was as such of the view "if the offences are cognizable then how could the statutory inherent power of the police to register the First Information Report in respect of commission of the offences and investigate the same could be barred by assuming many things without there being any provision in the Act. This could be going overboard to read many things in the Act which do not exist. " 9. Thus, the Division Bench doubted the correctness of all such judgments or orders that laid down as a general proposition that Section 32 of the Act bars police investigation after registering a FIR in respect of any offence under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and only a complaint petition as mandated by Section 32 of the Act was to be preferred by the persons, associations or the Drug Inspector. The Division Bench, thus, concurred with the opinion of the learned Single Judge and went on to frame various issues for consideration by a larger Bench. 10. The issues that were referred to the larger Bench were as under :- "(i) Is not it that in absence of any prescription as regards taking cognizance of an offence under Chapter IV of the Act, it could be only the Court of Magistrate who has to act under Section 190 Cr.P.C ? (ii) Is not it that Section 32 of the Act is attracted only in respect of offences which are defined and made punishable by Chapter IV of the Act. Other provisions, like, Section 13, 33-I and 33-J of the Act are not covered by Section 32 of the Act and in cases of those sections which are falling under Chapter III and lV-A cognizance and trial has to be undertaken by courts other than the court of sessions as per provisions contained under Chapters III or IV-A of the Act and if that is so and in absence of any special provision barring the investigation of offences which are declared cognizable by Section 36-AC, is not the police competent to register the offence under Section 154 Cr.P.C. and to investigate the same and lay down the charge sheet before the courts of Magistrate for taking cognizance? (iii) Whether the judgments/orders of the Court in Cr.W.J.C. No. 719 of 1998 and Cr. Misc. No. 808 of 1998 and also Cr. Misc. No. 50246 of 2006 require reconsideration?(iv) Should not the police register a case and investigate the same even in respect of offences under Chapter IV of the Act as appears held by implication by the Supreme Court in Vishal Agrawal & Anr. (supra), of course in context to an enactment other than the Act? " 11. The Full Bench after hearing the reference could not come to a unanimous opinion and all the learned Judges (Coram: Hemant Kumar Srivastava, J., Aditya Kumar Trivedi, J. and Birendra Kumar, J.) came to different conclusions on the issues except Issue No. 1 so framed by the Division Bench. 12. " 11. The Full Bench after hearing the reference could not come to a unanimous opinion and all the learned Judges (Coram: Hemant Kumar Srivastava, J., Aditya Kumar Trivedi, J. and Birendra Kumar, J.) came to different conclusions on the issues except Issue No. 1 so framed by the Division Bench. 12. One of the learned Judges (Aditya Kumar Trivedi, J.) in his distinctive flair held that (i) the police has the power to institute FIR under the provisions of Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 including offences under Chapter III and IV-A; and (ii) the Magistrate alone was empowered to take cognizance under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and was required to commit the case to the court of Sessions under Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short "Cr.P.C"). His opinion is reproduced thus :- "(i) (a) After going through Section 36, 36A, 36AB,36AC, 36AD, 36AE, it is crystal clear that there happens to be no impediment so prescribed under the CrPC, more particularly, is found properly answered on a plain reading of the same as the committal proceeding has to be taken up in accordance with Section 209 of the CrPC that too only after taking of cognizance under Section 190 CrPC irrespective of application of other penal provisions under garbs of Section 2 of the Act and is accordingly, answered that the Magistrate would while exercising power under Section 190 CrPC is competent enough to take cognizance of an offence, apart from others, including under Drugs and Cosmetics Act. 97. (ii) 97. So far points no.(b) and (d) are concerned, it is needless to say that irrespective of nature of the offence, being non cog or cog, the prosecution could not be confined byway of filing of the complaint petition only rather, considering the intent of the legislature, the spirit of the law, it could be on a complaint petition as well as on police report. (iii) 98. Point no.(c). In the aforesaid background, the principle so decided in CrWJC No. 719/1998 along with Cr.Misc. No. 808/1998 and also Cr.Misc. No. 50246/2006 are hereby, over ruled.” 13. (iii) 98. Point no.(c). In the aforesaid background, the principle so decided in CrWJC No. 719/1998 along with Cr.Misc. No. 808/1998 and also Cr.Misc. No. 50246/2006 are hereby, over ruled.” 13. The second learned Judge (Birendra Kumar, J.) was of the opinion that considering the Scheme of the Special Act the criminal prosecution can be set in motion by the Drug Inspector alone and that the police has not been assigned any role and is not empowered by the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 to investigate offences under the said Act. However, he agreed with the opinion of his brother Judge (Aditya Kumar Trivedi, J.) that a Magistrate alone was competent to take cognizance under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and the special court of Sessions will enter jurisdiction upon commitment of the case by the Magistrate under Section 209 of the Cr.P.C. He answered the reference thus :- With Regard to Issue No. I and II Para-119. "Thus the irresistible conclusion would be that irrespective of declaration of certain offences as cognizable by Section 36-AC of Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, the police is incompetent to register an FIR and investigate the case in view of the specific and compact scheme under the Act for investigation of the case by an inspector under the Act as well as scheme of institution of prosecution by the named authorities specifically excluding the provision for institution of prosecution on the police report which was sought to be brought on the statute book and declined by the parliament as discussed above. The judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Vishal Agrawal Case (Supra) was rendered in quite different factual and statutory provisions of the case, hence, is not applicable in the present facts and circumstances of this case. Accordingly, it is held that the judgments in Cr. Misc. No. 719 of 1998, Shankar Kumar Ghose Vs. The State of Bihar and in Cr.Misc. No. 808 of 1998 and Cr. Misc. No. 50246 of 2006 Om Prakash Singh Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors whereunder the two Division Benches comprising of different Honble Judges held that an FIR and police investigation of the cases under Section 32 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 is not permissible, requires no reconsideration. " With Regard to Issue No. III Para 128. Misc. No. 50246 of 2006 Om Prakash Singh Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors whereunder the two Division Benches comprising of different Honble Judges held that an FIR and police investigation of the cases under Section 32 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 is not permissible, requires no reconsideration. " With Regard to Issue No. III Para 128. "A conjoint and harmonious reading of the aforesaid provisions would be that the offences mentioned under Section 36-AB shall be tried by a special court of the rank of court of sessions except offences under Section 13(a)(b), other offences are related to Chapter-IV of the Act. Sub Section 2 of Section 32 of Chapter- IV says that no court inferior to that of a court of sessions shall try an offence punishable under this Chapter. Therefore, all offences under Chapter-IV plus offences under Section 13 (a) (b) occurring in Chapter-III shall be tried by a court of sessions or by the Special Judge of the rank of court of sessions if notified by the Central Govt. or the State Govt. Section 15 provides that no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of 1st Class shall try an offence punishable under Section 13 is to be harmonised to the extent that offences mentioned under Section 13(a)(b) shall be excluded from the jurisdiction of Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate 1st Class for the purpose of trial as the same is triable by a Special Judge of the rank of the court of sessions in view of the provisions of Section 36-AB. The offences under Chapter-IVA with respect to Ayurvedic, Siddha and Unani Drugs shall be tried by a court not inferior to that of the Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate 1st Class in view of the provisions under Section 33-M. " With Regard to Issue No. IV Para 130. "A Magistrate competent under Section 190 Cr.P.C. to take cognizance shall be competent to take cognizance under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 also and shall follow the procedure of Cr.P.C. for enquiry and trial according to law and the aforesaid provision would not only confine to offences under Chapter-IV of the Act rather in respect of all the offences mentioned under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. " 14. " 14. The third learned Judge (Hemant Kumar Srivastava, J.) too answered the reference by agreeing with the opinion of the two brother Judges on Issue No. I and held thus :- With Regard to Issue No. I Para 139. "... in absence of any specific provision of taking cognizance under the Act, the Magistrate of the 1st Class or Magistrate of the 2nd Class, specially, empowered in this behalf shall take cognizance of the offences of the Act as a court of original jurisdiction under Section 190 of the Code...." 15. On Issue No. II, the learned 3rd Judge was of the view that if the same set of facts constitute offences under another law then Chapter IV allows institution of an FIR. He expressed thus :- Para 148 "Therefore, it is obvious that if same set of facts constitute offence punishable under Chapter IV of the Act, 1940 as well as punishable under any other law, in that situation, the prosecution can be launched by any person and it is not necessary that the prosecution must be initiated by those persons who have been identified under Section 32(1) of the Act." 16. But this view of the learned third Judge came with a caveat that the person who can institute the FIR has to be a person who is a gazetted police officer duly authorized by the State Government or the Central Government. He opined thus:- Para 155. "... Since the Act specifically states that no cognizance can be taken except on the basis of prosecution initiated by those persons who have been identified under Section 32 of Chapter IVth and Section 33 M of Chapter IVth A of the Act, in my view, even if the offences of Chapter IVth as well as Chapter Ivth A of the Act have been identified as cognizable offences, the police cannot prosecute any person for the breaches and violation of offences identified under Chapter IV of the Act, except on the basis of the prosecution initiated by the gazetted police officer duly authorized by the State Government or the Central Government, as the case may be and so far as the offences identified under Chapter IV A of the Act are concerned, the prosecution can not be initiated by the police. The Act specifically states that no cognizance can be taken except on the basis of prosecution initiated by those persons who have been identified under Section 32 of Chapter IVth and Section 33 M of Chapter IVth A of the Act, in my view, even if the offences of Chapter IVth as well as Chapter IVth A of the Act have been identified as cognizable offences, the police cannot prosecute any person for the breaches and violation of offences identified under Chapter IV of the Act, except on the basis of the prosecution initiated by the gazetted police officer duly authorized by the State Government or the Central Government, as the case may be and so far as the offences identified under Chapter IV A of the Act are concerned, the prosecution can not be initiated by the police." 17. With regard to Chapter III of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, the learned third Judge was of the view that both the modes, i.e. institution of an FIR as well as a complaint for launching the prosecution was available and there was nothing in Chapter III which bars it. He held thus : Para 157. "......in my view, in the light of sub-section (2) of Section 4 and Section 5 of the Code, the provisions of Code are applicable in respect of the offences described under Section 13 of the Act and it cannot be said that offenders of the offences punishable under Section 13 of the Act can only be prosecuted by filing complaint petition by those persons who have been authorized under Section 32 of the Act because all the Chapters of the Act have separate distinction." 18. Answering Issue No. III, the learned third Judge overruled the previous judgments passed in Cr.W.J.C. No. 719 of 1998 and Cr.Misc. No. 808 of 1998 and also Cr.Misc. No. 50246 of 2006. 19. While answering Issue No. IV, the learned third Judge was of the view that as Chapter IV and Chapter IV-A provide for separate procedure for investigation and inquiry, the provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 eclipses the provisions of the Cr.P.C. He articulated his opinion thus :- Para 161. "... No. 50246 of 2006. 19. While answering Issue No. IV, the learned third Judge was of the view that as Chapter IV and Chapter IV-A provide for separate procedure for investigation and inquiry, the provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 eclipses the provisions of the Cr.P.C. He articulated his opinion thus :- Para 161. "... In Vishal Agrawal and another v. Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board and another reported in AIR 2014 SC 1539 , the Hon'ble Apex Court while dealing with the case of Electricity Act (36 of 2003) held that the offences under any other law could also be investigated, inquired into or tried with according to the provisions of the Code except in case of an offence where the procedure prescribed there under is different than the procedure prescribed under the Code. In Act, it is obvious that procedure for inquiry and investigation for the offences of Chapter IV and IV A of the Act have been specifically provided and, therefore, the procedure for investigation and inquiry prescribed in Act for the offences of Chapter IV and IV A of the Act shall prevail over the provisions of Code as per Section 4 of the Code. Accordingly, reference no. (iv) is answered in the aforesaid manner. " 20. It is obvious from the judgment of the Full Bench that there was unanimity of view with regard to the Issue No. I alone. With regard to the Issue No. II and III each learned Judge expressed their own opinion and each opinion was divergent from the other. On Issue No. IV, while two of the learned Judges (Hemant Kumar Srivastava, J. and Aditya Kumar Trivedi, J.) were in unison in overruling the judgments passed in Cr.W.J.C. No. 719 of 1998, Cr.Misc. No. 808 of 1998 and Cr.Misc. No. 50246 of 2006, the third learned Judge (Birendra Kumar, J.) upheld the previous two judgments. 21. Considering such divergence of view and lack of unanimity in the opinion, the Full Bench referred Issue No. II, Issue No. III and Issue No. IV for consideration by a still larger Bench for an authoritative pronouncement. The Full Bench phrased the reference after discussing the divergent opinion thus :- "164. Conclusion:- Learned Division Bench has formulated issue no. 21. Considering such divergence of view and lack of unanimity in the opinion, the Full Bench referred Issue No. II, Issue No. III and Issue No. IV for consideration by a still larger Bench for an authoritative pronouncement. The Full Bench phrased the reference after discussing the divergent opinion thus :- "164. Conclusion:- Learned Division Bench has formulated issue no. 1 in respect of taking cognizance of an offence under Chapter IV of the Act and we all three have unanimously come to conclusion that the Court of Magistrate shall be competent under Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. to take cognizance of an offence under the Act. 165. As regards point no. (ii) formulated by learned Division Bench, brother Justice Trivedi has come to conclusion that the prosecution could not be confined byway of filing of the complaint petition only rather it could be on complaint petition as well as on police report but brother Justice Birendra Kumar came to conclusion that under the Act, the institution of first information report under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. and investigation of the case by the police and submission of charge sheets under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. is completely barred in view of specific provision for institution of the prosecution and power of investigation vested to the specifically skilled inspectors in the matter of nature and technicalities of the offences under the Act. So far as my view is concerned, I have come to conclusion that no prosecution for the offences of Chapter IV of the Act can be lodged on police report except on police report submitted by authorized gazetted police officer. It is obvious that there is difference of opinion among us because brother Justice Trivedi has given his finding that the prosecution could not be confined by way of filing of the complaint petition only rather prosecution can be launched on a complaint petition as well as on police report but according to brother justice Birendra Kumar, the prosecution can be launched only by filing compliant petition and the institution of first information report is barred by Section 32 of the Act. However, in my view, Section 32 of the Act is restricted only to Chapter IV of the Act and the prosecution for the offences defined under Chapter IV of the Act can be launched on the basis of complaint petition as well as by institution of FIR only by the authorized gazetted police officer. Furthermore, I have come to conclusion that except the offences defined under Chapter IV and Chapter IV A of the Act, the FIR can be lodged in respect of offences described under other chapters of the Act. Since we are not unanimous on the aforesaid point, in my view, the above stated point should be referred to a Larger Bench. 166. In view of the aforesaid discussions, let the issues no. (ii), (Hi) and (iv) as formulated by the Division Bench be referred to Larger Bench for consideration. Accordingly, Registry (Office) is directed to place this matter before Honble the Chief Justice with a request to Hon'ble the Chief Justice to constitute Larger Bench for consideration of above stated issues." 22. The reference by the Full Bench has brought the issues before us. 23. Since the advocate on record for the petitioners in these applications did not turn up to assist the Court when the cases were taken up, we requested Mr. Jitendra Singh, learned senior advocate to assist the Court as Amicus Curiae on the issues involved. Mr. Singh readily accepted our request. We have heard learned Amicus Curiae being ably assisted by Mr. Harsh Singh, learned advocate. We have also heard Mr. Anjani Kumar, learned Additional Advocate General No. IV and Mr. Vinay Kirti Singh, learned Government Advocate No. 2 for the State. 24. It would not be out of place to mention that oblivious to the consciousness of the Full Bench, in parallel, in Union of India Vs. Ashok Kumar Sharma & Ors. reported in 2020 SCC OnLine SC 683, part of the issues were under consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 24. It would not be out of place to mention that oblivious to the consciousness of the Full Bench, in parallel, in Union of India Vs. Ashok Kumar Sharma & Ors. reported in 2020 SCC OnLine SC 683, part of the issues were under consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Apex Court was seized of two of the issues that had been referred by the Division Bench to the Full Bench; (i) Whether an FIR can be registered with regard to the offences falling under Chapter IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940?; and (ii) whether Section 32 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 supplants the procedure of investigation and taking of cognizance in terms of Section 190 of the Cr.P.C? 25. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar Sharma (Supra) had framed other issues as well (i) relating to interplay of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and the Cr.P.C; (ii) whether the Inspector under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 can arrest an offender of the provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. 