ORDER : Ujjal Bhuyan, J. Heard Ms. P. Hamsa Durga, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Maruthi Jadhav, learned counsel appearing on behalf of M/s. Pearl Law Associates for the respondent No. 1 - State Bank of India. 2. This petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India assailing the legality and validity of the docket order dated 06.10.2021 passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal - I at Hyderabad (Tribunal) dismissing I.A. No. 404 of 2020 filed by the petitioner in O.A. No. 587 of 2019. 3. Though not specifically pleaded, it can be gathered from the pleadings and other materials on record that petitioners had availed loan from respondent No. 1 - State Bank of India, but defaulted in repayment of the same. For recovery of the loan amount, respondent No. 1 - State Bank of India filed the original application before the Tribunal under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, which has been registered as O.A. No. 587 of 2019, wherein petitioner No. 1 herein has been arrayed as the respondent. 3.1 It further appears that petitioner No. 1 failed to file the written statement not only within the thirty days period of limitation, but also within the extended period of limitation of further fifteen days, where-after, the Tribunal passed an order dated 30.01.2020 foreclosing filing of written statement by the respondent (petitioner No. 1) and directing that O.A. No. 587 of 2019 shall proceed ex parte against the respondent. 3.2 For recalling the aforesaid ex parte order, respondent (Petitioner No.1) filed an interlocutory application before the Tribunal, which was registered as I.A. No.404 of 2020. 3.3 By the impugned docket order dated 06.10.2021, Tribunal dismissed the interlocutory application holding that it has no power to extend the time line for filing of the written statement beyond forty five days. However, it was clarified that respondent (petitioner No.1) could participate in the proceedings of O.A.No.587 of 2019, and advance arguments. 3.4 It is this order which has been challenged in the present proceeding. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that Tribunal was not justified in dismissing the interlocutory application of the petitioner. However, it was clarified that respondent (petitioner No.1) could participate in the proceedings of O.A.No.587 of 2019, and advance arguments. 3.4 It is this order which has been challenged in the present proceeding. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that Tribunal was not justified in dismissing the interlocutory application of the petitioner. She submits that though under Section 19(5) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993), since rechristened as Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (briefly ‘the 1993 Act’ hereinafter) there is a time limit of thirty days in filing of written statement by the defendant, which is extendable for a further period of fifteen days, Section 22 of the said Act clarifies that the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal would not be bound by the procedure laid down under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice. 4.1 According to her, principles of natural justice mandates that a reasonable opportunity of hearing should be afforded to the defendant, which includes filing of written statement, even if necessary, by relaxing the period of limitation. 4.2 Therefore the Tribunal was not justified in foreclosing filing of written statement by the respondent holding that it did not have the competence to condone the delay beyond the extended period of limitation. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submits that the time line provided under Section 19(5) of the 1993 Act is required to be adhered to strictly. Legislative intent is very clear. Initially thirty days time is provided to the defendant to file written statement and for exceptional circumstances, the said period of thirty days can be extended by a further period, not exceeding fifteen days. In all, defendant has time of forty five days to file the written statement. Beyond that, there is no provision extending the limitation for filing written statement. Therefore, view taken by the Tribunal is correct and no interference is called for. 5.1 In support of his submissions learned counsel for respondent No. 1 has relied upon a Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. v. HILLI MULTIPURPOSE COLD STORAGE(P) LTD., (2020) 5 SCC 757 . Therefore, view taken by the Tribunal is correct and no interference is called for. 5.1 In support of his submissions learned counsel for respondent No. 1 has relied upon a Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. v. HILLI MULTIPURPOSE COLD STORAGE(P) LTD., (2020) 5 SCC 757 . He further relied upon two other decisions of the Supreme Court in NATIONAL SPOT EXCHANGE LIMITED v. ANIL KOHLI, 2021 SCC Online SC 716 and A. SURESH KUMAR v. AMIT AGARWAL, (2021) 7 SCC 466 . 6. Submissions made by learned counsel for the parties have received the due consideration of the court. 