JUDGMENT : S. MANIKUMAR, J. 1. This writ petition is filed challenging Ext. P5 order, HRMP No. 8402/2014 dated 11.12.2017 and also seeking for a direction to declare that the complaint preferred by the 3rd respondent is barred by limitation as per Section 36(2) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 (‘Act 1993’ for short) and clause 17(d) of the Kerala Human Rights Commission (Procedure) Regulations, 2001 (‘Regulations 2001’ for short) and that the petitioner Panchayat is not liable to pay any compensation or to construct retaining wall to the 3rd respondent as directed in Ext. P5. 2. Materials on record discloses that respondent No. 3 has submitted Ext.P1 application before the Kerala State Human Rights Commission and the same reads thus: APPLICATION SUBMITTED BEFORE THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION From Jayasree S. Shyni Nivas, Kodithookkiya Kunnu P.O. Kallara Sir, I am residing at Shyni Nivas, K.T Kunnu, Kallara Village, Nedumangad Taluk, Thiruvananathapuram District. I am a widow and mother of two daughters. For a project of KWA in 1996, a road was constructed starting from my property. For surrendering my property for road construction, Kallara Panchayat told me to pay a decent amount. And due to the promise, they made me to sign in a white paper for the purpose of written consent. Even after many years there has not been any final decision regarding the fund as promised. Complaint was given to many authorities but it was of no use. In 2009 I submitted a complaint to the office of the Hon’ble Chief Minister. After that I gave a complaint to the water authority, then a complaint was given to Kallara Grama Panchayath (RT), then to the District Collector. Finally during the expansion of the PWD Road, for rendering justice I preferred a complaint to the Assistant Executive Engineer. All the complaints that I have preferred and the responses have been attached here. I am a widow and I have not been given justice from anywhere till now. The initial plan was to construct the road by taking 2.5 meters from either side and thereby to construct a 5 meter width by the water authority. My property starts from the main road. I am a widow and I have not been given justice from anywhere till now. The initial plan was to construct the road by taking 2.5 meters from either side and thereby to construct a 5 meter width by the water authority. My property starts from the main road. The owner of the property which is situated on the opposite side of my property had misused my property and even after constant objection from my side, my property was encroached without my permission and using JCBs they laid pipe on my land. My house is almost 10 feet above the road. After each rain, due to the removal of earth by the PWD and KWA, my property is in a dangerous position. After each rain landslides are happening. I preferred many complaints against different authorities. Water Authority has promised to rectify the damage if they get a report from the Panchayat. I am entitled for compensation for the property surrendered by me and also entitled to get back the property encroached by them on the basis of the old sketch and plan. Immediate steps may be taken to protect my house and property. I humbly request to take urgent steps to protect my interest in this regard. Faithfully, Jayasree S. Place: Kodithookkiya Kunnu Date: 05.09.2014 3. After receiving the notice on 01.10.2014 from the office of the Kerala Human Rights Commission, the petitioner has sent a reply dated 21.10.2014, which reads thus: From, Secretary, Kallara Grama Panchayat. To, Secretary, Human Rights Commission Sir, Sub: Representation submitted by Smt. Jayasree demanding price of the property, which was surrendered to the Kerala Water Authority by the Kallara Grama panchayat - reply report. Reg: Ref: Letter No. HRMP/14/TVM/HRC dated 1.10.2014 from your office. Attention invited to the reference. Enquiry conducted regarding the above subject reveals that the dispute is with regard to the mud road constructed for access to the water tank erected to the Kerala Water Authority in KT Kunnu Ward of Kallara Grama Panchayat, which lies from Varikkaplamoodu Junction to KT Kunnu PWD road. Now the road is having a width of 4.7 meter to 4.5 meters and having around 150 meter in length. The property of the complainant is situated at the end of the mud road. The house and the property is situated about 10 feet above the road and hence there are chances of landslide during heavy rain. Now the road is having a width of 4.7 meter to 4.5 meters and having around 150 meter in length. The property of the complainant is situated at the end of the mud road. The house and the property is situated about 10 feet above the road and hence there are chances of landslide during heavy rain. Since the road was constructed by surrendering the property to Kerala Authority, there is no justification demanding compensation from the Panchayat. Kerala Water Authority is not an institution entrusted with the Panchayat. It is understood that the property owners on either side had surrendered their properties, free of cost, for constructing a motorable road to the water tank years back may be due to the recommendation/intervention of the panchayat committee. In my knowledge, there is no rules or government orders to pay price of the properties, which was surrendered for forming the road. When inspection was conducted in the road none of the property owners had approached the panchayat demanding payment of compensation or price for the properties surrendered by them. It is made clear that since the road was constructed for a public sector institution, no amount can be paid from the panchayat fund. The photographs taken from the place is also enclosed. Yours faithfully, Secretary, Kallara Grama Panchayat 4. Secretary of the petitioner Panchayat has also filed Ext.P3 affidavit before the first respondent Commission stating that the Panchayat has no authority and responsibility with respect to the construction of the pathway, since the pipeline of the water authority is laid through the said road. In the affidavit, it is stated that, on site inspection, it was found that the subject property is under the possession of the Water Authority and that a mud road is constructed having 4 meter width and for the construction of pathway, the residents of the Panchayat had voluntarily surrendered their properties to the Water Authority. It is also stated that there is no encroachment reported for the construction of pathway, that the house and property of the complainant is having 6 meter distance from the road and hence, the house of the complainant is not in a hazardous condition. 