JUDGMENT : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. The appellants are in appeal under section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the judgment of conviction under section 376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code. 2. In the afternoon of 23.09.2011, a minor girl was abducted and ravished by four friends near village Degri. She reached home in the evening and narrated the incident to her mother. Next day, accompanied by her father she submitted a written report at Torpa police station. A First Information Report was lodged under section 376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code against Chhotoo Kumar, Chandan Kumar, Firoj Ansari @ Munna and Javed Hussain @ Manua. The statements of the prosecutrix, her mother and father were recorded by the investigating officer the same day under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as CrPC) and on 26.09.2011 statement of the prosecutrix was also recorded under section 164 CrPC. She was clinically examined by Dr. Rashmi Romila Sanga on 25.09.2011 at Sadar Hospital, Khunti and the vaginal swab and X-ray of her elbow joint, wrist joint, pelvic etc. were taken. No external injury on the body or any injury over vulva and thigh of the prosecutrix was observed by the doctor and no trace of spermatozoa, dead or alive, was detected In the forensic examination. All four accused were arrested on 24.09.2011 and their statements were taken by the investigating officer, but they were not taken to a doctor for their medical examination. On 18.11.2011, a charge-sheet was submitted against them and they have faced the trial on the charge under section 376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code. The prosecution has examined eight witnesses to prove the charge against them; the victim girl was examined as PW4. During the trial, Firoj Ansari who was on bail got involved in Rail PS Case No. 31 of 2013 and he was lodged in Tihar Jail since 05.10.2013. This fact was not brought to notice of the trial Judge and the prosecution continued to examine the witnesses as the accused were represented through their counsel. When statement of the accused was to be recorded under section 313 CrPC since Firoj Ansari remained absent the bail-bonds furnished by him were cancelled and the records were separated vide order dated 04.07.2015 - split up record was numbered as Sessions Trial No.147(A)/2012. When statement of the accused was to be recorded under section 313 CrPC since Firoj Ansari remained absent the bail-bonds furnished by him were cancelled and the records were separated vide order dated 04.07.2015 - split up record was numbered as Sessions Trial No.147(A)/2012. A production warrant was issued and when Firoj Ansari was produced from Tihar Jail he was offered opportunity to lead evidence in defence and finally vide order dated 12.04.2016 his defence was closed. Since prosecution evidence against all the accused was common and examination of Firoj Ansari under section 313 CrPC separately would have no impact on the outcome of the case, vide order dated 09.05.2016 both sessions trials were amalgamated and by a common judgment dated 20.05.2016 the appellants were convicted under section 376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code. They were heard on the point of sentence and by order dated 26.05.2016 sentenced to R.I for 10 years with a fine of Rs. 5000/- each under section 376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code, with a default stipulation to undergo S.I for one year. 3. The learned Sessions Judge has held as under : "The learned defence counsel further drew the attention of the court and submitted that the doctor has opined that no external and internal injury was found on the private part of the victim and as such the allegation of rape cannot be said to have been established beyond doubt but it is settled law that mere fact that no injuries were found on the private part of the victim cannot be a ground to hold that no rape was committed upon her. I find it relevant to mention here at the cost of repetition of facts that I have already opined during the discussion of the evidence in aforesaid paras of the judgment that the victim PW-4 has unrebuttedly and consistently stated the fact of rape committed upon her by the accused persons and the same has been fully corroborated by Ext-2, Ext-5 and PW-1 and PW-3 and the same have not been disturbed by the defence throughout the trial. I have also given finding that the presence of all the accused persons during the occurrence have not been rebutted by the accused persons as there is no explanation forthcoming from the accused persons regarding their presence at the time of occurrence which is strong militating circumstance against the accused persons and as such the guilt of the accused persons is, to my mind, conclusively proved. It is also settled law that the testimony of the victim of rape is appreciated in the back ground of entire case and her evidence is entitled to get weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding. It is settled law that the victim has no control over the investigating agency and negligence of IO cannot affect the credibility of the statement of the victim. It is well settled law that in criminal trial even if the investigation is defective the rest of the evidence must be scrutinized independently of the impact of the defects in the investigation otherwise the criminal trial will plummet to the level of investigation and the criminal trial should not be made casualties for any lapses committed by the investigating officer. It is found to be relevant to be mentioned here that I have already been opined about the unrebutted and consistent evidence of the victim and the same have been corroborated by other witnesses to whom the victim have narrated the occurrence in details. Moreover I find from the evidence of the IO that the manner in which the investigation has been made by the IO is in accordance with law and there is no lapses in the investigation on the basis of which the investigation can be said to be defective in law. Hence on the basis of discussion and analysis of entire gamut of evidence both oral and documentary and findings of mine given during discussions as aforesaid I further find that and hold that the prosecution has been able to demonstrate and establish the charges of rape against the accused persons by bringing on record firm, consistent, reliable, convincing and dependable evidence on the record and accordingly I find all the accused persons namely Chhotoo Kumar, Chandan Kumar, Javed Hussain @ Manua and Firoj Ansari @ Munna guilty u/s 376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code and accordingly they are convicted." 