ORDER : U. Durga Prasad Rao, J. 1. A short but important question arises for consideration in this writ petition is whether the District Registrar can refuse to levy and collect stamp duty and penalty on a reconstructed document transmitted to him by Civil Court on the ground that the document sent to him is a xerox copy? 2. The factual matter is thus: (a) The petitioner filed OS No. 136/2005 in the Court of Principal Junior Civil Judge, Bheemunipatnam seeking permanent injunction on the strength of the possessory agreement to sell dated 01.09.1995 obtained by him from Pakki Rama Rao and Pakki Narayana Rao. The said possessory agreement to sell, his vendor's registered Sale Deed and Encumbrance Certificate were unfortunately misplaced while they were in the custody of the Trial Court. Hence, learned Junior Civil Judge, Bheemunipatnam after obtaining permission from learned Principal District Judge, Visakhapatnam vide proceedings in DIS No. 8870, dated 12.10.2017 and in DIS No. 2247, dated 16.03.2018, reconstructed the documents. Since the possessory agreement to sell was not duly stamped, learned Junior Civil Judge vide his letter dated 28.03.2018 transmitted the reconstructed and unregistered sale agreement dated 01.09.1995 with a request to the District Registrar, Visakhapatnam to impound the same and collect stamp duty and penalty and remit the document to the Court for taking up further proceedings. Since there was no response from the 3rd respondent, learned Judge sent a reminder in DIS No. 624, dated 07.09.2019 but of no avail. Then the matter was informed to the 2nd respondent who is the District Collector, Visakhapatnam and he also addressed a letter in Rc. No. 1377/2018 H3, dated NIL. 10.2019 to the 3rd respondent requesting him to send the report early. Later the 3rd respondent issued proceedings in C. No. 481/G1/2018, dated 11.09.2019 and sent to the Trial Court informing that the xerox copy of unregistered instrument is not admissible for impounding under Section 38(2) of the Indian Stamp Act (for short 'the Stamp Act') and therefore, he was not authorized to act on xerox copy of such unregistered instrument. He thus refused to impound the document and collect stamp duty and penalty. Hence, the writ petition. 3. He thus refused to impound the document and collect stamp duty and penalty. Hence, the writ petition. 3. The 3rd respondent filed counter inter alia contending that a reconstructed document is only a copy, which do not come under the term "instrument" defined under Section 2(14) of the Indian Stamp Act and therefore, under Section 38(2) of the Stamp Act, the 3rd respondent cannot impound and levy stamp duty and penalty, for, stamp duty and penalty can be levied and collected as against the original document but not copies. 4. Heard learned Counsel for the petitioner Ms. Nimmagadda Revathi, and learned Government Pleader for Stamps and Registration representing the respondents. 5. While learned Counsel for the petitioner would argue that since the subject document is a reconstructed document, though it is a xerox copy, the 3rd respondent/District Registrar is obligated to impound the same and levy and collect the proper stamp duty and penalty, in oppugnation, learned Government Pleader would contend, the Stamp Act never envisaged impounding and levying of Stamp Duty on a copy except the original of a document and the definition of "instrument" does not subsume in it the copy other than original and therefore, the question of levying stamp duty and penalty on a xerox copy of a document under Section 38(2) of the Stamp Act does not arise. 6. I gave my anxious consideration to the above respective contentions. The scheme to deal with instruments not duly stamped is provided under Sections 33, 35, 36 and 38. It is pertinent at this juncture to discuss about the substance of those provisions. (a) Section 33 deals with the examination and impounding of instruments. It says, a duty is cast on every public authority who is authorised to receive evidence or any person in-charge of a public office except officer of police to impound an instrument which is not duly stamped as comes before him. Impound means taking possession of the document in custody as per law. (b) Then, Section 35 lays down that no instrument which is chargeable with duty shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose by the person who is authorized to receive evidence, or shall be acted upon, registered or authenticated by any such person or by any public officer unless such instrument is duly stamped. (b) Then, Section 35 lays down that no instrument which is chargeable with duty shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose by the person who is authorized to receive evidence, or shall be acted upon, registered or authenticated by any such person or by any public officer unless such instrument is duly stamped. Proviso to this section inter alia says that on payment of deficit stamp duty and penalty on such instrument which is not duly stamped, the same can be admitted in evidence. (c) Then Section 36 lays down that where an instrument has been admitted in evidence, such admission shall not, except as