7. At the outset, we may advert to the impugned docket order of the Tribunal dated 06.10.2021, relevant portion of which is extracted as under : “It is the main plea taken by the petitioners/defendants No. 1 and 2 that the vakalath was filed in the O.A. No. 587 of 2019 and could not file written statement. Ld. Counsel for the respondent filed counter. On verification of records, it is found that the summons were served and vakalth filed on 03.12.2019. Despite of several adjournments WS not filed and hence the right of filing WS was forfeited on 30.01.2020. Later WS filed on 16.03.2020 by defendants 1 and 2 but not within 45 days. It is settled law that this Tribunal has no power to extend time for filing of WS beyond 45 days. Hence the I.A. No. 404 of 2020 is dismissed. However, the petitioners/defendants can participate in the OA proceedings and advance their arguments.” 7.1 From a perusal of the above, we find that Tribunal had noted that summons issued by it were served upon the respondent (petitioner No.1), where-after, it filed vakalat on 03.12.2019; despite several adjournments, written statement was not filed and hence, right to file written statement was forfeited on 30.01.2020. Though written statement was subsequently filed on 16.03.2020, the same was beyond the limitation period of forty five days. Holding that Tribunal has no power to extend limitation for filing written statement beyond forty five days, interlocutory application of petitioner No. 1 was dismissed. 8. Though written statement was subsequently filed on 16.03.2020, the same was beyond the limitation period of forty five days. Holding that Tribunal has no power to extend limitation for filing written statement beyond forty five days, interlocutory application of petitioner No. 1 was dismissed. 8. The 1993 Act was enacted by the Parliament to provide for the establishment of Tribunals for expeditious adjudication and recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions (insolvency resolution and bankruptcy of individuals and partnership firms) and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The statement of objects and reasons leading to enactment of the 1993 Act reads as follows : “Banks and financial institutions at present experience considerable difficulties in recovering loans and enforcement of securities charged with them. The existing procedure for recovery of debts due to the banks and financial institutions has blocked a significant portion of their funds in unproductive assets, the value of which deteriorates with the passage of time. The Committee on the Financial System headed by Shri M. Narasimham has considered the setting up of the Special Tribunals with special powers for adjudication of such matters and speedy recovery as critical to the successful implementation of the financial sector reforms. An urgent need was, therefore, felt to work out a suitable mechanism through which the dues to the banks and financial institutions could be realized without delay. In 1981, a Committee under the Chairmanship of Shri T. Tiwari had examined the legal and other difficulties faced by banks and financial institutions and suggested remedial measures including changes in law. The Tiwari Committee had also suggested setting up of Special Tribunals for recovery of dues of the banks and financial institutions by following a summary procedure. The setting up of Special Tribunals will not only fulfill a long-felt need, but also will be an important step in the implementation of the Report of Narasimham Committee. Whereas on 30th September, 1990 more than fifteen lakhs of cases filed by the public sector banks and about 304 cases filed by the financial institutions were pending in various courts, recovery of debts involved more than Rs.5622 crores in dues of Public Sector Banks and about Rs.391 crores of dues of the financial institutions. The locking up of such huge amount of public money in litigation prevents proper utilisation and recycling of the funds for the development of the country. The locking up of such huge amount of public money in litigation prevents proper utilisation and recycling of the funds for the development of the country. The Bill seeks to provide for the establishment of Tribunal and Appellate Tribunals for expeditious adjudication and recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions.” 9. Thus, we find that the primary objective for enactment of the 1993 Act is establishing of Tribunals and Appellate Tribunals for expeditious adjudication of disputes for recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions. 10. Section 19 of the 1993 Act lays down the procedure to be followed by the Tribunals. Once an application is filed by the bank or financial institution under sub-section (1), then under sub-section (5), the defendant has a period of thirty days from the date of service of summons to file written statement of defence, which should be accompanied with original documents or true copies of such documents relied on by the defendant in his defence. As per the first proviso, where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of thirty days, the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal, may in exceptional cases and in special circumstances to be recorded in writing, extend the said period by such further period not exceeding fifteen days to file written statement of his defence. Under sub-section (25), the Tribunal is empowered to make such orders and give such directions as may be necessary or expedient to give effect to its orders or to prevent abuse of its process or to secure the ends of justice. 