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2021 DIGILAW 335 (MP)

LEE ANNE ELTON v. ARUNODAY SINGH

2021-03-09

PRAKASH SHRIVASTAVA, VIRENDER SINGH

body2021
ORDER/JUDGMENT- Shri Aditya Sanghi, learned counsel for the appellant. Shri Kishore Shrivastava, learned senior counsel with Shri Kunal Thakre, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. Heard on I. A. No. 5526/2020, which is an application for condonation of delay in filing this appeal. 3. There is a delay of 53 days in filing the appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the delay was caused because the counsel advising the appellant had misunderstood the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the matter of Shri Shivram Dodanna Shetty vs. Sou. Sharmila Shivram Shetty, Family Court Appeal No. 161 of 2013 and was under the impression that the limitation is of 90 days. He has further placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Savitri Pandey vs. Prem Chandra Pandey, AIR 2002 SC 591 and has submitted that the limitation of 30 days was not sufficient to file the appeal. He has also submitted that the delay had occurred for the aforesaid reason as also on account of the spread of Corona virus and due to the fact that the appellant is a lady. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in the matter of Robin Thapa vs. Rohit Dora, (2019) 7 SCC 359 and S. Ganesharaju (dead) through LRs. vs. Narasamma (dead) through LRs. and others, (2013) 11 SCC 341 . 5. Learned senior counsel for the respondent has opposed the application and has submitted that the appeal is under the Family Courts Act, 1984 where the limitation of only 30 days is prescribed and there is no provision for extending the limitation and the provisions of the Limitation Act will not be applicable. He further submits that the appellant’s plea that the decree has been passed behind her back is incorrect. He has also submitted that incorrect statement has been made by the appellant in the condonation of delay application as also in the affidavit that she was not aware of the proceedings. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in the matter of Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others, (2013) 12 SCC 649 , Mohd. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in the matter of Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others, (2013) 12 SCC 649 , Mohd. Sahid and others vs. Raziya Khanam (dead) through Legal Representatives and others, (2019) 11 SCC 384 and B. Madhuri Goud vs. B. Damodar Reddy, (2012) 12 SCC 693 . 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record, it is noticed that the present appeal has been filed under section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 read with section 39 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. So far as the limitation for filing the appeal under the Special Marriage Act is concerned, the same is 90 days and the present appeal has been filed within that period. Under section 19 of the Family Courts Act, the limitation prescribed for filing the appeal is 30 days, therefore, the appeal has been treated to be barred by time by 53 days. The Supreme Court in the matter of Savitri Pandey (supra) has expressed that the limitation of 30 days provided for filing the appeal is not sufficient. 7. So far as the argument of learned senior counsel for the respondent that section 5 of the Limitation Act will not be applicable for condonation of delay in filing the appeal under section 19 of the Family Courts Act, we find that by virtue of section 29 of the Limitation Act, the provisions of section 5 of the Act will be attracted as there is no specific bar of application of the Limitation Act under the provisions of the Family Courts Act. Section 19 sub-section (3) also does not provide any outer limit for condoning the delay. Hence the learned senior counsel for the respondent is not entitled to the benefits of the judgments in the matter of Esha Bhattacharjee (supra), Mohd. Sahid (supra) and B. Madhuri Goud (supra). 8. We have examined the plea which is taken in the application for condonation of delay as also the supporting affidavit and considered the arguments advanced before this Court. We find that the ex parte decree is under challenge and a plea has been taken that the decree was passed behind the back of the appellant. 8. We have examined the plea which is taken in the application for condonation of delay as also the supporting affidavit and considered the arguments advanced before this Court. We find that the ex parte decree is under challenge and a plea has been taken that the decree was passed behind the back of the appellant. Appellant is stated to be residing at Mumbai whereas the judgment and decree under challenge was passed by the Family Court, Bhopal, therefore, the plea of the appellant that she took some time to come to know about the decree appears to be bona fide. That apart, it is stated that the appellant is a Canadian citizen and was travelling to and fro from Mumbai to Toronto and in the meanwhile, there was a spread of Corona virus in the month of February-March, 2020, which also contributed in the delay. There is nothing to doubt the explanation of the appellant that the delay was also caused on account of the improper legal advise about limitation of 90 days based upon the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Shri Shivram Dodanna Shetty (supra). 9. Having regard to the aforesaid, we are also of the opinion that there is a sufficient explanation for filing the appeal with a delay of 53 days. The delay is not inordinate or intentional. The delay appears to have been caused due to bona fide reason and we are of the opinion that a case for condonation of delay is made out. 10. Accordingly, I. A. No. 5526/2020 is allowed and the delay in filing the appeal is condoned. List after four weeks.