provided in Section 61, be called in question at any stage of the same suit or proceeding on the ground that the instrument has not been duly stamped. (d) Section 38 deals with consequences that follow on impounding a deficitly stamped instrument. According to Section 38(1), if the impounding authority collects stamp duty and penalty, intimation shall be sent to the Collector by forwarding an authenticated copy of the instrument so impounded alongwith certificate stating the amount of duty and penalty levied and collected. Whereas, sub-section (2) says that if the authority mentioned in sub-section (1) has not collected the deficit stamp duty and penalty i.e., if the party who is liable to pay the same refuses to pay and requests the authority to forward the document to the Collector so as to make representation before him, in such an instance, the impounding authority has to forward the impounded instrument in original to the Collector to be dealt with in accordance with Section 40 of the Stamp Act. The impounding authority (Court) under law has no power to insist the party to pay the stamp duty and penalty without forwarding the document to the Collector under Section 38(2). It is so held in Nalajala Jagannadham v. Veerepally Mangamma, 1997 (2) ALD 549 : 1997 (1) ALT 725 , wherein the High Court of Andhra Pradesh observed as follows: "9. A reading of Section 38 says that if the party who filed the document wants it to be admitted in evidence then only the Court shall collect the stamp duty and penalty and then admit the instrument in evidence. A reading of Section 38 says that if the party who filed the document wants it to be admitted in evidence then only the Court shall collect the stamp duty and penalty and then admit the instrument in evidence. But if the party instead of requiring the document to be admitted in evidence merely wants the Court to send it to the Collector to be dealt with under Section 40 the Court has no option but to send it to the Collector as provided in Section 38(2). The Court cannot compel the party to pay duty and penalty and have it admitted in evidence." In fact, when some Courts were insisting the parties to pay stamp duty and penalty instead of transmitting the deficiently stamped documents to Collector under Section 38(2) of the Stamp Act, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh issued Circular No. 13/2007 in ROC No. 1628/SO/2005, dated 10.07.2006 to the effect that if the party pays the penalty to the Court as required under Section 33 of the Stamp Act, the Court shall endorse the same on the document and if he requests to send the document to the Collector for collection of stamp duty and penalty, the Court may consider such request and send the document to the Collector. 7. It should be noted that in all the above sections the term "instrument" is employed. Hence, it is apposite to look into the said term. Section 2(14) of the Stamp Act defines the term "instrument" thus: "Instrument includes every document by which any right or liability is, or purports to be, created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded." Thus, an instrument is a document by which right or liability must be or purported to be created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded. In view of the above definition, it has been held in a number of decisions that for the purpose of determining the stamp duty and penalty, the original document itself must be produced but not its copy, for, the rights or liabilities will not legally flow through such copy. There is a thicket of decisions in that regard. (i) In The Rajah of Bobbili v. Inuganti China Sitaramasyami Garu, (1900) ILR 23 Mad. There is a thicket of decisions in that regard. (i) In The Rajah of Bobbili v. Inuganti China Sitaramasyami Garu, (1900) ILR 23 Mad. 49, the suit was filed by Rajah of Bobbili against his relation Inuganti China Sitarasami Garu wherein, it became necessary for the plaintiff to show that the grant made by the then Rajah of Bobbili Sri Rajah Sveta Chalapati Ranga Rao Bahadur in 1848 was an absolute and unconditional grant. However, he could not produce the deed of grant but produced only copy of it and sought to tender as secondary evidence and since the original instrument itself was insufficiently stamped, the plaintiff was prepared to pay stamp duty and penalty on the copy of the instrument. In that context, the District Judge refused to receive the document and dismissed the suit. The matter went up to Privy Council wherein, it was observed as follows: "10. xxx... These clauses throughout deal with, and exclusively refer to the admission as evidence of original documents which, at the time of their execution, were not stamped at all, or were insufficiently stamped. It is only upon production of the original writ, that the Collector has the power given him, or the duty imposed upon him of assessing and charging the penalty, a duty which he must, in that case, perform by writing an Indorsement upon the writ submitted to him, which then, and not till then, becomes probative in law." (ii) In Jupudi Kesava Rao v. Pulavarthi Venkata Subbarao, (1971) 3 SCR 590 , relying upon Rajah of Bobbili's