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2021 DIGILAW 343 (GAU)

Lanuchuba Chang v. State of Nagaland

2021-04-08

S.HUKATO SWU, SONGKHUPCHUNG SERTO

body2021
JUDGMENT : S. Hukato Swu, J. 1. Heard Mr. C.T. Jamir, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. I. Imchen appearing for all the appellants in all the connected writ appeals. Also heard M r. T.B. Jamir, learned Senior Additional Advocate General, Nagaland assisted by Ms. V. Suokhrie appearing for the State respondents in all connected writ appeals. 2. In these bunch of writ appeals wherein, the appellants in W.A. No. 2/2020 are attached in the Directorate of School Education, the appellant in W.A. No. 6/2020 is attached in the Office of the Sub-Divisional Education Officer (SDEO), Kohima, the appellants in W.A. No, 13/2020 are attached in the Office of the Sub-Divisional Education Officer (SDEO), Pughoboto, the appellants in W.A. No. 18/2019 are attached in the Office of the District Education Officer (DEO), Zunheboto and in the Office of the Sub-Divisional Education Officer (SDEO), Niuland, the appellants in W.A. No. 32/2019 are attached in the Office of the Sub-Divisional Education Officer (SDEO), Kohima, the appellant in W.A. No. 17/2019 is attached in the Office of the District Education Officer (DEO), Zunheboto, the appellants in W.A. No. 8/2020 are attached in the Office of the District Education Officer (DEO), Tuensang, the appellants in W.A. No. 10/2020 are attached in the Office of the District Education Officer (DEO), Tuensang, the appellant in W.A. No. 15/2020 is attached in the Directorate of School Education, the appellants in W.A. No. 7/2020 are attached in the Office of the Sub-Divisional Education Officer (SDEO), Tuensang and the appellants in W.A. No. 5/2020 are attached in the Office of the Sub-Divisional Education Officer (SDEO), Pughoboto respectively. 3. 3. Along with the connected writ appeals, the appellants also have filed the following Interlocutory Applications and COP(C):- (1) I.A. (C)7/2020 in W.A. No. 2/2020, for stay of the impugned common judgment and Order dated 18-09-2019 passed in respect of W.P. (C) No. 244 (K)/2017 (2) I.A. (C)127/2019 in W.A. No. 18/2019, for stay of the impugned judgment and order dated 18-09-2019 passed in W.P. (C) 254 (K)/2017 (3) I.A. (C) 126/2019 in W.A. No. 2/2019, for stay of the impugned judgment and order dated 18-09-2019 passed in W.P. (C) 152 (K)/2016 (4) I.A. (C) 73/2020 in W.A. No. 15/2020 for stay of the impugned common judgment and order dated 18-09-2019 passed in respect of W.P. (C) 250 (K)/2017 (5) I.A.(C) 40/2020 in W.A. No. 10/2020 for modification/alteration of Order dated 14-02-2020 passed in I.A. (C) No. 377/2020 (6) I.A.(C)38/2020 in W.A. No. 8/2020, for stay of the impugned common judgment and order dated 18-09-2019 passed in respect of W.P. (C) 270 (K)/2017 (7) I.A.(C)41/2020 in W.A. No. 10/2020, for stay of the impugned common judgment and order dated 18-09-2019 passed in respect of W.P. (C) 270 (K)/2017 (8) I.A. (C)39/2020 in W.A. No. 8/2020, for modification/alteration of Order dated 14-02-2020 passed in I.A.(C) No. 380/2020 (9) I.A.(C)34/2020 in W.A. No. 7/2020, for stay of the impugned common judgment and order dated 18-09-2019 passed in respect of W.P. (C) 27 (K)/2017 (10) I.A.(C)52/2020 in W.A. No. 13/2020 for stay of the impugned judgment and order dated 18-09-2019 passed in W.P.(C) 262 (K)/2017 (11) I.A.(C)174/2019 in W.A. No. 32/2019, for stay of the impugned judgment and order dated 18-09-2019 passed in W.P.(C) 151 (K)/2017 (12) COP (C) 19/2020 connected with W.A. No. 7/2020 (13) COP (C) 20/2020 connected with W.A. No. 10/2020 (14) COP (C) 21/2020 connected with W.A. No. 8/2020 4. The writ appeals are heard and disposed of together since all of them have challenged the common order dated 18-09-2019 passed in W.P. (C) 251 (K) of 2017. The appellants were all initially appointed as teachers and some were attached to the Office of the SDEO (Sub-Divisional Education Officer) in the districts and while others were attached to the Directorate of School Education, Kohima. The appellants were all initially appointed as teachers and some were attached to the Office of the SDEO (Sub-Divisional Education Officer) in the districts and while others were attached to the Directorate of School Education, Kohima. While serving as attached employees in the Office of the Sub-Divisional Education Officer and in the Office of the Directorate of School Education, the Cabinet made two decisions on 28-04-2006 and on 28-04-2013 to give option to the teachers to either stay attached to the Office of the SDEO and Directorate of School Education by converting their posts of teachers to ministerial post or to go back to their respective schools. The condition for illegibility to exercise the option was that the concerned employees should have served for at least 5 years from the date of attachment. Secondly, the concerned employees opting for attachment to the Office of the SDEO and the Directorate should not claim their accrued rights both in terms of seniority and also in terms of pay and allowances attached to the post of teacher in the near future. Having opted for conversion of their posts to ministerial post and for attachment of their post to the Office of the SDEO and also in the Directorate of School Education, the candidates having qualified 5 years of service as pre-condition in the Government letter contained, the candidates filled up the forms and exercised options. However, to the surprise and dismay of the petitioners, by a letter dated 03-10-2017 the Government directed the respondent No. 3 to detach all the attached teachers to SDEO, DEO, Directorates and VIPs through rationalization and redeployment. The order dated 03-10-2017 is reproduced herein below:- "GOVERNMENT of NAGALAND DIRECTORATE OF SCHOOL EDUCATION NAGALAND: KOHIMA NO. DSE/GEN-41/2012-13 ///Dated, Kohima, the th October, 2017 To, The Principal Director, School Education, Nagaland, Kohima Sub:- Detachment of attached teachers through rationalization. Madam, I am directed to refer to your letter ED/GHSS/C/32/2015-16 dated 22nd August, 2016 and ED/EST-1/B/16/2014/231 dated 22nd August, 2017 wherein the list of teachers attached to SDEO, DEO and Directorate was submitted to the Government. In this regard, you are directed to detach all the teachers attached to SDEO, DEO, Directorate and VIPs (list enclosed) through rationalization and re-deployment. The teachers attached to Hon'ble Ministers, Advisors and Parliamentary Secretaries may also be detached and re-deployed. An early action on the matter is anticipated. In this regard, you are directed to detach all the teachers attached to SDEO, DEO, Directorate and VIPs (list enclosed) through rationalization and re-deployment. The teachers attached to Hon'ble Ministers, Advisors and Parliamentary Secretaries may also be detached and re-deployed. An early action on the matter is anticipated. Enclosed: As stated Yours faithfully, (THEJANGUSANO SAVINO) Under Secretary to the Govt. of Nagaland" 5. Pursuant to the above letter, the respondent No. 3 by order dated 31-10-2017 ordered for detachment and redeployment of 523 teachers attached to VIPs, Directorate of