Order Vinod Chatterji Koul, J.-This revision petition has been filed against the order of acquittal dated 06.03.2012 passed by the Trial Court i.e. Judicial Magistrate 1st Class (Munsiff), Samba, in criminal challan titled State v. Diwan Chand and others. The order of acquittal has been challenged in this revision petition precisely on the ground that the impugned judgment is against law and facts, highly prejudicial to the interests of equity and justice and the Trial Court has mis-appreciated the evidence, misconstrued the law and has overlooked the legally admissible evidence. It is submitted that by ordering acquittal of the respondent Nos. 1 to 9, the Trial Court has committed grave error of law, which is perverse and, therefore, indulgence of this Court is required to prevent gross mis-carriage of justice. It is further pleaded by the petitioner that the offences were proved against the accused by oral as well as documentary evidence. 2. After filing of the revision, notices were sent to the respondents. The petitioner is not appearing in this case since 8th June, 2020 nor has anybody appeared when the case was taken up today. Mr. M.K.Bhardwaj, learned Senior Counsel with Mr. Anirudh Sharma, Advocate caused appearance on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 to 9, whereas Mr. Aseem Sawhney, No.10. Since nobody has appeared for the petitioner, therefore, this revision is considered after hearing learned counsel for the respondents only. 3. Learned counsel for the respondents argued that there is no illegality in the order passed by the Trial Court and that the Trial Court has passed the order impugned after appreciating the entire evidence before it. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that the revision against an order of acquittal has a limited scope and High Court can interfere only when the order under challenge is perverse or has caused any illegality. 4. While considering the arguments put forth by the learned counsel for the respondents and the grounds taken in the revision, it would be profitable to give brief facts of the case:- As per the prosecution story, on 20.09.1997, the petitioner had started the construction work of lane at village Sangwal under the orders of Block Development Officer, Gagwal. At about 8.30 a.m., respondent Nos. 1 to 9, who were armed with sword, khokhri and lathies arrived on spot and with common object of taking the life of the petitioner. At about 8.30 a.m., respondent Nos. 1 to 9, who were armed with sword, khokhri and lathies arrived on spot and with common object of taking the life of the petitioner. In furtherance of common object respondent-Diwan Chand asked him to stop the work of construction but on refusal by the petitioner to stop the work, accused persons attacked him and other labourers. The petitioner along with labourers fled to the house of one Girdhari Lal to save their lives but accused chased them and entered into the house of Girdhari Lal. Accused inflicted injuries to petitioner and others. Respondent No.1 was stated carrying Khokhri, who inflicted injury on the petitioner. Accused Kewal Kumar was stated carrying sword in his hand. When locals arrived there, accused-respondent Nos. 1 to 9 fled away from the spot. On this statement police reached on spot, took the injured to hospital. A case FIR No.158/1997 was registered at Police Station, Hiranagar under Section 4/25 Arms Act and under Sections 307, 352, 147, 325, 324 r/w Section 149 RPC. Site plan was prepared, statement of eyewitnesses was recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Alleged weapon of offences were seized. After completing the investigation, Final Police Report was presented. The charges were framed against the accused on 02.06.1998. The accused denied the charges and claimed to be tried. In support of its case, the prosecution examined as many as nine witnesses out of the sixteen listed witnesses in the challan, whereas no witness has been examined by the accused in defence. 5. After appreciating the evidence adduced before it, the Trial Court has observed as under:- “There are huge contradictions in the testimonies of all prosecution witnesses regarding the place of occurrence. As per complainant-Jagidsh Raj, he went to the house of Girdhari Lal where all accused broken his legs and Dewan Chand and Kewal Kumar injured his arm and ring finger of left hand. Whereas other Pws have cited more than seven place of occurrences. As per PW-Chaman Lal some of the persons went to the house of Pappu, some in the house of Girdhair Lal and some in the house of Som Nath. Then he deposed that he was beaten in his house and he was unconscious there. Whereas other Pws have cited more than seven place of occurrences. As per PW-Chaman Lal some of the persons went to the house of Pappu, some in the house of Girdhair Lal and some in the house of Som Nath. Then he deposed that he was beaten in his house and he was unconscious there. As per Gurdayal he along with other went to the house of Dinesh and then Krishan’s house and then he was beaten at some