5. Thereafter, on 27.04.2016, the first respondent Commission passed Ext. It is also stated that there is no encroachment reported for the construction of pathway, that the house and property of the complainant is having 6 meter distance from the road and hence, the house of the complainant is not in a hazardous condition. 5. Thereafter, on 27.04.2016, the first respondent Commission passed Ext. P4 proceedings directing the Tahsildar to file a report after fixing the fair value of the property and also to file a report after preparing an estimate for the construction of the side wall. 6. After considering the entire material on record, the Kerala State Human Rights Commission passed Ext. P5 order dated 11.12.2017 directing the Secretary, Kallara Grama Panchayat to pay compensation to the complainant for the property taken, for formation of the road and to include the project to construct a retaining wall with dimensions 7 mtr. 25.5 mtr. length and 3 metre height for the property on the side of the PWD road to water tank, abutting the property of the complainant in the People's Plan Programme 2016-2017. Thereafter, as per Ext.P6 reminder dated 08.01.2021, the petitioner was directed to submit a report on or before 27.01.2021. In the meanwhile, on 18.01.2020, the petitioner Panchayat has passed Ext.P7 Resolution No. 6(1) dated 18.01.2020 deciding to prefer an appeal before this Court. 7. On the basis of the averments, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that Ext.P5 order was passed by the Commission without considering the question of limitation as mandated in Section 36(2) of the Act, 1993 and clause 17(d) of the Regulation, 2001. As per Section 36(2) of the Act, 1993, the Commission has not enquired into any matter after the expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights is alleged to have been committed. The alleged incident of forming a road was in the year 1996 and the third respondent approached the Commission in the year 2014 and that the first respondent Commission, without considering the question of limitation, straight away proceeded with the complaint and passed Ext. P5 order. 8. It is also contended that the first respondent Commission, by assuming the powers of a civil court, proceeded with Ext. P1 complaint and without recording any evidence, passed the impugned order. P5 order. 8. It is also contended that the first respondent Commission, by assuming the powers of a civil court, proceeded with Ext. P1 complaint and without recording any evidence, passed the impugned order. As per Clause 17(f) of the Regulations, 2001, no complaint is maintainable with respect to civil disputes, service matters, labour or industrial disputes. It is contended that the issue involved in this case is purely of civil nature and not in respect of any violation of human rights. As per Section 2(d) of Act, 1993, 'human rights' means ' the rights relating to life, liberty, equality and dignity of the individual guaranteed by the constitution or embodied in the international covenants and enforceable by courts of law. 9. It is further contended that none of the other persons, except the 3rd respondent who had surrendered their property for forming the road, had raised any claim against the Panchayat or any other authority and they never demanded any compensation for the property surrendered. Further, the 3rd respondent herself had removed the earth between the road and her house, which resulted in the loss of lateral support and therefore, she is not entitled to any relief, as granted in Ext. P5, including the construction of retaining wall by the Panchayat. 10. The procedure envisaged in Chapter IV of the Regulations, 2001 regarding summoning of parties, examination of witnesses and preparation of report was not complied while passing Ext. P5 order. The mandatory principles regarding recording of evidence in clause 44 was not complied by the Commission and without recording evidence of the complaint and without giving opportunity to the petitioner, the impugned order was passed. 11. It is further contended that the liability of constructing the road was fixed with the Panchayat without any materials and that no decision was taken by the Panchayat committee to widen the existing alley and no records are available with regard to the promise allegedly made to the 3rd respondent, by the Panchayat to pay compensation. Further, no acquisition or any other proceedings were taken at the instance of the Panchayat to construct the disputed road and in fact, the neighbouring property owners voluntarily surrendered their property to widen the road. 12. Further, no acquisition or any other proceedings were taken at the instance of the Panchayat to construct the disputed road and in fact, the neighbouring property owners voluntarily surrendered their property to widen the road. 12. Even though the learned counsel for the petitioner has made submissions on the above grounds, particularly, with regard to limitation in lodging a complaint before the Kerala State Human Rights Commission, perusal of Ext. P4 order dated 27.04.2016 and Ext.P5 order dated 11.12.2017 passed by the Human Rights Commission indicates that the petitioner Panchayat has not raised any objection on the issue of limitation. Respondent No. 3 has not been paid any compensation for forming the road and thus, she was constrained to prefer a complaint before the first respondent