10.1 In terms of Section 22, on which much reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners, more particularly, sub-section (1) thereof, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are not bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, but it is clarified that the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall be guided by the principles of natural justice, and subject to other provisions of this Act and any rules, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall have powers to regulate their own procedure including the places at which they shall have their sittings. Sub-section (1) of Section 22 reads as under : “22. Sub-section (1) of Section 22 reads as under : “22. Procedure and Powers of the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal: (1) The Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice, and subject to the other provisions of this Act and of any rules, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall have powers to regulate their own procedure including the places at which they shall have their sittings.” 10.2 A careful reading of sub-section (1) of Section 22 of the 1993 Act, would make it clear that it has got two parts viz., the first part i.e., the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are not bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice; and the second part is that, subject to other provisions of the 1993 Act, and the Rules framed there-under, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall have the power to regulate their own procedure including the places at which the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall have their sittings. 10.3 The word “and” appears between the first part and the second part. In other words, the two parts are joined by the conjunction “and”. The use of the word “and” between the first part and the second part makes it clear that the two parts are independent clauses joined together by the coordinating conjunction. Viewed in the above context, it is the second part i.e., regulation of own procedure, which is subject to other provisions of the 1993 Act and the Rules framed thereunder, and not the first part. The first part which says that the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are not bound by the procedure laid down by the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice, is not subject to the other provisions of the 1993 Act including the provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 19. 10.4 Thus, insofar the first part or clause is concerned, the same is not subject to any such limitation. 10.4 Thus, insofar the first part or clause is concerned, the same is not subject to any such limitation. This part makes it clear that the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, but guided by the principles of natural justice. This appears to be a logical interpretation of the aforesaid provision if we look at sub-section (25) of Section 19. As already adverted to above, as per sub-section (25) of Section 19, the Tribunal may make such orders and give such directions as may be necessary or expedient amongst others to secure the ends of justice. 11. Insofar the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (briefly ‘the 1986 Act’ hereinafter) is concerned, it is an Act to provide for better protection of the interest of consumers, and for that purpose, to make provision for establishing consumer fora for settlement of consumer disputes. 11.1 Section 13 of the 1986 Act deals with the procedure for admission of a complaint. When a complaint is filed by a consumer, as per sub-section (2)(a) thereof, the District Forum shall forward the complaint to the opposite party directing the opposite party to give his version of the case within thirty days, or within such extended period, not exceeding fifteen days, as may be granted by the District Forum. 12. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (P) Ltd. (1 supra) the first question which was referred to the Constitution Bench was, whether Section 13(2)(a) of the 1986 Act providing for time line of 30 days to file response by the respondent extendable by a period not exceeding 15 days, should be read as mandatory or directory? In other words, the question was whether the District Forum has the power to extend the time for filing the response beyond the period of fifteen days in addition to thirty days? 12.1 Adverting to the statement of objects and reasons of the 1986 Act, Supreme Court held the objective of the District Forum is to provide speedy disposal of consumer disputes. 12.1 Adverting to the statement of objects and reasons of the 1986 Act, Supreme Court held the objective of the District Forum is to provide speedy disposal of consumer disputes. 12.2 On the question of natural justice, Supreme Court referred to the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the 1986 Act, which provides that no proceedings complying with the procedure laid down in sub-sections (1) and (2), shall be called in question in any court on the ground that the principles of natural justice have not been complied with. 12.3 After due deliberations, and referring to the provisions contained in Order 8 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, and the related judgments, Supreme Court held that those would not be applicable to cases dealing with Section 13(2) of the 1986 Act, or such other enactments wherein a provision akin to Section 13(2) is there, and the consequences are also provided. 