Holy place of Baba. There is another place of occurrence by PW-Subash Chander as Forest as he deposed that after Chaman Lal received head injuries from Raj Kumar, he went to Forest and have no knowledge about Jagdish Raj. Others said all the persons entered their respective houses. Thus all the prosecution witness are citing different place where they were beaten by the accused. But as per the site plan of the I.O. place of occurrence is Lane where injured were beaten. It has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sayed Ibrahim V/s State of Andhara Predesh 2006(3) Apex Court Judgment 59 (S.C.) that there is significant factor which completely destroys the prosecution version and the credibility of PW 1 as a witness. He has indicated four different place of occurrence. When the place of occurrence itself has not been established it would be not proper to accept the prosecution version. Another huge contradiction is regarding the injuries of the injured and medical certificate issue by the doctor. As per pw-5- Karnail Singh he received 20-25 injuries whereas Pw-Gurdayal about 100 injuries was caused on his leg. But the medical certificate does not support these injuries. Prosecution has not filed any document on file which could show that the injured Jagdish Raj remain admitted in the hospital for 27 days and other injured was admitted in the hospital for about one week as alleged by the injured in their testimonies. Moreover delayof two days in sending the FIR to the concerned Magistrate has not been explained by the prosecution. There is another contradiction inma the testimonies of Pw-Jagdish Ra and PW-Chaman Lal. Moreover delayof two days in sending the FIR to the concerned Magistrate has not been explained by the prosecution. There is another contradiction inma the testimonies of Pw-Jagdish Ra and PW-Chaman Lal. As per Jagdish Raj, first attack was on Chaman Lal in the lane and then he went to the house of Girdhari Lal whereas as per Chaman Lal first attack was on Jagdish Raj in the lane and then Accused Raj Kumar hit him with Gainthi in the lane. Pw-Chaman Lal again contradicted his statement and said except him no else was beaten in the lane. As per Pw-Chaman Lal when he was beaten inside his house he was alone and then police came and took him to hospital. Whereas he himself contradicted his statement by saying that his uncle Kartar Chand took him inside and then he was beaten there. As per Pw-Subash Chander, police came on spot at about 2.00 PM and then police call him from the Jungle whereas during cross examination he contradicted his own statement and said he came out of the Forest on call of villagers. Then said police remained on spot up to evening. As per PW-Kanail Chand, complainant-Jagdish Raj was admitted in the hospital for about one month and regain his senses after about one month. Whereas as per prosecution story, complainant statement was recorded in the hospital on 20-9-1997 and on this statement FIR no.158 was registered in the P/S but as per Jagdish Raj, his statement was recorded in the hospital on 9-10-1997 and no other statement was recorded in the hospital by the police. Which also casts serious doubt on the prosecution story. Further, as all witnesses, accused Raj Kumar hit Chaman Lal with Gainthi on his head, the doctor in his testimony said that injury on his head cannot be caused by Gainthi which further creates a serious doubt on the prosecution story and testimonies of all the prosecution witness because Gainthi is heavy instrument used for digging the earth and even a small blow of Gainthi is sufficient to cause death of any person specially when it falls on the head. But as Pw-doctor Ram Dhan there was a wound on the left scalp of head of Chaman Lal which could not be caused by the Gainthi. But as Pw-doctor Ram Dhan there was a wound on the left scalp of head of Chaman Lal which could not be caused by the Gainthi. Moreover seizure memo of weapon of offence cannot be admitted as police has not revered(sick) the weapon on disclosure statement as held in “SLJ 1997 106” by Hon’ble J&K High Court that “any property seized, which is produced by accused himself could neither be proved nor it could be exhibited.” As per prosecution story accused were lased with revolver besides other weapons. But none of the prosecution witness including the complainant had talk about the revolver. Hence there are number of contradiction in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses which creates a serious doubt on the prosecution story. It has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of H.P. v. Sukhwinder Singh, 2005 (1) Apex Court Judgment III (S.C.) that “where there are contradictions and omissions of serious nature casting doubt on prosecution case, conviction of accused cannot be sustained.” 