case (supra) and other decisions, the Apex Court did not agree with the appellants' contention and observed that the first limb of Section 35 shuts out from evidence any instrument chargeable with duty unless it is duly stamped and the second limb of Section 35 which relates to "acting upon" the instrument will obviously shut out any secondary evidence of such instrument, because allowing such evidence when the original was not stamped or insufficiently stamped, would tantamount to the document being acted upon. The Apex Court made it clear that Proviso (a) to Section 35 is applicable only when the original instrument is actually before the Court of Law and deficit stamp with penalty is paid by the party. The Apex Court made it clear that Proviso (a) to Section 35 is applicable only when the original instrument is actually before the Court of Law and deficit stamp with penalty is paid by the party. (iii) Hariom Agrawal v. Prakash Chand Malviya, 2007 (6) ALD 105 (SC) : AIR 2008 SC 166 : (2007) 8 SCC 514 , was a suit for eviction, wherein the tenant relied upon an agreement dated 28.03.1988 said to be executed by the landlord. He, on the plea that original agreement was stolen, sought to produce a photostat copy of the agreement as secondary evidence by an application which was allowed by the Trial Court. The landlord being aggrieved, filed writ petition before the High Court which set aside the Trial Court's order and directed the Trial Court to decide the question whether photocopy of an improperly stamped original document can be received in secondary evidence. The Trial Court ordered that the photocopy, whose original was insufficiently stamped, be impounded and sent to Collector for levying stamp duty penalty. The said order was again challenged before the High Court which held that the impugned document which is a photocopy of the agreement, original of which lost, cannot be admitted in evidence and it can neither be impounded nor can be accepted in secondary evidence. In the appeal the Apex Court observed thus: "8. xxxx... Section 33 or 35 are not concerned with any copy of the instrument and party can only be allowed to rely on the document which is an instrument within the meaning of Section 2(14). There is no scope for the inclusion of the copy of the document for the purposes of the Indian Stamp Act. Law is now no doubt well settled that copy of the instrument cannot be validated by impounding and this cannot be admitted as secondary evidence under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. (Emphasis supplied)" (iv) In Akkam Laxmi v. Thosha Bhoomaiah, 2002 (4) ALD 808 , when the plaintiff sought to introduce the copy of possessory agreement to sale dated 24.04.1997 as secondary evidence on the plea that the original was lost, the Trial Court though permitted him to do so, however, since the original was insufficiently stamped, impounded the same under Section 35 of the Stamp Act. The impounding of the document was challenged by the plaintiff in the revision before the common High Court of A.P. on the main plea that the document was only a copy and adduced as secondary evidence and hence, it does not require stamp duty penalty. A learned Single Judge relying upon Jupudi Kesava Rao's case (supra) and Rajah of Bobbili's case (supra), observed that a combined reading of Sections 35 and 36 coupled with Section 2(14) of the Stamp Act would leave no room for any doubt that what is required to be stamped is the original instrument itself and the Act has not envisaged a copy of the original for the purpose of Stamp Act and copy of the document cannot be called as an instrument and therefore, it is not required to be stamped. With regard to evidentiary value of the copy, learned Judge observed that notwithstanding the legal position that a copy of the instrument need not be stamped, the same cannot be permitted to be introduced by means of a secondary evidence when the original itself is not clearly stamped, inasmuch as, such a document cannot be acted upon. (v) In C. Sreedhara Raja v. S. Vittoba Rao, 2005 (3) ALD 316 : AIR 2005 AP 322 , a tenant alongwith counter filed a xerox copy of memorandum of partition deed and requested to send the document to the competent authority for impounding and levying stamp duty and penalty which was allowed by the Trial Court. The said order was challenged by the plaintiff in revision. A learned Judge of the High Court of A.P., relying upon Akkam Laxmi's case (supra), Jupudi Kesava Rao's case (supra) and some other cases, has observed that the document in dispute would not fall under the definition of 'instrument' defined under Section 2(14) of the Stamp Act and therefore, the same cannot be impounded and transmitted under Section 38(2) of the Stamp Act for collection of stamp duty and penalty. (vi) In M. Venkata Rao v. M. Seshagiri Rao, 2009 (1) ALD 623 , in a suit for recovery of the possession of the suit schedule property, the defendants filed the photo copy of an agreement of sale dated 13.04.1988 purported to be executed by plaintiff in favour of 1st defendant and requested the Court by filing an I.A. to transmit the same to RDO, Mahabubabad for impounding. Since