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2021 DIGILAW 348 (SC)

State of Madhya Pradesh v. Sharad Goswami

2021-04-07

ANIRUDDHA BOSE, N.V.RAMANA, SURYA KANT

body2021
ORDER : The Court is convened through Video Conferencing. 1. The present Criminal Appeal, by way of Special Leave arises out of the impugned judgment dated 22.03.2010 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, at Gwalior, whereby the High Court partly allowed the appeal of the respondent thereby acquitting him of the charge under Section 302, IPC while sustaining his conviction under Section 498A, IPC and sentence of 2 years rigorous imprisonment thereunder. 2. A conspectus of the facts necessary for the disposal of the present appeal are as follows: the respondent, after marrying the deceased, was allegedly cruel towards her and used to hit her and demand dowry. On 29.03.2003, the respondent allegedly hit the deceased, poured kerosene on her and set her on fire. On hearing her screams, the neighbours and relatives arrived and helped the respondent douse the flames. She was taken to the hospital and subsequently passed away on 09.04.2003. 3. The Trial Court acquitted the respondent of the charge under Section 304B, IPC but convicted him for the offences under Sections 302 and 498A, IPC. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and 2 years rigorous imprisonment respectively. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Trial Court, the respondent filed an appeal before the High Court. As already stated above, the High Court vide the impugned judgment partly allowed his appeal-acquitting him under Section 302, IPC but sustaining his conviction and sentence under Section 498A, IPC. 4. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment, the appellant-State has filed the present appeal by way of special leave. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant-State and the respondent at length. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the High Court erred in acquitting the respondent from the charge under Section 302, IPC by discarding the statements dated 30.03.2003 and 03.04.2003 made by the deceased. The Trial Court had analyzed the evidence in the correct perspective and had rightly convicted the respondent under Section 302, IPC by relying upon the dying declaration dated 30.03.2003, which had been recorded by the Tehsildar. 7. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent supported the impugned judgment and submitted that the High Court rightly discarded the statements made by the deceased as they were contradictory. 7. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent supported the impugned judgment and submitted that the High Court rightly discarded the statements made by the deceased as they were contradictory. He further submitted that the appellant had not raised sufficient grounds in the present appeal to merit interference in the judgment acquitting the respondent of the charge under Section 302, IPC. 8. From the arguments advanced, it is clear that the learned counsel for the appellant is seeking to assail the acquittal of the respondent under Section 302, IPC by essentially challenging the findings of the High Court on essentially factual issues. 9. It is a settled proposition of law that this Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution, does not generally reappraise evidence or decide issues of fact which have already been determined by the High Court. This Court in State of U.P. v. Babul Nath, (1994) 6 SCC 29 held as follows: “5. At the very outset we may mention that in an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution this Court does not normally reappraise the evidence by itself and go into the question of credibility of the witnesses and the assessment of the evidence by the High Court is accepted by the Supreme Court as final unless, of course, the appreciation of evidence and finding is vitiated by any error of law of procedure or found contrary to the principles of natural justice, errors of record and misreading of the evidence, or where the conclusions of the High Court are manifestly perverse and unsupportable from the evidence on record...” (emphasis supplied) 10. Apart from the above, the fact that the appellant-State is in appeal against a finding of acquittal passed by the High Court should also not be lost sight of. An appellate Court is usually reluctant to interfere with a judgment acquitting an accused on the principle that “the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused is reinforced” by such a judgment [See Sadhu Saran Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2016) 4 SCC 357 ]. As early as in 1973, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 outlined the guiding principle to be kept in mind by an appellate Court while deciding an appeal from an acquittal in the following manner: “5.... As early as in 1973, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 outlined the guiding principle to be kept in mind by an appellate Court while deciding an appeal from an acquittal in the following manner: “5.... an acquitted accused should not be put in peril of conviction on appeal save were substantial and compelling grounds exist for such a course. In India it is not jurisdictional limitation on the appellate court but a Judge-made guideline of circumspection...In law there are no fetters on the plenary power of the appellate court to review the whole evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded and, indeed, it has a duty to scrutinise the probative material de novo, informed, however, by the weighty thought that the rebuttable innocence attributed to the accused having been converted into an acquittal the homage our jurisprudence owes to individual liberty constrains the higher court not to upset the holding without very convincing reasons and comprehensive consideration...” (emphasis supplied) The above principle has been consistently followed by this Court while deciding appeals against acquittal by way of Article 136 of the Constitution as well [See State of Rajasthan v. Shera Ram alias Vishnu Dutta, (2012) 1 SCC 602 ; Dilawar Singh v. State of Haryana, (2015) 1 SCC 737 ]. 11. Keeping in mind the above principles, we are of the opinion that the learned counsel for the appellant, despite his best efforts, was unable to convince us to interfere with and overturn findings of the High Court in order to reverse the acquittal of the respondent under Section 302, IPC. 12. It is admitted that the deceased, after the incident and while she was in the hospital, made multiple statements. The High Court noted that in her statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C., which was recorded on 29.03.2003 immediately after the incident, she completely exonerated the respondent. In the said statement, she stated that the respondent was not at the scene, and that the fire had been an accident. However, on 30.03.2003 and 03.04.2003, after the arrival of the respondent’s father, the subsequent statements that were made by the deceased gave a completely different color to the incident, wherein the respondent was implicated. 13. In the said statement, she stated that the respondent was not at the scene, and that the fire had been an accident. However, on 30.03.2003 and 03.04.2003, after the arrival of the respondent’s father, the subsequent statements that were made by the deceased gave a completely different color to the incident, wherein the respondent was implicated. 13. Apart from the contradictions in the statements made by the deceased, the High Court also considered the fact that the first statement made by the deceased, which supported the defense case and was contrary to the case set up by the prosecution, was suspiciously not brought on record by the prosecution. 14. The High Court also highlighted the fact that the neighbors turned hostile and did not support the prosecution case. Rather, they actually supported the defense case that the respondent was at his shop at the time of the incident. The same was also testified to by the defense witnesses. 15. Taking into account the above, the High Court held that the prosecution was not able to prove the charge under Section 302, IPC against the respondent beyond reasonable doubt. The High Court has rendered a well-reasoned judgment on the basis of the evidence before it, and has rightly acquitted the respondent by granting him the benefit of doubt. 16. In view of the above, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment of the High Court. 17. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, are accordingly disposed of.