6. In Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram, (1973) 2 SCC 583 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that: “8. The unrestricted right of appeal from acquittal is specifically conferred only on the State and a private complainant is given this right only when the criminal prosecution was instituted on his complaint and then also subject to special leave by the High Court. It is further provided in Section 439(5) Cr.P.C., that where no appeal is brought in a case in which an appeal is provided, no proceedings by way of revision would be entertained at the instance of the party who could have appealed. The State Government, therefore, having failed to appeal, cannot apply for revision of an order of acquittal. Again, on revision, the High Court is expressly prohibited from converting an acquittal into a conviction. Considering the problem facing the Court in this case in the background of this scheme, the High Court when approached by a private party for exercising its power of revision from an order of acquittal, should appropriately refrain from interfering except when there is a glaring legal defect of a serious nature which has resulted in grave failure of justice. Considering the problem facing the Court in this case in the background of this scheme, the High Court when approached by a private party for exercising its power of revision from an order of acquittal, should appropriately refrain from interfering except when there is a glaring legal defect of a serious nature which has resulted in grave failure of justice. It is not expected to act under Sections 435/439 Cr.P.C. as if it is a hearing on appeal in spite of the wide language under Section 435 which empowers it to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of a finding, sentence or order and as to the regularity of any proceeding and also in spite of the fact that under Section 439 it can exercise inter alia the power conferred on a Court of appeal under Section 423 Cr.P.C. The power being discretionary, it has to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily. ...” 7. In Johar v. Mangal Prasad, (2008) 3 SCC 423 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that: 23. In Mahendra Pratap Singh v. Sarju Singh [ AIR 1968 SC 707 : (1968) 2 SCR 287 ] this Court stated the law thus: (AIR pp. 708-09, para 8) “8. The practice on the subject has been stated by this Court on more than one occasion. In D. Stephens v. Nosibolla [ AIR 1951 SC 196 : 1951 SCR 284 ] only two grounds are mentioned by this Court as entitling the High Court to set aside an acquittal in a revision and to order a retrial. They are that there must exist a manifest illegality in the judgment of the Court of Session ordering the acquittal or there must be a gross miscarriage of justice. In explaining these two propositions, this Court further states that the High Court is not entitled to interfere even if a wrong view of law is taken by the Court of Session or if even there is mis-appreciation of evidence. Again, in Logendranath Jha v. Polai Lal Biswas [ AIR 1951 SC 316 : 1951 SCR 676 ] this Court points out that the High Court is entitled in revision to set aside an acquittal if there is an error on a point of law or no appraisal of the evidence at all. Again, in Logendranath Jha v. Polai Lal Biswas [ AIR 1951 SC 316 : 1951 SCR 676 ] this Court points out that the High Court is entitled in revision to set aside an acquittal if there is an error on a point of law or no appraisal of the evidence at all. This Court observes that it is not sufficient to say that the judgment under revision is ‘perverse’ or ‘lacking in true correct perspective’. It is pointed out further that by ordering a retrial, the dice is loaded against the accused, because however much the High Court may caution the subordinate court, it is always difficult to re-weigh the evidence ignoring the opinion of the High Court. Again in K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of A.P. [ AIR 1962 SC 1788 : (1963) 3 SCR 412 ] it is pointed out that an interference in revision with an order of acquittal can only take place if there is a glaring defect of procedure such as that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the case or the Court had shut out some material evidence which was admissible or attempted to take into account evidence which was not admissible or had overlooked some evidence. Although the list given by this Court is not exhaustive of all the circumstances in which the High Court may interfere with an acquittal in revision it is obvious that the defect in the judgment under revision must be analogous to those actually indicated by this Court.” 