4. Sexual violence to a woman shatters her self-esteem and causes immeasurable damage to dignity and sanctity of the victim. In Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Subhra Chakraborty, (1996) 1 SCC 490 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that sex crimes destroy the entire psychology of a woman and pushes her into deep emotional crisis. (State of Punjab v. Ramdev Singh, (2004) 1 SCC 421 held that sexual violence is a crime against basic human rights and violates the victim's most cherished fundamental right, namely, right to life enshrined in Article 21 of Constitution of India. More than a century after the Indian Penal Code was brought to the statute book sections 228A, 376A and other amendments were made in the Indian Penal Code; sections 173 and 327 CrPC were amended, and; section 114A was incorporated in the Indian Evidence Act. It was a heart wrenching tale of a tribal girl from Maharashtra raped at the police station commonly known as Mathura case, Tukaram v. State of Maharashtra (1979) 2 SCC 143 and solidarity movement taken to the streets by women's group in support of a rape survivor Maya Tyagi, Sheo Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P. 1988 SCC Online All 679 whose husband was shot dead for protesting to her attempted molestation by the police which led to further legislative activity in this area of law. A change came calling in judicial approach also and the Courts accepted testimony of a victim of sex crime without corroboration to record conviction. In State of H.P v. Gian Chand, (2001) 6 SCC 71 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the Courts need not look for corroboration for minor details in the testimony of the victim; in State of H.P v. Lekh Raj, (2000) 1 SCC 247 a plea based on absence of spermatozoa during vaginal examination of the prosecutrix was held irrelevant, and; in State of Rajasthan v. N.K., (2000) 5 SCC 30 absence of injury on the victim girl and non-examination of the person to whom she confided about the commission of offence were held irrelevant. 5. Prior to 2013 amendment, section 375 included six circumstances under which sexual intercourse with a woman amounted to rape. The following six descriptions of sexual intercourse with a woman were provided under section 375 : "375. 5. Prior to 2013 amendment, section 375 included six circumstances under which sexual intercourse with a woman amounted to rape. The following six descriptions of sexual intercourse with a woman were provided under section 375 : "375. Rape- A man is said to commit "rape" who, except in the case hereinafter excepted, has sexual intercourse with a woman under circumstances falling under any of the six following descriptions :- First – Against her will. Secondly – Without her consent. Thirdly – With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested in fear of death or of hurt. Fourthly – With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband, and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married. Fifthly – With her consent, when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent. Sixthly – With or without her consent, when she is under sixteen years of age. Explanation – Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary to the offence of rape. Exception – Sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape." 6. The first three clauses of the definition of rape are in a way interconnected and overlapping also. For example, sexual intercourse with a woman against her will may be construed without her consent, and it is rape when her consent is obtained by fear, force or fraud and also when she was not in full possession of her senses. The definition of rape has undergone a sea change and the law as it stood prior to 2013 provided that slight penetration was sufficient to constitute the offence under section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. The explanation to section 375 of the Indian Penal Code provides that penetration is sufficient sexual intercourse necessary to constitute the offence of rape-slight penetration is sufficient. 7. A victim of sexual offence is a competent witness under section 118 of the Indian Evidence Act. The explanation to section 375 of the Indian Penal Code provides that penetration is sufficient sexual intercourse necessary to constitute the offence of rape-slight penetration is sufficient. 7. A victim of sexual offence is a competent witness under section 118 of the Indian Evidence Act. She is not an accomplice and her evidence is not seen like that of an accomplice requiring corroboration. Illustration (b) to section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars. However, section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act which provides that an accomplice shall be a competent witness at the same time clarifies that a conviction is not illegal merely because it is based on uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. The rule of corroboration which was in practice since long became a rule of law after The King v. Baskerville, (1916) 2 K.B. 658. Lord Reading C.J. has written as under : "There is no doubt that the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice is admissible in law ..... But it has long been a rule of practice at common law for the judge to warn the jury of the danger of convicting a prisoner on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice or accomplices, and, in the discretion of the judge, to advise them not to convict upon such evidence; but the judge should point out to the jury that it is within their legal province to convict upon such unconfirmed evidence…….This rule of practice has become virtually equivalent to a rule of law, and since the Court of Criminal Appeal came into operation this Court has held that, in the absence of such a warning by the judge, the conviction must be quashed………..If after the proper caution by the judge the jury nevertheless convict the prisoner, this Court will not quash the conviction merely upon the ground that the accomplice's testimony was uncorroborated." 