School Education, SDEO and DEO. The petitioners felt aggrieved as many of them had spent more than a decade in the post as ministerial staff by waiving their right of seniority, right of promotion and also sacrificing their financial benefits which was attached to the post of teacher and opted for conversion of their post to ministerial post. 6. There were apparent disparities and discriminatory action of the Government even in the redeployment process. The concerned minister of the department had published in the daily newspaper Nagaland Post dated 01-11-2017 that there are more than 700 of such category of employees. However, by redeployment and detachment order dated 31-10-2017, the respondents had redeployed only 523 teachers which itself is discriminatory. The letter dated 26-10-2017 whereby the Government directed the respondent No. 3 to allow 3 officers to remain attached in the Directorate who are also similarly situated is also discriminatory. The petitioners aggrieved by this redeployment order challenged the decision of the Government by filing several writ petitions, being W.P. W.P. (C) 152 (K) of 2016, W.P. (C) 254 (K) of 2017, W.P. (C) 281 (K) of 2017 & W.P. (C) 49 (K) of 2018, W.P. (C) 249 (K) of 2017, W.P. (C) 251 (K) of 2017, W.P. (C) 244 (K) of 2017 & W.P. (C) 250 (K) of 2017, W.P. (C) (K) 252 (K) of 2017 & W.P. (C) 253 (K) of 2017, W.P. (C) 315 (K) of 2017, W.P. (C)100 (K) of 2018, W.P. (C) 263 (K) of 2017 & W.P. (C) 265 (K) of 2017 W.P. (C) 255 (K) of 2017 & W.P. (C) 260 (K) of 2017, W.P. (C) 261 (K) of 2017 & W.P. (C) 262 (K) of 2017, W.P. (C) 269 (K) of 2017, W.P. (C) 270 (K) of 2017 & W.P. (C) 05 (K) of 2018. 7. 7. On consideration of all the writ petitions, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petitions holding that the petitioners belongs to a definite cadre of teachers and as such, bringing teachers to a non-educational institution is illegal and in violation of the provision of the Right to Education Act, 2009. It was also held that the only way to get oneself employed as a ministerial staff in the Education Department is through 2006 Rules and therefore, the attachment of the petitioners and conversion of their post to ministerial post is in violation of the said Rules. The learned Single Judge has also further observed that under the service jurisprudence, the only way for an appointment or transfer to be made outside the cadre is by way of a deputation which is also for a limited period of three years extendable by another 2 years. Except by appointment/transfer or deputation and the subsequent absorption thereof in the borrowing department, there is no other mode of shifting of the employee from one cadre to another cadre. There was no legal basis of bringing the petitioners as ministerial staff in the Directorate of School Education, SDEO, DEO and it would remain illegal and unauthorized. The Nagaland Directorate Ministerial Service Rules, 2006 under Rule 7 (i) provides for filling up the post of Lower Division-cum-Computer Assistant by 100% direct recruitment through a selection to be made by a selection committee. The recruitment rules has been violated and cannot stand the test of law. It was further observed that promissory estoppel cannot be invoked against the Government if the promise made/proposal initiated was contrary to the law. The doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked against the Government inasmuch as, estoppels cannot operate against the mandate of law. For the reasons enumerated above, the learned Single Judge was of the view that the order dated 31-10-2017 passed by the respondents has no infirmity and the writ petitions were dismissed. It is against this decision of the learned Single Judge that the appellants are before this Court, challenging the judgment and order dated 18-09-2019 passed in the above mentioned writ petitions. 8. Appearing for the petitioners in the connected writ appeals, learned senior counsel Mr. It is against this decision of the learned Single Judge that the appellants are before this Court, challenging the judgment and order dated 18-09-2019 passed in the above mentioned writ petitions. 8. Appearing for the petitioners in the connected writ appeals, learned senior counsel Mr. C.T. Jamir questioned the validity of the impugned judgment and order dated 18-09-2019 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) 251 (K) of 2017 along with the rest of the connected writ petitions. The order of the learned Single Judge has been challenged on the ground that:- (1) it is against the law of promissory estoppel to redeploy the petitioners (2) even if the order of attachment of the petitioners to the Directorate and to the Office of the SDEOs in the District are void, it has to be declared by the competent authority and not in the arbitrary manner as has been done by the respondents (3) the law does not permit to approbate and reprobate as has been done by the respondents in the instant case (4) RTE Act, 2019 came to be effectual only in the year 2009 as such, it could not have retrospective effect upon the petitioners to give the respondents a ground for redeployment and repatriation to their original posts (5) the action of the respondents is in itself illegal and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable in the instant case which makes the action of the respondents not tenable in law (6) the impugned orders of the respondents is discriminatory. In the case of the petitioners in W.P. (C) No. 244 (K) of 2017, all together 11 employees submitted representation dated 14-09-2017 requesting the Principal Director of School Education to consider their option submitted in 2010. The Principal Director of School Education by letter dated 13-10-2017 forwarded the petitioners representation to the Government for necessary decision. However, by impugned letter dated 26-10-2017, the respondents conveyed approval for retention of only 3 employees from amongst the 11 employees who submitted their representation and directed detachment/redeployment of the other teachers i.e. the petitioners. Therefore, the impugned orders of the respondents are hit by Article 14 of the Constitution and is not tenable in the eye of law. 7. In W.P. (C) 252 (K) of 2017, the petitioners were victims of motor accident and their plight should be considered. Therefore, the impugned orders of the respondents are hit by Article 14 of the Constitution and is not tenable in the eye of law. 7. In W.P. (C) 252 (K) of 2017, the petitioners were victims of motor accident and their plight should be considered. The petitioners therein will not be able to discharge their duties efficiently as teachers. 