the original document was not filed, the Trial Court dismissed the application. Aggrieved, they filed revision petition. A learned Single Judge of the High Court of A.P. having observed that photo copy of a document cannot be treated as an instrument, dismissed the CRP. (vii) In V. Chidambaram Chettiar v. M.A. Meyyappan Ambalam, AIR 1946 Mad. 298 : (1946) ILR Mad. 672, the facts are that before Trial Court the plaintiffs relied upon and produced an unstamped document dated 01.11.1902 purported to have been executed by Ulagappa Chettiar in favour of the P.M.A. family. Before the trial commenced, a mob invaded the Court house and set fire to it, as a result, many records including the record in the subject case were destroyed. When the trial commenced, the plaintiffs sought to introduce a copy of the original document dated 01.11.1902. The defendants objected the said copy being introduced in evidence on the ground that a copy could not be stamped even on payment of penalty. Moreover, the original itself was inadmissible by reason of non-registration. Of course, it was also averred that the original was fabricated by the plaintiffs for the purpose of their case. The Subordinate Judge without admitting the document but leaving the question of its admissibility open until he heard the arguments at the conclusion of the case, marked document as Ex. P8(a). However, it was clear from his judgment that it was not to be regarded as an exhibit in the case. In the appeal, Division Bench of the High Court of Madras held thus: 4. Section 34 of the Stamp Act only relates to the stamping of original documents. (See Raja of Bobbili v. Inuganti China Sitaramaswami Garu). The fact that the document filed in Court before the trial began was destroyed by the mob's action puts the plaintiffs in no better position. In Rippiner v. Wright, (1819) 2 B. Ald. 478 : 106 E.R. 440, it was held that where an agreement on unstamped paper had been destroyed, no parol evidence could be given of its contents, even if it had been destroyed by the wrongful act of the party who took the objection. In that case an agreement had been reduced into writing on unstamped paper. The plaintiff snatched it from the hands of the defendant's attorney and then destroyed it. In that case an agreement had been reduced into writing on unstamped paper. The plaintiff snatched it from the hands of the defendant's attorney and then destroyed it. It was contended that the plaintiff, by his act in destroying the paper, had prevented the defendant from getting it stamped, as he might have done, on payment of the penalty and therefore it was not competent for him to take the objection with regard to its admissibility. It was held that the evidence was properly rejected. It was the duty of the parties to an agreement to take care that when it was executed it was properly stamped; and it was one of the risks attendant upon an omission to do this that if an accident happened to the document before the stamp was affixed, there was no remedy. It was not possible to say whether or not the Commissioners of Stamps, in the exercise of their discretion, would have permitted the agreement, if it had remained in existence, to be stamped on payment of the penalty." 8. From the above jurimetrics, the jurisprudence that evolved is, under Section 35 of the Stamp Act there can be validation only of the original, when it is unstamped or insufficiently stamped, but its copy cannot be validated and 'acted upon' and that in consequence no decree could be passed thereon. The decisions which are elaborately discussed above with facts would further show that the reasons for non-production of the original instrument is immaterial i.e., whether it was lost or stolen or misplaced or destroyed or even in extreme circumstances, the original document was suppressed or withheld by the opposite party or was lost or misplaced or destroyed during the custody of the Court. The reason for the statute being harsh is not far to seek. It is because, the term 'instrument' appearing in Sections 33, 35, 36, 37 & 38 of the Stamp Act, by virtue of its definition under Section 2(14), is understood as only the original document, for, the creation or extinction of rights and liabilities could be possible with original document but not its copy. Therefore, a copy of original document which was deficitly stamped cannot be validated by impounding and collecting penalty. Therefore, a copy of original document which was deficitly stamped cannot be validated by impounding and collecting penalty. The jurisprudence also tells us that a party who enters into a transaction on an insufficiently stamped document carries with him an inherent risk that in case the original is lost or destroyed even for no fault of him, his judicial remedy is lost, for, the copy of the original is of no avail to establish his rights. At the same time, the situation would be different if the original document itself was duly stamped and registered under the relevant laws and lost or destroyed. In such an event, copy of the original can be admitted as secondary evidence since it does not require any more stamp duty. There is no demur or dispute