8. "Baskerville, (supra)" held sway in its time and the opinion of the learned Chief Justice was accepted by the Courts in India Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 54 seems to adopt a similar rule in the cases of sexual offences. "Baskerville, (supra)" held sway in its time and the opinion of the learned Chief Justice was accepted by the Courts in India Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 54 seems to adopt a similar rule in the cases of sexual offences. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under : "That, in my opinion, is exactly the law in India so far as accomplices are concerned and it is certainly not any higher in the case of sexual offences. The only clarification necessary for purposes of this country is where this class of offence is sometimes tried by a judge without the aid of a jury. In these cases it is necessary that the judge should give some indication in his judgment that he has had this rule of caution in mind and should proceed to give reasons for considering it unnecessary to require corroboration on the facts of the particular case before him and show why he considers it safe to convict without corroboration in that particular case. I am of opinion that the learned High Court Judges were wrong in thinking that they could not, as a matter of law, convict without corroboration." 9. The Indian Evidence Act does not provide that evidence of a victim of sex crime cannot be accepted unless corroborated in material particulars and there is no prohibition in law to base conviction on uncorroborated testimony of a prosecutrix. Her evidence in the Court is given the same weight as is attached to an injured witness in cases of physical violence and is examined with the same degree of care and caution. In a catena of judgments the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that it is improper and undesirable to test evidence of a prosecutrix with a certain amount of suspicion, treating her as if she were an accomplice. No doubt a certain degree of caution is indicated in the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court but primarily those are the cases in which the Court was hesitant to place implicit reliance on testimony of the prosecutrix. In such cases the Court may look for evidence which would lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix but the rule of corroboration cannot be applied in every case. In such cases the Court may look for evidence which would lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix but the rule of corroboration cannot be applied in every case. The last word seems to be that the testimony of a prosecutrix though commands great weight the same cannot necessarily be accepted mechanically; to indicate the expression used by the Hon'ble Supreme Court - it is not like a gospel truth. 10. PW1 who is father and PW3 who is mother of the prosecutrix have come in the witness-box to support and corroborate complaint of their daughter against the accused. PW1 has stated that his daughter was a Class-IX student in the High School, Torpa. It was about two years ago she had gone to Block for residential certificate when four boys had forcibly taken her away. He has identified his own signature over written report of his daughter. In his cross-examination he has stated that he did not read the written report given to the police; his daughter did not inform him who offended her, and; he does not know what happened to his daughter. He dealt another blow to the prosecution by saying that his statement was not recorded by the police. His wife has, however, stood by the daughter. In her cross-examination PW3 who is the wife of PW1 has stated that when her daughter came back home and narrated the incident her husband was not at home, but after he came back she told him the whole story. She has stated that about two years back Chhotoo Kumar, Chandan Kumar, Rohit and Munna took away her daughter and ravished her. Her daughter informed her that in past also the accused had forced themselves upon her. In her cross-examination she has admitted that the accused were not known to her and they were shown to her by her daughter when they were put in jail. 11. PW4, the prosecutrix has stated that in the morning of 23.09.2011, at about 10:00 AM, she had gone to Torpa Block for residential certificate. The accused came there and forcibly took her near Degri village and behind the bushes committed rape upon her one by one. She reached home around 04:00-05:00 PM and narrated the incident to her mother and next day submitted a written report to the police. She has affirmed that her statement was recorded by the Magistrate. The accused came there and forcibly took her near Degri village and behind the bushes committed rape upon her one by one. She reached home around 04:00-05:00 PM and narrated the incident to her mother and next day submitted a written report to the police. She has affirmed that her statement was recorded by the Magistrate. But what happened next was a severe jolt to the prosecution, albeit momentarily. She has made such statements in her cross-examination which create doubt on her own story of abduction and rape by the appellants. She has stated that there was a police station adjacent to Torpa Block; there are about 100 shops there, and; nearby bus stand used to be always crowded. She has further stated that she raised hulla when the accused were trying to forcibly abduct her and the police brought all of them to the police station but after some time she came back home. She seems to disown her written statement and stated that the police took her signature on blank paper. 