9. On the argument of promissory estoppels, learned senior counsel has placed reliance upon the ruling of the Apex Court in the case of Bhim Singh and Others vs. State of Haryana and Others, reported in (1981) 2 SCC 673 in Civil Appeal No. 4591 of 1979, decided on July 24, 1979, wherein, at para 3, it was held as under:- "3. By virtue of Ex. P-1, the State (respondent) held out certain specific promises as an inducement for the appellants to move into a New Department (Agriculture Department). After they had gone over to the Agriculture Department, the State, by virtue of its Ex. P-3, sought to go back upon the earlier promise made in Ex. P-1. The appellants having believed the representation made by the State and having further acted thereon cannot now be defeated of their hopes which have crystallized into rights, thanks to the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppels. Therefore, it is not open to the State, according to the law laid down by this Court, to backtrack. We, therefore, direct the State to implement Ex. P-1 and confer such rights and benefits as are promised thereunder in entirety. Shri. B. Datta says that a little time may be necessary for the various departments to readjust. We allow three months' time for implementation of Ex. P-1, failing which the State will be held in breach." The above being the decision of the Apex Court, learned senior counsel argues that the Government had by their own act i.e. the decision of the Cabinet dated 28-04-2013 giving option to the teachers, committed a contractual agreement with the petitioners who have served for more than 5 years and opting to be retained in the Directorate of School Education and in the Office of the SDEOs in different districts exercised the option and acted upon the offer of the respondents. By the operation of the law of promissory estoppels enunciated by the Apex Court in the case of Bhim Singh the respondents are barred and they cannot revoke what has already been acted upon. 10. Learned senior counsel has further contended that even if the order which has been acted upon is void, it has to be declared so by a competent authority. In support of his contention, he has relied upon the Apex Court ruling in the case of Krishna Devi Malchand Kamathia and Others vs. Bombay Environmental Action Group and Others, reported in (2011) 3 SCC 363 wherein, it has been ruled that: "16. It is a settled legal proposition that even if an order is void, it requires to be so declared by a competent forum and it is not permissible for any person to ignore the same merely because in his opinion the order is void. In State of Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth Naduvil, Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla v. Hind Rubber Industries (P) Ltd., M. Meenakshi v. Metadin Agarwal and Sneh Gupta v. Devi Sarup : 2009 6 SCC 194 , this Court held that whether an order is valid or void, cannot be determined by the parties. For setting aside such an order, even if void, the party has to approach the appropriate forum. 19. Thus, from the above it emerges that even if the order/notification is void/voidable, the party aggrieved by the same cannot decide that the said order/notification is not binding upon it. It has to approach the court for seeking such declaration. The order may be hypothetically a nullity and even if its invalidity is challenged before the court in a given circumstance, the court may refuse to quash the same on various grounds including the standing of the petitioner or on the ground of delay or on the doctrine of waiver or any other legal reason. The order may be void for one purpose or for one person, it may not be so for another purpose or another person." Therefore, considering the ruling of the Apex Court, it was proper for the competent Court to declare whether the order was void or not. Therefore, the order dated 31-10-2017 is per se illegal. 11. The order may be void for one purpose or for one person, it may not be so for another purpose or another person." Therefore, considering the ruling of the Apex Court, it was proper for the competent Court to declare whether the order was void or not. Therefore, the order dated 31-10-2017 is per se illegal. 11. The learned counsel further submitted that all the petitioners had by virtue of the order dated 28-04-2013 exercised the option of attachment to the offices of SDEOs in different districts and also in the Directorate of School Education sacrificing their higher scale of pay and their seniority which bestows upon them the right of promotion as well. The contention of the petitioners is that when their services were required in the directorate as well as in the office of the SDEOs in various districts, their services were utilized. Therefore, with the coming into force of the RTE Act, 2009, to fulfill the provisions of the same, the respondents could not arbitrarily redeploy them to their parent cadre. It is most pertinent to place on record that many of the petitioners have served for more than 10 years and above in the present post they hold now. It would be difficult for them to adapt to the change by making themselves prepared for the teaching duty which they have left for so long. It will not be in the interest of the students as well considering that the skill of teaching has been thoroughly compromised. They have also foregone their higher pay and their seniority which is now difficult to be assessed by the respondents. Learned senior counsel has placed reliance upon the Apex Court ruling in the case of Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation and Another vs. Diamond & Gem Development corporation Limited and Another, reported in (2013) 5 SCC 470 has held as under: 15. A party cannot be permitted to "blow hot-blow cold", "fast and loose" or "approbate and reprobate". Where one knowingly accepts the benefits of a contract, or conveyance, or of an order, he is stopped from denying the validity of, or the binding effect of such contract, or conveyance, or order upon himself. This rule is applied to ensure equity, however, it must not be applied in such a manner so as to violate the principles of what is right and of good conscience. 16. This rule is applied to ensure equity, however, it must not be applied in such a manner so as to violate the principles of what is right and of good conscience. 16. Thus, it is evident that the doctrine of election is based on the rule of estoppels-the principle that one cannot approbate and reprobate is inherent in it. The doctrine of estoppels by election is one among the species of estoppels in pais (or equitable estoppel), which is a rule of equity. By this law, a person may be precluded, by way of his actions, or conduct, or silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he would have otherwise had". 12. Reliance is placed on the Apex Court's ruling in the case of Shyam Telelink Limited now Sistema Shyam Teleservices Limited vs. Union of India, reported in (2010) 10 SCC 165 wherein, the Apex Court in para 23 and 26 has held as under: 23. The maxim qui approbat non reprobat (one who approbates cannot reprobate) is firmly embodied in English Common Law and often applied by Courts in this country. It is akin to the doctrine of benefits and burdens which at its most basic level provides that a person taking advantage under an instrument which both grants a benefit and imposes a burden cannot take the former without complying with the latter. A person cannot approbate and reprobate or accept and reject the same instrument. 