ORDER: The grievance of the petitioner/party-in-person is that the Officer-in-Charge of the Kushaiguda Police Station, refused to record information under Section 154(1) Cr.P.C. pursuant to the complaint dated 27.02.2021 lodged by her. 2. In her complaint dated 27.02.2021, the petitioner stated that one Mr. Bhaskar (Detective Inspector) and Mr. Chandra Sekhar (Inspector of Police) of Kushaiguda Police Station have committed the offence of framing an incorrect record and document dated 18.05.2019 (remand report and charge sheet under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. in Cr.No.326 of 2019) and that it caused grievous injury and grave prejudice to the accused in the said crime. It is stated that the offender/accused may be anyone but it is the bounden duty of the public servants to register the FIR on receipt of a complaint under Section 154(1) Cr.P.C. According to the petitioner, false accusation is made against Mr. Veereshwar/accused that he killed his mother (C.S. Radha Purnima). In fact, some debtor (may be lender) or stranger had killed C.S. Radha Punima, as she refused to repay money to persons who have lent her; that she wanted to repay the debts but to her misfortune, her terminal benefits were not disbursed and settled by her school management authorities of Defence Lab School, Kanchanbagh, Hyderabad, on the ground that WA.No.400 of 2009 filed by her is still pending before this Court. The school authorities served an official letter stating that her terminal benefits are withheld and will be settled only after the disposal of the writ appeal. 3. It was further stated that the Investigating Officer, Mr. Bhaskar, had deliberately contended and concluded in the remand report that C.S. Radha Purnima has drawn terminal benefits and the said money was lying in the way of cash as she preserved it in the safe of the Almirah in their living bedroom; Veereshwar demanded money and killed her brutally as she refused to give some of the amount. According to the petitioner, such contents in the remand report are blatant lies. The investigating Officer framed an incorrect record and called it as Remand Case Dairy. According to the petitioner, such contents in the remand report are blatant lies. The investigating Officer framed an incorrect record and called it as Remand Case Dairy. It is further stated that another false statement is made in the remand report that his mother, after the demise of his father, married one Subramanyam and for this reason too, Veereshwar had a dislike towards the said Subramanyam and he used to often pick up quarrel and in that course on 17.05.2019, killed his mother. The Investigating Officer without proper investigation and proper application of legal provisions, falsely concluded that Veereshwar murdered his mother, which is unfortunate and ridiculous. 4. In the complaint, the petitioner has referred to several events like the accused Veereshwar submitting an application in Crl.MP.Sr.No.3317 of 2019 in Cr.No.326 of 2019 under Section 156(3) before the Court and he preferred another application under Section 91 Cr.P.C., which were not acted upon. Eventually, the real culprits were allowed to escape as proper investigation was not conducted by Mr. Bhaskar and Mr. Chandra Sekhar. Veereshwar suffered judicial custody for a period of 94 days. The petitioner also referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court in SAKIRI VASU v. STATE OF U.P., (2008) 2 SCC 409 ; INSPECTOR OF POLICE v. BATTENAPATLA VENKATA RATNAM, (2015) 13 SCC 87 and decision of this Court in CRLA.No.11 of 2007 dated 08.04.2009. 5. The aforesaid decisions are not relevant for the purpose of adjudication of this writ petition, as this Court is not satisfied with the maintainability of this writ petition and decision of the case on merits may not be necessary. As stated above, the petitioner appeared as party-in-person. On reading the contents of the affidavit, this Court was not in a position to understand what was the grievance of the petitioner. The Court had to converse with the petitioner in Telugu and enquire as to how she has locus standi in the instant case. Then the petitioner stated that she has got no personal interest in the matter but as a well-wisher of Veereshwar (accused in Cr.No.326 of 2019, Kushaiguda Police Station), she had filed the writ petition. The Court had to converse with the petitioner in Telugu and enquire as to how she has locus standi in the instant case. Then the petitioner stated that she has got no personal interest in the matter but as a well-wisher of Veereshwar (accused in Cr.No.326 of 2019, Kushaiguda Police Station), she had filed the writ petition. This Court informed the petitioner that she is a stranger and third party and if there is any grievance with regard to creation of the alleged false record and false implication of the accused, it has to be challenged by the aggrieved party i.e. Veereshwar but not the petitioner. However, the petitioner contended that under Section 154 Cr.P.C. any person can inform about the commission of a cognizable offence and she has locus standi to file this writ petition. 