with regard to the above law pronounced basing on the facts involved in those cases. It is significant to note, in all the above cases except in V. Chidambaram Chettiar's case (supra), the facts would demonstrate that original document was not produced and parties by producing the photostat copies of the original (which were deficitly stamped), sought to adduce them as secondary evidence and even prepared to pay stamp duty and penalty on copies which was declined in view of law being clear in that regard. In V. Chidambaram Chettiar's case (supra), original document was no doubt filed, but it was destroyed when the Court was gutted to fire and copy of the original was sought to be adduced as secondary evidence and even marked as exhibit. However, the same was discarded. It is pertinent to note that reconstruction of original was not done in that case. The case on hand is significantly different from the above cases, inasmuch as, though original agreement to sell dated 01.09.1995 was lost in the Trial Court, however, the said document was reconstructed by the Trial Court with the permission of the District Court, Visakhapatnam. Hence, the question is what is its evidentiary value. At this juncture, it is apposite to discuss concisely about the object behind reconstruction of the records lost while in custody of a Court and their validity. 9. It should be noted that Courts by exercising the inherent jurisdiction reconstruct the records that were misplaced, lost or destroyed during their custody so as to avoid any prejudice being caused to the parties. 9. It should be noted that Courts by exercising the inherent jurisdiction reconstruct the records that were misplaced, lost or destroyed during their custody so as to avoid any prejudice being caused to the parties. The object behind reconstruction of records is based on the maxim "Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit", which means that the act of the Court shall prejudice no one and the Court is under an obligation to undo the wrong done to a party by the act of the Court, vide Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania, AIR 2010 SC 3745 . Regarding the inherent power of the Court, we have some case law. (i) In Marakkarutti v. T.P.M. Veeran Kutty, AIR 1923 Mad. 647, a Division Bench of the High Court of Madras tried to trace the origin of the inherent power of the Court to construct the record. It observed thus: "2. xxxx..... I think that one can safely start with the proposition that there is inherent power in every Court to reconstruct its own records, and I think it follows that there is inherent power in the Appellate Court to reconstruct the records of the Court from which an appeal lies to it. This power has been recognised in England and in America, which follows the English Common Law, and also in this Country. The English case that is quoted on the subject is Douglass v. Yallop, 97 E.R. 532. The matter was more fully discussed in an American case, McLendon v. Jones, 42 Am. Dec. 640, a judgment of the Court of Alabama which quoted and followed Douglass v. Yallop (supra) and a case which had been decided by the Supreme Court of New York; and that case points out, "Cases must frequently have occurred in which, by accident, the records of Courts of Justice have been destroyed or lost, and it would seem strange if the Common Law had provided no adequate means by which the injuries growing out of such accident could be averted or remedied," and then goes on to discuss the methods by which the remedy should be provided." (ii) In Ram Khelawan v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, 1987 RD 350, the High Court of Allahabad reiterated the inherent power. It held thus: 6. Director of Consolidation, 1987 RD 350, the High Court of Allahabad reiterated the inherent power. It held thus: 6. The principle of reconstruction of document whether it is lost, burnt or misplaced not oh account of fault of either parties is clearly covered under the Courts' inherent power under Section 151 Code of Civil Procedure. However, this power has to be exercised with great care and circumvention to see that in reconstruction of file no party is getting favourable gains from the position what it was prior to the reconstructions. One of the principles which is to be kept in mind is that the party should be given fullest opportunity first to file such certified copies which are in their possession of those records which are now not available to the Court. In doing so the Court need not confine itself to the certified copies but even copies which are not certified if either party did not object and accept the said document, it may be accepted as a part of the record of the then existing document. No fixed principle or criterion could be laid down to the Court in deciding as to in what manner the record is to be reconstructed." (iii) In' U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Geeta Devi, 1983 ACJ 360 , the High Court of Allahabad observed thus: "11. xxxx .... This, to our mind, can be done under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure Section 151 Code of Civil Procedure preserves inherent power which a Court of general jurisdiction is required to exercise in the ends of justice. The "inherent power", observed by the Supreme Court in Manoharlal v. Seth Hira Lal, AIR 1962 SC 527 , "has not been conferred on the Court, it is a power inherent in the Court by virtue of its duty to do justice between the parties, before it." 12. It may further be stated that it is one of the first and the highest duties of the Courts to take care that the act of the Court does no injury to any of the litigants. Accordingly, if on account of some accident, the record of a Court is lost or destroyed by fire, it is the duty of the Court to reconstruct the same so that justice is done between the parties on its basis. 