26. The decision of this Court in R.N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir bring in the doctrine of election in support of the very same conclusion in the following words: "10. Law does not permit a person to both approbate and reprobate. This principle is based on the doctrine of election which postulates that no party can accept and reject the same instrument and that: "..... A person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage. According to Halsbury's laws of England, 4th Edn., vol. 16: "1508. A person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage. According to Halsbury's laws of England, 4th Edn., vol. 16: "1508. Examples of the common law principle of election-after taking an advantage under an order (for example for the payment of costs) a party may be precluded from saying that it is invalid and asking to set it aside." The learned counsel further submitted that the respondent has already utilized the services of the petitioners in their time of need, the respondents now cannot say that it is against the law and reprobate what they have already approbated. 13. Further, the learned counsel submitted that the decision of the learned Single Judge that the RTE Act, 2009 prohibits deployment of teachers to non-teaching assignment and basing on the provision of the Act, redeploying the petitioners to their respective cadre is not in keeping with the provision of the Act itself. A thorough study of the RTE Act does not anywhere suggest that the Act will have retrospective effect. Majority of the petitioners who have been attached were under attachment prior to 2009. As such, the RTE Act, 2009 cannot be applied retrospectively to repatriate the petitioners who have already been serving in the Directorate of School Education and SDEOs Office in different district. Hence, the order of the learned Single Judge is not sustainable as per the RTE Act, 2009 itself. 14. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners has also submitted that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been vitiated by perversity, irrationality and unreasonableness in the decision making process. The decision so made by the respondents is not tenable since it has not considered the plight of the petitioners and its cascading effect. Reliance is placed on the Apex Court's ruling in the case of Jayrajbhai Jayantibhai Patel vs. Anil Bhai Nathubhai Patel and Others, reported in (2006) 8 SCC 200 wherein, in para 18 it has been held as under: " 18. Reliance is placed on the Apex Court's ruling in the case of Jayrajbhai Jayantibhai Patel vs. Anil Bhai Nathubhai Patel and Others, reported in (2006) 8 SCC 200 wherein, in para 18 it has been held as under: " 18. Having regard to it all, it is manifest that the power of judicial review may not be exercised unless the administrative decision is illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or it shocks the conscience of the court in the sense that it is in defiance of logic or moral standards but no standardised formula, universally applicable to all cases, can be evolved. Each case has to be considered on its own facts, depending upon the authority that exercises the power, the source, the nature or scope of power and the indelible effects it generates in the operation of law or affects the individual or society. Though judicial restraint, albeit self-recognised, is the order of the day, yet an administrative decision or action which is based on wholly irrelevant considerations or material; or excludes from consideration the relevant material; or it is so absurd that no reasonable person could have arrived at it on the given material, may be struck down. In other words, when a Court is satisfied that there is an abuse or misuse of power, and its jurisdiction is invoked, it is incumbent on the Court to intervene. It is nevertheless, trite that the scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in the decision-making process and not the decision". The Act speaks for itself and it is subject to judicial review as illustrated in the above referred case. The decision of the respondents can thus be reviewed since it is not in conformity with the provisions of law submitted the learned counsel. 15. Appearing for the State respondents, learned Senior Additional Advocate General, Nagaland, Mr. T.B. Jamir submits that the writ appeal if it does not establish prima facie violation of the provision of law, the appellate Court should avoid admitting the same. In the instant case, the learned Single Judge has appropriately come to the decision that the petitioners case has no merit on scrutiny of all the points raised by the petitioners with respect to the law of estoppels, the service jurisprudence and also with respect to the provision of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution. In the instant case, the learned Single Judge has appropriately come to the decision that the petitioners case has no merit on scrutiny of all the points raised by the petitioners with respect to the law of estoppels, the service jurisprudence and also with respect to the provision of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, the present appeal does not merit admission. He has placed reliance upon the decision of our own High Court in the case of Sonaram Baruah and Another vs. The Assam State Electricity Board and Others, reported in (2011) 2 GLR 630, wherein, a Division Bench of this Court examined the issues regarding admission of writ appeal and held as follows: "21. We have considered the submission of the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge and also given our anxious thoughts to the points raised at the time of admission hearing of the appeal. Admission of writ appeal is not a matter of right, like Civil First Appeal or Criminal Appeal but when a prima facie case is made out for examining the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge, then only the court should admit the appeal for hearing. Even if the opinion of the learned Single Judge is erroneous then also the appellate court cannot interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge unless it is totally perverse and violative of provisions of law. At the time of admission of the appeal the appellate court should be more cautious to examine the prima facie merit of the appeal and when there is no prima facie merit in an appeal, the court should avoid admitting the same." 16. Again on the issue of merit in admitting an appeal, he has placed further reliance upon the case of Tractor & Farm Equipment Ltd. vs. The Secretary to the Government of Assam, Department of Agriculture and Others, reported in (2004) 2 GLR 56 wherein, a Division Bench of our own High Court has again at para 26 ruled that: "26. While dealing with the present appeal, one has to bear in mind that a writ appeal is really not a statutory appeal preferred against the judgment and order of an inferior to the superior Court. While dealing with the present appeal, one has to bear in mind that a writ appeal is really not a statutory appeal preferred against the judgment and order of an inferior to the superior Court. The appeal inter se in a High Court from one Court to another is really an appeal from one coordinate Bench to another coordinate Bench and it is for this reason that a writ cannot be issued by one Bench of the High Court to another Bench of the High Court nor can even the Supreme Court issue