Commission. What is alleged to have been violated is the right to property, which is declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as ‘human right’ in the following decisions: (i) In Indian Handicrafts Emporium and Others vs. Union of India and Others, (2003) 7 SCC 589 , the Hon'ble Supreme court held that: 113. It is true that right to property is a human right as also a constitutional right. But it is not a fundamental right. Each and every claim to property would not be property right. (ii) In Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran vs. Pure Industrial Cock and Chem. Ltd. and Others, (2007) 8 SCC 705 , the Hon'ble Supreme court held that: 44. There are two competing interests, viz. one, the interest of the vis-a-vis the general public and, two, to have better living conditions and the right of property of an individual which although is not a fundamental right but is a constitutional and human right. 54. The right of property is now considered to be not only a constitutional right but also a human right. 55. The Declaration of Human Rights (1789) enunciates under Article 17 “since the right to property is inviolable and sacred, no-one may be deprived thereof, unless public necessity, legally ascertained, obviously requires it and just and prior indemnity has been paid”. Further under Article 217 (IIII) of 10th December, 1948, adopted in the General Assembly Resolution it is stated that: (i) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. (ii) No-one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. 56. Further under Article 217 (IIII) of 10th December, 1948, adopted in the General Assembly Resolution it is stated that: (i) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. (ii) No-one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. 56. Earlier human rights were existed to the claim of individuals right to health, right to livelihood, right to shelter and employment etc. but now human rights have started gaining a multifaceted approach. Now property rights are also incorporated within the definition of human rights. Even claim of adverse possession has to be read in consonance with human rights. (iii) In P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy and Others vs. Revamma and Others, (2007) 6 SCC 59 , the Hon'ble Supreme court held that: RIGHT TO PROPERTY AS HUMAN RIGHT 23. There is another aspect of the matter, which cannot be lost sight of. The right of property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right but also a human right. Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 1789 enunciates right to property under Article 17: Since the right to property is inviolable and sacred, no-one may be deprived thereof, unless public necessity, legally ascertained, obviously requires it and just and prior indemnity has been paid. Moreover, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 under Section 17(i) and 17(ii) also recognizes right to property: 17. (i) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. (ii) No-one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” 24. Human rights have been historically considered in the realm of individual rights such as, right to health, right to livelihood, right to shelter and employment etc. but now human rights are gaining a multifaceted dimension. Right to property is also considered very much a part of the new dimension. Therefore, even claim of adverse possession has to be read in that context. The activist approach of the English Courts is quite visible from the judgment of Beaulane Properties Ltd. vs. Palmer, 2005 (3) WLR 554 : 2005 EWHC 817 (Ch.) and J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd vs. United Kingdom, (2005) ECHR 921 : (2005) 49 ERG 90 : (2005) ECHR 921 The court herein tried to read the Human Rights position in the context of adverse possession. But what is commendable is that the dimensions of human rights has widened so much that now property dispute issues are also being raised within the contours of human rights. 25. With the expanding jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the Court has taken an unkind view to the concept of adverse possession in the recent judgment of J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd vs. The United Kingdom, (2005) ECHR 921 which concerned the loss of ownership of land by virtue of adverse possession. (iv) In Lachhman Dass vs. Jagat Ram and Others, (2007) 10 SCC 448 , the Hon'ble Supreme court held that: 10. Despite such notice, the appellant was not impleaded as a party. His right, therefore, to own and possess the suit land could not have been taken away without giving him an opportunity of hearing in a matter of this nature. To hold property is a constitutional right in terms of Article 300A of the Constitution of India. It is also a human right. Right to hold property, therefore, cannot be taken away except in accordance with the provisions of a statute. If a superior right to hold a property is claimed, the procedures therefore must be complied with. The conditions precedent therefore must be satisfied. Even otherwise, the right of pre-emption is a very weak right, although it is a statutory right. The Court, while granting a relief in favour of a pre-emptor, must bear it in mind about the character of the right, vis-a-vis, the constitutional and human right of the owner thereof. (v) In N. Padmamma and Others vs. S. Ramakrishna Reddy and Others, (2008) 15 SCC 517 , the Hon'ble Supreme court held that: 17. Where the civil court's jurisdiction is barred expressly it must mean that the same would be confined to the matters covered thereby or connected therewith. The right or the claim must be necessarily required to be dealt with by the authorities under the Act. The grievance/adjudicatory forum provided therein must be competent to resolve the dispute. The right of property is a human right. The Act contemplates divesting of right of an Inamdar. It does not contemplate cessation of a right of a co-sharer or recognition of a right in favour of other co-sharer. The