13. Accordingly, if on account of some accident, the record of a Court is lost or destroyed by fire, it is the duty of the Court to reconstruct the same so that justice is done between the parties on its basis. 13. The argument raised in this regard was that as there is no specific power in Code of Civil Procedure for reconstruction of a destroyed record, the Court is not empowered in exercise of its inherent power to get it reconstructed. It is undeniable that the Court cannot exercise its inherent power which is otherwise prohibited by any specific provision or impliedly barred. In the exercise of its inherent power, the Court should be careful to see that its decision is based on sound general principles and is not in conflict with them or the intention of the Legislature." (iv) In S.S. Neelamegam v. R. Jeyapal and others, 2011 (5) CTC 537 , in the context of reconstruction of an application for restoration of the suit misplaced by the Court staff, the High Court of Madras (Madurai Bench) observed that for the mistake of either the Court or its staff no litigant should suffer or be penalized when no fault is attributable to him. Every Court of law has inherent powers to reconstruct its record which is universally recognized principle. 10. It is pertinent at this juncture to mention about S.O. 51 of the High Court of A.P. Standing Orders, 2004. It says that in the matter of reconstruction of records, the High Court usually advises the Unit Heads to exercise their powers under Section 151 CPC with regard to civil matters. 11. Thus, the ratio in the above decisions is that a Court in whose custody record was misplaced, lost or destroyed can exercise its inherent powers and reconstruct such record so as to obviate injustice being done to party who was not at fault. Now, the crucial question is when the original of the reconstructed document was not duly stamped, can the latter be validated and admitted in evidence by levying stamp duty and penalty. In my considered view, the maxim "Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit" which is taken aid on equitable basis to reconstruct a document, can also be resorted for validating such document. My view gets fortified by the following decisions: (i) In Katam Atchutharamayya v. Irrinki Nagabhushanam, 1957 (2) An. In my considered view, the maxim "Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit" which is taken aid on equitable basis to reconstruct a document, can also be resorted for validating such document. My view gets fortified by the following decisions: (i) In Katam Atchutharamayya v. Irrinki Nagabhushanam, 1957 (2) An. WR 280, the arbitration award which was not duly stamped was filed into Court and same was sent to R.D.O., Bhimavaram for collection of stamp duty and penalty. The document was lost. Speaking about the validity of the reconstructed document, a learned Judge of the High Court of A.P. observed thus: "6. The award was filed into Court under the terms of Section 14 of the Arbitration Act, and the award was certainly a Court record. 7. In the United States Code, 1952 Edition, Volume-III, at Page 4,215 it is clearly stated that the reconstructed record shall have the same effect as the original record subject to intervening rights of third persons. Following these decisions I hold that the copy which has been accepted by the Courts below as being a true copy of the award should be treated as the original itself by reason of the reconstruction. 8. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the reasoning of the decision of the Privy Council in Raja of Bobbili v. Inuganti China Sitaramasami Garh (supra) and of the Madras High Court in Chidambaram v. Meyyappan (supra), applies to the facts of this case. Lord Watson stated in Raja of Bobbili v. Inuganti China Sitaramaswami Garu (supra), that under the terms of Section 34 of the Indian Stamp Act of 1879, as the copy could not be stamped, the original having been lost it could not be admitted in evidence. This decision was followed by the Madras High Court in Chidambaram v. Meyyappan (supra). Those decisions have really no application to the case of loss of original record of the Court, which under the Court's inherent power, can be reconstructed and which, if reconstructed, would have the effect of the originals." (ii) In P. Balraj v. A. Pochaiah, 1992 (3) ALT 575 , the facts were that the original agreement of sale sent by Trial Court to the Sub-Registrar for impounding and levying stamp duty