ORDER 1. The present appeals arise from the order dated 07.05.2009 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dismissing the defendants Second Appeal arising out of an Eviction Suit. 2. The Trial Court decreed the Eviction Suit on finding that the appellants-defendants had created nuisance in terms of Section 12(1)(c) of the Madhya Pradesh (Accommodation and Control) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”). The first appeal preferred by the appellant also stood dismissed. 3. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that no nuisance had been created. The appellants were in possession under a valid lease. No unauthorised constructions had been raised on the Platform in front of the Shop. The construction of the tin shed was with Municipal approval, to the knowledge of the respondent. Denying that any encroachment had been made, it was submitted that if the wooden platform placed over the municipal drain adjacent to the Platform was considered an obstruction, the appellants are willing to remove it. It was a purely temporary arrangement and was removed immediately after shop hours. It was specifically denied that any inconvenience had been caused to the respondent-plaintiff by reason of the customers coming to the shop of the appellants. It was lastly submitted that the First Appellate Court did not concur with the findings of the Trial Court regarding the tin Shed only and not on the issue of encroachment. 4. Learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that the lease agreement dated 1.10.1979 was for a period of five months only. The Platform was not to be used as shop premises but was to be utilized by way of passage only. The appellants could not raise any construction on the Platform without the consent of the respondent. In thisregard, he relied upon the findings of the First Appellate Court that the tin shed had been constructed on the Platform without the consent of the respondent and the municipal authorities. It was lastly submitted that the lease deed provided that in case of violation of any condition, the landlord would have the right to get the shop premises vacated. 5. It was lastly submitted that the lease deed provided that in case of violation of any condition, the landlord would have the right to get the shop premises vacated. 5. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the parties and deem it appropriate to set out Section 12(1)(c) of the Act which reads as follows: “...that the tenant or any person residing with him has created a nuisance or has done any act which is inconsistent with the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy of the accommodation, or which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord therein. Provided that the use by a tenant of a portion of the accommodation as his office shall not be deemed to be an act inconsistent with the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy.” The issue No. 3 framed by the Trial Court was as follows: “Whether the defendant has caused obstruction and hindrance by putting up goods of the shop on the public road and passage to the courtyard of the plaintiff.” The Trial Court after consideration of the evidence concluded that the tin shed had been put up on the Platform which was to be used as passage. The defendants-appellants were obliged under the lease not to create any obstruction in the passage to the courtyard. The placing of goods by the appellants in the courtyard, shrinking the road by putting up wooden platform over the drain and using the same to keep weights and measures, balances used for sale to customers, narrowing of the passage of the courtyard, the presence of customers standing on the road for purchases, all caused nuisance to the respondent and other tenants. The appellate court held that the construction on the Platform had not been proved to have been made with approval, affirming the finding with regard to obstruction and nuisance. We are of the considered opinion that there is no occasion for us to interfere with the concurrent findings of facts by three Courts with regard to issue that the appellants had caused nuisance by carrying on his business beyond the permissible area and in violation of the conditions of the lease. The duration of the lease makes it apparent that it was a licence and not a lease. The duration of the lease makes it apparent that it was a licence and not a lease. The definition of nuisance in Section 12 (1)(c) of the Act is wide enough to take the conduct of the appellants within its ambit which was inconsistent with the purpose for which defendant was admitted to the tenancy and which adversely and substantially affected the interest of the landlord. We therefore, find no reason to interfere with the impugned order. The appeals are dismissed. The appellants are granted time upto 31st March, 2022 to vacate the premises subject to filing of usual undertaking within a period of four weeks from today and payment of the current rent by the seventh of every month. In the event of default under either head, the appellants shall be liable to eviction from the premises by use of police force immediately. It is made clear that no further extension of time shall be granted to the appellants after 31st March, 2022 and any violation of the undertaking shall attract the contempt jurisdiction of this Court.