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2021 DIGILAW 351 (TS)

Anees Mohiuddin @ Ameer @ Abu Ayub Ansari v. State of Andhra Pradesh

2021-11-17

SHAMEEM AKTHER

body2021
ORDER : 1. Since the issue involved and the petitioner in both these Criminal Revision Cases are one and the same, both these Criminal Revision Cases are taken up together and are being disposed of by this common order. 2. Criminal Revision Case Nos. 1296 and 1297 of 2009 are filed by the same petitioner-Anees Mohiuddin, under Sections 397 and 401 of Cr.P.C. challenging the order of the even date, dated 27.06.2009, passed in Crl. M.P. No. 1218 of 2006 in C.C. No. 1 of 2004 and Crl. M.P. No. 1228 of 2006 in S.C. No. 225 of 2005 respectively, by the Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge for the trial of Jubilee Hills Car Bomb Blast Case, Hyderabad, whereby, the Court below declined to grant consent to the Public Prosecutor for withdrawal from prosecution against the petitioner/accused in both these Criminal Revision Cases, observing that they are fit cases to proceed with trial, after framing of charges, if any. 3. Heard the submissions of Sri C. Sharan Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the sole respondent/State in both these Criminal Revision Cases and perused the record. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner in both these Criminal Revision Cases would contend that the Government, vide G.O.Rt. Nos. 911 and 912, Home (Legal II) Department, dated 18.05.2006, ordered for withdrawal from prosecution against the petitioner in both the subject C.C. and S.C. The subject applications filed by the Public Prosecutor under Section 321 of Cr.P.C. in both these Criminal Revision Cases seeking permission to withdraw from prosecution before the Court below were in order and fulfils the requirements under Section 321 of Cr.P.C. Further, while dealing with the subject applications, the Court below is not supposed to go into the merits of the case. The Court below is only supposed to see as to whether the applications were made in good faith, in the interest of public policy and justice and not to thwart or stifle the process of law. The petitioner/accused in both these Criminal Revision Cases is being proceeded for the offence under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (for short ‘POTA’) basing on the confession made by the co-accused, which is inadmissible in evidence. The Court below erroneously placed reliance on Sections 30 and 133 of Indian Evidence Act. The petitioner/accused in both these Criminal Revision Cases is being proceeded for the offence under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (for short ‘POTA’) basing on the confession made by the co-accused, which is inadmissible in evidence. The Court below erroneously placed reliance on Sections 30 and 133 of Indian Evidence Act. There is no legally acceptable evidence to proceed against the petitioner/accused in both these Criminal Revision Cases. The subject applications were filed by the prosecution before the Court below in good faith, opining that there was no conclusive evidence to prove the guilt of the petitioner/accused in both these Criminal Revision Cases. The Court below ought to have granted permission to the Public Prosecutor for withdrawal from prosecution. The orders under challenge suffer from illegality and impropriety and ultimately prayed to allow both the Criminal Revision Cases as prayed for. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel placed reliance on a decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Sheo Nandan Paswan vs. State of Bihar and Others, 1987 Cri. L.J. 793 (SC). 5. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor fairly conceded the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner/accused in both these Criminal Revision Cases. 6. In view of the above submissions, the points that arise for determination in both these Criminal Revision Cases are as follows: 1. Whether the orders of the even date, dated 27.06.2009, passed in Crl. M.P. No. 1218 of 2006 in C.C. No. 1 of 2004 and Crl. M.P. No. 1228 of 2006 in S.C. No. 225 of 2005 respectively, by the Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge for the trial of Jubilee Hills Car Bomb Blast Case, Hyderabad, is liable to be set aside? 2. Since the charges are not framed in the subject S.C. and C.C. against the petitioner/accused in both these Criminal Revision Cases, whether he is liable for discharge? POINT: 7. Here, it is apt to extract Section 321 of Cr.P.C. which reads as follows: 321. 