12. Mr. Ajit Kumar, the learned counsel appearing for Firoj Ansari would contend that delay of even one day in lodging the First Information Report was sufficient to cook up a false story to implicate the appellant in the case. The submission is that on her own admission the prosecutrix was not assaulted by the appellants much less sexually and the medical evidence completely demolishes the prosecution case. 13. A witness who does not support the prosecution in the Court and takes a position that he knows nothing about the occurrence or denies his statement made before the police under section 161 CrPC is called hostile witness. For long, the judicial opinion was divided as to what value should be attached to evidence of a witness who did not support the case of the party calling him in the Court. Campbell, C.J. has observed in Faulkner v. Brine, 1858 (I) F&F 254, that the object of cross-examination of his own witness by a party is to discredit the witness in toto and to get rid of his testimony altogether. Campbell, C.J. has observed in Faulkner v. Brine, 1858 (I) F&F 254, that the object of cross-examination of his own witness by a party is to discredit the witness in toto and to get rid of his testimony altogether. It seems that the opinion of Campbell, C.J. was adopted in Khijiruddin v. Emperor, AIR 1926 Cal 139 but around the same time a discordant note was struck by Terrell, J. in Sohrai Sao v. Emperor, AIR 1930 Pat 247 who held that admissions of a witness in the cross-examination by the party calling him can be relied upon by the party calling him. The law on the subject was finally settled by a judgment of Full Bench of Calcutta High Court in Praphulla Kumar Sarkar v. Emperor, AIR 1931 Cal 401. Rankin, C.J. has written in his opinion (at p. 1428-30 of the report): "In my opinion, the fact that a witness is dealt with under Section 154 of the Evidence Act, even when under that section he is 'cross-examined' to credit, in no way warrants a direction to the jury that they are bound in law to place no reliance on his evidence, or that the party who called and cross-examined him can take no advantage from any part of his evidence. There is moreover no rule of law that if a jury thinks that a witness has been discredited on one point they may not give credit to him on another. The rule of law is that it is for the jury to say" 14. In Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1964 SC 1563 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that section 154 of the Indian Evidence Act is wide in scope and the discretion is entirely left to the Court to exercise the power when the circumstances demand. It was further held that section 154 confers a discretionary power on the Court to permit a person who calls a witness to put any questions to him which might be put in cross-examination by the adverse party. Now the law which seems to be fairly settled is that the evidence of a witness who did not support the prosecution is examined with care and in the context of other evidences led by the prosecution. Now the law which seems to be fairly settled is that the evidence of a witness who did not support the prosecution is examined with care and in the context of other evidences led by the prosecution. A part of the evidence of an unsupportive witness if supports the prosecution can be used and his evidence is not discarded in entirety and the prosecution or the defence can rely on a part of the evidence of a hostile witness. Initially, in the cross-examination the prosecutrix appears to have made some statements unfavourable to the prosecution but thereafter she has again reiterated her story and stood to her grounds that the appellants have committed rape upon her. 15. In her cross-examination, the victim girl has stated thus: ^^8- gesa tc tcjnLrh ys tk jgk Fkk] eSaus gYyk fd;k Fkk] cgqr ls yksx vk;s Fks] iqfyl Hkh vk;h FkhA iqfyl gesa Fkkuk ys x;h Fkh vkSj Fkkuk ls eSa vius ?kj okil vk x;h FkhA** English Translation: "8. When I was taken away forcefully, I raised hulla. Many persons had come, the police also arrived. The police took me to the police station and then I returned home from the police station." 16. From the aforesaid, it is apparent that the statements elicited from the prosecutrix were not in the context of her previous statement before the police. The questions put to her in the cross-examination were entirely unrelated and contrary to the materials on record. No question was put to the father of the victim girl or the investigating officer that the boys were apprehended by the local people and brought to the police station but a report was not lodged against them. We further find that no witness was examined by the defence on this issue. In Sakhawat v. Crown, ILR (1937) Nag.227 it was observed that contradiction means the setting up of one statement against another and not the setting up of a statement against nothing at all. The cross-examination of the prosecutrix in paragraph nos. 7 & 8 was not with reference to her previous statements and her statements made therein cannot be used to discredit her. The cross-examination of the prosecutrix in paragraph nos. 7 & 8 was not with reference to her previous statements and her statements made therein cannot be used to discredit her. The evidence of a witness is read as a whole and first endeavor of the Court would be to harmonize statements of a witness which may sometime appear to be inconsistent - in the process of harmonizing minor aberrations are best ignored. 