writ to a High Court. Thus, unlike an appeal, in general, a writ appeal is an appeal on principle and that is why, unlike an appeal, in an ordinary sense, such as a criminal appeal, where the whole evidence on record is examined anew by the appellate Court, what is really examined, in a writ appeal, is the legality and validity of the Judgment and/or order of the Single Judge and it can be set aside or should be set aside only when there is a patent error on the face of the record or the judgment is against the established or settled principle of law. If two views are possible and a view, which is reasonable and logical, has been adopted by a Single Judge, the other view, howsoever appealing such a view may be to the Division Bench, it is the view adopted by the single Judge, which should, normally, be allowed to prevail. Hence, the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge cannot be completely ignored and this Court has to consider the judgment and order in its proper perspective and if this Bench, sitting as an appellate Bench, is of the view that the decision has been arrived at by the learned Single Judge without any material error of fact or law, then, the judgment, in question, should be allowed to prevail. The reference made, in this regard, by Mr. Dutta to the case of Ramendra Nath, Dey (supra) is not misplaced." For the fact that there is no infirmity with respect to the decision of the learned Single Judge, the present appeals deserve to be dismissed at the very threshold, the learned Senior Additional Advocate General has argued. 17. The reference made, in this regard, by Mr. Dutta to the case of Ramendra Nath, Dey (supra) is not misplaced." For the fact that there is no infirmity with respect to the decision of the learned Single Judge, the present appeals deserve to be dismissed at the very threshold, the learned Senior Additional Advocate General has argued. 17. Learned Senior Additional Advocate General also has submitted that the exercise of power by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is to enforce rule of law and not to pass an order or direction which is contrary to and what has been injuncted by law. In the instant case, the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petitions of the petitioners on the ground that if the petitioners are allowed to continue, it would be against the service jurisprudence and also against the Service Rules of 2006. Therefore, giving relief to the petitioners would have been an order deviating from the provisions of law and contrary to what is injuncted by law. He has placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation vs. Ashrafulla Khan & Others, reported in (2002) 2 SCC 560 , the Apex Court in the above case has ruled that the object and scope of Article 226 is that the High Court is required to enforce the rule of law it cannot therefore pass an order or direction contrary to what is not permitted by law. Therefore, there is no infirmity whatsoever with the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge. 18. Countering the submission advanced by the learned senior counsel for the appellants that the respondents are stopped from redeploying the petitioners by their own action, learned Senior Additional Advocate General submits that there cannot be estoppels against the law. Estoppels is applicable only to facts where the action of the parties does not violate the law. The agreement between the parties if it is beyond the provision of law, the law of estoppel does not apply in such cases. He has placed reliance upon the Apex Court ruling in the case of Jalandhar Improvement Trust vs. Sampuran Singh, reported in (1999) 3 SCC 494 . In the above referred case, the Apex Court has ruled that: 13. He has placed reliance upon the Apex Court ruling in the case of Jalandhar Improvement Trust vs. Sampuran Singh, reported in (1999) 3 SCC 494 . In the above referred case, the Apex Court has ruled that: 13. The High Court as well as the lower appellate court also relied upon the fact that the Trust had made similar preferential allotments as local displaced person in favour of other persons. Therefore, the courts below came to the conclusion that even the plaintiffs-respondents were entitled to such allotment. In our opinion, before coming to this conclusion the courts below should have first decided the question whether the allotment in favour of those persons was within the scope of the Rules applicable. If it was not within the scope of the Rules then even those allotments in favour of other persons will not create a right in the respondents to claim equality with them; may be, if the allotments were made wrongly in favour of those persons, the same may become liable for cancellation, if permissible in law, but that will not create an enforceable right on the respondents to claim similar wrongful allotments in their favour. In our opinion, even this ground relied upon by the High Court as well as the lower appellate court is unsustainable. The courts below next relied upon the fact that in regard to some of the respondents, the Trust itself at a point of time made allotments and accepted initial deposits towards the consideration of the plot which was subsequently cancelled. Based on those facts, the courts below held that the Trust having once allotted the plots and having collected part of the consideration, it could not have cancelled the allotments, probably basing the respondents' case on the principle of promissory estoppel. Here the courts below have failed to notice the legal principle that there is no estoppel against law. The allotment of plots by the Trust is controlled by the statutory Rules. Any allotment contrary to those Rules will be against the law. Since the allotments made in favour of some of the respondents was based on wrong application of the reservation made for "local displaced person" those allotments were contrary to law. Hence, the principle of promissory/equitable estoppel cannot be invoked to protect such illegal allotments. Any allotment contrary to those Rules will be against the law. Since the allotments made in favour of some of the respondents was based on wrong application of the reservation made for "local displaced person" those allotments were contrary to law. Hence, the principle of promissory/equitable estoppel cannot be invoked to protect such illegal allotments. In the said view of the matter, we are unable to sustain the judgments and decrees impugned in these appeals." Therefore, the argument that the respondents are estopped from enforcing the appropriate law is not sustainable, submitted the learned Addl. A.G. 19. The learned Addl. A.G. further submitted that in the instant case, the respondents sought to reverse the decision it had taken so that it may rectify which is not permissible under the law and therefore, the action of the State respondents is unquestionable. Policy decision cannot override statutory rules. In the case of State of Orissa and Others vs. Prasanan Kumar Sahoo, reported in (2007) 15 SCC 129 , the Supreme Court at para 12 has held as under:- "12. Even a policy decision taken by the State in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 162 of the