2. Since the charges are not framed in the subject S.C. and C.C. against the petitioner/accused in both these Criminal Revision Cases, whether he is liable for discharge? POINT: 7. Here, it is apt to extract Section 321 of Cr.P.C. which reads as follows: 321. Withdrawal from prosecution - The Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of a case may, with the consent of the Court, at any time before the judgment is pronounced, withdraw from the prosecution of any person either generally or in respect of any one or more of the offences for which he is tried; and, upon such withdrawal: (a) if it is made before a charge has been framed, the accused shall be discharged in respect of such offence or offences. (b) if it is made after a charge has been framed, or when under this Code no charge is required, he shall be acquitted in respect of such offence or offences: Provided that where such offence: (i) was against any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the Union extends. (ii) was investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946). (iii) involved the misappropriation or destruction of, or damage to, any property belonging to the Central Government. (iv) was committed by a person in the service of the Central Government while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, and the Prosecutor in charge of the case has not been appointed by the Central Government, he shall not, unless he has been permitted by the Central Government to do so, move the Court for its consent to withdraw from the prosecution and the Court shall, before according consent, direct the Prosecutor to produce before it the permission granted by the Central Government to withdraw from the prosecution. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner/accused in both these Criminal Revision Cases placed heavy reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Sheo Nandan Paswan’s case supra, wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court, in Para No. 67 of the said judgment, held as follows: “Section 321 gives the Public Prosecutor the power for withdrawal of any case at any stage before judgment is pronounced. This presupposes the fact that the entire evidence may have been adduced in the case, before the application is made. This presupposes the fact that the entire evidence may have been adduced in the case, before the application is made. When an application under Section 321 Cr.P.C. is made, it is not necessary for the court to assess the evidence to discover whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. To contend that the court when it exercises its limited power of giving consent under Section 321 has to assess the evidence and find out whether the case would end in acquittal or conviction, would be to rewrite Section 321 Cr.P.C. and would be to concede to the court a power which the scheme of Section 321 does not contemplate. The acquittal or discharge order under Section 321 are not the same as the normal final orders in criminal cases. The conclusion will not be backed by a detailed discussion of the evidence in the case of acquittal or absence of prima facie case or groundlessness in the case of discharge. All that the court has to see is whether the application is made in good faith, in the interest of public policy and justice and not to thwart or stifle the process of law. The court after considering these facets of the case, will have to see whether the application suffers from such improprieties or illegalities as to cause manifest injustice if consent is given. In this case, on a reading of the application for withdrawal, the order of consent and the other attendant circumstances, I have no hesitation to hold that the application for withdrawal and the order giving consent were proper and strictly within the confines of Section 321 Cr.P.C.” 9. A careful reading of Section 321 of Cr.P.C. and various precedents on the said provision makes it clear that the only guiding factor which should weigh with the Public Prosecutor while moving an application for withdrawal from prosecution and the Court according permission for such withdrawal is as to whether the interest of public justice is advanced and the application for withdrawal is not moved with oblique motive. Further, the Court, while dealing with an application filed under Section 321 of Cr.P.C. has only to see whether the Public Prosecutor has acted properly and has not been actuated by oblique/extraneous considerations. Further, the Court, while dealing with an application filed under Section 321 of Cr.P.C. has only to see whether the Public Prosecutor has acted properly and has not been actuated by oblique/extraneous considerations. It is not the function of the Court to make a fresh appraisal of the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the question whether there is a triable issue to be investigated by the Court. Although, Section 321 of Cr.P.C. provides no grounds on which an application for withdrawal from prosecution can be filed by the Public Prosecutor, the essential inherent condition is that withdrawal should be in the interest of administration of justice. It is the responsibility of the respective court, in which the withdrawal application has been filed, to scrutinize the reasons behind the withdrawal and check that such withdrawal is not sought for extraneous reasons or against the interest of