17. The investigating officer has recorded statements of the prosecutrix and her parents the same day and in their statements under section 161 CrPC they have fully supported the prosecution case. The mother of the prosecutrix who supported her has deposed in the Court that her daughter came home crying and next day she had gone to the police station to lodge the complaint. She has stated that by the time the prosecutrix was examined in the Court she was married. The cross-examination of the prosecutrix was deferred by two days and this period appears to have been utilized by the accused or her own family members to persuade her to change her mind. That appears to be one reason why she has made few statements favouring the accused, but soon after that she has again stood to the truth. To a Court question she has stated that her statement about the incident was written by a police on her dictation and that was read over to her and thereafter she put her signature on that. She has stated that she had shown her injuries to the doctor and in her statement before the Magistrate also she has stated that Chhotoo Kumar, Chandan Kumar, Javed Hussain and Firoj Ansari had committed rape upon her. The investigating officer has stated that the place of occurrence was a barren forest area and there was a ditch. The prosecutrix was acquainted with the accused and she has stated that she had no idea about rape before 23.09.2011. According to her, on previous two-three occasions also the accused ravished her but keeping in mind her statement that she had no idea about rape before 23.09.2011 the previous instances were anything but short of offensive to her. On 23.09.2011 when she was taken away by the appellants she might not have offered much resistance for this reason, but this time she was sexually ravished by them. On 23.09.2011 when she was taken away by the appellants she might not have offered much resistance for this reason, but this time she was sexually ravished by them. We are inclined to accept that testimony of the prosecutrix about the appellants sexually ravishing her in the past was exaggeration but for this reason her testimony cannot be discarded in entirety exaggerations per se do not brittle the evidence. The offence under section 376 of the Indian Penal Code constitutes a different kind of crime and it is well settled that a voir dire statement of the victim of sex crime is more than sufficient to record conviction under section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, provided her testimony is free from doubt and does not suffer from any inherent improbability or embellishment. 18. The prosecutrix is a reliable and trustworthy witness and notwithstanding that her own father and neutral witnesses have not supported her in the Court her testimony has remained unscathed on the core of the prosecution case. She is supported by her mother and medical evidence puts a seal of truthfulness on her testimony. 19. The medical examination of the prosecutrix was conducted by Dr. Rashmi Romila Sanga on 25.09.2011. The relevant portions of the opinion of the doctor are extracted below : "General Examination : Patent is average built, breast well developed. Axaillary hair thin and sparse, pubic hair thick and sparse. Height-148 cm, weight-34 Kg, menstrual history-LMP 25-08-11, patient is menstruating. Regarding age :- No. of teeth 28, upper jaw-14, lower jaw-14. According to X-ray- X-ray of right elbow joint plate No. R-61 dated 25-09-2011, medial epicondyle fused with lower end. Head of radius fused with shaft. Olecranon partially fused. X-ray of wrist joint plate No.-R-61 dated 25-09-11 distal end of radius partially fused. Distal end of Ulna partially fused. X-ray of Pelvis Plate No. R-61 dated 25-09-11 iliac crest not fused. Local Examination : No external injury over any part of body. Examination of Vulva and thigh : No injury over Vulva and thigh. Introitus admits one finger. Old rupture of hymen. Examination of Vaginal Swab : Pathological examination of slide no spermatozoa found on slide. Opinion :- Victim age is between 14 to 15 years. No evidence of sexual intercourse at the time of examination. No external or internal injury seen on private part." 20. Introitus admits one finger. Old rupture of hymen. Examination of Vaginal Swab : Pathological examination of slide no spermatozoa found on slide. Opinion :- Victim age is between 14 to 15 years. No evidence of sexual intercourse at the time of examination. No external or internal injury seen on private part." 20. The injuries on a victim of sexual offence may be found around her (i) cheeks, lips and neck, (ii) wrist and arm, (iii) on the back due to fallon the ground, (iv) the inner sides of knees and thighs, and (v) on the breasts from rough handling. The age, physical development and class of society to which the victim belongs are the factors which decide the resistance offered by the prosecutrix. A feeling of helplessness, inability to offer resistance etc. may lead a woman to succumb to the lust of an accused without offering resistance. Sometimes the victim is so terrified that she may not offer any resistance and consequently no injury or external sign of rape is found on the body which normally is expected from a struggle while resisting the attempt. In Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1987) 2 SCC 27 , a young girl was raped by four persons. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the girl was not expected to offer such resistance as would cause injuries to her body - the accused were convicted. 