right has to be determined having regard to the possession by way of personal cultivation. The right of property is a human right. The Act contemplates divesting of right of an Inamdar. It does not contemplate cessation of a right of a co-sharer or recognition of a right in favour of other co-sharer. The right has to be determined having regard to the possession by way of personal cultivation. The word ‘possession’ in such cases should be given a broader connotation. Possession of one sharer would be deemed to be the possession of others. It is a legal concept. This legal concept cannot be held to have been done away with under the Act. If a right of property is a human right as also a constitutional right, the same cannot be taken away except in accordance with law. Article 300A of the Constitution protects such right. The provisions of the Act seeking to divest such right, keeping in view of the provisions of Article 300A of the Constitution of India, must be strictly construed. [See: Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. vs. Darius Shapur Chenai, AIR 2005 SC 3520 ]. (vi) In Mahender Pal and Others vs. State of Haryana and Others, (2009) 14 SCC 281 , the Hon'ble Supreme court held that: 16. It is a well-settled principle of law that an exception carved out from the main provision as a result whereof a citizen of India may be deprived of his property particularly having regard to the fact that if it is considered to be a human right, procedural safeguards laid down therefore must be scrupulously complied with. It being an expropriatory legislation deserves strict construction. [See: Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. vs. Darius Shapur Chenai and Others, AIR 2005 SC 3520 , Devinder Singh and Others vs. State of Punjab and Others, (2008) 1 SCC 728 and City Montessori School vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, 2009 (2) SCALE 740 ]. (vii) In Tukaram Kana Joshi and Others vs. M.I.D.C. and Others, (2013) 1 SCC 353 , the Hon’ble Supreme court held that: 7. The right to property is now considered to be, not only a constitutional or a statutory right, but also a human right. Though, it is not a basic feature of the Constitution or a fundamental right. Human rights are considered to be in realm of individual rights, such as the right to health, the right to livelihood, the right to shelter and employment etc. Though, it is not a basic feature of the Constitution or a fundamental right. Human rights are considered to be in realm of individual rights, such as the right to health, the right to livelihood, the right to shelter and employment etc. Now however, human rights are gaining an even greater multi faceted dimension. The right to property is considered, very much to be a part of such new dimension. [Vide: Lachhman Dass vs. Jagat Ram and Others, (2007) 10 SCC 448 , Amarjit Singh and Others vs. State of Punjab and Others, (2010) 10 SCC 43 , Narmada Bachao Andolan vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another, AIR 2011 SC 1989 , State of Haryana vs. Mukesh Kumar and Others, AIR 2012 SC 559 and Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of U.P. and Another, AIR 2012 SC 573 ]. (viii) In Amarjit Singh and Others vs. State of Punjab and Others, (2010) 10 SCC 43 , the Hon'ble Supreme court observed that: 41. Article 300A of the Constitution rests on the doctrine of eminent domain and guarantees a constitutional right against deprivation of property save by authority of law. It mandates that to be valid the deprivation of property must be by authority of law. That such deprivation in the present case is by the authority of law was not disputed, for it is common ground that the property owned by the appellants has been acquired in terms of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which is a validly enacted piece of legislation. It is also not in dispute that the provisions of Land Acquisition Act invoked by the State for the acquisition under challenge provides for payment of compensation equivalent to the market value of the property as on the date of the preliminary notification apart from other benefits like solatium for the compulsory nature of the acquisition, additional compensation and interest etc. The sum total of all these amounts undoubtedly constitutes a reasonable compensation for the land acquired from the expropriated owners. Neither Article 300A of the Constitution nor the Land Acquisition Act make any measures for rehabilitation of the expropriated owners a condition precedent for compulsory acquisition of land. The sum total of all these amounts undoubtedly constitutes a reasonable compensation for the land acquired from the expropriated owners. Neither Article 300A of the Constitution nor the Land Acquisition Act make any measures for rehabilitation of the expropriated owners a condition precedent for compulsory acquisition of land. In the absence of any such obligation arising either under Article 300A or under any other statutory provision, rehabilitation of the owners cannot be treated as an essential requirement for a valid acquisition of property. We must, in fairness to Mr. Gupta mention that he did not suggest that rehabilitation of the oustees was an essential part of any process of compulsory acquisition so as to render illegal any acquisition that is not accompanied by such measure. He did not pitch his case that high and in our opinion rightly so. The decisions of this Court in New Reviera Coop Housing Society and Another vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer and Others, 1996 (1) SCC 731 and Chameli Singh and Others vs. State of U.P. and Another, 1996 (2) SCC 549 have repelled the contention that rehabilitation of the property owners is a part of the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution so as to render any compulsory acquisition for public purpose bad for want of any such measures. In New Reviera's case (supra) this Court held that if the State comes forward with a proposal to provide alternative sites to the owners, the Court can