8. In K. Ramachandran v. V.N. Rajan, (2009) 14 SCC 569 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed with respect to cases which would justify the High Court in interfering with the finding of acquittal in revision that: “40. In K. Ramachandran v. V.N. Rajan, (2009) 14 SCC 569 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed with respect to cases which would justify the High Court in interfering with the finding of acquittal in revision that: “40. This question has been considered in the celebrated judgment of Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram [ (1973) 2 SCC 583 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 903], where, after considering the judgments of D. Stephens v. Nosibolla [ AIR 1951 SC 196 : 1951 SCR 284 ], Logendranath Jha v. Polai Lal Biswas [ AIR 1951 SC 316 : 1951 SCR 676 ], K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of A.P. [ AIR 1962 SC 1788 : (1963) 3 SCR 412 ] and Mahendra Pratap Singh v. Sarju Singh [ AIR 1968 SC 707 : (1968) 2 SCR 287 ] this Court came out with categories of cases which would justify the High Court in interfering with the finding of acquittal in revision: (Akalu Ahir case [ (1973) 2 SCC 583 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 903], SCC pp. 587-88, para 8) “(i) where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case, but has still acquitted the [appellant-]accused; (ii) where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce; (iii) where the appellate court has wrongly held the evidence which was admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible; (iv) where the material evidence has been overlooked only (either) by the trial court or by the appellate court; and (v) where the acquittal is based on the compounding of the offence which is invalid under the law.” Of course, these categories were declared by this Court to be illustrative and this Court observed that other cases of similar nature could also be properly held to be exceptional in nature where the High Court could justifiably interfere with the order of acquittal.” 9. In Sheetala Prasad v. Sri Kant, (2010) 2 SCC 190 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that: “12. The High Court was exercising the revisional jurisdiction at the instance of a private complainant and, therefore, it is necessary to notice the principles on which such revisional jurisdiction can be exercised. Sub-section (3) of Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure prohibits conversion of a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. The High Court was exercising the revisional jurisdiction at the instance of a private complainant and, therefore, it is necessary to notice the principles on which such revisional jurisdiction can be exercised. Sub-section (3) of Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure prohibits conversion of a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. Without making the categories exhaustive, revisional jurisdiction can be exercised by the High Court at the instance of a private complainant (1) where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce, (2) where the admissible evidence is wrongly brushed aside as inadmissible, (3) where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case and has still acquitted the accused, (4) where the material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial court or the appellate court or the order is passed by considering irrelevant evidence, and (5) where the acquittal is based on the compounding of the offence which is invalid under the law. 13. By now, it is well settled that the revisional jurisdiction, when invoked by a private complainant against an order of acquittal, cannot be exercised lightly and that it can be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interest of public justice requires interference for correction of manifest illegality or the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice. In these cases, or cases of similar nature, retrial or rehearing of the appeal may be ordered.” 10. From the decisions discussed herein above, it can be inferred that it is open to this court in the revisional jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the acquittal of the lower court, if it is found that the order is vitiated on account of illegality, impropriety or incorrectness and thereby, causing serious miscarriage of justice. Of course, this Court cannot convert any finding of acquittal into one of conviction nor can it re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own view. From the legal position discussed herein above, it becomes abundantly clear that the revisional jurisdiction, invoked by a private party against an order of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court, can be exercised only in certain exceptions such as, where the Trial Court has no jurisdiction to try and case, where the Trial Court has wrongly shut out the evidence which the prosecution wished to produce, where material evidence has been overlooked etc. etc. 11. etc. 11. As it is apparent from the record that the learned Trial Court in its exhaustive order appreciated the material evidence on record and came to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges against the accused. Looking from any angle, this case does not fall in any of the exceptions, carved out by the Supreme Court in Sheetala Prasad’s case (supra), justifying exercise of revisional jurisdiction by this Court. 12. For the foregoing reasons, I find no merit in this revision petition warranting interference by this Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. Accordingly, the revision petition is dismissed. Record of the Trial Court be sent back.