Constitution of India would be subservient to the recruitment rules framed by the State either in terms of a legislative act or the proviso appended to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. A purported policy decision issued by way of an executive instruction cannot override the statute or statutory rules far less the constitutional provisions" As such, there can be no infirmity imputable against the respondents. Even if there are illegalities in matters of appointments or orders, they cannot be perpetuated. The encadrement of the petitioners to a cadre under which the Rules of 2006 does not provide entry is sought to be confirmed by the order of this Court. This is not permissible under the law. The High Court exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is to advance and protect the law not rule something which is not permissible. In the State of U.P. and Others vs. Rajkumar Sharma and Others, reported in (2006) 3 SCC 330 , it has been declared by the Supreme Court in para 15 as under: "15. Even if in some cases appointments have been made by mistake or wrongly that does not confer any right on another person. In the State of U.P. and Others vs. Rajkumar Sharma and Others, reported in (2006) 3 SCC 330 , it has been declared by the Supreme Court in para 15 as under: "15. Even if in some cases appointments have been made by mistake or wrongly that does not confer any right on another person. Article 14 of the Constitution does not envisage negative equality, and if the State committed the mistake it cannot be forced to perpetuate the same mistake. (See: Sneh Prabha v. State of U.P. & Ors., Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur, v. Daulat Mal Jain & Ors., State of Haryana and Ors. v. Ram Kumar Mann, Faridabad C.T. Scan Centre v. D.G. Health Services & Ors., Jalandhar Improvement Trust, V. Sampuran Singh, State of Punjab and Others v. Dr. Rajeev Sarwal, Yogesh Kumar and Ors. v. Govt. of NCT, Delhi and Ors., Union of India and Anr. v. International Trading Co. and Anrand Kastha Niwarak G.S.S. Maryadit, Indore v. President, Indore Development Authority." Therefore, it is clear that if the order of the State respondents is not in conformity with the law the Court cannot confirm the said illegality and perpetuate the same. There was no illegality on the part of the State respondents in repatriating the petitioners to their parent cadre and there was no illegality by the learned Single Judge in pronouncing that the service jurisprudence does not allow the prayer of the petitioners to be considered. 20. On the next contention made by the petitioners that there was discrimination with respect to representation filed by the 11 petitioners whereby the State respondents considered the case of only 3 employees who were similarly situated, it is the case of the petitioners that this action of the respondents is violative of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Learned Senior Additional Advocate General has countered this argument by stating that Article 14 is not a negative equality but a positive equality. The equality as envisaged in the Constitution cannot be used as a tool for illegal acts which is contrary to the law. Learned Senior Additional Advocate General has placed reliance in the ruling of the Apex Court in the State of Orissa and Another vs. Mamata Mohanty, reported in (2011) 3 SCC 436 wherein, in para 56 it has been held as under: " 56. Learned Senior Additional Advocate General has placed reliance in the ruling of the Apex Court in the State of Orissa and Another vs. Mamata Mohanty, reported in (2011) 3 SCC 436 wherein, in para 56 it has been held as under: " 56. It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 is not meant to perpetuate illegality and it does not envisage negative equality. Thus, even if some other similarly situated persons have been granted some benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such order does not confer any legal right on the petitioner to get the same relief" Argument that the petitioners should also be given opportunity to be retained in the Directorate of School Education is therefore not sustainable being against service jurisprudence and the Service Rules of 2006. 21. The argument raised by the petitioners in W.P. (C) No. 252 (K) of 2017 and W.P. (C) No. 253 (K) of 2017 about the victims of motor accident arguing that they should be considered and retained in the Directorate and District offices on the ground of sympathy is also not sustainable while exercising writ under Article 226, the Court cannot on the basis of sympathy alone issue the writ of mandamus. Learned Senior Additional Advocate General has placed reliance in the case of State of Bihar and Others vs. Amrendra Kumar Mishra, reported in MANU/SC/4355/2006 : (2006) 12 SCC 561 . Paragraph 15, 16 and 17 are reproduced below: " 15. In Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Ram Lal, it was observed (SCC pp. 645-55, paras 44-45) "44. While construing a statue, 'sympathy' has no role to play. This Court cannot interpret the provisions of the said Act ignoring the binding decisions of the Constitution Bench of this Court only by way of sympathy to the workmen concerned. 16. In the facts and circumstances of this case, in our opinion, the High Court should not have allowed the respondent herein to join his services only on the basis of sympathy. 17. It is now also well settled that in absence of any legal right, the Court should not issue a writ of or in the nature of mandamus on the basis of sympathy". Another supporting ruling referred to is the case of Sudhir Kumar Consul vs. Allahabad Bank, reported in (2011) 3 SCC 486 . Paragraph 31 and 32 are reproduced herein below: "31. Another supporting ruling referred to is the case of Sudhir Kumar Consul vs. Allahabad Bank, reported in (2011) 3 SCC 486 . Paragraph 31 and 32 are reproduced herein below: "31. We have sympathies for the appellant but, in a society governed by the rule of law, sympathies cannot override the Rules and Regulations. We may recall the observations made by this Court while considering the issue of compassionate appointment in public service. 32. In LIC. v. Asha Ramchhandra Ambekar, wherein the Court observed "10..... The High Courts and the Administrative Tribunals cannot confer benediction impelled by sympathetic consideration... Yielding to instinct will tend to ignore the cold logic of law. It should be remembered that 'law is the embodiment of all wisdom'. Justice according to law is a principle as old as the hills. The Courts are to administer law as they find it, however, inconvenient it may be" 22. Having established the fact, all the issues raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners has no legal standing, the learned Senior Additional Advocate General has submitted that the present writ appeals has no merit and should be dismissed. 23. We have heard the learned counsels and considered the arguments raised by the learned counsels. The materials placed before us are also considered. 