give effect to any such proposal by issuing appropriate directions in that behalf. But a provision for alternative sites cannot be made a condition precedent for every acquisition of land. In Chameli Singh's case (supra) also the Court held that acquisitions are made in exercise of power of eminent domain for public purpose, and that individual right of ownership over land must yield place to the larger public good. That acquisition in accordance with the procedure sanctioned by law is a valid exercise of power vested in the State hence cannot be taken to deprive the right to livelihood especially when compensation is paid for the acquired land at the rates prevailing on the date of publication of the preliminary notification. That acquisition in accordance with the procedure sanctioned by law is a valid exercise of power vested in the State hence cannot be taken to deprive the right to livelihood especially when compensation is paid for the acquired land at the rates prevailing on the date of publication of the preliminary notification. There is thus no gainsaying that rehabilitation is not an essential requirement of law for any compulsory acquisition nor can acquisition made for a public purpose and in accordance with the procedure established by law upon payment of compensation that is fair and reasonable be assailed on the ground that any such acquisition violates the right to livelihood of the owners who may be dependant on the land being acquired from them. (ix) In State of Haryana vs. Mukesh Kumar and Others, (2011) 10 SCC 404 , the Hon'ble Supreme court held that: 35. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner. It is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish adverse possession. Though we got this law of adverse possession from the British, it is important to note that these days English Courts are taking a very negative view towards the law of adverse possession. The English law was amended and changed substantially to reflect these changes, particularly in light of the view that property is a human right adopted by the European Commission. This Court in Revamma (supra) observed that to understand the true nature of adverse possession, Fairweather vs. St Marylebone Property Co. (1962) 2 WLR 1020 : (1962) 2 All ER 288 can be considered where House of Lords referring to Taylor vs. Twinberrow, (1930) 2 K.B. 16 termed adverse possession as a negative and consequential right effected only because somebody else's positive right to access the court is barred by operation of law. As against the rights of the paper-owner, in the context of adverse possession, there evolves a set of competing rights in favour of the adverse possessor who has, for a long period of time, cared for the land, developed it, as against the owner of the property who has ignored the property. 36. The right to property is now considered to be not only constitutional or statutory right but also a human right. 36. The right to property is now considered to be not only constitutional or statutory right but also a human right. Human rights have already been considered in realm of individual rights such as right to health, right to livelihood, right to shelter and employment etc. But now human rights are gaining a multi faceted dimension. Right to property is also considered very much a part of the new dimension. Therefore, even claim of adverse possession has to be read in that context. 37. The changing attitude of the English Courts is quite visible from the judgment of Beaulane Properties Ltd. vs. Palmer, (2005) 3 WLR 554 . The Court here tried to read the human rights position in the context of adverse possession. But what is commendable is that the dimension of human rights have widened so much that now property dispute issues are also being raised within the contours of human rights. With the expanding jurisprudence of the European Courts of Human Rights, the Court has taken an unkind view to the concept of adverse possession. (x) In Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. and Others vs. State of U.P. and Others (2011) 9 SCC 354 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that: 118. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by different political thinkers that some amount of property right is an indispensable safeguard against tyranny and economic oppression of the Government. Jefferson was of the view that liberty cannot long subsist without the support of property. “Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist” was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the view that property itself is the seed bed which must be conserved if other constitutional values are to flourish is the consensus among political thinkers and jurists. 160. Section 17(3A) has been enacted for protecting the rights of deprived land-loser in an emergency acquisition. The said provision is therefore based on reason, justice and fair play. Since the said provision has been introduced by way of an amendment as noted above to balance the right of the state as against the interest of the land-loser, the State's power of eminent domain is expressly made subject to aforesaid statutory provision as also the constitutional right to property protected under Article 300A. Since the said provision has been introduced by way of an amendment as noted above to balance the right of the state as against the interest of the land-loser, the State's power of eminent domain is expressly made subject to aforesaid statutory provision as also the constitutional right to property protected under Article 300A. Right to property has been pronounced as fundamental human right by this Court in Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran vs. Pure Industrial Coke and Chemicals Ltd. and Others, (2007) 8 SCC 705 . 