12.4 Therefore, Supreme Court answered the first question by holding that District Forum has no power to extend the time for filing response to the complaint beyond the period of 15 days in addition to 30 days, as is envisaged under Section 13 of the 1986 Act. 13. Similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in A. Suresh Kumar v. Amit Agarwal (3 supra), which was also a case pertaining to Section 13(2)(a) of the 1986 Act. 14. Insofar National Sport Exchange Limited v. Anil Kohli (3 supra) is concerned, that was a case under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. Appeal filed against the order of the National Company Law Tribunal before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi was barred by limitation by forty four days. After surveying various provisions of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, as well as provision of Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1986, Supreme Court held that in view of the specific statutory provision contained in Section 61(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, it could not be said that National Company Law Appellate Tribunal had committed any error in dismissing the appeal on the ground that it was filed beyond the extended period of limitation. 14.1 At this stage, for our convenience, we may extract Section 61(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, which reads as under : “61. Appeals and Appellate Authority: (2). 14.1 At this stage, for our convenience, we may extract Section 61(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, which reads as under : “61. Appeals and Appellate Authority: (2). Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed within thirty days before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal: Provided that the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal may allow an appeal to be filed after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing the appeal but such period shall not exceed fifteen days. 14.2 From the above, it is evident that under Section 61(2) the limitation for filing appeal is thirty days. However, as per the proviso, the Appellate Tribunal may extend the limitation if it is satisfied that because of sufficient cause the appeal could not be filed within the limitation of thirty days. But such extension of limitation shall not exceed fifteen days. Thus there is clear legislative embargo on extension of limitation beyond fifteen days. 15. That apart, both in the 1986 Act, as well as in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, we do not find any provision akin to sub-section (25) of Section 19 and Section 22 of the 1993 Act. 16. The presence of the aforesaid provisions in the 1993 Act is a crucial and critical distinguishing feature. This is so because, in a proceeding under the 1993 Act, the borrower (defendant) may lose his valuable right over the secured asset as a consequence of forfeiture of the right to file written statement on account of limitation and, therefore, the limited relaxation vis-à-vis compliance with the principles of natural justice, as envisaged under Section 22 of the 1993 Act, as well as to meet the ends of justice, as is visualised under sub-section (25) of Section 19, have been provided by the legislature. This is in contradistinction to the provisions of the 1986 Act, whereby and where-under, it is the consumer, who seeks relief against the defaulting service provider, which is not the case under the 1993 Act, as well as under the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. This is in contradistinction to the provisions of the 1986 Act, whereby and where-under, it is the consumer, who seeks relief against the defaulting service provider, which is not the case under the 1993 Act, as well as under the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. Likewise, in a case of commercial insolvency, the legislature has provided strict period of limitation, and there is no provision akin to sub-section (25) of Section 19 and Section 22 as present in the 1993 Act, in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. 17. That being the position, we are of the view that the Tribunal erred in holding that it had no power to extend the time for filing written statement beyond 45 days. Of-course, whether to condone the delay or not, in the given facts and circumstances of a case, is a different question altogether. 18. Therefore, and following the discussion made above, we set aside the impugned docket order dated 06.10.2021, and remand the matter back to the Tribunal for a fresh hearing and decision on I.A. No. 404 of 2020 filed by petitioner No. 1. The same shall be carried out within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 19. To enable the Tribunal to proceed with the hearing of I.A. No. 404 of 2020, let the parties appear before the Tribunal on 30.11.2021 at 11.00 a.m. 20. Writ petition is disposed of accordingly. 21. Interlocutory applications pending, if any, shall stand closed. No order as to costs.