21. The doctor has stated that X-ray of right elbow joint of the prosecutrix which was taken on 25.09.2011 shows her medial epicondyle fused with lower end and head of radius fused with shaft. The medial epicondyle is part of humerus bone of upper arm in humans. When a person falls on to an outstretched hand epicondyle fracture of humerus which is very common would occur. The doctor has observed that distal end of radius and distal end of ulna were partially fused. The radius also called radial bone is one of the two large bones of the forearm - the other is ulna. The radius forms a joint with ulna bone at the wrist. The radius primarily contributes to the wrist joint and ulna is a major contributor to elbow joint. The radius is named so because the radius (bone) acts like the radius - it rotates around the ulna and the far end of the radius. The radius forms a joint with ulna bone at the wrist. The radius primarily contributes to the wrist joint and ulna is a major contributor to elbow joint. The radius is named so because the radius (bone) acts like the radius - it rotates around the ulna and the far end of the radius. Ulna acts as the center point of the circle as it does not move when the arm is rotated. Olecranon is a large thick curved bony eminence of ulna. It is a long bone in the forearm that projects behind the elbow. The X-ray reports show that distal end of radius, distal end of ulna and olecranon - all are part of hand and wrist bone; were partially fused. These injuries clearly indicate struggle by the prosecutrix - may be she was thrashed on the ground. 22. Furthermore, there is no substance in the contention that the prosecution case must fail because the doctor did not observe any external or internal injury on private parts of the prosecutrix and no trace of spermatozoa, dead or alive, was found on the vaginal swab. 23. The absence of sperms in the vagina does not mean that sexual intercourse has not taken place. It may be due to non-emission, aspermia, previous vasectomy, very old age or poor technique by the examining doctor. Modi, Extracted in Lyon's Medical Jurisprudence & Toxicology, 11th Edition has noted that : "The presence of spermatozoa in the vagina after intercourse has been reported by Pollack (1943) from 30 minutes to 17 days, and by Morrison (1972) up to 9 days in vagina and 12 days in the cervix. However, in the vagina of a dead woman, they persist for a longer period." Parikh, Parikh's Textbook of Medical Jurisprudence, Forensic Medicine and Toxicology, Sixth Edition, writes that normally sperms remain motile in the vagina for about six to eight hours and occasionally for about twelve hours, while non-motile sperms are detectable for about twenty four hours, with occasional reports of detection varying between forty eight to seventy two hours and rarely till ninety six hours. Parikh, Parikh's Textbook of Medical Jurisprudence, Forensic Medicine and Toxicology, Sixth Edition, further writes that it is quite possible to commit the offence of rape without producing any injury to the genitals or leaving any seminal stem. 24. Parikh, Parikh's Textbook of Medical Jurisprudence, Forensic Medicine and Toxicology, Sixth Edition, further writes that it is quite possible to commit the offence of rape without producing any injury to the genitals or leaving any seminal stem. 24. The internal Signs of rape such as redness or inflammation of vulva and vagina are difficult to distinguish as there may be redness of the internal organs due to long standing inflammation or irritation by a chronic discharge. Similarly, inadequate personal hygiene of the victim may make it difficult to render definite opinion about recent sign of sexual intercourse. Modi, A Textbook of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, 26th Edition, writes that there is a distinction between vulval penetration and vaginal penetration; and vulval penetration, with or without violence, is as much rape as vaginal penetration. The learned author further mentions that since the definition of vagina includes labia majora there is no need to carry out "the two finger test" in order to find out whether or not the woman was habituated to sex. He further says that lack of genital injury could be because of use of lubricant, it could also be because there was fingering or penetration by object with use of lubricant. 25. Quite clearly, it is wrong to suggest that the medical evidence does not support the prosecution. Going further, there is one significant observation of the doctor which, in our opinion, was the reason why internal signs of rape could not be seen during medical examination. The doctor has observed that the last menstrual period of the prosecutrix was 25.08.2011 and at the time she was clinically examined she was menstruating. If any sign of a recent non-consensual sex over her internal parts was not detected by the doctor the same is explained by the aforesaid observations. The prosecutrix has stated in her cross-examination that there were blood marks on her clothes (salwar) and her mother has stated that the investigating officer examined the clothes of her daughter but gave it back. In Gurcharan Singh v. State of Haryana, (1972) 2 SCC 749 the suggestion that, there being no marks of violence on the private parts or elsewhere on the person of the prosecutrix, there could be no offence of rape on her, was held wholly misconceived. 26. In “Gurcharan Singh, (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under : "10. In Gurcharan Singh v. State of Haryana, (1972) 2 SCC 749 the suggestion that, there being no marks of violence on the private parts or elsewhere on the person of the prosecutrix, there could be no offence of rape on her, was held wholly misconceived. 26. In “Gurcharan Singh, (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under : "10. The point most seriously canvassed in this Court on behalf of the appellant was that the solitary statement of the prosecutrix without corroboration in material particulars is not enough to sustain the conviction of the appellant. The learned counsel appearing for Gurcharan Singh contended that Dalip Singh and Sanjha Ram may have been rightly convicted. But so far as the appellant is concerned the evidence against him is neither reliable nor sufficient for bringing home to him the offences of abduction and rape beyond reasonable doubt. The basic question which, therefore, arises is as to how far the testimony of the prosecutrix before us can form the basis of the appellant's conviction. It is well-settled that the prosecutrix cannot be considered as an accomplice and, therefore, her testimony cannot be equated with that of an accomplice in an offence. As a rule of prudence, however, court normally looks for some corroboration of her testimony so as to satisfy its conscience that she is telling the truth and that the person accused of rape on her has not been falsely implicated. The matter is not res integra and this Court has, on more occasions than one, considered and enunciated the legal position." 