161. The expression ‘law’ which figures both in Article 21 and Article 300A must be given the same meaning. In both the cases the law would mean a validly enacted law. In order to be valid law it must be just, fair and reasonable having regard to the requirement of Article 14 and 21 as explained in Maneka Gandhi (supra). This is especially so, as ‘law’ in both the Articles 21 and 300A is meant to prevent deprivation of rights. Insofar as Article 21 is concerned, it is a Fundamental Right whereas in Article 300A it is a constitutional right which has been given a status of a basic human right. (xi) In Prabin Ram Phukan vs. State of Assam, (2015) 3 SCC 605 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that: 28. It is a settled principle of law that no person can be deprived of his property or any interest in the property save by authority of law. Article 300A of the Constitution recognizes this constitutional right of a person, which was till 1978 recognized as the fundamental right of a citizen. Indeed whether fundamental or constitutional, the fact remains that it has always been recognized as a right guaranteed under the Constitution in favour of a citizen/person and hence no person cannot be deprived of this valuable right which Constitution has given to him save by authority of law. (xii) In Vidya Devi vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Others, (2020) 2 SCC 569 , the Hon'ble Supreme court held that: 10.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right in a welfare State, and a Constitutional right Under Article 300A of the Constitution. Article 300A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right in a welfare State, and a Constitutional right Under Article 300A of the Constitution. Article 300A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300A, can be inferred in that Article. To forcibly dispossess a person of his private property, without following due process of law, would be violative of a human right, as also the constitutional right Under Article 300A of the Constitution. Payment of appropriate compensation to the third respondent has not been made for taking over of the land, used for formation of a road. 13. A perusal of Ext.P5 order dated 11.12.2017 shows that complaint has been given in the year 2014, demanding fair value for the land given for the construction of the road and for constructing a retaining wall, so as to protect the property. Writ petitioner, who had taken the land, ought to have paid appropriate compensation to the third respondent. When that was not done, she has rightly approached the first respondent Commission ventilating her grievances. 14. From Ext. P5 order dated 11.12.2017, it is clear that there is no denial on the part of the petitioner Panchayat in taking over the land surrendered by the third respondent. Laying of the road is also admitted. If that be the case, whether the 3rd respondent is entitled to compensation. The first respondent Commission has addressed the grievance appropriately. Even though an order has been passed as early as on 11.12.2017, writ petitioner has not taken any steps to comply with the directions and after about 3 years, the petitioner Panchayat has chosen to pass Ext.P6 resolution dated 18.01.2020 to prefer an appeal before this Court. 15. Instant writ petition has been filed after 3 years and 3 months from the date of passing of Ext.P5 order dated 11.12.2017. There is an inordinate and unexplained delay in filing the writ petition. 15. Instant writ petition has been filed after 3 years and 3 months from the date of passing of Ext.P5 order dated 11.12.2017. There is an inordinate and unexplained delay in filing the writ petition. A person if being aggrieved by a decision or order of an authority, Tribunal or statutory body constituted under any enactment should have approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India within a reasonable time. It is worthwhile to consider a few decisions on the above aspect: (i) In State of M.P. vs. Bhailal Bhai, AIR 1964 SC 1006 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that unreasonable delay denies to the petitioner, the discretionary extraordinary remedy of mandamus, certiorari or other relief. (ii) In State of M.P. vs. Nandlal Jaismal, 1986 (4) SCC 566 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paragraph 24, held as follows: “24. Now, it is well settled that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in the exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The evolution of this rule of laches or delay is premised upon a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices. The rights of third parties may intervene and if the writ jurisdiction is exercised on a writ petition filed after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. When the writ jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meanwhile is an important factor which always weighs the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. When the writ jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meanwhile is an important factor which always weighs the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. We do not think it necessary to burden this judgment with reference to various decisions of this Court where it has been emphasised time and again that where there is inordinate and unexplained delay and third party rights are created in the intervening period, the High Court would decline to interfere, even if the State action complained of is unconstitutional or illegal..........Of course, this rule of laches or delay is not a rigid rule which can be cast in a strait jacket formula, for there may be cases where despite delay and creation of third party rights the High Court may still in the exercise of its discretion interfere and grant relief to the petitioner. But, such cases where the demand of justice is so compelling that the High Court would be inclined to interfere in spite of delay or creation of third party rights would by their very nature be few and far between. Ultimately it would be a matter within the discretion of the court; ex hypothesi every discretion must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it.” (iii) In State of Maharastra vs. Digambar, AIR 1995 SC 1991 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, considered