penalty was lost. Plaintiff's application requesting the Court to permit him to file photostat copy of agreement of sale as secondary evidence was dismissed. Plaintiff's application requesting the Court to permit him to file photostat copy of agreement of sale as secondary evidence was dismissed. In the resultant C.R.P., a learned Judge of the High Court of A.P. having found there was no fault of the petitioner, while allowing the revision petition observed thus: "2. xxxx .. In this case there is no doubt that the original document was filed by the party into the Court. The Court in its turn sent it to the Sub-Registrar, Ibrahimpatnam for ascertaining the value of the property for the purpose of impounding the document and levying the stamp duty and penalty. If the original document sent to the Sub-Registrar has been lost, the plaintiff cannot be blamed nor should he suffer the consequence of its loss. 3. Section 65(c) is enacted only to meet such contingencies. It cannot be said that the loss of document is attributable to the plaintiffs default or negligence. If so, the secondary evidence, namely, the Xerox copy available with him cannot be shut out from evidence. 4. The revision petition is therefore allowed on condition of the petitioner undertaking to pay the requisite stamp duty and penalty which is payable by him on the document. Had the original document been available with plaintiff, he would have been permitted to mark the document only on payment of stamp duty and penalty and he cannot escape that liability merely because the original was lost and he is permitted to file the secondary evidence." (iii) In Achuta Nageswara Rao v. Chundru Krishna Murthy (died) and others, 2008 (6) ALD 736 , plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance of Ex. A2-agreement to sell dated 28.09.1987. Since the original agreement was not duly stamped, the document was sent to the District Collector for impounding but the same was misplaced and hence, on the request of the District Collector, a xerox copy of the original available in the record was sent by the Trial Court to the revenue office and same was impounded and stamp duty and penalty was levied and document was marked as Ex. A2 without objection. The case of defendant was that the document was obtained by force and threat. Be that it may, the Trial Court and First Appellate Court dismissed the suit on the prime ground that suit cannot be maintained on the strength of Ex. A2-xerox copy of original agreement. A2 without objection. The case of defendant was that the document was obtained by force and threat. Be that it may, the Trial Court and First Appellate Court dismissed the suit on the prime ground that suit cannot be maintained on the strength of Ex. A2-xerox copy of original agreement. In the second appeal, a learned Judge observed that the suit was instituted on the strength of original agreement of sale which was lost in the revenue office when sent for impounding and said fault cannot be attributed to the plaintiff. On this observation, learned Judge found fault with the finding of the Courts below in dismissing the suit on the main ground that suit was not maintainable on the strength of Ex. A2. He set aside the judgment and remanded the matter to First Appellate Court to consider the respective stands taken by the parties and decide the matter. Thus, from the above decisions, it is clear that if the original document which was filed in Court was deficitly stamped and lost or misplaced while in the custody of the Court, it can be reconstructed by the Court by exercising its inherent powers, in which case, the reconstructed document, by virtue of legal fiction, assumes the character of original document for all purposes, including the Stamp Act. Further, if the original document was duly stamped and lost in the hands of the party, he may produce its copy in Court and seek to admit the same as secondary evidence on proving that the original was lost. However, if the original document was not duly stamped, a party relying on its copy cannot seek the Court to validate the copy by paying stamp duty and penalty and admit in evidence. 12. In the light of above law, the proceedings of the 3rd respondent in refusing to impound, levy and collect the Stamp duty and penalty on the xerox copy of the sale agreement is legally unsustainable. 13. 12. In the light of above law, the proceedings of the 3rd respondent in refusing to impound, levy and collect the Stamp duty and penalty on the xerox copy of the sale agreement is legally unsustainable. 13. Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed setting aside the proceedings of 3rd respondent in C. No. 481/G1/2018, dated 11.09.2019 and 3rd respondent is directed to impound the reconstructed xerox copy of sale agreement dated 01.09.1995 transmitted by the Court of Principal Junior Civil Judge, Bheemunipatnam, and levy and collect the Stamp Duty and penalty thereon and retransmit the aforesaid document to the Trial Court expeditiously, but not later than three (3) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs. 14. As a sequel, interlocutory applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.