26. The Hon'ble Supreme Court was of the opinion that considering the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 being a complete code, the police was not empowered to register an FIR with regard to the offences under Chapter IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. It further held that for the offences under Chapter IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 the Drug Inspector alone is authorized to set in motion the criminal law and arrest an offender. The Hon'ble Supreme Court was also of the opinion that Chapter IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 has been so fashioned by the legislature that it not only excludes the police to institute an FIR but the scheme of Chapter IV leads to irresistible conclusion that the entire procedure of investigation under Cr.P.C has been excluded. The Hon'ble Supreme Court answered the issue that it framed and summed it up thus :- "162. Thus, we may cull out our conclusions/directions as follows: I. In regard to cognizable offences under Chapter IV of the Act, in view of Section 32 of the Act and also the scheme of the CrPC, the Police Officer cannot prosecute offenders in regard to such offences. Only the persons mentioned in Section 32 are entitled to do the same. II. Only the persons mentioned in Section 32 are entitled to do the same. II. There is no bar to the Police Officer, however, to investigate and prosecute the person where he has committed an offence, as stated under Section 32(3) of the Act, i.e., if he has committed any cognizable offence under any other law. III. Having regard to the scheme of the CrPC and also the mandate of Section 32 of the Act and on a conspectus of powers which are available with the Drugs Inspector under the Act and also his duties, a Police Officer cannot register a FIR under Section 154 of the CrPC, in regard to cognizable offences under Chapter IV of the Act and he cannot investigate such offences under the provisions of the CrPC. IV. Having regard to the provisions of Section 22(1) (a) of the Act, we hold that an arrest can be made by the Drugs Inspector in regard to cognizable offences falling under Chapter IV of the Act without any warrant and otherwise treating it as a cognizable offence. He is, however, bound by the law as laid down in D.K. Basu (supra) and to follow the provisions of CrPC. V. It would appear that on the understanding that the Police Officer can register a FIR, there are many cases where FIRs have been registered in regard to cognizable offences falling under Chapter IV of the Act. We find substance in the stand taken by learned Amicus Curiae and direct that they should be made over to the Drugs Inspectors, if not already made over, and it is for the Drugs Inspector to take action on the same in accordance with the law. We must record that we are resorting to our power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India in this regard. VI. Further, we would be inclined to believe that in a number of cases on the understanding of the law relating to the power of arrest as, in fact, evidenced by the facts of the present case, police officers would have made arrests in regard to offences under Chapter IV of the Act. VI. Further, we would be inclined to believe that in a number of cases on the understanding of the law relating to the power of arrest as, in fact, evidenced by the facts of the present case, police officers would have made arrests in regard to offences under Chapter IV of the Act. Therefore, in regard to the power of arrest, we make it clear that our decision that Police Officers do not have power to arrest in respect of cognizable offences under Chapter IV of the Act, will operate with effect from the date of this Judgment. VII. We further direct that the Drugs Inspectors, who carry out the arrest, must not only report the arrests, as provided in Section 58 of the CrPC, but also immediately report the arrests to their superior Officers." 27. It would be apparent from the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that it answered the issue with regard to the powers of the police to register FIR and to investigate the offences under Section 32 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, saved the arrests that had been effected by the police under the Cr.P.C and directed making over of the cases where FIRs have been registered under Chapter IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 to the Drug Inspector. 28. Though the Hon'ble Supreme Court answered the issues before it, the same raised several questions that were left unanswered. 29. The issue which engages the attention of this Bench especially in view of the submissions advanced by learned Amicus Curiae is that once the FIR stood quashed all consequential proceedings standing on the edifice of the FIR would stand demolished and the parties should be left to face the consequences. The ancillary issue which arose before the present Bench was whether the FIR of such cases be also quashed where the courts have progressed beyond the stage of taking cognizance such as the cases which are at the stage of framing of charge or at the trial stage. The ancillary issue which arose before the present Bench was whether the FIR of such cases be also quashed where the courts have progressed beyond the stage of taking cognizance such as the cases which are at the stage of framing of charge or at the trial stage. Further, the present Bench was also alive to the fact that a de novo initiation of criminal proceeding by the Drug Inspector after an inordinate length of time would not only have adverse consequences vis-a-vis the victims of the cognizable offences under Chapter IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and the society at large but also the fact that the drug samples would have lost their shelf life. The puzzle was should the Court quash the FIR and leave the parties to bear the consequences as was submitted by the learned Amicus Curiae or should the Court approach the entire issue more holistically taking into consideration whole raft of real consequential issues that may arise. 30. The Issue No. II, according to me, has been left open for this Bench to deliberate upon the power of the police to register an FIR vis-a-vis offences under Chapter III and Chapter IVA of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. 31. Before adverting to the issue under reference that remains unanswered, it would be appropriate to consider the submissions of Mr. Jitendra Singh, learned Amicus Curiae with regard to the consequential issues that arise from the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Sharma (Supra). 32. Addressing the issue, the submission of Mr. Singh, learned Amicus Curiae was that the Special Bench should follow the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Sharma (Supra) and should quash the FIR and leave the parties to bear their consequences, be it good, bad or ugly. The attention of the Bench was drawn to the concluding paragraph wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court had dismissed the appeal and had thereby upheld the order of the High Court which had quashed the FIR. It was further submitted that the Special Bench was bound by the terms of the reference and cannot travel beyond the same. It was strenuously urged relying upon para 8 of the judgment of Kerala State Science & Technology Museum Vs. Rambal Co. It was further submitted that the Special Bench was bound by the terms of the reference and cannot travel beyond the same. It was strenuously urged relying upon para 8 of the judgment of Kerala State Science & Technology Museum Vs. Rambal Co. reported in (2006) 6 SCC 258 that when a reference is made on a specific issue to a Larger Bench, the Larger Bench cannot adjudicate upon an issue that has not been referred to it and, thus, Special Bench must confine itself to the issues referred and also should not travel beyond what has been decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Sharma (Supra). 33. The issue of scope of the Larger Bench to confine itself to the issues referred to it alone is no longer res-integra and has been so held by a catena of decisions. But, it is equally of relevance that the scope of larger Bench is also to be regulated by the rules regulating the powers of the larger Bench as also the fact that the reference may raise the issues which are ancillary or subsidiary to the main issues referred to it. 34. The larger Bench when confronted with unavoidable subsidiary or ancillary issues arising out of the reference would be obliged to answer them and cannot shut its eyes to it. 35. In the State of Punjab Vs. Salil Sabhlok reported in (2013) 5 SCC 7, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had occasion to deal with a similar issue and it answered the same thus :- "137. The learned counsel supporting the appointment of Mr. Dhanda submitted that the Full Bench could not expand the scope of the reference made to it by the Division Bench, nor could it frame additional questions. 138. Generally speaking, they are right in their contention, but it also depends on the reference made. 139. The law on the subject has crystallised through a long line of decisions and it need not be reiterated again and again: 139.1. The decisions include Kesho Nath Khurana v. Union of India [1981 Supp SCC 38 :1981 SCC (Cri) 674]: (SCC p. 39, para 1) "1.... 139. The law on the subject has crystallised through a long line of decisions and it need not be reiterated again and again: 139.1. The decisions include Kesho Nath Khurana v. Union of India [1981 Supp SCC 38 :1981 SCC (Cri) 674]: (SCC p. 39, para 1) "1.... The Division Bench ought to have sent the appeal back to the Single Judge with the answer rendered by them to the question referred by the Single Judge and left it to the Single Judge to dispose of the second appeal according to law. " 139.2. Kerala State Science & Technology Museum v. Rambal Co. [ (2006) 6 SCC 258 ] : (SCC p. 262, para 8) "8. It is fairly well settled that when reference is made on a specific issue either by a learned Single Judge or Division Bench to a larger Bench i.e. Division Bench or Full Bench or Constitution Bench, as the case may be, the larger Bench cannot adjudicate upon an issue which is not the question referred to. " 139.3. T.A. Hameed v. M. Viswanathan [ (2008) 3 SCC 243 ]: (SCC p. 245, para 12) "12.... Since, only reference was made to the Full Bench, the Full Bench should have answered the question referred to it and remitted the matter to the Division Bench for deciding the revision petition on merits. " 139.4. And more recently, Saquib Abdul Hameed Nachan v. State of Maharashtra [ (2010) 9 SCC 93 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1146]: (SCC p. 102, para 15) "15.... Normally, after answering the reference by the larger Bench, it is for the Reference Court to decide the issue on merits on the basis of the answers given by the larger Bench." 145. To this extent, the learned counsel supporting the cause of Mr. Dhanda are right that the Full Bench overstepped its mandate. But where does this discussion lead us to? The two questions were fully argued in this Court for the purposes of obtaining a decision on them, and no suggestion was made that the decision of the Full Bench on these questions be set aside because of a jurisdictional error and the Division Bench be asked to decide them quite independently. Therefore, this issue is only of academic interest so far as this appeal is concerned notwithstanding the law that a larger Bench should decide only the questions referred to it. Therefore, this issue is only of academic interest so far as this appeal is concerned notwithstanding the law that a larger Bench should decide only the questions referred to it. Of course, if a subsidiary question logically and unavoidably arises, the larger Bench cannot be dogmatic and refuse to answer it. A common sense approach must be taken on such occasions. (emphasis is mine)3 6. Further, Rule 1 of Chapter V of the Rules of the High Court at Patna states :- "Rule-1. Whenever a division bench desires and the Chief Justice consents that any case shall be referred to a Full Bench, or whenever in any case a division bench differs from any other division bench upon a point of law or usage having the force of law, such case shall be referred for decision by Full Bench. " (emphasis is mine) 37. Rule 12 of Chapter II of the Rules of the High Court at Patna defines a Full Bench and states that "a full bench shall be a bench of any number not less than three judges" 38. When Rule 1 of Chapter V of the Rules of the High Court at Patna is read with Rule 12 of Chapter II of the Rules of the High Court at Patna, it would be apparent that even a Bench larger than three Judges would still be a Full Bench and will have the power to decide "such case", which is referred to it. As a reasonable conclusion, it is not the issue referred alone that is before the Full Bench but the entire case is placed before the Full Bench for decision. 39. In the present case, what has been referred for decision are not only the points of law but also the usage having force of law as also the case. It is of relevance to note that Rule 12 of Chapter V states that "such case" shall be referred to the Full Bench for decision. A decision not merely mean the conclusion but it embraces within its fold the reasons which form the basis for arriving at the conclusion. 40. In view of the law, the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the fact that the Issue Nos. A decision not merely mean the conclusion but it embraces within its fold the reasons which form the basis for arriving at the conclusion. 40. In view of the law, the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the fact that the Issue Nos. II, III and IV that have been referred, the present Bench is not only seized of the reference, but is also seized of the ancillary issues arising out of the said reference, the entire case in which the issues arose, as also, the usage of law. It is, thus, unexceptionable that the present Bench is competent not only to look into the issues referred to it but also the subsidiary and ancillary issues arising therefrom. Thus, the submission of Mr. Jitendra Singh, learned Amicus Curiae that the present Bench should not travel beyond the issues referred cannot be accepted. Further, another submission of Mr. Singh, learned Amicus Curiae too deserves to be rejected. He has submitted that in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Sharma (Supra), especially the concluding paragraph wherein even the Hon'ble Supreme Court has upheld the order of the Allahabad High Court, the Bench should quash the FIR instituted under Chapter IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and leave it at that irrespective of the stage of the criminal case or considering the consequences. It was contended that if the Court looks into the consequences of the quashing of the FIR registered under Chapter IV, as has been held in the case of Ashok Kumar Sharma (Supra), it would amount to judicial overreach and also amount to travelling beyond the reference made to it. 41. Apart from the fact that the aforementioned submission of Mr. Singh, learned Amicus Curiae is oversimplification of the issues involved, the present Bench has the sanction of the judgment passed in the case of State of Punjab Vs. Salil Sabhlok (Supra) to look into the subsidiary issues and even the Rules of the High Court at Patna sanctions the same. 42. From another perspective, the submission of learned Amicus Curiae seems to be deeply invested in maintaining the partial aspect of the criminal justice system that emphasizes the fair play and the aspect of welfare of the accused. Salil Sabhlok (Supra) to look into the subsidiary issues and even the Rules of the High Court at Patna sanctions the same. 42. From another perspective, the submission of learned Amicus Curiae seems to be deeply invested in maintaining the partial aspect of the criminal justice system that emphasizes the fair play and the aspect of welfare of the accused. The submission ignores the welfare of the victims and the society who have equal stakes in the fair play of the criminal justice system. 43. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of A.P. Vs. Bodem Sundara Rao, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 230 , held though in a different context: "... The court must not only keep in view the right of the victim of the crime but also the society at large while considering the imposition of punishment...." 44. In State of Gujarat & Anr. Vs. Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 392 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court said : "In our efforts to look after and protect the human rights of the convict, we cannot forget the victim or his family in case of his death or who is otherwise incapacitated to earn his livelihood because of the criminal act of the convict. The victim is certainly entitled to reparation, restitution and safeguard of his rights. Criminal justice would look hollow if justice is not done to the victim of the crime. The subject of victimology is gaining ground while we are also concerned with the rights of the prisoners and prison reforms. A victim of crime cannot be a "forgotten man" in the criminal justice system. It is he who has suffered the most. His family is ruined particularly in case of death and other bodily injury. This is apart from the factors like loss of reputation, humiliation, etc. An honour which is lost or life which is snuffed out cannot be recompensed but then monetary compensation will at least provide some solace. (emphasis is mine) 45. In a recent judgment in the case of Fainul Khan Vs. State of Jharkhand, reported in (2019) 9 SCC 549 , in the context of procedural fairness, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed :- "In other words, there will have to be a cumulative balancing of several factors. (emphasis is mine) 45. In a recent judgment in the case of Fainul Khan Vs. State of Jharkhand, reported in (2019) 9 SCC 549 , in the context of procedural fairness, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed :- "In other words, there will have to be a cumulative balancing of several factors. While the rights of an accused to a fair trial are undoubtedly important, the rights of the victim and the society at large for correction of deviant behaviour cannot be made subservient to the rights of an accused by placing the latter at a pedestal higher than necessary for a fair trial. " 46. It cannot be overemphasized that the amendment of the year 2008 by Act 26 of 2008 was primarily victim and society centric. If one is to see the amended provisions of penalty, it would be apparent that punishments have been enhanced. It also provides for realization of fines which would be used for reparation to victims. 47. In the light of the 2008 amendment, which is also justification for existence of the present proceeding and the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it would be sheer apathetic on the part of the Court to accept the submission of Mr. Singh, learned Amicus Curiae to quash the FIR and leave the victim and the society at large to suffer the consequences. 48. Confronted with situations that a simple quashing of an FIR and leaving at that would lead to detrimental consequences this Court cannot shut its eyes to the consequences where cases have progressed beyond the stages of investigation and where (I) cognizance has been taken; or (ii) charges have been framed; or (iii) where trial is already underway. The question before the Court is would it be appropriate to make over the case to Drugs Inspector to start the entire process of investigation in terms of the procedure prescribed under Section 21 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940? In such case, drug samples would have lost their shelf life and victims may not be available. As time passes, the testimony of witnesses becomes weaker and weaker because of lapse of memory and evidence becomes more and more uncertain with the result that the danger of error becomes greater. The victims may have lost their energy to pursue and the witnesses may themselves have moved on. As time passes, the testimony of witnesses becomes weaker and weaker because of lapse of memory and evidence becomes more and more uncertain with the result that the danger of error becomes greater. The victims may have lost their energy to pursue and the witnesses may themselves have moved on. The deterrent effect of punishment is impaired if prosecution is not launched and punishment is not inflicted before the offence has been wiped off the memory of persons concerned. The sense of social retribution which is one of the purposes of criminal law loses its edge after the expiry of long period. The delay compounds the ordeal of victims and inordinate delay produces unknown variables that do away with the idea of fair trial. 49. "Crime never dies" is the general rule of criminal justice. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Japani Sahoo Vs. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty reported in (2007) 7 SCC 394 , while considering the issue of limitation in criminal prosecution held :- "The general rule of criminal justice is that "a crime never dies". The principle is reflected in the well-known maxim nullum tempus aut locus occurrit regi (lapse of time is no bar to Crown in proceeding against offenders)..........It is settled law that a criminal offence is considered as a wrong against the State and the society even though it has been committed against an individual....." 50. To maintain the purity of the streams of justice and fair play as also balancing of rights of the accused and that of the victims and the society, the Courts are called upon to forge new idioms of engagement with the criminal justice system. Our understanding of the judgment in Ashok Kumar Sharma (Supra) commends to us to believe that the Hon'ble Supreme Court was guided by the fact that the said judgment shall be prospective in nature for otherwise there was no occasion for it to save the arrests already effected till the date of judgment as also the saving of the one-dimensional motion of criminal justice system set in motion by institution of FIR, by making it over the same to the Drug Inspectors. It is so much apparent from the judgment of Ashok Kumar Sharma (Supra) that the Hon'ble Supreme Court never intended that the criminal proceeding set into motion should be stopped on its tracks inspite of declaration of law that institution of FIR was barred under Chapter IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and the police had no role in investigating the offences under the said Chapter. 51. Being conscious of the consequences that may entail on account of simplicitor quashing, the Hon'ble Supreme Court nowhere held in its judgment in Ashok Kumar Sharma (Supra) that the criminal cases instituted shall stand abrogated. In fact, the Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld the order of the Allahabad High Court whereby it had directed the State authorities to institute criminal proceeding against the petitioner inspite of quashing of the FIR. 52. The Hon'ble Supreme Court was also conscious of the fact that where the cases were at the stage of investigation, they be made over to the Drug Inspector to continue with the prescribed procedure under Chapter IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and take the cases to their logical conclusion but there are no such direction where the cases have progressed beyond the stage of investigation. The conclusion of the judgment in Ashok Kumar Sharma (Supra) is that the judgment has prospective application and that the said judgment unexceptionally saves all past proceedings instituted at the instance of the police by filing FIR. 53. I am further of the opinion that the action of the police officers to institute FIR prior to the judgment of Ashok Kumar Sharma (Supra) in cases not covered by the direction of the said judgment were acts that had been performed under assumed authority in the interest of public or third persons and not for their own benefit as such actions are saved as valid and binding as if performed by an authority de jure. 54. I am of the opinion that the police officer in instituting the FIR was not an usurper or intruder but was discharging duties under colour of lawful authority which has now been held to be unlawful by interpretation in the case of Ashok Kumar Sharma (Supra) and they need to be saved as a matter of policy and necessity to protect the interest of public and the society at large. 55. 