24. The plea of the petitioners with respect to the law of estoppels, the plea of the maxim qui approbate non reprobate, the plea that the R.T.E. Act, 2019 disallows deployment of teaches in non-educational department and also the plea that the respondents have been treated unequally and discriminated is examined in terms of the applications of law determining these issues. 25. We propose to address each issue raised in seriatim. On the plea of the law of promissory estoppels raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the ruling in Bhim Singh and Others vs. State of Haryana and Others (1981) 2 SCC 673 has now lost its legal force having been over ruled by several later decisions. 26. Learned Senior Additional Advocate General has appropriately answered with the citations in the cases of Jalandhar Improvement Trust vs. Sampuran Singh, reported in (1999) 3 SCC 494 and State of Orissa and Others vs. Prasanan Kumar Sahoo, reported in (2007) 15 SCC 129 . 26. Learned Senior Additional Advocate General has appropriately answered with the citations in the cases of Jalandhar Improvement Trust vs. Sampuran Singh, reported in (1999) 3 SCC 494 and State of Orissa and Others vs. Prasanan Kumar Sahoo, reported in (2007) 15 SCC 129 . We are in agreement with the submissions made by the learned Senior Additional Advocate General that law of promissory estoppels cannot override the statutory rules. 27. The argument that even if the order is void it has to be declared by a competent authority, it is observed that the impugned order dated 03-10-2017 issued by the Under Secretary to the Government of Nagaland to the Principal School Education, Nagaland, Kohima vide DSE/GEN-41/2012-13 and the impugned order dated 31-10-2017 issued by the Principal Director, Directorate of School Education, Nagaland vide letter No. ED/EST-1/DETACHMENT/2017 detaching teachers serving as ministerial staff in the Directorate of School Education, District Education Officers and Sub-Divisional Education Officers has no procedural infirmity. Both the signatories have the authority to issue notification and sign documents on behalf of the Government in their respective departments under Section 11 & 12 of the Rules of Executive Business. 28. With regard to the argument that one cannot approbate and reprobate, it is factually correct that the petitioners were offered to sign an option format. However, we have not found anything on record which shows that the option exercised by the petitioners was accepted by the respondents. The concept of qui approbate non approbate is maxim more relatable to the contractual laws. It is not applicable to the fundamental rights or statutory laws. Illegal agreement cannot be protected by the Courts. The reason is that an illegal agreement will only achieve illegal end. To some extent illegal agreements under contractual laws, when parties are not equally guilty, the least guilty party is granted relief when it is in the public interest. If the contract is divisible the Court may enforce the legal part of the contract. Otherwise in general the Courts follow the Hands off Policy. The parties are left where the Court finds them and no relief is granted. These are legal principles which are adopted when faced with illegal agreement under the contract laws. We cannot apply contract law to the fundamental rights specially when the matter relates to exercise of writ jurisdiction. Otherwise in general the Courts follow the Hands off Policy. The parties are left where the Court finds them and no relief is granted. These are legal principles which are adopted when faced with illegal agreement under the contract laws. We cannot apply contract law to the fundamental rights specially when the matter relates to exercise of writ jurisdiction. Argument that the respondents was a party who approved the action and that he cannot disapprove is acceptable, but it is subject to the condition that the agreement should be legal agreement. We must therefore examine the service rules which governs the services of the employees of the Directorate of School Education. The employees are governed by the Nagaland Directorate Ministerial Service Rules, 2006. Rule 7 (i) of the said 2006 Rules clearly provides as follows:- PROCEDURE-7 (i) There shall be a Selection Committee consisting of the persons mentioned under the Rules 6(i) above to select suitable candidates to the posts of Lower Division-cum-Computer Assistant which shall be by 100% Direct recruitment (1) The Appointing Authority shall make an annual assessment of the vacancies in this Cadre and inform the Committee as the case may be on the basis of vacancies required to be filled up by direct recruitment (2) The Selection Committee shall prepare a list of successful candidates in order of merit which shall be determined in accordance with the aggregate marks obtained by each candidate in the written exam/viva voce and recommend the names of such candidates to the Appointing Authority for appointment to the Service. The list as drawn up shall be valid for a period of six months from the date of its drawal (3) Principles underlying direct recruitment to various categories of posts shall be in accordance with the executive instructions/policy decisions issued in this behalf by the Government from time to time including reservation for Backward Tribes/Persons with Disabilities (ii) All persons shall be appointed to the service in the order in which their names are arranged in the list prepared in accordance with Rule 7 (i) (2) (iii) A persons recruited under Rule 7 (i)(ii) shall join within thirty days from the date of issue of the order of appointment failing which and unless the Appointing Authority extend the period, which shall not exceed two months, the appointment shall be treated as cancelled." 29. There is no other provision contained in the 2006 Rules for entry as a ministerial staff in the Directorate of School Education. Therefore, the process by which the petitioners entered into the Directorate Services is not in compliance with the Rules. The Cabinet decisions and its subsequential orders have no legal sanctity and therefore does not confer any legal right upon the petitioners. 30. We can but only agree with the submission of the learned Senior Additional Advocate General that the High Court in exercise of power under Article 226 has to enforce the law and cannot pass an order to circumvent the provisions of the laws. It is clear that the Nagaland Directorate Ministerial Service Rules, 2006 under Rule 7 (i) provides that entry into the Directorate service shall be by 100% direct recruitment. The Courts cannot change the Rules, it is ultra vires and also deviation from the duty cast upon the Courts under Article 226 "To enforce the Rule of Law". Anything beyond that would run counter to the spirit of the Constitution. 