JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Shri. Nanjunda Reddy, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants. There is no representation for first and third respondents inspite of service of notice. The second respondent has been served by publishing a notice in the newspaper. A memo has been filed in respect of the substituted service. 2. Learned Senior Counsel has argued before this Court that the judgment delivered by the learned Single Judge setting aside the acquisition proceedings deserves to be set aside, in the light of the judgment delivered by the Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No.1415 of 2018 (LA- BDA) in the case of (Sri.L.Ramareddy Vs. The State of Karnataka). Paragraph Nos.28 and 44 of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced as under: 28. Next, it is necessary to discuss Smt. K.M.Chikkathayamma and others vs. The State of Karnataka and others [ILR 2016 KAR 1603], which is a judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of this Court. (a) One of the points for determination in the said case was: Whether the provisions of the LA Act, 1894 or the LA Act, 2013, should be applied to acquisition proceedings under the provisions of the KUDA Act and the BDA Act, if the proceedings are not completed as on the date of coming into force of the LA Act, 2013. Learned Single judge has culled out the ingredients of the said sub-sec. which is extracted later. b) The primary contention canvassed in the aforesaid case was, as to, whether 2013 Act would be applicable to acquisitions initiated under the provisions of the Karnataka Urban Development Authorities Act, 1987 (KUDA Act) and BDA Act. If the answer to the same was in the affirmative, then the acquisition proceeding in the aforesaid case which concerned BDA Act also was deemed to have lapsed. c) In that case, the contention of learned Senior Counsel and learned Counsel for the petitioners was, where a statute is cited by a reference (the cited statute) (LA Act, 1894) into an another statute (the referring statute) (BDA Act/KUDA Act) any repeal or amendment of the cited statute is automatically carried over or reflected in the referring statute. This was in contrast, to a case of legislation by incorporation wherein the repeal or amendment of the incorporated statute does not automatically affect the incorporating statute. This was in contrast, to a case of legislation by incorporation wherein the repeal or amendment of the incorporated statute does not automatically affect the incorporating statute. It was further contended in the said case that in Offshore Holdings Private Limited, the Honble Supreme Court held, Sec. 36 of the BDA Act (a provision in pari materia with Sec. 36 of KUDA Act) to be a case of legislation by incorporation. But, the repeal of LA Act, 1894 and substitution of 2013 Act created an exception and when the exception applied, the effect would be one of legislation by reference. It was contended that, if LA Act, 1894, was to be applied to acquisitions made under the KUDA Act post 1/1/2014, the quantum of compensation to the land owners in relation to acquisitions under the KUDA Act would be lesser than the compensation vis--vis acquisition made under 2013 Act, even though the purpose of the acquisition is same (urban or town planning and allotment of house sites). Similarly, the additional benefits in relation to rehabilitation and resettlement of affected families would also not be available to the land owners even though the purpose of the acquisition remains the same. It was emphasized in that case that the provisions of 2013 Act are more beneficial to the land owners and affected families in land acquisition proceedings. The discriminatory effect as regards compensation and other benefits would occur because there is a complete change in the legislative approach in relation to land acquisition, rehabilitation and resettlement under 2013 Act which is more beneficial to the land owners. It was further contended in the said case that the land owners would thus be entitled to different rates of compensation and other resettlement and rehabilitation benefits, depending upon which Act the acquisition is made, whether under the BDA Act or KUDA Act or the central land acquisition enactments resulting in a discriminatory effect being in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. d) Per contra, the State through learned Advocate General submitted in the said case that the intention of Sec. 24 in 2013 Act is different and distinct in that the said sec. has specific reference to acquisition proceedings initiated under LA Act, 1894. That the object and purpose of Sec. 24 is not only to save acquisition initiated under LA Act, 1894, but also to declare lapse of acquisition under sub-sec. has specific reference to acquisition proceedings initiated under LA Act, 1894. That the object and purpose of Sec. 24 is not only to save acquisition initiated under LA Act, 1894, but also to declare lapse of acquisition under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 24 and to also give the benefit of the 2013 Act under certain circumstances. It was further contended that Sec. 27 of KUDA Act as well as BDA Act provide for lapse of scheme of development and consequent in-operation of Sec. 36 of the Act. That BDA Act being a complete code by itself, lapse of acquisition has to be considered under that Act only. It was further contended that Sec. 24 is more in the nature of a transitory provision and an exception and operates as a link between LA Act, 1894 and 2013 Act. e) While considering point No.2 extracted above, learned Single Judge in the said case held with regard to interpretation of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 24 of the 2013 Act as under:- Sec. 24(2) of the LA Act, 2013 provides for lapse of acquisition proceedings commenced under the LA Act, 1894, on the satisfaction of certain conditions, which are as follows: a. The award of compensation should have been passed five years or more prior to the commencement of the LA Act, 2013. In that, it should have been passed prior to 1/1/2009; b. Physical possession of the land has not been taken; c. Compensation has not been paid. The Apex Court has interpreted the requirement of possession being taken under Sec. 24(2) of the LA Act, 2013, to mean that actual physical possession has to be taken and mere symbolic possession would not suffice. (emphasis by us) Although learned Single Judge has noticed that sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 24 of the 2013 Act applies to acquisition proceedings commenced under the LA Act, 1894, nevertheless has also held that the answer to the second point for consideration is that it is the LA Act, 2013 that shall be applied to acquisition proceedings under the BDA Act and KUDA Act, that have remained without being completed in all respects as on 1/1/2014, and proceedings that have been initiated thereafter. f) Thus, learned Single Judge after referring to Sec. 24 of 2013 Act, held that it was applicable even to acquisitions made under the provisions of the BDA Act as well as KUDA Act. f) Thus, learned Single Judge after referring to Sec. 24 of 2013 Act, held that it was applicable even to acquisitions made under the provisions of the BDA Act as well as KUDA Act. Learned Single Judge however noted that sub- sec. (2) of Sec. 24 is a substantive provision of law which saves acquisition as well as affords the prospect of land sought to be acquired reverting to the land owner under certain conditions. 44. In the circumstances, it is concluded and held that Sec. 24 does not take within its scope nor does it apply to acquisitions which have been initiated under the provisions of any other enactment particularly, State enactment, such as, BDA Act. The said Sec. is restricted to only those acquisitions which have been initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894 only. Subject to compliance of the conditions mentioned under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 24, the land owner would be entitled to the deeming provision regarding lapse of acquisition and not otherwise. 3. This Court has carefully gone through the aforesaid judgment and we are of the opinion that the controversy stands concluded on account of the judgment delivered in the case of case of Sri.L.Ramareddy (supra). Resultantly, the Writ Appeals are allowed and the judgment delivered by the learned Single Judge is set aside.