55. In this regard, it would be apt to refer to the following passage from Cooley's A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations (8th Ed. Vol. 2, p. 1355-1358) and which has been quoted with approval in paras 5 and 8 of State of Haryana Vs. Haryana Cooperative Transport Ltd. reported in (1977) 1 SCC 271 :- "5. Nevertheless, the award given by Shri Gupta as the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court is defended by the State Government on the plea that Shri Gupta's appointment cannot be challenged in a collateral proceeding filed in the High Court for challenging the award. Reliance is placed in support of this submission on the following passage in Cooley's, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations (8th Edn. Vol. 2, p. 1355-1358): "An officer de jure is one who, possessing the legal qualifications, has been lawfully chosen to the office in question, and has fulfilled any conditions precedent to the performance of its duties. By being thus chosen and observing the precedent conditions, such a person becomes of right entitled to the possession and enjoyment of the office, and the public, in whose interest the office is created, is entitled of right to have him perform its duties. If he is excluded from it, the exclusion is both a public offence and a private injury. An officer de jure may be excluded from his office by either an officer de facto or an intruder. An officer de facto is one who by some color of right is in possession of an office and for the time being performs its duties with public acquiescence, though having no right in fact. An officer de jure may be excluded from his office by either an officer de facto or an intruder. An officer de facto is one who by some color of right is in possession of an office and for the time being performs its duties with public acquiescence, though having no right in fact. His color of right may come from an election or appointment made by some officer or body having colorable but no actual right to make it; or made in such disregard of legal requirements as to be ineffectual in law; or made to fill the place of an officer illegally removed; or made in favour of a party not having the legal qualifications; or it may come from public acquiescence in the officer holding without performing the precedent conditions, or holding over under claim of right after his legal right has been terminated; or possibly from public acquiescence alone when accompanied by such circumstances of official reputation as are calculated to induce people, without inquiry, to submit to or invoke official action on the supposition that the person claiming the office is what he assumes to be. An intruder is one who attempts to perform the duties of an office without authority of law, and without the support of public acquiescence. No one is under obligation to recognise or respect the acts of an intruder, and for all legal purposes they are absolutely void. But for the sake of order and regularity, and to prevent confusion in the conduct of public business and in security of private rights, the acts of officers de facto are not suffered to be questioned because of the want of legal authority except by some direct proceeding instituted for the purpose by the State or by someone claiming the office de jure, or except when the person himself attempts to build up some right, or claim some privilege or emolument, by reason of being the officer which he claims to be. In all other cases the acts of an officer de facto are as valid and effectual, while he is suffered to retain the office, as though he were an officer by right, and the same legal consequences will flow from them for the protection of the public and of third parties. In all other cases the acts of an officer de facto are as valid and effectual, while he is suffered to retain the office, as though he were an officer by right, and the same legal consequences will flow from them for the protection of the public and of third parties. This is an important principle, which finds concise expression in the legal maxim that the acts of officers de facto cannot be questioned collaterally." 8. Broadly, the starting point and the primary basis of these decisions is the passage from Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, which we have extracted above. That passage says and means that the acts of officers de facto cannot be suffered to be questioned for want of legal authority except by some direct proceeding. This important principle, according to Cooley, finds concise expression in the legal maxim that the acts of officers de facto cannot be allowed to be questioned collaterally." 56. The de facto doctrine envisages that unless an authority is an outright usurper or intruder the acts performed by the said authority in lawful exercise of his powers shall be valid and be saved on account of public necessity and to avoid inconvenience to those who unknowingly acquiesced the acts performed de facto by the said authority. Thus, the de facto doctrine saves the actions carried out from being declared as null and void. The Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the de facto doctrine in State of Telangana Vs. Managipet, reported in (2019) 19 SCC 87 thus :- "15. We further find that Shri K. Sampath Kumar's acts whilst discharging the duties of Joint Director in the Anti-Corruption Bureau were within the scope of the assumed official authority in public interest and not for his own benefit. Therefore, acts undertaken in this regard by the officer will be taken to be valid. This Court in a judgment in Gokaraju Rangaraju v. State of A.R, (1981) 3 SCC 132 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 652 held as under: (SCC pp. 140-43, paras 17 & 19) "17. A Judge, de facto, therefore, is one who is not a mere intruder or usurper but one who holds office, under colour of lawful authority, though his appointment is defective and may later be found to be defective. 140-43, paras 17 & 19) "17. A Judge, de facto, therefore, is one who is not a mere intruder or usurper but one who holds office, under colour of lawful authority, though his appointment is defective and may later be found to be defective. Whatever be the defect of his title to the office, judgments pronounced by him and acts done by him when he was clothed with the powers and functions of the office, albeit unlawfully, have the same efficacy as judgments pronounced and acts done by a Judge de jure. Such is the de facto doctrine, born of necessity and public policy to prevent needless confusion and endless mischief.... 19. In our view, the de facto doctrine furnishes an answer to the submissions of Shri Phadke based on Section 9 of the Criminal Procedure Code and Article 21 of the Constitution. The Judges who rejected the appeal in one case and convicted the accused in the other case were not mere usurpers or intruders but were persons who discharged the functions and duties of Judges under colour of lawful authority. We are concerned with the office that the Judges purported to hold. We are not concerned with the particular incumbents of the office. So long as the office was validly created, it matters not that the incumbent was not validly appointed. A person appointed as a Sessions Judge, Additional Sessions Judge or Assistant Sessions Judge, would be exercising jurisdiction in the Court of Session and his judgments and orders would be those of the Court of Session. They would continue to be valid as the judgments and orders of the Court of Session, notwithstanding that his appointment to such court might be declared invalid. On that account alone, it can never be said that the procedure prescribed by law has not been followed. It would be a different matter if the constitution of the court itself is under challenge. Weare not concerned with such a situation in the instant cases. We, therefore, find no force in any of the submissions of the learned counsel. " 16. It would be a different matter if the constitution of the court itself is under challenge. Weare not concerned with such a situation in the instant cases. We, therefore, find no force in any of the submissions of the learned counsel. " 16. The aforesaid judgment relies upon Pulin Behari Das v. King Emperor, 1911 SCC Online Cal 159 : (1911-12) 16 CWN 1105, wherein Mookerjee, J. held the following: (SCC OnLine Cal) "The doctrine that the acts of officers de facto performed by them within the scope of their assumed authority in the interest of the public or third persons and not for their own benefit, are generally as valid and binding as if they were the acts of officers de jure, dates as far back as the Year Books, and it stands confirmed, without any qualification or exception, by a long line of adjudications. Viner says "acts done by an officer de facto and not de jure are good, for the law favours one in a refuted authority" (Abridgment, Tit. Officers and Officers G.4). In fact the question for determination in cases involving the application of the de facto doctrine, is not, as a rule, whether the challenged acts, assuming the officer to be de facto, as such are valid, but whether the person whose title is questioned is or was really a de facto officer. It is not necessary for our present purposes to investigate exhaustively all the qualifications or limitations subject to which the de facto doctrine has to be applied. The substance of the matter is that the de facto doctrine was introduced into the law as a matter of policy and necessity, to protect the interest of the public and the individual where those interests were involved in the official acts of persons exercising the duties of an office without being lawful officers. The doctrine in fact is necessary to maintain the supremacy of the law and to preserve peace and order in the community at large. Indeed, if any individual or body of individuals were permitted at his or their pleasure to collaterally challenge the authority of and to refuse obedience to the Government of the State and the numerous functionaries through whom it exercised its various powers, on the ground of irregular existence or defective title, insubordination and disorder of the worst kind would be encouraged. For the good order and peace of society their authority must be upheld until in some regular mode their title is directly investigated and determined [see the observations in Scadding v. Lorant, (1851) 3 HLC 418 : 10 ER 164 and Norton v. Shelby County, 1886 SCC Online US SC 194 : 30 L Ed 178 : 118 US 425 (1886)]. In the matter now before us, the sanction under Section 196 of the Criminal Procedure Code was granted by the de facto local Government and the cognizance of the case has been taken by the de facto Sessions Judge. In my opinion, it is not open to the appellants to question collaterally the legality of the conviction upon the allegation that the local Government was irregularly constituted and the Sessions Judge irregularly appointed. The first ground upon which the legality of the trial is assailed must consequently be overruled. " 17. The de facto doctrine as encapsulated above has been reiterated by this Court, even in the context of an executive appointment, in the judgment in Pushpadevi M. Jatia v. M.L. Wadhawan, (1987) 3 SCC 367 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 526. In this case, the Additional Secretary to the Government of India had detained Mohanlal Jatia vide a government order under subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA), on being satisfied that it was necessary to detain him. Herein, the Additional Secretary relied on statements recorded by one R.C. Singh whom the appellant contended was not a "gazetted officer" of enforcement under FERA, and therefore statements recorded by the officer could not be relied upon to detain him. It was discussed : (SCC pp. 386 & 389-90, paras 17-18 & 20) "17. In any event, the learned counsel further contends that R.C. Singh was clothed with the insignia of office and he was purporting to exercise the functions and duties of a Gazetted Officer of Enforcement under Section 40(1) of FERA and therefore the de facto doctrine was attracted. He relies upon the decision of this Court in Gokaraju Rangaraju v. State of A.P., (1981) 3 SCC 132 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 652 enunciating the de facto doctrine, born of necessity and public policy to prevent needless confusion and endless mischief. He relies upon the decision of this Court in Gokaraju Rangaraju v. State of A.P., (1981) 3 SCC 132 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 652 enunciating the de facto doctrine, born of necessity and public policy to prevent needless confusion and endless mischief. In other words, he contends that where an officer acts under the law, it matters not how the appointment of the incumbent is made so far as the validity of his acts are concerned. 18. We are inclined to the view that in this jurisdiction there is a presumption of regularity in the acts of officials and that the evidential burden is upon him who asserts to the contrary. The contention that R.C. Singh was not a Gazetted Officer of Enforcement within the meaning of Section 40(1) of FERA appears to be wholly misconceived besides being an afterthought. The validity of appointment of R.C. Singh to be an officer of Enforcement under this Act cannot be questioned.... 20.... Where an office exists under the law, it matters not how the appointment of the incumbent is made, so far as validity of his acts are concerned. It is enough that he is clothed with the insignia of the office, and exercises its powers and functions. The official acts of such persons are recognised as valid under the de facto doctrine, born of necessity and public policy to prevent needless confusion and endless mischief. In Gokaraju Rangaraju v. State of A.R, (1981) 3 SCC 132 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 652 Chinnappa Reddy, J., explained that this doctrine was engrafted as a matter of policy and necessity to protect the interest of the public. " 18. Further, a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in a judgment in P.S. Menon v. State of Kerala, 1969 SCC Online Ker 88 : AIR 1970 Ker 165 held that the de facto doctrine was engrafted as a matter of policy and necessity to protect the interest of the public as well as the individuals involved in the official capacity of persons exercising the duty of an officer without actually being one in strict point of law. These officers may not be the officers de jure but by virtue of particular circumstances, their acts should be considered valid as a matter of public policy. 19. These officers may not be the officers de jure but by virtue of particular circumstances, their acts should be considered valid as a matter of public policy. 19. In another Division Bench judgment in P. Mahamani v. T.N. Magnesite Ltd., 1993 SCC OnLine Mad 178 : (1993) 2 LLN 353, the Madras High Court held as under: (SCC OnLine Mad para 12) "12. An officer de facto is one who by some colour or right is in possession of an office and for the time being performs his duties with public acquiescence, though having no right in fact. Whereas an intruder is one who attempts to perform the duties of an office without authority of law, and without the support of public acquiescence. No one is under obligation to recognise or respect the acts of an intruder, and for all legal purposes they are absolutely void. But for the sake of order and regularity, and to prevent confusion in the conduct of public business and in security of private rights, the acts of officers de facto are not suffered to be questioned because of the want of legal authority except by some direct proceeding instituted for the purpose. In all other cases the acts of an officer de facto are as valid and effectual, while he is suffered to retain the office as though he were an officer by right, and the same legal consequences will flow from them for the protection of the public and of third parties. There is an important principle, which finds concise expression in the legal maxim that the acts of officers de facto cannot be questioned collaterally. A person may be entitled to his designation although he is not a true and rightful incumbent of the office, yet he is no more usurper but holds it under colour of lawful authority. The de facto doctrine was introduced into the law as a matter of policy and necessity, to protect the interest of the public and the individual where these interests were involved in the official act of persons exercising the duties of an office without being lawful officers. The doctrine in fact is necessary to maintain the supremacy of the law and to preserve peace and order in the community at large. The doctrine in fact is necessary to maintain the supremacy of the law and to preserve peace and order in the community at large. Indeed, if any individual or body of individuals were permitted, at his or their pleasure, to collaterally challenge the authority of and to refuse obedience to the Government of the State and the numerous functionaries through whom it exercised its various powers on the ground of irregular existence of defective title insubordination and disorder of the worst kind would be encouraged. For the good order and peace of society, their authority must be upheld until in some regular mode their title is directly investigated and determined. When one holds office under colour of lawful authority, whatever be the defect of his title to the office, acts done by him when he was clothed with the powers and functions of the office, albeit unlawfully, have the same efficacy and acts done by an officer de jure. The defective appointment of a de facto officer may be questioned directly in a proceeding to which he may be a party but it cannot be permitted to be questioned in a litigation between two private litigants, a litigation which is of no concern or consequence to the officer concerned. So the writ petitioner cannot be heard to say that Shri Madhavan Nair, the second respondent had no authority to preside over the meeting of the Board of Directors wherein it was resolved to place him under suspension and initiate disciplinary action. " 20. The de facto doctrine was reiterated yet again in a recent Supreme Court judgment in Veerendra Kumar Gautam v. Karuna Nidhan Upadhyay, (2016) 14 SCC 18 " 57. I am, thus, of the opinion that all previous acts of the police officer including the investigation and the material collected in the course of investigation shall be saved on account of de facto doctrine and proceedings pending too shall be saved and only the prosecution shall be handed over to the Drug Inspector who shall prosecute through the Public Prosecutor or the Special Public Prosecutor, as the case may be. 58. This leaves me with the issue of reference that has still not been answered, i.e., whether the police is empowered to register FIR under Chapter III and Chapter IV-A of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. 59. 58. This leaves me with the issue of reference that has still not been answered, i.e., whether the police is empowered to register FIR under Chapter III and Chapter IV-A of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. 59. On noticing the relevant provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945, it would be important to note that Chapter III of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 deals with "Import of Drugs and Cosmetics". The word 'import' has been defined in Section 3(g) of the said Act and means "to bring into India". 60. Chapter III has its own definition of Misbranded and Spurious Drugs and Cosmetics as also Adulterated Drugs and have been defined between Sections 9 to 9D. Interestingly, the definition of Misbranded and Spurious Drugs and Cosmetics as also Adulterated Drugs are pari materia with the definition of the Drugs and Cosmetics as is given in Chapter IV of the said Act. 61. Section 11(1) of Chapter III of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 confers general power on the officers of the Customs Act and the officers authorized under the Customs Act to do or act against prohibited Drugs and Cosmetics as they have the power as against goods prohibited under the Customs Act. 62. Section 11(2), which is without prejudice to powers conferred under Section 11(1), confers power to the Commissioner of Customs or any officer of the Customs authorized by the Central Government in this behalf to detain any imported package which he suspects to contain any Drug or Cosmetic, the import of which is prohibited. It also casts duty upon the officer concerned to forthwith report such detention to the Drugs Controller of India and, if necessary, to forward the package or sample of any suspected drug or cosmetic for testing to the Central Drugs Laboratory. 63. The power conferred under Section 11 comes into play at the threshold of entry of the imported drugs or cosmetics within India. The power conferred under Section 11(2) has to be read along with the procedure and consequences prescribed under Rule 40 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945. 64. Section 13 of Chapter III of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 declares the offences and punishment for import of prohibited or adulterated or spurious or misbranded drugs and cosmetics. 65. The power conferred under Section 11(2) has to be read along with the procedure and consequences prescribed under Rule 40 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945. 64. Section 13 of Chapter III of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 declares the offences and punishment for import of prohibited or adulterated or spurious or misbranded drugs and cosmetics. 65. There is another aspect that needs to be highlighted at this stage. That issue would be whether the customs authorities can institute an FIR to initiate and set in motion the criminal justice system? It has already been noted in the aforesaid paragraphs that the customs authorities are empowered under Chapter III of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 to institute a case under the Customs Act, 1962 for violations prescribed under Section 11 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. It is conspicuous to note that Chapter III of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 is silent with regard to the powers of the Customs authorities to institute and proceed with the case under Section 13 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. What is arresting is the presence of Section 13(3) in Chapter III of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. It says that the punishment provided in Section 13 is in addition to any penalty to which an offender would be liable under the provisions of Section 11 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. Conflating Section 11 with Section 13(3) it is apparent that a customs authority can not only register a case under the Customs Act, 1962 but under Section 13 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 as well and follow the prescribed procedure of prosecution under the Customs Act, 1962. 