31. The next ground raised by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners Mr. C.T. Jamir that the learned Single Judge could not have relied upon the provisions of the RTE Act, 2009 and it could not be applied to the petitioners retrospectively is given due consideration. We are in agreement with the argument raised by the learned counsel that the RTE Act, 2009 does not contain provisions for giving retrospective effect. This would follow that if the decision of the learned Single Judge was solely based on the ground that the RTE Act, 2009 prohibits deployment of teachers for non-educational purposes, then those teachers who were posted prior to 2009 in the Directorate /D.E.O./S.D.E.O. establishments could not be redeployed. However, we are not confronted with this issue alone. We are more concerned with the propriety of law with respect to the service jurisprudence and the desired action of a writ Court in facts of such nature. Had this issue been the sole consideration to repatriate the petitioners to their parent cadre it could have effected the judgment. We are unable to defenestrate the other law points that are engrained in this writ. 32. Had this issue been the sole consideration to repatriate the petitioners to their parent cadre it could have effected the judgment. We are unable to defenestrate the other law points that are engrained in this writ. 32. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as raised by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners is basically a concept of the law of torts that privileges the plaintiff to prove negligence of the respondents and its applicability to the writ matters would be overshadowed by more relevant and appropriate legal concepts. The fact that illegality cannot be perpetuated by writ Court answers the argument. Facts itself explains the negligence of the respondents but proof of negligence alone is not the standard required for establishing an individuals right in a writ petition. The issue raised is subsumed by more pertinent questions. 33. We are also in agreement with the submissions of the learned Senior Additional Advocate General that Article 14 postulates positive right and not negative right. There is no provision for entry into the Directorate Services except by way of proper process of selection if allowed, it would be perpetuating illegality by the Court. 34. Lastly, on the plea of the petitioners in W.P. (C) 252(K) of 2017, we also subscribe to the submissions made by the learned Senior Additional Advocate General that sympathy and concern has no role to play while examining rights of the parties in a writ petition. The learned Single Judge has appropriately directed that the petitioners therein should represent their case for consideration as provided under Rights of Persons with Disability Act, 2016 which needs no interference. Thus, all the plea raised by the petitioners have been appropriately and convincingly replied by the learned Senior Additional Advocate General, Mr. T.B. Jamir by supportive rulings of the Apex Court. 35. We are also in agreement with the plea that unless there is misinterpretation of the law or facts which is apparent on the face of the records, the view of the learned Single Judge should not be interfered with. An appeal from a Single Bench to a Division Bench is otherwise only a matter of transfer from one co-ordinate Bench to the other. An appeal from a Single Bench to a Division Bench is otherwise only a matter of transfer from one co-ordinate Bench to the other. Subject to the modification that the RTE Act, 2009 could not be read retrospectively and also that the law of equity was not considered, we do not find any perversity which would persuade us to take a different view. 36. The present writ petition has conspicuous pleadings which perhaps deserves a little discourse. Writ petitions are filed to protect the rights of the petitioners, however, in the present writ, the petitioners have pleaded that they are willing to sacrifice their seniority and the concomitant promotions as well as their entitlement to higher pay. Corollary of which is that it is the prayer of the petitioners that they should be dis-privileged; meaning thereby they should be punished by allowing them to continue in the position as ministerial staff with lower pay by sacrificing seniority and also promotion. We do not think there is anything in the service jurisprudence that gives right of a writ petitioners to be demoted. It is a plea for a negative right which we cannot comprehend under the service jurisprudence unless we are desirous of carving out a new concept of law. We are therefore of the view that negative right cannot be brought before a writ court. 37. We also take the opportunity to observe that the State respondents have either not sought for advice or they were ill advised. Huge exercise of such nature would have cascading effect in the department which can cause bottle neck in the functioning. It would therefore be advisable that the State respondents seek legal opinion before such steps are taken. However, this shall remain only as an obiter dicta. 38. Having answered all the issues raised by the petitioners, we are of the view that all these issues have been eclipsed by the principle that "the writ courts are ordained to protect the rule of law". Firstly, we rule that the establishment of fact by the State respondents that the Directorate Ministerial Service Rules, 2006 under Rule 7 (i) provides for 100% recruitment through direct recruitment or through selection made by a Selection Committee. This was not disputed by the writ petitioners. Rule of law must prevail. 39. Firstly, we rule that the establishment of fact by the State respondents that the Directorate Ministerial Service Rules, 2006 under Rule 7 (i) provides for 100% recruitment through direct recruitment or through selection made by a Selection Committee. This was not disputed by the writ petitioners. Rule of law must prevail. 39. Secondly, we also come to the undisputed conclusion that the parties put themselves in an agreement not permitted by law. In such situation, the court should adopt the "hands off policy" and leave the parties in the position they were found; or restore them to the original position, if the law of equity so demands. 40. Thirdly, the petitioners have brought a negative plea which is to say that they are exercising their rights under writ jurisdiction to disprivilege themselves, which a writ Court cannot take cognizance of. 41. The law of equity demands that the petitioners should be treated in a fair and equitable manner. Rule of law and the law of equity can co-exist parallelly. They have no quarrel. The law of equity demands that the petitioners be restored to their rights which they have lost in the misadventure which was caused due to the negligence of the respondents. The State respondents are directed to restore all the consequential rights of the petitioners which they have lost w.e.f. the date of attachment till the date of redeployment. It is clarified that the less pay drawn by the petitioners/seniority/promotion shall be restored retrospectively w.e.f. such date each petitioner was attached. The exercise being enormous in nature, we deem it proper to give sufficient time for examining all the records of the petitioners as such, we direct the State respondents to make endeavour to complete the exercise within six months of the passing of this order. The State respondents shall ensure that the petitioners are not repatriated till such time the restoration exercise is finalized as against each petitioner. Writ appeals stands disposed off in terms of the ruling as indicated. There shall be no order as to costs considering the nature of the case.