27. A conviction solely based on the evidence of a prosecutrix without any corroboration is not illegal and it is not necessary that every part of the evidence of the victim should be confirmed in every detail by independent evidence [refer, Sk. Zakir v. State of Bihar, (1983) 4 SCC 10 ], but wherever corroboration is necessary it should be from an independent source. The appellants have set up a defence that the prosecutrix and Chhotoo Kumar were in love. Zakir v. State of Bihar, (1983) 4 SCC 10 ], but wherever corroboration is necessary it should be from an independent source. The appellants have set up a defence that the prosecutrix and Chhotoo Kumar were in love. According to them this is a story of failed love and their friendship with Chhotoo Kumar was the reason that prompted the prosecutrix to institute a false case against them, but we do not find any support to the defence story from the materials on record rather there is overwhelming material against them establishing their complicity and involvement in 'the occurrence. 28. Section 53 CrPC provides that it shall be lawful to examine a person accused of committing an offence if there are reasonable grounds for believing, that an examination of his person will afford evidence as to the commission of an offence. Section 53-A was inserted in the Code of Criminal Procedure by Act 25 of 2005. It deals with medical examination of a person who has been arrested on the charge of committing rape or an attempt to commit rape. The incorporation of section 53-A by an amendment in the Code of Criminal Procedure may be construed that non-compliance of section 53-A would count against the prosecution, but like other procedural laws failure of the investigating officer to take the accused for medical examination is not fatal for the prosecution. The judgment in Santosh Prasad v. The State of Bihar, (2020) 3 SCC 443 on which the learned counsels for the appellants have placed reliance does not help the appellants. In “Santosh Prasad, (supra) the medical report and FSL report did not support the prosecution. There was delay in lodging the complaint, both parties were on inimical terms and, above all, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the manner in which the occurrence is stated to have occurred was not believable. 29. There is no evidence of definite character to prove that on the day of the occurrence the prosecutrix was under sixteen years of age. But then, it seems this issue was not seriously challenged by the defence and there is evidence of Dr. Rashmi Romila Sanga that the victim girl's age was 14-15 years. 29. There is no evidence of definite character to prove that on the day of the occurrence the prosecutrix was under sixteen years of age. But then, it seems this issue was not seriously challenged by the defence and there is evidence of Dr. Rashmi Romila Sanga that the victim girl's age was 14-15 years. Under clause sixthly to section 375 of the Indian Penal Code consent of the victim girl under the age of sixteen years is immaterial and, therefore, a plea of consensual sex is not available to the appellants. In R.v. Carr, 4 Cox D.C 223 a girl of 14 years consulted a physician for suppressed menstruation. The physician had intercourse with her suggesting that it was a part of treatment. He was convicted for the offence of rape. Parikh's Textbook of Medical Jurisprudence, Forensic Medicine and Toxkology, Parikh's Textbook of Medical Jurisprudence, Forensic Medicine and Toxicology, Sixth Edition, refers to a case in 1923. Williams, a singing teacher, was charged with rape for persuading a young pupil that a sexual intercourse with him would improve the quality of her voice. 30. We further find that there was no delay in lodging the First Information Report, as the learned counsels for the appellants would contend. The prosecutrix, has stated that she could reach home by the evening and therefore did not go to the police station. Early next morning she had gone to the police station and lodged the report. A victim of sexual assault may be reluctant to approach the police as it involves the question of her morality and chastity, State of Rajasthan v. Narayan (1992) 3 SCC 615 . In ((Narayan (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that a woman or her relative would have to struggle with various situations before they decide to approach the police. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that reluctance of the prosecutrix or her family members to go to the police and complain about the incident which concerns reputation of the prosecutrix and honour of her family cannot be over-looked. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further observed that it is only after giving it a cool thought that a complaint of sexual offence is lodged. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further observed that it is only after giving it a cool thought that a complaint of sexual offence is lodged. On similar lines, Deepak v. State of Haryana, (2015) 4 SCC 762 , deals with a plea raised on delay in lodging a complaint with the police. 