66. It is to be noted that the power of the customs authority extends only to the point of entry within the territory of India, but even at this stage, the customs officers have been empowered under Rules 40 and 41 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 read with Section 11 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 to send samples of drugs and cosmetics for testing to the Central Drugs Laboratory for verifying whether the drugs imported conform to the specification prescribed by the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and the Rules framed thereunder. Upon an adverse report, the consequence flowing from it is not only the power to direct return of the imported drugs and cosmetics or to confiscate and destroy the same in terms of Rules 40 and 41 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 but also to prosecute the offender in terms of Section 11 as well as Section 13 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 in terms of the procedure prescribed under the Customs Act, 1962. Discernible from the scheme under the Customs Act, 1962 is the power of the customs officers to arrest for violation of import of prohibited item under Section 104 along with Section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962. Further, the power that has been conferred on the customs officers in terms of Section 104(3) of the Customs Act, 1962 is the same as that of Officer-in-Charge of a police station and is subject to limitations and restraints provided under the Cr.P.C. This re-enforces my view that at the point of entry of drugs and cosmetics the power has to be exercised only by the customs authorities for infraction of Chapter III of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 following the procedure prescribed under the Customs Act, 1962. The above discussion leaves no scope of registering of an FIR by the police even for offences under Chapter III for import of adulterated, misbranded and spurious drugs and cosmetics at the point of its entry in the territory of India. 67. Section 36-AC of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 makes the offences under Sections 13(1)(a) and 13(1)(c) as cognizable and non-bailable. 68. Section 13(3) declares that the punishment under Section 13 shall be in addition to what is contemplated under the Customs Act. 69. Section 21(1) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 talks about prescription of requisite qualification for being an Inspector under Chapter IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 to be prescribed by the State or the Central Government. 70. Section 21(3) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 speaks of disqualification for appointment of an Inspector and it includes any financial interest in import, manufacture or sale of drugs and cosmetics. 71. 70. Section 21(3) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 speaks of disqualification for appointment of an Inspector and it includes any financial interest in import, manufacture or sale of drugs and cosmetics. 71. Chapter III does not prescribe for "Inspectors" but Section 21(3) prescribes disqualification for appointment of "Inspector" and it includes any financial interest in import of drugs and cosmetics leading to irresistible conclusion that the "Inspector" appointed under Chapter IV is the Inspector for all purposes for Chapter III as well. 72. Further, Rule 51(8) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945, which allows the Inspector to inspect premises of sale and detain imported packages of prohibited drugs, creates redoubts around the conclusion that the Inspector under Chapter IV is also the Inspector for Chapter III of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. 73. It is important to note that "Inspector" has not been referred to and conferred with any specific duties under Chapter III of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, which specifically provides for import of drugs and cosmetics. Even offences stated therein relate to import of drugs and cosmetics. But when read along with Rule 26(ii) and Rule 51(8) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945, it is apparent that the Inspector appointed has the power to detain imported drugs which are prohibited in terms of Sections 10 and 10-A of Chapter III of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. Rule 26(ii) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 permits the Inspector to enter into premises where the imported drugs and cosmetics are stocked and it also permits the Inspector to collect the samples for testing. Rule 40 states that even imported drugs and cosmetics need to conform to the standards prescribed in the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945. 74. At the intersection of Chapter III and Chapter IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 rests the powers and duties of the Drug Inspector. Chapter IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 deals with manufacture, sale and distribution of drugs and cosmetics and they are not cumulative but alternative subjects dealt with in the Chapter IV. 75. 74. At the intersection of Chapter III and Chapter IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 rests the powers and duties of the Drug Inspector. Chapter IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 deals with manufacture, sale and distribution of drugs and cosmetics and they are not cumulative but alternative subjects dealt with in the Chapter IV. 75. Chapter IV does not say that the drugs and cosmetics being sold or distributed or stocked or exhibited or offered for sale should be one, i.e., manufactured within India or should be imported and as such the conclusion upon reading Chapter III and Chapter IV that can reasonably be drawn is that an imported drug or cosmetic which is prohibited or is spurious, adulterated or misbranded and when sold or distributed or stocked or exhibited or offered for sale shall fall within Chapter IV and Inspector shall exercise all powers conferred upon him under the said Chapter IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. 76. Even an imported drug or cosmetic, which is adulterated, spurious or misbranded under Chapter III can be adulterated, spurious and misbranded when the imported drug and cosmetic is sold or distributed or stocked or exhibited or offered for sale under Chapter IV and the Drug Inspector shall have the jurisdiction over the same and all procedures and consequences prescribed under Chapter IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 including the consequences of Section 32 of the said Act provided under Chapter IV shall follow. 77. It is of salience to note that Inspector has been given power under Rule 26(ii) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 to collect samples for testing and the procedure for collection and processing of samples have only been given in Section 23 of Chapter IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. It is further to be noted that upon sample of imported drugs and cosmetics reported to be in contravention of standards prescribed by the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945, he has to follow the procedure prescribed in terms of Chapter IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 for there is no other procedure prescribed in Chapter III. 78. Considering the interplay of Sections between Chapter IV and Chapter III, the submission made by Mr. 78. Considering the interplay of Sections between Chapter IV and Chapter III, the submission made by Mr. Jitendra Singh, learned Amicus Curiae deserves to be accepted that the only irresistible conclusion that one can draw is that Chapter IV is an adjunct of Chapter III and the two have to be read together as a scheme. What Chapter III lacks, aid shall have to be drawn from Chapter IV. Mr. Singh is also right in his submission that once Chapter IV comes into play, the law laid down in Ashok Kumar Sharma (Supra) by the Hon'ble Supreme Court comes into play and the police shall be divested of the power to institute an FIR and investigate even under Chapter III of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 irrespective of the fact that offences under Sections 13(1)(a) and 13(1)(c) of Chapter III have been made cognizable and non-bailable. 79. For the reasons aforesaid, the arguments advanced by Mr. Anjani Kumar, learned AAG-IV and Mr. Vinay Kirti Singh, learned G.A.-2 appearing for the State that there is nothing in Chapter III of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 which prohibits the police from lodging an FIR or its investigation for the offences falling under Chapter III deserve to be rejected. 80. In view of the discussions made above, it is as clear as daylight that under Chapter III there are offences for which Customs authorities have been empowered to set in motion the criminal justice system under the Customs Act and another set of offences for which the Inspector has to set the criminal law in motion by taking aid of the provisions prescribed under Chapter IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 read with powers and duties prescribed under Rule 26(ii) and mandate of Rule 31 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945. 81. Considering the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and in the scheme of things of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, the police has no role to play either under Chapter III or Chapter IV unless the same is brought within the mandate of Section 32(3) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. The contrary argument made by Mr. Anjani Kumar, learned AAG-IV and Mr. The contrary argument made by Mr. Anjani Kumar, learned AAG-IV and Mr. Vinay Kirti Singh, learned G.A.-2 appearing for the State that there is no provision like Section 32 which falls under Chapter III of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and, hence, there would be no bar for the police to lodge FIR for the offences falling under Chapter III and to investigate them lacks merit. 82. The next issue, which has been referred to the present Bench for answer is with respect to the power of police to institute FIR and investigate the offences under Chapter IV-A, which deals with the provisions relating to Ayurvedic, Siddha and Unani Drugs. 83. In this regard, it is important to note that Section 33-G of Chapter IV-A of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 speaks of duties and qualification of an Inspector. Further Rule 162 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 prescribes duties of Inspector specially authorized to inspect the manufacture of Ayurvedic (including Siddha) and Unani Drugs and Rule 167 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 provides qualifications of an Inspector. Section 33-H legislates by reference and makes a wholesale import of Sections 22, 23, 24 and 25 of Chapter IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. into Chapter IV-A. It, thus, prescribes that the power of the Inspector (Section 22) and the procedure for taking samples and its processing till institution of prosecution (Section 23) under Chapter IV-A shall be the same as that for drugs and cosmetics under Chapter IV. Section 33-I prescribes penalty for contravention of Chapter IV-A. 84. Section 33-M of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 talks of cognizance of offence. Clause (1) of Section 33-M provides that no prosecution under Chapter IV-A shall be instituted except by an Inspector with the previous sanction of the authority specified under sub-section (4) of Section 33-G of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. Clause (2) of Section 33-M provides that no court inferior to that of Metropolitan Magistrate or of a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class shall try an offence punishable under this Chapter. 85. It is to be noted that none of the offences of Chapter IV-A are triable by Special Courts, which are courts of Sessions as has been prescribed by Section 36-AB. 85. It is to be noted that none of the offences of Chapter IV-A are triable by Special Courts, which are courts of Sessions as has been prescribed by Section 36-AB. Further, none of the offences of Chapter IV-A are cognizable and non-bailable as has been prescribed by Section 36-AC. Further, Section 36-A makes the offences except offence under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 33-I of Chapter IV-A summary triable. 86. If one reads Section 32 under Chapter IV with Section 33-M under Chapter IV-A of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 side by side, it would be evident that they have same opening lines. The material difference between the two provisions is that while the power to institute prosecution has been conferred to four different sets of persons under Section 32, the same has exclusively been conferred upon the Inspector. Further, unlike subsection (3) of Section 32, there is no such provision in Section 33-M of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. 87. The rigours of Section 32 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 was the subject matter of consideration by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Sharma (Supra) and while concluding it held that the police has no power to institute an FIR under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C in regard to cognizable offences under Chapter IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and investigate them. It stated that the police has power only to institute and prosecute cases which are offences under any other law over which it has jurisdiction but not for the offences under Chapter IV. The Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the provisions of Sections 22, 23 and 24 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and the interplay of the scheme of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 with that of procedure prescribed under Chapter XII, XIII, XIV and XV of the Cr.P.C and concluded that the scheme of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, which is a special Act, is totally different from Cr.P.C and, thus, police cannot initiate prosecution under Section 32 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. 88. 88. Considering the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and Section 33-M of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, which is more restrictive than Section 32 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, the only conclusion that one can draw is that there is legal interdict to police registering an FIR for the offences under Chapter IV-A of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 as well as investigating the same. The absence of anything like sub-section (3) of Section 32 in Section 33-M also goes to show that the legislature has circumscribed the powers of the police to register an FIR and investigate an offence under Chapter IV-A of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. 89. In conclusion, the reference is being answered thus:- (i) Issue No. II: (a) The police has no power to institute and investigate the offences under Chapter III, Chapter IV and Chapter IV-A of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. (b) The offences under Chapter IV-A are not to be tried by the court of Sessions and except the offences under Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 13 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, all other offences under Chapter III would be triable by a court of Judicial Magistrate. (c) When imported drugs and cosmetics are distributed, or sold, or stocked, or exhibited, or offered for sale, they would be covered by Chapter IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. (ii) Issue No. III: The judgments of this Court in Cr.W.J.C. No. 719 of 1998, Cr.Misc. No. 808 of 1998 and Cr.Misc. No. 50246 of 2006 are affirmed as good law. (iii) Issue No. IV : The said issue is now exhaustively covered by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Sharma (Supra), which lays down that the prosecution under Section 32 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 shall be instituted only by way of filing of complaint and that police cannot register and investigate offences under Chapter IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. 90. 90. After answering the reference, I deem it proper to issue following directions keeping in view the ramification of the matter :- (i) In the FIRs instituted in respect of the offences under Chapter III and IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 prior to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Sharma (Supra) and where investigation has been completed and cognizance has been taken by the court and the cases have travelled beyond the stage of cognizance shall be saved and the prosecution shall continue as per the provisions prescribed under the Cr.P.C. (ii) The cases in which the FIRs were instituted in respect of the offences under Chapter III and IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 prior to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Sharma (Supra) and where investigations have not been completed, all previous acts of the police officer including the investigation and the material collected in course of investigation and the pending proceedings shall be saved on account of de facto doctrine and only the prosecution of the cases shall be handed over to the concerned Drug Inspector, who shall prosecute through Public Prosecutor or the Special Public Prosecutor, as the case may be. (iii) In such cases any action taken by the police, except handing over the case to Drug Inspector, after the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Sharma (Supra) shall be a nullity in the eye of law. (iv) During argument, we have been told that there are many cases where FIRs have been registered in regard to cognizable offences falling under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and the pending investigations prior to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Sharma (Supra) have not been handed over to Drug Inspector till date. In all such cases, it would be the responsibility of the Director General of Police of the State of Bihar to ensure that pursuant to the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Sharma (Supra), those cases should be handed over by the police to the concerned Drug Inspectors as early as possible, but no later than one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. (v) In all such FIRs registered for the offences punishable under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 in which the samples of drugs and cosmetics had been sent for test or analysis and the samples were analyzed or tested and were found misbranded, spurious or adulterated by the Government Analyst and the report has been received during investigation, the concerned Drug Inspector shall be individually responsible to file prosecution report before the court and to take action on the same in accordance with law as early as possible and preferably within a further period of one month from the date of receipt of the FIR and other materials collected during investigation from the police, (vi) The Drug Controller, State of Bihar shall also be individually responsible to ensure compliance of the directions made in para (v) by this Court. 91. Registry is directed to send a copy of the order to the Director General of Police, Bihar and the Drug Controller, Bihar, Patna forthwith. 92. I place on record my appreciation for the enlightening assistance rendered by the learned Amicus Curiae as well as learned Additional Advocate General No. IV and the learned Government Advocate No. 2. 93. Since I have already answered the issues referred to this Bench as well as the ancillary and subsidiary issues of importance and issued certain directions, I remit these applications back to the learned Single Judge for deciding them in accordance with law. Per Chakradhari Sharan Singh, J: 94. I have had the great privilege of going through the scholarly judgment authored by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ashwani Kumar Singh. Despite my sincere reverence for his Lordship's learning, erudition and experience, I have failed to persuade myself to agree with the conclusion that the police does not have the authority to institute prosecution and investigate qua offences punishable under Chapter III of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (Act 23 of 1940) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). Further, I humbly and respectfully do not agree with the conclusion that when imported drugs and cosmetics are distributed, or sold, or stocked, or exhibited, or offered for sale, they would be covered only by Chapter IV of the Act and Chapter III thereof which deals with import of drugs. Further, I humbly and respectfully do not agree with the conclusion that when imported drugs and cosmetics are distributed, or sold, or stocked, or exhibited, or offered for sale, they would be covered only by Chapter IV of the Act and Chapter III thereof which deals with import of drugs. In my opinion, once a case is made out of illegal import of misbranded, adulterated, spurious drugs or cosmetics or import of such drug or cosmetics, which do not comply with the standards set out and prescribed under the Act, the same shall essentially constitute an offence punishable under Section 13 falling under Chapter III of the Act. Since brother Singh J has extensively encapsulated in his judgment the submissions advanced at the bar during the course of hearing before this bench, I have, in my judgment, briefly referred to only such aspects which I have considered relevant to arrive at my conclusions. 95. How a criminal prosecution can be launched for various offences punishable under the provisions of the Act? Whether filing of a complaint case by the officers mentioned under the Act is the only valid option for initiating a criminal prosecution for the said offences? Whether prosecution can be instituted also with the registration of FIR by the police or by filing a complaint case by the officers or persons other than those mentioned in the Act? These are the primordial questions which need to be answered to answer the reference made by a Full Bench of three Judges of this Court to this Larger Bench. 