a case, where compensation for the acquired land was claimed belatedly, and, at paragraphs 12, 18 and 21, held as follows: “12. How a person who alleges against the State of deprivation of his legal right, can get relief of compensation from the State invoking writ jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution even though, he is guilty of laches or undue delay is difficult to comprehend, when it is well settled by decision of this Court that no person, be he a citizen or otherwise, is entitled to obtain the equitable relief under Article 226 of the Constitution if his conduct is blameworthy because of laches, undue delay, acquiescence, waiver and the like. Moreover, how a citizen claiming discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution against a State, could be relieved of his obligation to establish his un-blameworthy conduct for getting such relief, where the State against which relief is sought is a welfare State, is also difficult to comprehend. Where the relief sought under Article 226 of the Constitution by a person against the welfare State is founded on its alleged illegal or wrongful executive action, the need to explain laches or undue delay on his part to obtain such relief, should, if anything, be more stringent than in other cases, for the reason that the State due to laches or undue delay on the part of the person seeking relief, may not be able to show that the executive action complained of was legal or correct for want of records pertaining to the action or for the officers who were responsible for such action not being available later on. Further, where granting of relief is claimed against the State on alleged unwarranted executive action, is bound to result in loss to the public exchequer of the State or in damage to other public interest, the High Court before granting such relief is required to satisfy itself that the delay or laches on the part of a citizen or any other person in approaching for relief under Article 226 of the Constitution on the alleged violation of his legal right, was wholly justified in the facts and circumstances, instead of ignoring the same or leniently considering it. Thus, in our view, persons seeking relief against the State under Article 226 of the Constitution, be they citizens or otherwise, cannot get discretionary relief obtainable thereunder unless they fully satisfy the High Court that the facts and circumstances of the case clearly justified the laches or undue delay on their part in approaching the Court for grant of such discretionary relief. Therefore, where a High Court grants relief to a citizen or any other person under Article 226 of the Constitution against any person including the State without considering his blame-worthy conduct, such as laches or undue delay, acquiescence or waiver, the relief so granted becomes unsustainable even if the relief was granted in respect of alleged deprivation of his legal right by the State. 18. 18. Laches or undue delay, the blame-worthy conduct of a person in approaching a Court of Equity in England for obtaining discretionary relief which disentitled for grant of such relief was explained succinctly by Sir Barnes Peacock, long ago, in Lindsay Petroleum Co. vs. Prosper Armstrong, (1874) 5 PC 221, thus: “Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation, in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute or limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of Justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.” 21. Therefore, where a High Court in exercise of its power vested under Article 226 of the Constitution issues a direction, order or writ for granting relief to a person including a citizen without considering his disentitlement of such relief due to his blameworthy conduct of undue delay or laches in claiming the same, such a direction, order or writ becomes unsustainable as that not made judiciously and reasonably in exercise of its sound judicial discretion, but as that made arbitrarily.” (iv) In State of Rajasthan vs. D.R. Laxmi, 1996 (6) SCC 445 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that though the order may be void, if the party does not approach the Court within a reasonable time, which is always a question of fact and have the order invalidated or acquiesced or waived, the discretion of the Court has to be exercised in a reasonable manner. (v) In Chairman, U.P. Jal Nigam and Another vs. Jaswant Singh, AIR 2007 SC 924 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after considering a catena of decisions, on the aspect of delay, at paragraph 13, held as follows: “13........Therefore, whenever it appears that the claimants lost time or while away and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in such cases, the Court should be very slow in granting the relief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has also to be taken into consideration the question of acquiescence or waiver on the part of the incumbent whether other parties are going to be prejudiced if the relief is granted.” (vi) In Virender Chaudhary vs. Bharat Petroleum Corporation, (2009) 1 SCC 297 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: “The court exercises its jurisdiction only upon satisfying itself that it would be equitable to do so. Delay and/or latches, indisputably, are the relevant factors: “15. The Superior Courts, times without number, applied the equitable principles for not granting a relief and/or a limited relief in favour of the applicant in a case of this nature. While doing so, the court although not oblivious of the fact that no period of limitation is provided for filing a writ petition but emphasize is laid that it should be filed within a reasonable time. A discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India need not be exercised if the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches.” Some of the decisions considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Virender Chaudhary's case (cited supra), are reiterated as follows: “16. In Uttaranchal Forest Development Corporation and Another vs. Jabar Singh and Others, (2007) 2 SCC 112, this Court held: “It is not in dispute that the effective alternative remedy was not availed of by many of the workmen as detailed in paragraphs supra. The termination order was made in the year 1995 and the writ petitions were admittedly field in the year 2005 after a delay of 10 years. The High Court, in our opinion, was not justified in entertaining the writ petition on the ground that the petition has been filed after a delay of 10 years and that the writ petitions should have been dismissed by the High Court on the ground of latches.” 