31. In “Deepak” (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under: "15. The courts cannot overtook the fact that in sexual offences and, in particular, the offence of rape and that too on a young illiterate girl, the delay in lodging the FIR can occur due to various reasons. One of the reasons is the reluctance of the prosecutrix or her family members to go to the police station and to make a complaint about the incident, which concerns the reputation of the prosecutrix and the honour of the entire family. In such cases, after giving very cool thought and considering all pros and cons arising out of an unfortunate incident, a complaint of sexual offence is generally lodged either by the victim or by any member of her family. Indeed, this has been the consistent view of this Court as has been held in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh." 32. Mr. Ajit Kumar, the learned counsel has contended that there is no material on record to suggest that Firoj Ansari shared common intention with others to sexually ravish the prosecutrix and mere presence is not sufficient to attract the offence under section 376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code. 33. Explanation-I to section 376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code provides that the prosecution has to adduce evidence to indicate that more than one accused have acted in concert. If rape was committed by one all shall be guilty irrespective of their individual overt act(s) and it is not necessary for the prosecution to adduce evidence of a completed act of rape by each one of the accused. In the present case, the prosecutrix is consistent about involvement of all the appellants, each one of them has committed rape upon her. 34. In Bhupinder Sharma v. State of H.P., (2003) 8 SCC 551 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: "14. In cases of gang rape the proof of completed act of rape by each accused on the victim is not required. 34. In Bhupinder Sharma v. State of H.P., (2003) 8 SCC 551 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: "14. In cases of gang rape the proof of completed act of rape by each accused on the victim is not required. The statutory intention in introducing Explanation 1 in relation to Section 376(2)(g) appears to have been done with a view to effectively deal with the growing menace of gang rape. In such circumstances, it is not necessary that the prosecution should adduce clinching proof of a completed act of rape by each one of the accused on the victim or on each one of the victims where there are more than one in order to find the accused guilty of gang rape and convict them under Section 376 IPC." 35. Lastly it was contended that examination of the appellants under section 313 CrPC was so cryptic that their conviction for gang rape cannot sustain. 36. There are judgments that if an incriminating circumstance was not put to the accused when he was examined under section 313 CrPC then that circumstance should be excluded from consideration for recording conviction of the accused - that was the period of, Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of M.B., AIR 1953 SC 468 and Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 . Then came another view that failure to bring every inculpatory circumstance to the notice of the accused for his explanation may not invalidate the trial which gained foothold, Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1973 SC 2622 and became an integral part of the rule of practice before the appellate and revisional Court. The accused is-required to show how he has been prejudiced by not attracting his attention to a piece of evidence and that failure to afford an opportunity to him to explain the incriminating evidence has resulted in failure of justice. Essentially, examination of an accused under section 313 CrPC is not a matter of choice for the Court and the principles of natural justice and fair trial require that every incriminating circumstance appearing against the accused in the prosecution evidence should be put to him to afford an opportunity to him to offer an explanation, but every failure to do so would not ipso facto result in acquittal of the accused. In Munish Mubar v. State of Haryana, (2012) 10 SCC 464 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that it is obligatory on the part of accused when he is examined under section 313 CrPC to furnish some explanation with respect to the incriminating circumstances associated with him. The appellants have failed to put forth a plausible explanation to the incriminating materials put to them under section 313 CrPC and no suggestion was put to the prosecution witnesses regarding the plea of their false implication in the case. The important incriminating circumstances relied upon by the prosecution were put to the appellants and as regards some of the materials which were not brought to their notice the accused have not shown any prejudice caused to them. The trial was conducted in their presence, the charges were spelt out clearly and the witnesses were fully cross-examined by their counsels. In the circumstances, a plea of violation of the principles of fair trial is not available to them and we hold that no prejudice was caused to the appellants. 37. In the aforesaid circumstances, we hold that the prosecution has proved the charge under section 376 (2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code and the appellants were rightly convicted by the trial Court for gang rape. 38. In the result, Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 1013 of 2016, Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 546 of 2016, Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 737 of 2016 and Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 738 of 2016 are dismissed. 39. The learned APPs state that Firoj Ansari @ Munna who is the appellant in Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 1013 of 2016 is in jail, whereas the other appellants, namely, Chandan Kumar, Javed Hussain @ Manua and Chhotoo Kumar are on bail. 40. Accordingly, the bail-bonds furnished by Chandan Kumar, Javed Hussain @ Manua and Chhotoo Kumar are cancelled. The appellants shall serve the remaining sentence as awarded to them by the trial Court. 41. A copy of the judgment shall be sent to the Court concerned for information and necessary action. 42. Let the lower Court records be sent to the Court concerned forthwith. : Ratnaker Bhengra, J. – I Agree Appeal dismissed.