96. Before adverting to the questions noted hereinabove, it would be appropriate to briefly recount the background in which the present reference has been made to this Larger Bench. The Division Benches of this Court in case of Om Prakash Singh vs. State of Bihar (Cr. Misc. No. 50246 of 2006) and in case of Shankar Kumar Ghosh vs. State of Bihar (Cr. Misc. No. 719 of 1998) have held registration of First Information Report and police investigation of the cases registered under Section 32 of the Act to be impermissible. Misc. No. 50246 of 2006) and in case of Shankar Kumar Ghosh vs. State of Bihar (Cr. Misc. No. 719 of 1998) have held registration of First Information Report and police investigation of the cases registered under Section 32 of the Act to be impermissible. The correctness of the said legal proposition came to be doubted by another Division Bench in its order dated 12.08.2015, passed in the present Cr.WJC No. 887 of 2013 (Bablu @ Rajesh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar and others) and Cr.WJC No. 899 of 2012 (Chotelal Singh vs. The State of Bihar and others) (Bablu I in short). Accordingly, for an authoritative pronouncement, the Division Bench referred the matter to a Full Bench for consideration. Following were the points of reference :- "(i) Is not it that in absence of any prescription as regards taking cognizance of an offence under Chapter IV of the Act, it could be only the Court of Magistrate who has to act under Section 190 Cr.P.C? (ii) Is not it that Section 32 of the Act is attracted only in respect of offences which are defined and made punishable by Chapter IV of the Act. Other provisions, like, Section 13, 33-I and 33-J of the Act are not covered by Section 32 of the Act and in cases of those sections which are falling under Chapter III and IV-A cognizance and trial has to be undertaken by courts other than the court of sessions as per provisions contained under Chapters III or IV-A of the Act and if that is so and in absence of any special provision barring the investigation of offences which are declared cognizable by Section 36-AC, is not the police competent to register the offence under Section 154 Cr.P.C. and to investigate the same and lay down the charge sheet before the courts of Magistrate for taking cognizance? (iii) Whether the judgments/orders of the Court in Cr.W.J.C. No. 719 of 1998 and Cr. Misc. No. 808 of 1998 and also Cr. Misc. No. 50246 of 2006 require reconsideration? (iv) Should not the police register a case and investigate the same even in respect of offences under Chapter IV of the Act as appears held by implication by the Supreme Court in Vishal Agrawal & Anr. (supra), of course in context to an enactment other than the Act? 97. Misc. No. 50246 of 2006 require reconsideration? (iv) Should not the police register a case and investigate the same even in respect of offences under Chapter IV of the Act as appears held by implication by the Supreme Court in Vishal Agrawal & Anr. (supra), of course in context to an enactment other than the Act? 97. For an authoritative pronouncement of law on the questions of reference, the cases were placed before a Full Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice Hemant Kumar Srivastava, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Aditya Kumar Trivedi and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Birendra Kumar. The three learned Judges constituting the Full Bench delivered their separate judgments recording their respective opinions on 24.07.2020 (Bablu II in short). Hon'ble Mr. Justice Aditya Kumar Trivedi answered the three questions of reference in paragraphs 96, 97 and 98 as under : "96. Keeping the aforesaid principle in mind, now the questionnaire so formulated by the Division Bench has to be answered, (a) After going through Section 36, 36A, 36AB, 36AC, 36AD, 36AE, it is crystal clear that there happens to be no impediment so prescribed under the CrPC, more particularly, is found properly answered on a plain reading of the same as the committal proceeding has to be taken up in accordance with Section 209 of the CrPC that too only after taking of cognizance under Section 190 CrPC irrespective of application of other penal provisions under garbs of Section 2 of the Act and is accordingly, answered that the Magistrate would while exercising power under Section 190 CrPC is competent enough to take cognizance of an offence, apart from others, including under Drugs and Cosmetics Act. 97. So far points no.(b) and (d) are concerned, it is needless to say that irrespective of nature of the offence, being non cog or cog, the prosecution could not be confined by way of filing of the complaint petition only rather, considering the intent of the legislature, the spirit of the law, it could be on a complaint petition as well as on police report. 98. Point no.(c). In the aforesaid background, the principle so decided in CrWJC No. 719/1998 along with Cr.Misc. No. 808/1998 and also Cr.Misc. No. 50246/2006 are hereby, over ruled. " 98. Hon'ble Mr. Justice Birendra Kumar, on the other hand, concluded as under in paragraph 130, answering the reference made by the Division Bench:- "130. 98. Point no.(c). In the aforesaid background, the principle so decided in CrWJC No. 719/1998 along with Cr.Misc. No. 808/1998 and also Cr.Misc. No. 50246/2006 are hereby, over ruled. " 98. Hon'ble Mr. Justice Birendra Kumar, on the other hand, concluded as under in paragraph 130, answering the reference made by the Division Bench:- "130. Conclusion :- A. Under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, the institution of FIR under Section 154 Cr.P.C. and investigation of the case by the police and submission of chargesheets under Section 173 Cr.P.C. is completely barred in view of the specific provision for institution of the prosecution and power of investigation vested to the specially skilled Inspectors in the matter of nature and technicalities of the offences under the Act. B: Any aggrieved person can file a criminal complaint either to the court or to the Inspector under the Act and the Inspector is authorised to investigate any complaint in writing which may be made to him in view of the powers under Rule 51(4) of the Rules, 1945. Even the Magistrate is competent to transmit the complaint petition filed before it to the Inspector in exercise of power vested in Cr.P.C. with direction to investigate and thereafter institute prosecution in respect of breaches of the Act and Rules thereunder. The power of the Magistrate shall be in addition to its own power to proceed with the complaint, instituted before it, according to law. C: As has been concluded above, the offences mentioned under Section 36-AB and 32(2) shall be tried by a court at the level of Sessions Judge by whatever designation, it may be known which includes one offence of Chapter-III and remaining offences of Chapter-IV of the Act. The rest of the offences under Chapter-III and under Chapter-IVA shall be tried by a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the 1st Class in view of the provisions under Section 15 occurring in Chapter-III and Section 33-M occurring in Chapter-IVA of the Act. According to quantum of punishment prescribed, the provisions of summary trial mentioned in the Cr.P.C. would be applicable as provided under Section 36-A of the Act as referred above. According to quantum of punishment prescribed, the provisions of summary trial mentioned in the Cr.P.C. would be applicable as provided under Section 36-A of the Act as referred above. D: A Magistrate competent under Section 190 Cr.P.C. to take cognizance shall be competent to take cognizance under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 also and shall follow the procedure of Cr.P.C. for enquiry and trial according to law and the aforesaid provision would not only confine to offences under Chapter-IV of the Act rather in respect of all the offences mentioned under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act." 99. Hon'ble Mr. Justice Hemant Kumar Srivastava noticed the conflicting opinions expressed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Aditya Kumar Trivedi and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Birendra Kumar and upon analyzing various statutory provisions under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder recorded his third opinion to the effect that except for the offence punishable under Chapter IV and Chapter IVA of the Act, an FIR can be lodged in respect of the offences punishable under other Chapters of the Act. Evidently, three Hon'ble Judges of the Special Bench were unanimous apropos point (i) of the reference made by the Division Bench and concluded that in absence of any specific provision of taking cognizance under the Act, the Magistrate of the 1st Class or Magistrate of the 2nd Class, specially empowered in this behalf, can take cognizance of the offences punishable under the Act as a court of original jurisdiction under Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. There being absence of a majority view, let alone unanimity of opinions among the three Hon'ble Judges, the Full Bench referred the matter to a Larger Bench for considering the points no. (ii), (iii) and (iv) of reference made by the Division Bench. Paragraph 166 of the Full Bench judgment reads as under : "166. In view of the aforesaid discussions, let the issues no. (ii), (iii) and (iv) as formulated by the Division Bench be referred to Larger Bench for consideration. Accordingly, Registry (Office) is directed to place this matter before Honble the Chief Justice with a request to Honble the Chief Justice to constitute Larger Bench for consideration of above stated issues. " 100. (ii), (iii) and (iv) as formulated by the Division Bench be referred to Larger Bench for consideration. Accordingly, Registry (Office) is directed to place this matter before Honble the Chief Justice with a request to Honble the Chief Justice to constitute Larger Bench for consideration of above stated issues. " 100. In view of the opinion recorded by the Full Bench in the order dated 24.07.2020 (Bablu II) as noticed above and the nature of the points of reference of the Division Bench in the order dated 12.08.2015 (Bablu I) as noted above, point (ii) is the only crucial issue which remains to be answered by this Larger Bench. 101. For convenience, I consider it desirable to split up the point no. (ii) of the reference in case of Bablu I into the following four parts so as to precisely and effectively deal with the questions involved therein:- (a) Is it not that Section 32 of the Act is attracted only in respect of the offences which are defined and made punishable by Chapter IV of the Act? (b) Whether other provisions, like Section 13, 33I and 33J of the Act are not covered by Section 32 of the Act? (c) Whether in cases of those Sections which fall under Chapters III and IVA of the Act, cognizance and trial have to be undertaken by courts other than court of sessions as per provisions contained under Chapter III or Chapter IVA of the Act? (d) If the above noted questions (a) and (b) have answers in affirmative, in the absence of any special provision barring investigation of offences which are declared cognizable by Section 36AC of the Act, whether the police is competent to register case under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. and to investigate the same and lay charge-sheet before the courts of magistrate for taking cognizance? 102. 102. It is apposite to note at this stage that a question had fallen for consideration before the Supreme Court in case of Union of India vs. Ashok Kumar Sharma and others (2020 SCC OnLine SC 683) as to whether in respect of offences falling under Chapter IV of the Act, an FIR could be registered under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. and the case be investigated or whether Section 32 of the Act supplants the procedure for investigation of offences under Cr.P.C. and the taking of cognizance of offences under Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. Further, whether it is permissible for an Inspector under the Act to arrest a person in connection with an offence under Chapter IV of the Act, was another question before the Supreme Court in case of Ashok Kumar Sharma (supra). Dealing exhaustively with the provisions of the Act, the Supreme Court answered the questions in following terms as contained in sub-paragraphs (i) to (iv) of paragraph 162 :- "162. Thus, we may cull out our conclusions/directions as follows: I. In regard to cognizable offences under Chapter IV of the Act, in view of Section 32 of the Act and also the scheme of the CrPC, the Police Officer cannot prosecute offenders in regard to such offences. Only the persons mentioned in Section 32 are entitled to do the same. II. There is no bar to the Police Officer, however, to investigate and prosecute the person where he has committed an offence, as stated under Section 32(3) of the Act, i.e., if he has committed any cognizable offence under any other law. III. Having regard to the scheme of the CrPC and also the mandate of Section 32 of the Act and on a conspectus of powers which are available with the Drugs Inspector under the Act and also his duties, a Police Officer cannot register a FIR under Section 154 of the CrPC, in regard to cognizable offences under Chapter IV of the Act and he cannot investigate such offences under the provisions of the CrPC. IV. Having regard to the provisions of Section 22(1) (d) of the Act, we hold that an arrest can be made by the Drugs Inspector in regard to cognizable offences falling under Chapter IV of the Act without any warrant and otherwise treating it as a cognizable offence. IV. Having regard to the provisions of Section 22(1) (d) of the Act, we hold that an arrest can be made by the Drugs Inspector in regard to cognizable offences falling under Chapter IV of the Act without any warrant and otherwise treating it as a cognizable offence. He is, however, bound by the law as laid down in D.K. Basu (supra) and to follow the provisions of CrPC. "(Underlined for emphasis) 103. After having laid down the law thus, while answering the questions posed by itself, the Supreme Court considered it appropriate in case of Ashok Kumar Sharma (supra) to issue certain directions in relation to the prosecutions already initiated for the offences punishable under the Act with the registration of an FIR and arrest made by a police officer. Sub paragraphs (v) to (vii) of paragraph 162 reads as under :- "V. It would appear that on the understanding that the Police Officer can register a FIR, there are many cases where FIRs have been registered in regard to cognizable offences falling under Chapter IV of the Act. We find substance in the stand taken by learned Amicus Curiae and direct that they should be made over to the Drugs Inspectors, if not already made over, and it is for the Drugs Inspector to take action on the same in accordance with the law. We must record that we are resorting to our power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India in this regard. VI. Further, we would be inclined to believe that in a number of cases on the understanding of the law relating to the power of arrest as, in fact, evidenced by the facts of the present case, police officers would have made arrests in regard to offences under Chapter IV of the Act. Therefore, in regard to the power of arrest, we make it clear that our decision that Police Officers do not have power to arrest in respect of cognizable offences under Chapter IV of the Act, will operate with effect from the date of this Judgment. VII. We further direct that the Drugs Inspectors, who carry out the arrest, must not only report the arrests, as provided in Section 58 of the Cr.P.C, but also immediately report the arrests to their superior Officers. " 104. VII. We further direct that the Drugs Inspectors, who carry out the arrest, must not only report the arrests, as provided in Section 58 of the Cr.P.C, but also immediately report the arrests to their superior Officers. " 104. From the very opening paragraph of the conclusions arrived at in Ashok Kumar Sharma (supra) it can be easily discerned that the said decision is confined to the provisions under Chapter IV of the Act and does not deal at all with provisions falling under Chapters III and IVA of the Act. The questions relating to permissibility of registration of FIR, investigation and arrest by the police in relation to the offences punishable under Chapter IV of the Act only have been considered and dealt with in Ashok Kumar Sharma (supra). The decision in case of Ashok Kumar Sharma (supra) was rendered on 28.08.2020 i.e. after the reference was made by the Full Bench in Bablu II, to the Larger Bench. 105. Be that as it may, the law laid down by the Supreme Court in case of Ashok Kumar Sharma (supra), relevant portion of which has been quoted hereinabove, leaves no room for doubt that even in respect of the cognizable offences falling under Chapter IV of the Act, a police officer cannot prosecute the offenders. In view of Section 32 of the Act and the scheme of the Cr.P.C. a police officer cannot register an FIR under Section 154 of the Act in regard to the offences punishable under Chapter IV of the Act and cannot investigate such offences under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. Further, such bar to the police officer to investigate and prosecute a person is absent when a person is found to have committed any cognizable offence under any other law, for any act or omission which constitutes an offence against Chapter IV of the Act. 106. Arguments have been advanced at length before this bench. It is regrettable to note at this stage that, throughout, during the course of hearing of these matters on the points of reference, we could not get any assistance from learned counsel for the petitioners in Cr.W.J.C. No. 887 of 2013. Mr. 106. Arguments have been advanced at length before this bench. It is regrettable to note at this stage that, throughout, during the course of hearing of these matters on the points of reference, we could not get any assistance from learned counsel for the petitioners in Cr.W.J.C. No. 887 of 2013. Mr. Jitendra Singh, learned Senior Counsel present for the petitioner in another case was, therefore, requested by this Bench to assist it, considering the significance and the wider ramification of the issues involved, to answer the points of reference and to reach a definite conclusion as an amicus curiae. Rising to the occasion, Mr. Singh extended to this Bench commendable assistance befitting a Senior Counsel of his stature. Mr. Anjani Kumar, learned AAG-4 representing the State of Bihar has assisted this Bench with his usual diligence and perseverance. 107. Mr. Jitendra Singh, learned Senior Counsel has submitted that for the purpose of understanding true import of Section 32 of the Act, the same needs to be read in conjunction with Section 36AD of the Act which states the provisions of Cr.P.C. shall apply to only 'proceeding before the court'. It is his analogy that since Section 36AD of the Act states that the provisions of the Cr.P.C. shall apply to the proceedings before the Court, the same shall not apply at the stage of investigation which is purely in executive domain as the proceeding before the Court commences from the stage of taking cognizance and includes thereafter, other subsequent stages including commitment/framing of charge and so on. It is his contention that Section 32 read with Section 36AD of the Act permits the only mode of instituting prosecution by way of complaint alone. He has placed reliance on various decisions of the Supreme Court in case of Amarinder Singh vs. Special Committee, Punjab Vidhan Sabha and others reported in (2010) 6 SCC 113 (paragraphs 87 to 89), Manubhai Ratilal Patel through Ushaben vs. State of Gujarat and others reported in (2013) 1 SCC 374 (paragraph 31), R. Sarala vs. T.S. Velu and others reported in (2000) 4 SCC 459 and State of Bihar and another vs. P.P. Sharma, IAS and another (AIR 1991 SC 7260)(paragraph 68) to support his contentions. 108. 108. He has next contended that the word 'prosecution' means a criminal action before a Tribunal or a Court of Law and does not include registration of FIR and investigation by police. He has relied, in this respect, on the decisions of Supreme Court in case of Thomas Dana vs. State of Punjab ( AIR 1959 SC 375 ) and in case of General Officer Commanding, Rashtriya Rifles vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and another reported in (2012) 6 SCC 228 . 109. He has urged that subsequent decision of Supreme Court in case of State, CBI vs. Sashi Balasubramanium and another reported in (2006) 13 SCC 252, which lays down that prosecution also includes registration of FIR, has not noticed earlier Larger Bench decision of Supreme Court in case of Thomas Dana (supra). Relying on the decision in case of N.S. Giri vs. Corporation of City of Mangalore and others reported in (1999) 4 SCC 697 he has argued that since a decision of a Constitution Bench of larger strength has been overlooked by a subsequent judgment by a Bench of lesser strength, the subsequent judgment can not be treated to be binding authority. He has also argued that the decision in case of Sashi Balasubramanium (supra) was rendered in a different context which has neither a binding authority nor can be considered as an authoritative pronouncement on the aspect of the true purport and meaning of the word 'prosecution'. 110. Addressing on the provisions falling under Chapter III of the Act, he has submitted that though the import of drugs and cosmetics prohibited under the said Chapter of the Act, is governed also by the Customs Act, the same is yet subject to Section 13 of the Act and, therefore, import of prohibited drugs and cosmetics constitutes an offence and invite punishment as prescribed under Section 13 of the Act only and penal provisions of Customs Act so far as its illegal import is concerned, shall not be attracted. According to him, the Custom Officers do not get the powers and duties conferred on Drug Inspector under the Act and, therefore, prosecution if any, as provided for under the Customs Act, can be lodged in respect of such imported drugs and cosmetics by the officers empowered under the Customs Act, though the offence and punishment for illegal import under Chapter III of the Act will be guided by Section 13 of the Act and not by penal provisions of the Customs Act. 111. Section 11 of the Act reads as under : - "11. Application of law relating to sea customs and powers of Customs Officers.