6. Admittedly the petitioner is a third party and no way related to the accused, Veereshwar in Cr.No.326 of 2019. There is a difference between information given to the police about the commission of a cognizable offence under Section 154 Cr.P.C. and information regarding improper investigation or creation of false record by the police. A third party/stranger may have witnessed an incident or crime or may have heard about commission of an offence and such information may be given to the police and the officer-in-charge shall record the same and register the FIR under Section 154(1) Cr.P.C., if such information discloses commission of a cognizable offence. The role of such informant ends immediately after the FIR is registered. Such person has got a further limited role viz. may be only to give evidence in the Court at later point of time. Comparing such a situation to that of the petitioner herein, who claims to be aggrieved by an incorrect record or creation of false record by police officers, who have conducted investigation in Cr.No.326 of 2019, is too farfetched and unwarranted. By any stretch of imagination the petitioner person cannot be treated as an aggrieved person, even assuming that she is a well-wisher of Veereshwar. 7. The Supreme Court in SIMRANJIT SINGH MANN v. UNION OF INDIA, (1992) 4 SCC 653 made the following observations: “7. By any stretch of imagination the petitioner person cannot be treated as an aggrieved person, even assuming that she is a well-wisher of Veereshwar. 7. The Supreme Court in SIMRANJIT SINGH MANN v. UNION OF INDIA, (1992) 4 SCC 653 made the following observations: “7. Ordinarily, the aggrieved party which is affected by any order has the right to seek redress by questioning the legality, validity or correctness of the order, unless such party is a minor, an insane person or is suffering from any other disability which the law recognises as sufficient to permit another person, e.g. next friend, to move the Court on his behalf. If a guardian or a next friend initiates proceedings for and on behalf of such a disabled aggrieved party, it is in effect proceedings initiated by the party aggrieved and not by a total stranger who has no direct personal stake in the outcome thereof. In the present case no fundamental right of the petitioner before us is violated; if at all the case sought to be made out is that the fundamental rights of the two convicts have been violated. The two convicts could, if so minded, have raised the contention in the earlier proceedings but a third party, a total stranger to the trial commenced against the two convicts, cannot be permitted to question the correctness of the conviction recorded against them. If that were permitted any and every person could challenge convictions recorded day in and day out by courts even if the persons convicted do not desire to do so and are inclined to acquiesce in the decision. If the aggrieved party invokes the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, that may stand on a different footing as in the case of A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1998) 2 SCC 602]. However, we should not be understood to say that in all such cases the aggrieved party has a remedy under Article 32 of the Constitution. Unless an aggrieved party is under some disability recognised by law, it would be unsafe and hazardous to allow any third party to question the decision against him …” 8. More apposite is the view expressed by a Division Bench of this Court in Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary and Ors. Unless an aggrieved party is under some disability recognised by law, it would be unsafe and hazardous to allow any third party to question the decision against him …” 8. More apposite is the view expressed by a Division Bench of this Court in Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary and Ors. [ (1992) 4 SCC 305 ] … The High Court came to the conclusion that the said third party litigant had no 'locus standi' to maintain the action and so also the interveners had no right to seek impleadment/intervention in the said proceeding. However, the learned Judge took suo moto cognizance of the matter and for reasons stated in his order directed issue of show cause notice to the C.B.I and the State why the F.I.R. should not be quashed. On appeal this Court came to the conclusion that the learned Judge in the High Court was right in holding that the advocate litigant as well as the interveners had no 'locus standi'. The relevant observations found in paragraph 45 of the judgment read as under: “Even if there are million questions of law to be deeply gone into and examined in a criminal case of this nature registered against specified accused persons, it is for them and them alone to raise all such questions and challenge the proceedings initiated against them at the appropriate time before the proper forum and not for third parties under the garb of public interest litigants.” (emphasis supplied) 8. The instant writ is not a public interest litigation but the ratio laid down in the above decision that ‘a third party cannot be an aggrieved person in a criminal case’ is squarely applicable to the facts of this case. 9. In view of the above discussion and decision of the Supreme Court in SIMRANJIT SINGH MANN’s case (2 supra), this Court is of the view that there is no violation of fundamental rights of the petitioner and she has no locus standi and cannot be treated as an aggrieved party so as to invoke jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs.