JUDGMENT : Heard learned counsel for the parties through V.C. 2. The instant writ application has been preferred by the petitioner praying therein for quashing the letter No.2176 dated 27.07.2009 passed by the respondent No.4; whereby it has been held that the date of birth of the petitioner has been ascertained by the Joint Secretary, Bihar State Electricity Board vide letter No.1702 dated 22.12.1997 as 30.06.1944. 3. Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that that the petitioner had earlier moved before this Court in W.P.(S) No.3032 of 2004 praying for quashing the letter dated 16.02.2004, issued by Personnel Officer of the Board, asking the petitioner to submit his papers regarding retirement benefit as he is going to retire with effect from 30.06.2004. Learned counsel further submits that though vide order dated 08.04.2009 passed in the earlier writ application; the impugned letter dated 16.02.2004 was not quashed; however, the respondents were directed to take a decision with regard to claim as indicated in the prayer of the writ application. Pursuant thereto, the impugned order (Annexure-11) has been passed whereby the claim of the petitioner has been rejected. 4. Learned counsel further draws attention of this Court towards Annexure-1, which is said to be a duplicate service book. He further submits that since the original service book was mutilated as such duplicate service book was created in the year 1993 and in his service book the School Leaving Certificate was made part and parcel of the service book. He further draws attention of this Court towards the standing order of Board wherein at Clause-IV (d) it is stipulated that in case of any dispute with regard to date of birth; the Matriculation Certificate or School Leaving certificate or Horoscope shall be deemed to be the satisfactory proof of the age of the workman. Relying upon the aforesaid standing order he submits that since the School Leaving Certificate was part of the service book; as such his claim regarding date of birth as 05.01.1948 is justified. 5. At this stage, it is pertinent to mention here that the alleged duplicate service book is only signed till 1993 though admittedly; the petitioner retired in the year 2004. Learned counsel could not answer as to why the service book is only singed till 1993 and why the entire service book has been signed by single person. 5. At this stage, it is pertinent to mention here that the alleged duplicate service book is only signed till 1993 though admittedly; the petitioner retired in the year 2004. Learned counsel could not answer as to why the service book is only singed till 1993 and why the entire service book has been signed by single person. On specific query by this Court that when he first represented before the Board with regard to dispute of date of birth, learned counsel submits that the moment petitioner received the letter dated 16.02.2004 from the Board to submit the required documents for retiral benefit; he filed the earlier writ application. As such, the ground indicated in the impugned order is nonest in the eye of law and it cannot be said that the petitioner has raised objection at the fag end of service because as per him fag end of service will be in 2008 and not 2004. 6. Mr. O.P. Tiwari, learned counsel for the respondent-Board opposes the prayer of the petitioner and submits that when it came to the notice of the Board sometime in the year 1990 that the service book of the petitioner is missing; then the matter was brought to the knowledge of the Apex Board and a direction was sought to determine the date of birth of this petitioner along with several other employees facing similar problem. Thereafter, the Apex Board passed an order with regard to this petitioner and other co-employees and communicated the same to the Joint Secretary of the Board vide letter No.1702 dated 22.12.1997. As per the said order the date of birth of the petitioner has been determined as 30.06.1944 which was based upon the civil list published by Board in the year 1970. In the said order it was also stipulated that if the petitioner has passed his matriculation examination before joining the service of the Board, then the date of birth recorded in the matriculation certificate will be considered as his actual date of birth. This order dated 22.12.1997 was never challenged or objected by the petitioner till his retirement. 7. In the said order it was also stipulated that if the petitioner has passed his matriculation examination before joining the service of the Board, then the date of birth recorded in the matriculation certificate will be considered as his actual date of birth. This order dated 22.12.1997 was never challenged or objected by the petitioner till his retirement. 7. Learned counsel further submits that though in the School Transfer Certificate as annexed with the writ application the date of birth has been mentioned as 05.01.1948 but in the same certificate it has mentioned that at the time of leaving the said school he was studying in standard 11th as such; it was the duty of the petitioner to file/submit the matriculation certificate. In view of the aforesaid facts the case of the petitioner deserves to be dismissed. 8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after going through the documents annexed and the averments made in the respective affidavits, it appears that a high level committee was formed in order to decide the date of birth of all those employees whose service book was missing since it came to notice of the Board that the service book of this petitioner as well as several other co-employees were missing and thereafter the matter was brought to the knowledge of Apex Board and it was decided by the Apex Board that the date of birth of the petitioner has been determined as 30.06.1944. The said order was communicated to the Joint Secretary vide letter No.1702 dated 22.12.1997. As such in 1997 itself, the petitioner’s age was determined as 30.06.1944. From record it also appears that the petitioner has never objected the said order nor he has challenged the said order either in the previous writ application or in the instant writ application. The said order was communicated to the Joint Secretary vide letter No.1702 dated 22.12.1997. As such in 1997 itself, the petitioner’s age was determined as 30.06.1944. From record it also appears that the petitioner has never objected the said order nor he has challenged the said order either in the previous writ application or in the instant writ application. As a matter of fact for the first time he raised the objection after receiving the letter dated 16.02.2004; as such the contention of the petitioner that the objection made in 2004 cannot be construed at the fag end of service as he was going to retire in 2008; is not acceptable to this Court, inasmuch as, the order whereby the petitioner age was determined as 30.06.1944 was vide order dated 22.12.1997 and 7 years lapsed after the said order and in those 7 years petitioner must have came across with the aforesaid order; however he never objected the same. Now coming to the argument and reliance on the School Transfer Certificate; this Court is of the opinion that when this Transfer Certificate indicates that the petitioner was leaving that school on 21.3.1964 as class 11th student then what stopped the petitioner from annexing the matriculation certificate at the time of joining. This creates a doubt that the petitioner has not even passed the matriculation examination. Further, the service book which has been annexed by the petitioner also appears to be forged and fabricated, inasmuch as, single person has signed the entire service book and after 09.10.1993 there is no entry but admittedly; the petitioner remains in service till 2004. 9. Thus, any reliance on the Transfer Certificate and/or the duplicate Service Book appears to be dicey. Even otherwise; the law is well settled and the Hon’ble Apex Court has consistently held that the request for the change of the date of birth in the service records at the fag end of service is not sustainable. In the case of State of Maharashtra & Anr. v. Gorakhnath Sitaram Kamble & Ors.reported in (2010) 14 SCC 423 the Hon’ble Apex Court has held in paragraphs Nos. 16 and 19 as under:- “16. The learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in U.P. Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad v. Raj Kumar Agnihotri. In the case of State of Maharashtra & Anr. v. Gorakhnath Sitaram Kamble & Ors.reported in (2010) 14 SCC 423 the Hon’ble Apex Court has held in paragraphs Nos. 16 and 19 as under:- “16. The learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in U.P. Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad v. Raj Kumar Agnihotri. In this case, this Court has considered a number of judgments of this Court and observed that the grievance as to the date of birth in the service record should not be permitted at the fag end of the service career. 19. These decisions lead to a different dimension of the case that correction at the fag end would be at the cost of a large number of employees, therefore, any correction at the fag end must be discouraged by the court. The relevant portion of the judgment in Home Deptt. v. R. Kirubakaran reads as under : “7. An application for correction of the date of birth [by a public servant cannot be entertained at the fag end of his service]. It need not be pointed out that any such direction for correction of the date of birth of the public servant concerned has a chain reaction, inasmuch as others waiting for years, below him for their respective promotions are affected in this process. Some are likely to suffer irreparable injury, inasmuch as, because of the correction of the date of birth, the officer concerned, continues in office, in some cases for years, within which time many officers who are below him in seniority waiting for their promotion, may lose their promotion forever. … According to us, this is an important aspect, which cannot be lost sight of by the court or the tribunal while examining the grievance of a public servant in respect of correction of his date of birth. As such, unless a clear case on the basis of materials which can be held to be conclusive in nature, is made out by the respondent, the court or the tribunal should not issue a direction, on the basis of materials which make such claim only plausible. As such, unless a clear case on the basis of materials which can be held to be conclusive in nature, is made out by the respondent, the court or the tribunal should not issue a direction, on the basis of materials which make such claim only plausible. Before any such direction is issued, the court or the tribunal must be fully satisfied that there has been real injustice to the person concerned and his claim for correction of date of birth has been made in accordance with the procedure prescribed, and within the time fixed by any rule or order. … the onus is on the applicant to prove the wrong recording of his date of birth, in his service book.” Same view was reiterated in the case of State of M.P. & Ors. v. Premlal Shrivas reported in (2011) 9 SCC 664 wherein at para-8 and 12 the Hon’ble Court has held as under: “8. It needs to be emphasised that in matters involving correction of date of birth of a government servant, particularly on the eve of his superannuation or at the fag end of his career, the court or the tribunal has to be circumspect, cautious and careful while issuing direction for correction of date of birth, recorded in the service book at the time of entry into any government service. Unless the court or the tribunal is fully satisfied on the basis of the irrefutable proof relating to his date of birth and that such a claim is made in accordance with the procedure prescribed or as per the consistent procedure adopted by the department concerned, as the case may be, and a real injustice has been caused to the person concerned, the court or the tribunal should be loath to issue a direction for correction of the service book. Time and again this Court has expressed the view that if a government servant makes a request for correction of the recorded date of birth after lapse of a long time of his induction into the service, particularly beyond the time fixed by his employer, he cannot claim, as a matter of right, the correction of his date of birth, even if he has good evidence to establish that the recorded date of birth is clearly erroneous. No court or the tribunal can come to the aid of those who sleep over their rights. 12. No court or the tribunal can come to the aid of those who sleep over their rights. 12. Be that as it may, in our opinion, the delay of over two decades in applying for the correction of date of birth is ex facie fatal to the case of the respondent, notwithstanding the fact that there was no specific rule or order, framed or made, prescribing the period within which such application could be filed. It is trite that even in such a situation such an application should be filed which can be held to be reasonable. The application filed by the respondent 25 years after his induction into service, by no standards, can be held to be reasonable, more so when not a feeble attempt was made to explain the said delay. There is also no substance in the plea of the respondent that since Rule 84 of the M.P. Financial Code does not prescribe the time-limit within which an application is to be filed, the appellants were duty-bound to correct the clerical error in recording of his date of birth in the service book. 10. In the instant case, the petitioner join service in the year 1966 thereafter since service book of several employees including petitioner were misplaced and the Board came with a decision to ascertain the date of birth by way of other documents and it was also stipulated that if employee is having matriculation certificate then the same shall override everything; however, neither the petitioner objected the said order nor produced the matriculation certificate before the Board or before this Court though the petitioner has annexed School Transfer Certificate which is of Class 11th. Further, in spite of the order dated 22.12.1997, the petitioner never challenged the same and just at the fag end of service i.e. in 2004 filed a writ application before this Court. 11. In view of the aforesaid findings; no relief can be granted to this petitioner and the instant writ application is dismissed being devoid of merits.