- (IX The law for the time being in force relating to sea customs and to goods, the import of which is prohibited by section 18 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 (8 of 1878) shall, subject to the provisions of section 13 of this Act, apply in respect of drugs [and cosmetics] the import of which is prohibited under this Chapter, and officers of Customs and officers empowered under that Act to perform the duties imposed thereby on a [Commissioner of Customs] and other officers of Customs, shall have the same powers in respect of such drugs [and cosmetics] as they have for the time being in respect of such goods as aforesaid. [(2) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1), the [Commissioner of Customs] or any officer of the Government authorised by the Central Government in this behalf, may detain any imported package which he suspects to contain any drug [or cosmetic] the import of which is prohibited under this Chapter and shall forthwith report such detention to the Drugs Controller, India, and if necessary, forward the package or sample of any suspected drug [or cosmetic] found therein to the Central Drugs Laboratory.]" (Highlighted for emphasis) 112. According to him, however, the Section does not denude the powers and duties of Drug Inspector prescribed in Sections 22, 25 of Chapter IV of the Act and Rules framed thereunder and to prosecute for offences punishable under the Act including for offences under Section 13 of the Act. According to him, however, the Section does not denude the powers and duties of Drug Inspector prescribed in Sections 22, 25 of Chapter IV of the Act and Rules framed thereunder and to prosecute for offences punishable under the Act including for offences under Section 13 of the Act. Neither Section 11 of the Customs Act nor Section 13 of the Act empowers the Police Officers to institute an FIR under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. and investigate in respect of the drugs and cosmetics, import of which has been prohibited under Chapter III of the Act, he would submits. 113. He has further submitted that offences punishable under Section 135 of the Customs Act being non-cognizable, no FIR can be instituted in respect thereof and the only mode available under the Customs Act is to institute prosecution through complaint as defined under Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C. He has argued that even in respect of an offence punishable under Section 13 of the Act, the Custom Officers may, at the highest, initiate prosecution by filing a complaint and not otherwise. 114. A reference has been made by Mr. Singh, learned Senior Counsel to the Repealing and Amending Act 2016(Act 23 of 2016) whereby enactments specified in the First Schedule thereof including the Drugs and Cosmetics (Amendment) Act, 2008 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act 26 of 2008') have been repealed. By the said Act 26 of 2008, various amendments have been introduced in the Act including Section 32 of the Act, which has been substituted in place of earlier provision. This argument has been advanced to contend that with the coming into force of the Repealing and Amending Act 2016, the position, as the same existed before enactment of Act 26 of 2008, stands restored. 115. Mr. Anjani Kumar, learned AAG-4 has submitted that the Act does not exclude such provisions of Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. which pertain to information to the police and their powers to investigate, as available under Sections 154 to 176 of the Cr.P.C. He has contended that by operation of Section 4 and 5 of the Cr.P.C, said provisions under Sections 154 to 176 apply with full force as the provisions of Cr.P.C. have not been excluded. He has placed reliance on a Supreme Court's decision in case of Sashi Balasubramanium (supra) to convey that prosecution includes registration of FIR. He has placed reliance on a Supreme Court's decision in case of Sashi Balasubramanium (supra) to convey that prosecution includes registration of FIR. He has argued that in respect of such offences punishable under Section 13 of the Act which are cognizable in terms of Sections 36AC of the Act, institution of prosecution with the lodging of the FIR cannot be held to be impermissible. 116. The submission made by Mr. Singh, learned Senior Counsel that with the enactment of Repealing and Amending Act 2016 (Act 23 of 2016), whereby certain enactments including Act 26 of 2008 have been repealed and, therefore, the position of the Act as the same existed before enactment of Act 26 of 2008 stands restored, in my opinion, is on a mistaken notice of the scope and effect of 'Repealing and Amending Act'. 117. Section 6-A of the General Clauses Act gives direct answer to the said contention which states that where any Central Act or Regulation repeals any enactment by which the text of any Central Act or Regulation was amended by express omission, insertion or substitution of any matter, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect the continuance of any such amendment made by the enactment so repealed and in operation at the time of such repeal. In my opinion, the Repealing and Amending Act, 2016 has no effect at all on continuance of the provisions incorporated by amendment in the Act by Act 26 of 2008. 118. The effect of enactment of Repealing and Amending Act has been lucidly explained in a Division Bench decision of Calcutta High Court in case of Khuda Bux vs. Manager, Caledonian Press ( AIR 1954 Cal 484 ), which has been noted with approval by the Supreme Court in Jethanand Betab vs. State of Delhi ( AIR 1960 SC 89 ). It has been unambiguously laid down in these decisions that such acts have no legislative effect, but are designed for editorial revision, being intended only to excise dead matter from the statute book and to reduce its volume. Mostly, they expurgate amending Acts, because, having imparted the amendments to the main Acts, those Acts have served their purpose and have no further reasons for their existence. Mostly, they expurgate amending Acts, because, having imparted the amendments to the main Acts, those Acts have served their purpose and have no further reasons for their existence. The Calcutta High Court in case of Khuda Bux (supra) has further noted that the only object of such Acts which in England called Statute Law Revision Acts, is 'legislative spring-cleaning' and they are not intended to make any change in the law. 119. In any view of the matter, the said Repealing and Amending Act, 2016 is guarded by Saving Clause (4) of the Act in tune with Section 6A of the General Clauses Act, from which it can be easily culled out that the repeal of the Amendment Act does not affect the continuance of the amendment made by the Act 26 of 2008 so repealed in operation at the time of such repeal. 120. It is clear on plain reading of Section 6-A of the General Clauses Act that repeal of an Amendment Act is not intended to bring any change in law but to remove such enactments which become unnecessary after having served their purpose of imparting amendment to the main Act. 121. After having answered the aforementioned submission, I now proceed to answer the reference. In order to adequately answer point (ii) of the reference made by the Division Bench in Bablu I (supra) and for deeper appreciation of the core issue which the present debate involves, in my opinion, the 'distinguishing' and 'identical' features of the three Chapters viz. Chapter III, Chapter IV and Chapter IVA of the Act, in the background of the enactment of the Act and its scheme need to be identified and ascertained, first. 122. The preamble of the Act makes it evident that it was enacted to regulate (i) the import (ii) the manufacture (iii) the distribution and (iv) the sale of drugs. The Act came into force with effect from 10.04.1940. The term 'Cosmetics' came to be inserted into the Act with the 'Drugs' by an amendment (Act 21 of 1962) which came into force with effect from 27.07.1964. It is also evident that the Act was enacted under and in accordance with Section 103 of the Government of India Act, 1935. Section 103 of the Government of India Act, 1935 reads as under : "103. It is also evident that the Act was enacted under and in accordance with Section 103 of the Government of India Act, 1935. Section 103 of the Government of India Act, 1935 reads as under : "103. If it appears to the Legislatures of two or more Provinces to be desirable that any of the matters enumerated in the Provincial Legislative List should be regulated in those Provinces by Act of the Federal Legislature, and if resolutions to that effect are passed by all the Chambers of those Provincial Legislatures, it shall be lawful for the Federal Legislature to pass an Act for regulating that matter accordingly, but any Act so passed may, as respects any Province to which it applies, be amended or repealed by an Act of the Legislature of that Province." 123. Article 252 of the Constitution of India is the equivalent provision to Section 103 of the Government of India Act which reads as under : "252. Power of Parliament to legislate for two or more States by consent and adoption of such legislation by any other State.-(1) If it appears to the Legislatures of two or more States to be desirable that any of the matters with respect to which Parliament has no power to make laws for the States except as provided in Articles 249 and 250 should be regulated in such States by Parliament by law, and if resolutions to that effect are passed by all the Houses of the Legislatures of those States, it shall be lawful for Parliament to pass an Act for regulating that matter accordingly, and any Act so passed shall apply to such States and to any other State by which it is adopted afterwards by resolution passed in that behalf by the House or, where there are two Houses, by each of the Houses of the Legislature of that State. (2) Any Act so passed by Parliament may be amended or repealed by an Act of Parliament passed or adopted in like manner but shall not, as respects any State to which it applies, be amended or repealed by an Act of the Legislature of that State. " 124. It is to be noticed that Chapter IVA was introduced by an amendment with effect from 01.02.1969 (Act 13 of 1964). " 124. It is to be noticed that Chapter IVA was introduced by an amendment with effect from 01.02.1969 (Act 13 of 1964). When the Act was enacted in 1940, in its original form, its Chapter III provided for 'control of import of drugs into India' whereas Chapter IV dealt with 'control, manufacture, sale and distribution of drugs'. The separate Chapter IVA was incorporated with effect from 01.02.1969, apparently, to control manufacture, sale and distribution of Ayurvedic, Siddha and Unani Drugs. Evidently thus, whereas Chapter III of the Act incorporates provisions qua import of the drugs and cosmetics, Chapter IV and IVA deal with manufacture, sale and distribution of the same. The statement of objects and reasons of the Act 23 of 1940 read as under :- "Statement of Objects and Reasons.- In order to give effect to the recommendations of the Drugs Enquiry Committee, insofar as they relate to matters with which the Central Government is primarily concerned, a Bill to regulate the import of drugs into British India was introduced in the Legislative Assembly in 1937. The Select Committee appointed by the Legislative Assembly was of the opinion that a more comprehensive measure providing for the uniform control of the manufacture and distribution of drugs as well as of import was desirable. The Government of India accordingly asked Provincial Governments to invite the Provincial Legislatures to pass resolutions under section 103 of the Government of India Act, 1935, empowering the Central Legislature to pass an Act for regulating such matters relating to the control of drugs as fall within the Provincial Legislative list. Such resolutions have now been passed by all Provincial Legislatures. 2. Chapter II of the Bill establishes a Board of Technical Experts to advise the Central and the Provincial Governments on technical matters. 3. Chapter III provides for the control of the import of drugs into British India. The executive power under this Chapter will accordingly be exercised by the Central Government. 4. Chapter IV relates to control of the manufacture, sale and distribution of drugs and contains the provisions which it is proposed should be enacted in exercise of the powers conferred by the resolutions under section 103 of the Government of India Act, 1935, passed by the Provincial Legislatures. The executive power under Chapter IV will be exercised by the Provincial Government. 5. The executive power under Chapter IV will be exercised by the Provincial Government. 5. The First Schedule prescribes the standards to be complied with by imported drugs and the Second Schedule prescribes the standards to be complied with the drugs manufactured, sold or distributed in India. The standards prescribed in the two Schedules are identical. The Central Government will have power to amend the First Schedule, but power to amend the Second Schedule will rest with Provincial Government. 6. The Government of India have considered to what extent provision can be made to secure the maintenance of uniformity in standards and in other important matters in which uniformity is desirable. They understand that it would be ultra vires of the Central Legislature to assign to any authority other than the Provincial Governments authority conferred by the Bill in respect of matters falling within the Provincial Legislative field. For this reason it is not possible to assign the power to fix standards and to make rules to any single authority. In order to assure that before any action is taken due consideration is given to the desirability of maintaining uniformity, provision has been made in Chapter VI for a single Technical Advisory Board which both Central and Provincial Government will be required to consult before modifying the standards set up by the Bill or before making rules under the Bill." 125. It is evident on reading of the preamble and the statement of objects and reasons of the Act that cognizant of limitations of legislative competence of the Central Government to enact law regulating import of drugs and that of the provincial governments to enact law relating to manufacture, sale and distribution of drugs, it was considered desirable to enact one legislation for maintaining uniformity by invoking Section 103 of the Government of India Act. A circumspect analysis of the way, Part III and Part IV of the Act dealing with the two aforementioned aspects were distinctly compartmentalized originally in 1940, leads to the only inescapable conclusion, in my considered view, that the two Chapters operated in different fields altogether. A fortiori, unless expressly mentioned in the Act otherwise, these two chapters need to be understood distinctly and independent of each other. 126. A fortiori, unless expressly mentioned in the Act otherwise, these two chapters need to be understood distinctly and independent of each other. 126. A new Section 33A was inserted in Chapter IV of the Act with the enactment of Drugs and Cosmetics (Amendment) Act, 1964 (Act 13 of 1964) which excluded from its (Chapter IV) purview the Ayurvedic, Siddha or Unani drugs. By the same Act 13 of 1964, Chapter IVA was inserted and with subsequent amendments in this Chapter the Act contains provisions, beginning from Section 33B to Section 33-O. Certain other provisions were incorporated subsequently in Chapter IVA, which are not required to be referred to for the purpose of present discussion. 127. During the course of time certain significant legislative changes have been made in the Act which need to be noticed and cannot be overlooked for the present purpose. By the Drugs and Cosmetics Amendment Act, 2008 (Act 26 of 2008), which came into force with effect from 10.08.2009, massive amendments were made in various provisions of the Act. Chapter III of the Act, however, remained untouched, by the said amendment. A new Section 17E was added after Section 17D of the Act. Amendments were made in Section 18, 26A, 27, 27A, 28A, 29, 30, 32, 32A, 33, 33I, 33J, 33N, 36A. Sections 32B, 33KA, 33KB, 36AB, 36AC, 36AD were added by the said Act No. 26 of 2008. 128. In its original form, Section 32 of the Act prohibited institution of a prosecution under Chapter IV of the Act except by an Inspector. Sub-section (1) of Section 32 originally read as under :- "(1) No prosecution under this Chapter shall be instituted except by an Inspector " 129. By the Drugs and Cosmetics (Amendment) Act, 1986 (71 of 1986), which came into force with effect from 15.09.1987, following were inserted after the word "Inspector" :- "Or by the person aggrieved or by a recognised consumer association whether such person is member of that association or not. " 130. Section 32 of the Act as it stood before amendment by Act 26 of 2008 read as under :- "32. Cognizance of offences.-[(1) No prosecution under this Chapter shall be instituted except by an Inspector [or by the person aggrieved or by a recognised consumer association whether such person is a member of that association or not]. " 130. Section 32 of the Act as it stood before amendment by Act 26 of 2008 read as under :- "32. Cognizance of offences.-[(1) No prosecution under this Chapter shall be instituted except by an Inspector [or by the person aggrieved or by a recognised consumer association whether such person is a member of that association or not]. (2) No Court inferior to that of [a Metropolitan Magistrate or of a Judicial Magistrate of the first class] shall try an offence punishable under this Chapter. (3) Nothing contained in this Chapter shall be deemed to prevent any person from being prosecuted under any other law for any act or omission which constitutes an offence against this Chapter. " 131. Section 32 was substituted with the following by Act 26 of 2008:- "32. Cognizance of offences.-[(1) No prosecution under this Chapter shall be instituted except by- (a) an Inspector; or (b) any Gazetted Officer of the Central Government or a State Government authorised in writing in this behalf by the Central Government or a State Government by a general or special order made in this behalf by that Government; or (c) the person aggrieved; or (d) a recognised consumer association whether such person is a member of that association or not. (2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, no court inferior to that of a Court of Session shall try an offence punishable under this Chapter] (3) Nothing contained in this Chapter shall be deemed to prevent any person from being prosecuted under any other law for any act or omission which constitutes an offence against this Chapter. " 132. It is, thus, clear that before 10.08.2009, prosecution under Chapter IV could not be instituted except by (i) Inspector or (ii) by the person aggrieved or (iii) by a recognized consumer association whether such person was a member of that association or not. After enactment of Act 26 of 2008 any Gazetted Officer of the Central Government or State Government authorised in writing in this behalf by the Central Government or State Government by a general or special order made in this behalf by that Government can also institute a prosecution. 133. After enactment of Act 26 of 2008 any Gazetted Officer of the Central Government or State Government authorised in writing in this behalf by the Central Government or State Government by a general or special order made in this behalf by that Government can also institute a prosecution. 133. From the legislative developments in Section 32 of the Act as noted above, the only irresistible inference which one may derive, in my opinion, is that though initially only the Inspector was authorised to institute a prosecution for the offences under Chapter IV of the Act, subsequent amendments in the Act disclose clear legislative intent to permit institution of criminal case by persons other than the Inspector. Ashok Kumar Sharma(supra), noticing clear language of Section 32 of the Act, has laid down that only persons mentioned in Section 32 of the Act are entitled to prosecute offenders in regard to the offences punishable under Chapter IV of the Act. There is, however, clear bar for a Police Officer to prosecute offenders under Chapter IV of the Act, as has been laid down in case of Ashok Kumar Sharma (supra). 134. I need now to compare various provisions under Chapter III and Chapter IV of the Act, for, in my opinion, a comparative analysis of these two Chapters is crucial to aptly answer point (ii) of reference in Bablu I. It is significant here to note that Sections 8, 9, 9A, 9B, 9C and 9D under Chapter III of the Act define 'standard quality', 'misbranded drugs', 'adulterated drugs', 'spurious drugs', 'misbranded cosmetics' and 'spurious cosmetics'. Identical definitions of the said terms find place in Sections 16, 17, 17A, 17B, 17C and 17D of Chapter IV of the Act respectively. 