17. The High Court, in our opinion, was not justified in entertaining the writ petition on the ground that the petition has been filed after a delay of 10 years and that the writ petitions should have been dismissed by the High Court on the ground of latches.” 17. In New Delhi Municipal Council vs. Pan Singh and Others, (2007) 9 SCC 278 , this Court held: “16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They did not agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. [See: Govt. of West Bengal vs. Tarun K. Roy, (2004) 1 SCC 347 , U.P. Jal Nigam vs. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 and Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. vs. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 332]. 17. Although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily, writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time. [See: Lipton India Ltd. vs. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 524 and M.R. Gupta vs. Union of India, (1995) 5 SCC 628 ].” (vii) In S.S. Balu vs. State of Kerala, (2009) 2 SCC 479 , at paragraph 17, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: “17. It is also well-settled principle of law that “delay defeats equity”. The Government Order was issued on 15-1-2002. The appellants did not file any writ application questioning the legality and validity thereof. Only after the writ petitions filed by others were allowed and the State of Kerala preferred an appeal there-against, they impleaded themselves as party-respondents. It is also well-settled principle of law that “delay defeats equity”. The Government Order was issued on 15-1-2002. The appellants did not file any writ application questioning the legality and validity thereof. Only after the writ petitions filed by others were allowed and the State of Kerala preferred an appeal there-against, they impleaded themselves as party-respondents. It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment. It is, thus, not possible for us to issue any direction to the State of Kerala or the Commission to appoint the appellants at this stage. In NDMC vs. Pan Singh, this Court held: (SCC p. 283, Para 16) “16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They did not agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cutoff date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction.” (viii) In Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board vs. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 , at paragraphs 16 and 17, held as follows: “16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant - a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. 17. In the case at hand, though there has been four years’ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent-employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons - who compete with ‘Kumbhakarna’ or for that matter ‘Rip Van Winkle’. Such delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons - who compete with ‘Kumbhakarna’ or for that matter ‘Rip Van Winkle’. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.” 16. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, we find that the third respondent, who had voluntarily surrendered her property thinking that suitable compensation would be paid, had to wait for nearly 26 years to receive appropriate compensation, which the appellant has failed to do. 17. Now, looking at the objectives of the Act, 1993, it is clear that the Act intends to protect any kind of human rights violations, which in our considered opinion, includes any act done by any authority interfering with the property enjoyed by its owner protected under Article 300A of the Constitution of India. This is a case where possession of the property of the 3rd respondent was taken; however, compensation was not paid for several years. It was under the said circumstances the third respondent has approached the Human Rights Commission, giving due consideration to the material on record in our view, the Human Rights Commission has identified that the said act of Panchayat is a violation of human rights. Moreover, definition of ‘human rights’ under Section 2(d) shows that it is in relation to the life, liberty, equality and dignity of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution or embodied in the international covenants and enforceable by courts of law. Article 300 A of the Constitution of India is enforcible in law. Therefore, the contention advanced by the petitioner Panchayat, in the writ petition cannot be sustained under law. 18. We do not find any justification in interfering with the order of the first respondent Commission, both on the grounds of delay and on merits. Accordingly, this writ appeal is dismissed. 19. The petitioner is directed to pay compensation of Rs. Therefore, the contention advanced by the petitioner Panchayat, in the writ petition cannot be sustained under law. 18. We do not find any justification in interfering with the order of the first respondent Commission, both on the grounds of delay and on merits. Accordingly, this writ appeal is dismissed. 19. The petitioner is directed to pay compensation of Rs. 58,500/- (Rupees Fifty Eight Thousand Five Hundred only) along with 9% interest per annum from the date of Ext.P5 order dated 11.12.2017 and also construct a retaining wall to the property of the third respondent/complainant within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.