135. The definitions of each of these terms in the two Chapters i.e. Chapter III and Chapter IV open with the phrase 'for the purpose of this Chapter'. Apparently thus, even the definitions of the terms, though identical, have been placed in two different Chapters, namely, Chapter III and Chapter IV of the Act, confined to the purposes of the respective chapters. Similar is the case with Chapter IVA wherein the expressions misbranded, drugs, adulterated drugs, spurious drugs have been defined for the purpose of the said Chapter only confined to the provisions relating to Ayurvedic, Siddha and Unani drugs. Similar is the case with Chapter IVA wherein the expressions misbranded, drugs, adulterated drugs, spurious drugs have been defined for the purpose of the said Chapter only confined to the provisions relating to Ayurvedic, Siddha and Unani drugs. On close scrutiny of the provisions under Chapters III, IV and IVA, in my opinion, they operate in different fields. Chapter III encompasses the provisions relating to import of drugs and cosmetics whereas Chapter IV deals with manufacture, sale and distribution of drugs and cosmetics. Chapter IVA contains provisions relating to regulation of manufacture for sale of Ayurvedic, Siddha and Unani drugs and prohibition of manufacture and sale of certain Ayurvedic, Siddha and Unani drugs. Section 33M under Chapter IVA of the Act provides that no prosecution 'under this Chapter' shall be instituted except by the Inspector with the previous sanction of the authority specified under sub-section (4) of Section 33G of the Act. Section 33G of the Act lays down the provision for appointment of Inspectors under Chapter IVA. The Inspectors under Chapter IV of the Act are appointed in accordance with Section 21 of the Act. On careful comparison of Section 21 under Chapter IV and 33G under Chapter IVA it can be easily noticed that Inspectors are to be appointed separately under Section 21 for the purposes of Chapter IV and under Section 33G for the purposes of Chapter IVA of the Act. This becomes clearer from definition assigned to Inspector under Section 3(e) of the Act, which reads as under :- "3(e) "Inspector" means- (i) in relation to [Ayurvedic, Siddha or Unani] drug, an Inspector appointed by the Central Government or a State Government under section 33 G; and (ii) in relation to any other drug or cosmetic, an Inspector appointed by the Central Government or a State Government under section 21; " 136. In any view of the matter, it is evident that the nature of proscription in institution of prosecution as imposed under Section 32 under Chapter IV and 33M under Chapter IVA are not available for the offences punishable under Chapter III of the Act. In my opinion, therefore, institution of prosecution for the offences punishable under Chapter III in any legally permissible manner or by any person, including by registration of FIR for the offences which are cognizable, is not barred by virtue of Section 32 of the Act, which falls under Chapter IV. In my opinion, therefore, institution of prosecution for the offences punishable under Chapter III in any legally permissible manner or by any person, including by registration of FIR for the offences which are cognizable, is not barred by virtue of Section 32 of the Act, which falls under Chapter IV. 137. The Supreme Court in case of Ashok Kumar Sharma (supra) has considered the scope and effect of Section 32 of the Act in relation to the offences punishable under Chapter IV of the Act only. Though not identical, there being similar bar under Section 33M of the Act in relation to the offences punishable under Chapter IVA of the Act, the law laid down in Ashok Kumar Sharma (supra) shall apply with full force. The distinction between sub-section (1) of Section 32 and Section 33M(1) can be easily noticed as in the former, prosecution can be instituted by Inspector and other persons mentioned therein whereas in latter, prosecution can be instituted only by an Inspector appointed under Chapter IVA of the Act. Accordingly, I am of the view that no prosecution for an offence punishable under Sections 33-I and 33 J, which are under Chapter IVA of the Act can be instituted, except by an Inspector with the previous sanction of the authority specified under sub-section (4) of Section 33G of the Act. 138. The Legislative intent in respect of institution of prosecution for the offence punishable under Chapter III of the Act can be easily gathered from conspicuous absence of such bar in the nature of Sections 32 and 33M of the Act in the said Chapter. At the cost of repetition, it is opined that from the categorical language of the provision under Section 32 and Section 33M of the Act it is abundantly clear that the bar is in respect of and for the purpose of the respective Chapters only and not for the offences punishable under Chapter III of the Act. 139. Mr. At the cost of repetition, it is opined that from the categorical language of the provision under Section 32 and Section 33M of the Act it is abundantly clear that the bar is in respect of and for the purpose of the respective Chapters only and not for the offences punishable under Chapter III of the Act. 139. Mr. Jitendra Singh, learned Senior Counsel has heavily relied on Section 32B of the Act which provides for compounding of the offences punishable under clause (b) of sub-section(1) of Section 13, Section 28 and Section 28A of the Act in order to bring home his point that certain provisions of Chapter IV of the Act do govern provisions under Chapter III of the Act and, therefore, Chapter III of the Act cannot be read completely independent of the provisions under Chapter IV of the Act. 140. I do not stand persuaded with the aforesaid submission of Mr. Singh, learned Amicus Curias. Section 32B of the Act is the only provision which deals with compounding of certain offences under the Act and was inserted by Act 26 of 2008. It states that notwithstanding anything contained in the Cr.P.C, any offence punishable under Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 and Sections 28 and 28A of the Act may be compounded in accordance with the provisions prescribed thereunder. Whereas Section 32 of the Act uses the language 'no prosecution under this Chapter'------, Section 32B specifically refers to Section 13(1)(b) of the Act. The said section, because of its clear and unambiguous language, permits compounding of an offence punishable under Section 13(1)(b) of the Act which falls under Chapter III of the Act. In my opinion, it is not logical to conclude that because of such provision under Section 32B of the Act, Section 32 of the Act under Chapter IV can be read in a manner that it shall apply to the offences punishable under Chapter III of the Act also. 141. The aforesaid discussions answer the point that Section 32 of the Act is attracted only in respect of offences which have been defined and made punishable under Chapter IV of the Act. In similar manner, Section 33M of the Act is attracted in respect of the offences punishable under Sections 33-I and 33J under Chapter IVA of the Act. 142. The aforesaid discussions answer the point that Section 32 of the Act is attracted only in respect of offences which have been defined and made punishable under Chapter IV of the Act. In similar manner, Section 33M of the Act is attracted in respect of the offences punishable under Sections 33-I and 33J under Chapter IVA of the Act. 142. This leads me to the next question as to the manner in which a prosecution can be instituted for the offences punishable under said Chapter III of the Act. For the said purpose, the scheme of the said Chapter needs to be understood first. I have already noted hereinabove the definitions of misbranded, adulterated, spurious drugs/cosmetics mentioned in Sections 9, 9A, 9B, 9C and 9D. Section 8 defines standards of quality which means, in relation to drug that complies with the standards set out in the second schedule and in relation to a cosmetic, such standard as may be prescribed. Section 10 proscribes import of any drug or cosmetic, which is not of standard quality, misbranded, adulterated or spurious. It also prohibits import of drugs or cosmetics, for import of which a licence is prescribed, otherwise than under, and in accordance with such licence. Import of any drug or cosmetic, if prohibited by rule made under this Chapter, is prohibited under the said section. 143. Section 11 of the Act states that the law for the time being in force relating to sea customs and to goods, the import of which is prohibited by Section 18 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 (now the Customs Act, 1962) shall, subject to the provisions of Section 13 of this Act, apply in respect of drugs and cosmetics import of which is prohibited under this Chapter, and officers of customs and officers empowered under that Act to perform the duties imposed thereby on a Commissioner of Customs and other officers of Customs, shall have the same powers in respect of such drugs and cosmetics as they have for the time being in respect of such goods. 144. Section 13 under Chapter III of the Act is the penal provision. 144. Section 13 under Chapter III of the Act is the penal provision. If a person imports any drug deemed to be adulterated under Section 9A or deemed to be a spurious drug under Section 9B or any spurious cosmetic referred to in Section 9D or any cosmetic of the nature referred to in Clause (ee) of Section 10, is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and a fine which may extend to Rs. 5000/-, under Section 13(1)(a) of the Act. If a person imports any drug or cosmetic other than a drug or cosmetic referred to in Section 13(1) (a), import of which is prohibited under Section 10, or any Rule made under this Chapter he shall be punishable for term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to Rs. 500/- or with both under Section 13(1)(b) of the Act. If a person imports any drug or cosmetic in contravention of the provisions of Section 10A, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine which may extend to Rs. 5000/- or with both under Section 13(1)(c) of the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 13 provides that a person convicted of an offence punishable under Section 13(1)(a) or 13(1)(c) if again convicted of an offence under the same provisions, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years or with fine which may extend to Rs. 10,000/- or with both. In case of a person having already been convicted of the offence punishable under Section 13(1)(b) of the Act, if again convicted of the said offence, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine which may extend to Rs. 1000/- or with both, states Section 13(2)(b). 145. Sub-section (3) of Section 13 is relevant which states that the punishment provided under Section 13 shall be in addition to any penalty to which the offender may be liable under the provisions of Section 11 of the Act. It has already been noted hereinabove that the Customs Act shall have application in respect of drugs, import of which is prohibited under Chapter III of the Act, in view of clear language of Section 11 of the Act. 146. It has already been noted hereinabove that the Customs Act shall have application in respect of drugs, import of which is prohibited under Chapter III of the Act, in view of clear language of Section 11 of the Act. 146. I shall be referring to the provisions of the Customs Act later but before that, so as to answer the question which has arisen, it is to be seen whether an offence punishable under Section 13 of the Act is cognizable or not and if it is cognizable, what is the legal consequence. Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 36 AC of the Act reads as under : "(a) every offence, relating to adulterated or spurious drug and punishable under clauses (a) and (c) of sub-section (1) of section 13, clause (a) of sub -section(2) of Section 13, sub-section (3) of section 22, clauses (a) and (c) of section 27, section 28, section 28A, section 28B and sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 30 and other offences relating to adulterated drugs or spurious drugs, shall be cognizable.” 147. The aforesaid provision is preceded by a non-obstante clause stating that it is 'notwithstanding' anything contained in the Cr.P.C. There is no difficulty on plain reading of the aforesaid provision that clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 has been excluded and thus offences punishable under clause (a) and clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 only have been declared by the Act to be cognizable. 148. It is the statutory mandate of Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. that every information relating to commission of a cognizable offence to an Officer-in-Charge of a police station shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer, which, in common parlance, is called registration of First Information Report (FIR). Section 156 of the Cr.P.C. authorises the Officer-in-Charge of a police station having jurisdiction over the local area to investigate any case. 149. The Supreme Court in case of Ashok Kumar Sharma (supra) has held in paragraph 162 that there is no bar to the police officer to investigate and prosecute the person where he has committed an offence, as stated under Section 32 (3) of the Act i.e. if he has committed any 'cognizable offence under any other law'. 149. The Supreme Court in case of Ashok Kumar Sharma (supra) has held in paragraph 162 that there is no bar to the police officer to investigate and prosecute the person where he has committed an offence, as stated under Section 32 (3) of the Act i.e. if he has committed any 'cognizable offence under any other law'. The expression 'under any other law' which precedes "for any act or omission which constitutes an offence against this chapter" in sub-section (3) of Section 32 of the Act, in my judgment, refers to offences punishable under the provisions other than those falling under Chapter IV of the Act, applying the rule of ejusdem generis [see (2020) 13 SCC 521 , Department of Customs vs. Sharad Gandhi at para 38-39]. 150. The rule of ejusdem generis is an important tool of statutory interpretation, which suggests that when particular words pertaining to a class, category or genus are followed by general words, general words are construed as limited to things of the same kind as those specified. This rule reflects an attempt to reconcile incompatibility between specific and general words so that all words in a statute are given effect and no words in a statute are presumed to be superfluous, [see Principles of Statutory Interpretation, Justice G.R Singh, 10th Edition (2006) page 455] 150. It would be apposite to notice at this stage Section 36 AC of the Act which states that notwithstanding anything contained in the Cr.P.C, every offence relating to adulterated or spurious drug and punishable under Clauses (a) and (c) of sub-section(1) of Section 13 and Clause (a) of sub-section(2) of Section 13(falling under Chapter III), sub-section (3) of Section 22 (falling under Chapter III), Clauses (a) and (c) of Section 27, Section 28, Section 28A, Section 28B and sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 30 (falling under Chapter IV) and other offences relating to adulterated drugs and spurious drugs, shall be cognizable. The scheme of the Act itself distinguishes the offences punishable under Chapter III of the Act from those under Chapter IV and IV-A of the Act in the matter of institution of prosecution, irrespective of the fact whether such offences are cognizable or not because of presence of Section 32 under Chapter IV and Section 33M in Chapter IVA of the Act and no parallel provision under Chapter III of the Act. 151. 151. A Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in case of Lalita Kumari vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2014) 2 SCC 1 has laid down that registration of an FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C, if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation. The Supreme Court has further held that a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether a cognizable offence is disclosed or not, if the information received does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the need for such inquiry. The effect of Lalita Kumari (supra) has been dealt with in Ashok Kumar Sharma (supra) and it has been held in paragraph 77 thereof that if information is relatable only to cognizable offences under Chapter IV of the Act, the police officer would be out of bounds and he has no role to play in the investigation. The Supreme Court has recorded in paragraph 72 in Ashok Kumar Sharma (supra) that the principle laid down in case of Lalita Kumari (supra) shall not be attracted because of Section 32 of the Act which does not permit cognizance being taken on a police report. For the aforesaid reason, the entire exercise of police officer proceeding on the basis of an FIR would become futile and, therefore, it becomes unauthorized, the Supreme Court remarked in Ashok Kumar Sharma (supra). 152. It is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that intention of the Legislature is to be gathered from the language used in an enactment. A court has not only to be conscious about what has been stated in a statute but also what has not been stated. While interpreting it, a grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified so as to avoid that absurdity or inconsistency, but no further [see (1843-60) All ER Rep 21 (Grey vs. Pearson)], quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in (2008) 12 SCC 364 (Nagar Palika Nigam vs. Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti and others).] 153. The contention of Mr. The contention of Mr. Singh that the provision under Section 32 of the Act shall govern prosecution under Chapter III also could be accepted only if the expression 'no prosecution under this Chapter -' could be read as 'no prosecution under this Act-' in sub-section(1) of Section 32. This can happen only by substituting the word 'Act' in place of 'Chapter', which, in my opinion, is impermissible in present scheme of the Act. This is well settled legal position that a casus omissus ought not to be created by interpretation, save in some cases of strong necessity. A casus omissus cannot be supplied by a court of law for that would amount to legislation in the name of statutory interpretation. In my opinion, it is impermissible to supply an interpretation of Section 32 of the Act which has the effect of altering the plain language used in the said provision. It is noteworthy that Section 32 of the Act is in a negative form which begins with 'no prosecution-' and prohibits institution of prosecution in a manner other than that prescribed thereunder. 154. As has been noticed, similar provision is there in Section 33M of the Act which is also in negative form and prohibits institution of prosecution except in accordance with the said provision. A statutory provision in negative form is mandatory in nature, though there may be exception to this rule of interpretation in appropriate cases. 155. It has been noticed in the foregoing paragraphs also that no provision parallel to Section 32 under Chapter IV and 33M under Chapter IVA is available in Chapter III of the Act. The Rule of statutory interpretation that attention has to be paid not only to what has been said but also what has not been said comes into play for interpreting applicability of Section 32 of the Act for the purpose of the offences punishable under Chapter III of the Act. It is clearly stated in Section 32 of the Act that no prosecution can be instituted for the offences punishable under Chapter IV except in accordance with the prescriptions thereunder. Section 33M, which is also in negative form, states that no prosecution under Chapter IVA shall be instituted except as prescribed thereunder. There is no such statement in Chapter III of the Act in relation to the offences punishable under Section 13 of the Act. Section 33M, which is also in negative form, states that no prosecution under Chapter IVA shall be instituted except as prescribed thereunder. There is no such statement in Chapter III of the Act in relation to the offences punishable under Section 13 of the Act. The legislative intent is clear by plain language of the provisions under Chapter III of the Act and it becomes clearer on examining the scheme of the Act as a whole. 156. Further, in exercise of the powers conferred by Sections 6(2), 12, 33 and 33N of the Act, the Central Government has framed Rules called Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules'). Part IV of the Rules deals with Import and Registration (Rule 21 to 43B). Part V deals with Government Analysts, Inspectors, Licensing Authorities and Controlling Authorities (Rule 44 to 58). Rule 49 lays down qualifications of Inspectors. Rule 51 lays down duties of Inspectors to inspect premises licensed for sale of drugs. Rule 52 lays down the duties of the Inspectors specially authorised to inspect premises licensed for manufacture of drugs or cosmetics. Sub-rule (5) of Rule 51 and sub-rule (5) of Rule 52 casts a duty on the Inspectors to institute prosecutions in respect of breaches of the Act and the Rules thereunder. 157. With reference to the said provisions an argument has been advanced by Mr. Singh, learned Senior Counsel that prosecution for the offences punishable under any provision of the Act including those falling under Chapter III can be instituted by Inspectors only appointed under Section 33G (Chapter IVA) and Section 22(1) (Chapter IV) within the meaning of Section 3(e) of the Act. The said contention, though ingenuous, cannot be accepted for the reason that it is true that sub-rule (5) of Rule 51 and sub-rule (5) of Rule 52 cast duty upon Inspectors within the meaning of Section 3(e) of the Act to institute prosecution in respect of breaches of the Act including breaches under Chapter III of the Act, it does not, however, say that only Inspectors have been authorised under the Rules to institute prosecution for the offences punishable under Chapter III of the Act. Rules 51 and 52 of the Rules cast duty on the Inspector to inspect the premises licensed for sale and manufacture of drugs and cosmetics respectively. Rules 51 and 52 of the Rules cast duty on the Inspector to inspect the premises licensed for sale and manufacture of drugs and cosmetics respectively. If during course of inspection he notices breach of any provision under the Act constituting an offence, he is duty bound to institute prosecution by virtue of Rule 51(5) and Rule 52(5) of the Rules. The provisions do not suggest that the Inspectors under the Act are the only authorities who can institute prosecution to the exclusions of others, for any offence punishable under the Act. Even in the absence of such provision under Rule 51(5) and Rule 52(5) of the Rules an Inspector could institute a prosecution for any offence punishable under Chapter III of the Act which contains no bar identical or equivalent to those under Section 32 and 33M of the Act. 158. The distinction between the expressions 'punishment' and 'penalty' under sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the Act should not escape our attention. Sub-section (3) of Section 13 states that 'punishment provided by this section shall be in addition to penalty' to which the offender may be liable under the provisions of Section 11 of the Act. It has already been noticed hereinabove that the provisions under the Customs Act in respect of the goods import of which is prohibited by Section 18 of the Customs Act does apply in respect of drugs and cosmetics, import of which is prohibited under Chapter III of the Act, subject to Section 13 of the Act. Section 112 of the Customs Act prescribes, inter alia, for imposition of penalty for improper importation of goods and confiscation of such goods. The said provision does not prescribe punishment for improper importation. Offences and prosecutions under the Customs Act are governed by Chapter XVI thereof. Section 135 of the Customs Act reads as under : "135. Section 112 of the Customs Act prescribes, inter alia, for imposition of penalty for improper importation of goods and confiscation of such goods. The said provision does not prescribe punishment for improper importation. Offences and prosecutions under the Customs Act are governed by Chapter XVI thereof. Section 135 of the Customs Act reads as under : "135. Evasion of duty or prohibitions.-If (1) Without prejudice to any action that may be taken under this Act, if any person- (a) is in relation to any goods in any way knowingly concerned in mis declaration of value or in any fraudulent evasion or attempt at evasion of any duty chargeable thereon or of any prohibition for the time being imposed under this Act or any other law for the time being in force with respect to such goods; or (b) acquires possession of or is in any way concerned in carrying, removing, depositing, harbouring, keeping, concealing, selling or purchasing or in any other manner dealing with any goods which he knows or has reason to believe are liable to confiscation under section 111 or section 113, as the case may be; or (c) attempts to export any goods which he knows or has reason to believe are liable to confiscation under section 113; or (d) fraudulently avails of or attempts to avail of drawback or any exemption from duty provided under this Act in connection with export of goods, he shall be punishable,- (i) in the case of an offence relating to,- (A) any goods the market price of which exceeds one crore of rupees; or (B) the evasion or attempted evasion of duty exceeding thirty lakh of rupees; or (C) such categories of prohibited goods as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify; or (D) fraudulently availing of or attempting to avail of drawback or any exemption from duty referred to in clause (d), if the amount of drawback or exemption from duty exceeds thirty lakh of rupees, with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and with fine: Provided that in the absence of special and adequate reasons to the contrary to be recorded in the judgment of the court, such imprisonment shall not be for less than one year; (ii) in any other case, with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.] 2[(2) If any person convicted of an offence under this section or under sub-section (1) of section 136 is again convicted of an offence under this section, then, he shall be punishable for the second and for every subsequent offence with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and with fine: Provided that in the absence of special and adequate reasons to the contrary to be recorded in the judgment of the court such imprisonment shall not be for less than 3[one year]. (3) For the purposes of sub-section (1) and (2), the following shall not be considered as special and adequate reasons for awarding a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than 3[one year], namely:- (i) the fact that the accused has been convicted for the first time for a reference under this Act; (ii) the fact that in any proceeding under this Act, other than a prosecution, the accused has been ordered to pay a penalty or the goods which are the subject matter of such proceedings have been ordered to be confiscated or any other action has been taken against him for the same act which constitutes the offence; (iii) the fact that the accused was not the principal offender and was acting merely as a carrier of goods or otherwise was a secondary party to the commission of the offence; (iv) the age of the accused.]"(Highlighted for emphasis) 159. It is evident on careful reading of Section 135 of the Customs Act that possession, carriage, harbouring, thieving, concealing, selling or purchasing etc. of goods, which are liable to confiscation under Section 111 or Section 113 of the Customs Act, is punishable for imprisonment for terms mentioned therein. Goods, import of which is prohibited is liable to confiscation under Section 111 of the Customs Act. The punishment, which is prescribed for import of prohibited goods under the Customs Act, is subject to the provision of Section 13 of the Act by virtue of Section 11 of the Act. Other laws relating to the Customs Act apply in respect of the drugs, import of which is prohibited under Chapter III of the Act. When sub-section (3) of Section 13 states that the punishment provided by the said section shall be in addition to any 'penalty' to which the offenders may be liable under the provisions of Section 11 of the Act, in my opinion, it refers to the 'penalty' under the Customs Act and not the punishment thereunder. 160. In view of the aforementioned discussions, following are my conclusions :- (I) Institution of prosecution for the offences punishable under Chapter III in any legally permissible manner or by any person, including by registration of FIR for such offences which are cognizable, is not barred by virtue of Section 32 of the Act, which falls under Chapter IV. 160. In view of the aforementioned discussions, following are my conclusions :- (I) Institution of prosecution for the offences punishable under Chapter III in any legally permissible manner or by any person, including by registration of FIR for such offences which are cognizable, is not barred by virtue of Section 32 of the Act, which falls under Chapter IV. (II) No prosecution for an offence punishable under Sections 33-I and 33J, which are under Chapter IVA of the Act can be instituted, except by an Inspector with the previous sanction of the authority specified under sub-section (4) of Section 33G of the Act. (III) Section 32 of the Act is attracted only in respect of offences which have been defined and made punishable under Chapter IV of the Act. In similar manner, Section 33M of the Act is attracted in respect of the offences punishable under Sections 33-I and 33 J under Chapter IVA of the Act. (IV) I am in full agreement with the view expressed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ashwani Kumar Singh that except for the offences under Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 13 of the Act, all other offences under Chapter III of the Act would be triable by a court of Judicial Magistrate. (V) Since I have answered parts (a) and (b) of the question as set out in paragraph 7 hereinabove in affirmative, in the absence of any bar similar to Section 32 under Chapter IV and Section 33M under Chapter IVA of the Act, the police is competent to register a case making out a cognizable offence, under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. and to investigate the same and lay charge-sheet before the courts of Magistrate for taking cognizance. 161. I answer the point (ii) of reference in Bablu I accordingly. The decisions rendered by this Court in case of Hindustan Liver Limited vs. State of Bihar reported in 1997(1) BLJ 899 and those rendered in Cr.W.J.C. No. 719 of 1998 (Shankar Kumar Ghosh vs. State of Bihar and analogous matter), Cr. Misc. No. 50246 of 2006 (Om Prakash Singh vs. State of Bihar) stand overruled to this limited extent. I am in agreement with the rest of the opinion recorded by brother Ashwani Kumar Singh, J. This answers point (iii) of reference. Misc. No. 50246 of 2006 (Om Prakash Singh vs. State of Bihar) stand overruled to this limited extent. I am in agreement with the rest of the opinion recorded by brother Ashwani Kumar Singh, J. This answers point (iii) of reference. Further, in view of the law laid down in case of Ashok Kumar Sharma (supra), the police cannot register a case and investigate it in respect of offences punishable under Chapter IV of the Act. This answers point (iv) of reference. 162. I again record my deep sense of appreciation for the able assistance extended by Mr. Jitendra Singh, learned Senior Advocate ably assisted by Mr. Harsh Singh, learned counsel as well as Mr. Anjani Kumar, learned AAG-4 assisted by Mr. Amit Kumar Jha, Mr. Shailendra Kumar Singh, Mr. Alok Kumar Rahi, learned counsel. They deftly and selflessly addressed the intricate legal issues, for this Bench to arrive at a definite conclusion. Per Vikash Jain, J: 163. I have had the privilege of perusing the separate judgments of my esteemed brothers Justice Ashwani Kumar Singh and Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh. It would appear that Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh has disagreed with the conclusion that the police does not have the authority to institute prosecution and investigate offences punishable under Chapter III of The Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). On careful consideration, however, I am inclined to agree with the views expressed and conclusions drawn by Justice Ashwani Kumar Singh and would venture only to add another reason in support. 164. The main difference of opinion expressed in the two judgments relates to the applicability of Section 32 falling under Chapter IV (manufacture, sale and distribution of drugs and cosmetics), to the provisions of Chapter III (import of drugs and cosmetics) in absence of any similar specific provision thereunder; there being no controversy with regard to Chapter IVA (ayurvedic, siddha and unani drugs) in view of the specific provision under Section 33-G appearing thereunder. I shall therefore limit myself only to this aspect. 165. The scope of operation of each of Chapters III and IV of the Act is well cut-out and is quite distinct from each other. While Chapter III deals with import of drugs and cosmetics, Chapter IV concerns itself with manufacture, sale and distribution of drugs and cosmetics. 166. I shall therefore limit myself only to this aspect. 165. The scope of operation of each of Chapters III and IV of the Act is well cut-out and is quite distinct from each other. While Chapter III deals with import of drugs and cosmetics, Chapter IV concerns itself with manufacture, sale and distribution of drugs and cosmetics. 166. The broad procedure in case of import may be culled out from Section 11 of the Act read with Rules 40 and 41 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules 1945 (hereinafter 'the Rules') which conceive of the authority exercisable by the Customs Officials and assign no role whatsoever to either a Police Officer or a person under Section 32 of the Act. These provisions envisage remedial measures in case of import of prohibited drugs and cosmetics by way of their export or forfeiture and destruction. As such, the procedure for institution of prosecution in such cases has not specifically been indicated, but on the other hand, Section 13 enumerates the imports which are punishable as offences. 167. In my view, in circumstances where prohibited drugs and cosmetics are imported and find their way into the open market for sale or distribution, having escaped detection at the initial point of entry, or by any other means, such imported goods become the subject matter of action by the persons mentioned in Section 32 of the Act. It would therefore be reasonable to infer that in such cases, keeping in mind the continuity of the transaction from the point of import to the point of sale or distribution, Chapter III and Chapter IV have to be read as an integrated whole, and prosecution would have to be initiated under Section 32 also for the offences under Section 13 falling under Chapter III of the Act. 168. There are other indications of interlacing between Chapter III and Chapter IV to show that they must work in tandem. For instance, Section 32B under Chapter IV deals with compounding of certain offences, and takes within its sweep also the offence punishable under Section 13(1)(b) which falls under Chapter III. Similarly, Section 21(3) under Chapter IV bars a person having financial interest in the import of drugs and cosmetics, a matter covered under Chapter III, from being appointed as an Inspector under Section 21. 169. Similarly, Section 21(3) under Chapter IV bars a person having financial interest in the import of drugs and cosmetics, a matter covered under Chapter III, from being appointed as an Inspector under Section 21. 169. The duty to collect materials and evidences such as samples and reports from the laboratory for purposes of trial of offences vests in the Customs Officer under Chapter III and in the Drugs Inspector under Chapter IV. A person or association purchasing drugs and cosmetics has also been granted the right to obtain a report from the Government Analyst under Section 26 of the Act. In all of this, no role has been visualized for a Police Officer. It therefore logically follows that a Police Officer would not be competent to institute prosecution in absence of powers of investigation and collection of materials being vested in him, as this would be an exercise in futility and would lead the trial to a dead-end. Such an interpretation would be contrary to the object sought to be achieved and must be avoided. 170. The modern day approach to the interpretation of statutes is to promote the "general legislative purpose" instead of adhering to the "golden rule" of interpreting according to grammatical and ordinary sense of words as the latter would defeat the intention of the Parliament, and justice. I may at this point refer to the well-settled principles of purposive construction of statutes with reference to some judicial decisions "The Courts strongly lean against a construction which reduces the statute to a futility. The provision of a Statute must be so construed as to make it effective and operative, on the principle "but res majis valeat quam periat." - Pentiah vs. Veeramallappa Muddala, AIR 1961 SC 1107 . "So the courts are at least now, when purposive construction is gaining momentum, very reluctant to hold that Parliament has achieved nothing by the language it used when it is tolerably plain what it wished to achieve." - BBC Enterprises vs. Hi-Tech Xtravision Ltd. (1990) 2 All ER 118. "The rules of purposive construction have to be resorted to which would require the construction of the Act in such a manner as to see that the object of the Act is fulfilled." -New India Assurance Company. Ltd. vs. Nusli Nerille Wadia, (2008) 3 SCC 279 . 171. "The rules of purposive construction have to be resorted to which would require the construction of the Act in such a manner as to see that the object of the Act is fulfilled." -New India Assurance Company. Ltd. vs. Nusli Nerille Wadia, (2008) 3 SCC 279 . 171. On the aforesaid reasoning as well, I am of the view that a Police Officer cannot register an FIR for the offences under Chapter III of the Act. I am in complete agreement with the conclusions recorded in the judgment of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ashwani Kumar Singh. Per Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J: 172. I have had the privilege of going through the erudite opinions rendered by my learned Brothers Ashwani Kumar Singh, J. and Chakradhari Sharan Singh, J. I have also had the good fortune of perusing the scholarly opinion of my learned Brother Vikash Jain, J., concurring with Brother Ashwani Kumar Singh, J. 173. On an overall conspectus, I find myself in agreement with the view expressed by Brother Ashwani Kumar Singh, J. I am also in agreement with the supplementing opinion of Brother Vikash Jain, J. 174. I would like to indicate my own reasons as well. 175. As noted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v Ashok Kumar Sharma, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 683 itself, at paragraph 88, 'The power to arrest is a drastic power. It involves encroachment on personal liberty.'' However, taking a few steps back, to a pre-arrest stage, there is no doubt that the powers to (a) institute cases, and (b) investigate offences are also, by and of themselves, drastic in nature. 176. As a Constitutional Court, this Court must remain cautious and conscious that such powers should not be usurped upon by 'intruders' and/or 'outsiders' not duly authorised by law. In view of the fact that we have interpreted that a police officer cannot institute cases and/or investigate offences under Chapters III, IV and IV-A of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'), we must, henceforth insist that the procedure prescribed by law must, necessarily, be in tandem with the due process of law. 177. It is no longer res integra that when a thing is to be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner or not at all. 177. It is no longer res integra that when a thing is to be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner or not at all. This rule emanated in Taylor v Taylor, (1875) LR 1 ChD 426 and has since then been followed consistently. In Nazir Ahmed v King Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253 (2), it was held that '...where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all..." 178. In State v Sanjeev Nanda, AIR 2012 SC 3104 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that it is ca settled principle of law that if something is required to be done in a particular manner, then that has to be done only in that way or not, at all.' 179. In MacKinnon Mackenzie and Company Limited v MacKinnon Employees Union, 2015 SCC OnLine SC 160, the Hon'ble Supreme Court again stated: 43. It would be appropriate for us to refer to the decision of this Court in Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of Kerala [ (1999) 3 SCC 422 ], to show that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, and the same is not followed, then the action suffers from nullity in the eye of the law, the relevant paragraphs of the above said case are extracted hereunder: (SCC pp. 432-33, paras 31-32) "31. It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. The origin of this rule is traceable to the decision in Taylor v. Taylor [(1875) LR 1 ChD 426] which was followed by Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor [(1935-36) 63 IA 372: (1936) 44 LW 583: AIR 1936 PC 253 (2)] who stated as under: (Nazir Ahmad case [(1935-36) 63 IA 372: (1936) 44 LW 583: AIR 1936 PC 253 (2)], IA pp. 381-82) where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all.' 32. 381-82) where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all.' 32. This rule has since been approved by this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh [ AIR 1954 SC 322 : 1954 Cri LJ 910: 1954 SCR 1098 ] and again in Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan [ AIR 1961 SC 1527 : (1961) 2 Cri LJ 705: (1962) 1 SCR 662 ]. These cases were considered by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh [ AIR 1964 SC 358 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 263 (2): (1964) 1 SCWR 57] and the rule laid down in Nazir Ahmad case [(1935-36) 63 IA 372: (1936) 44 LW 583: AIR 1936 PC 253 (2)] was again upheld. This rule has since been applied to the exercise of jurisdiction by courts and has also been recognised as a salutary principle of administrative law.'" (underlining in original; emphasis supplied) 180. What emerges from the aforesaid, is that insistence on following procedure as prescribed by a statute is not just a safeguard in favour of individual rights and liberties, but is also meant as an effective restriction and restraint on executive excesses. When faced with a situation where there is a doubt, even if miniscule, we should ordinarily insist on strict adherence and compliance with the provisions concerned. 181. Qua the directions issued in paragraph 90 of the opinion of Justice Ashwani Kumar Singh, this approach is also supported by the decision in Varinder Kumar v State of Himachal Pradesh, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 170, emphasising the role of the judiciary in balancing competing, and often, conflicting interests, where the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to hold: '12. Individual rights of the accused are undoubtedly important. But equally important is the societal interest for bringing the offender to book and for the system to send the right message to all in the society-be it the law-abiding citizen or the potential offender. "Human rights" are not only of the accused but, extent apart, also of the victim, the symbolic member of the society as the potential victim and the society as a whole. 13. Law has to cater to wide variety of situations as appear in society. "Human rights" are not only of the accused but, extent apart, also of the victim, the symbolic member of the society as the potential victim and the society as a whole. 13. Law has to cater to wide variety of situations as appear in society. Law being dynamic, the certainty of the legislation appears rigid at times whenever a circumstance (set of facts) appears which is not catered for explicitly. Expediency then dictates that the higher judiciary, while interpreting the law, considers such exception(s) as are called for without disturbing the pith and substance and the original intention of the legislature. This is required primarily for the reason to help strike a balance between competing forces-justice being the end-and also because the process of fresh legislation could take a long time, which would mean failure of justice, and with it erosion of public confidence and trust in the justice delivery system. 14. The principle of fair trial now informs and energises many areas of the law. It is a constant, ongoing, evolutionary process continually adapting itself to changing circumstances, and endeavouring to meet the exigencies of the situation-peculiar at times-and related to the nature of crime, persons involved, directly or operating from behind, and so many other powerful factors which may come in the way of administration of criminal justice, wherefore the endeavour of the higher courts, while interpreting the law, is to strike the right balance.' (emphasis supplied) 182. I reiterate my agreement with Justice Ashwani Kumar Singh, as supplemented by Justice Vikash Jain. Per Rajendra Kumar Mishra, J: 183. I have had the privilege of going through the judgment delivered by learned Brother Ashwani Kumar Singh, J. and also the view of the learned Brother Chakradhari Sharan Singh, J. I have also the advantage of going through the concurring views of learned Brother Vikash Jain, J. and learned Brother Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J. with the view expressed by learned Brother Ashwani Kumar Singh, J. Learned Brother Chakradhari Sharan Singh, J. has also agreed with the rest of the opinion recorded by learned Brother Ashwani Kumar Singh except his conclusion that the police does not have the authority to institute prosecution and investigate qua offences punishable under Chapter III of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (Act 23 of 1940). He has also not agreed with the conclusion of learned Brother Ashwani Kumar Singh, J. that when imported drugs and cosmetics are distributed, or sold, or stocked, or exhibited, or offered for sale, they would be covered only by Chapter IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. He has opined that once a case is made out of illegal import of misbranded, adulterated, spurious drugs or cosmetics or import of such drug or cosmetics, which do not comply with the standards set out and prescribed under the Act, the same shall essentially constitute an offence punishable under Section 13 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 falling under Chapter III of the said Act. 184. I am, however, unable to agree with the aforesaid dissenting view expressed by learned Brother Chakradhari Sharan Singh, J. I completely agree with the proposition of law canvassed by Brother Ashwani Kumar Singh, J. on all the issues including that the police does not have the authority to institute prosecution and investigate qua offences punishable under Chapter III of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. I also agree with the reasons assigned in concurring views expressed by Brothers Vikash Jain, J and Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.