justice. Furthermore, it is the duty of the court to see that the Public Prosecutor actually applies his/her free mind and not just act as mere mechanical agent of the State government. However, in the cases of this nature, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, added a note of caution that the Court has a responsibility and a stake in the administration of criminal justice and so has the Public Prosecutor, its Minister of Justice. Both have a duty to protect the administration of criminal justice against possible abuse or misuse by the Executive by resorting to the provisions of Section 321 of Cr.P.C. It is thus abundantly clear that the ultimate guiding consideration must necessarily be the interest of administration of justice and that is the touchstone on which, the question must be determined. So, the Court has to consider whether the broader cause of public justice would be advanced or retarded by withdrawal/continuation of prosecution. 10. Keeping in view the afore-stated guidelines and the limited function of the Court in the matters of this nature, in the instant case, the question for determination would be as to whether the decision of the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from prosecution on the grounds stated by him in his application for withdrawal can be said to be actuated by improper/oblique motive or whether he bonafidely thought that it would be in the interest of Public justice to withdraw from the prosecution. 11. 11. The averments in the application filed by the Public Prosecutor seeking permission to withdraw from prosecution in S.C. No. 225 of 2005 (subject matter of Crl. R.C. No. 1297 of 2009) reads thus: “The Government in G.O.Rt. No. 912 Home (Legal II) Department, dated 18.5.2006, I has ordered to file a petition U/s. 321 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Act 2 of 1974) for withdrawal of prosecution against the accused and the same was communicated by the District Collector in Lr. No. C2/3629/2006 Revenue Department, dated 31.5.2006. As could be seen from the Charge-Sheet, it is evident that the accused Anees Mohinuddin was a party to the criminal conspiracy and contacted co-accused while at Dubai in providing funds. However, there is no direct evidence to prove that he paid any money to the accused for commission of offence except the confession of the co-accused recorded under the provisions of the POTA there is no other evidence to prove that he was a party to the criminal conspiracy. The Supreme Court of India in its judgment held that confession of the accused under POTA is only admissible against himself but not against the co-accused. In view of the said judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court the confession of the co-accused cannot be used or admissible against the accused and the accused has not made any confessions in this above case and there is no other evidence except the confession of the co-accused which cannot be made use of by the prosecution in view of the above judgment. And it will be desirable in public interest to withdraw such cases where there is no evidence instead of prosecuting the accused in Courts. In view of the facts stated above, it is prayed to accord consent to the prosecution to withdraw the case on the ground of paucity of evidence and public interest.” 12. The averments in the application filed by the Public Prosecutor seeking permission to withdraw from prosecution in C.C. No. 1 of 2004 (subject matter of Crl. R.C. No. 1296 of 2009) reads thus: “The Government in G.O.Rt. No. 911 Home (Legal II) Department, dated 18.5.2006, I has ordered to file a petition U/s. 321 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Act 2 of 1974) for withdrawal of prosecution against the accused and the same was communicated by the District Collector in Lr. R.C. No. 1296 of 2009) reads thus: “The Government in G.O.Rt. No. 911 Home (Legal II) Department, dated 18.5.2006, I has ordered to file a petition U/s. 321 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Act 2 of 1974) for withdrawal of prosecution against the accused and the same was communicated by the District Collector in Lr. No. C2/3629/2006 Revenue Department, dated 31.5.2006. The above case is a split up case, since he was absconding who was later apprehended. In the above case as many as 14 accused were tried for offences U/s. 120-B ad 153-A of IPC and convicted to suffer imprisonment for a term of six months. The prosecution examined as many as PW-1 to PW-95 during trial of specific offences and marked exhibits P-1 to P-122. Simultaneously in this case and at this point of time after lapse of 6 years many witnesses are not traced and are also not available for examination. The accused was in judicial custody for a period of more than 4 months and the period of detention has to be set off. The allegation against the accused in this case is that he was a party to criminal conspiracy by sending e-mails to the other accused and there is no conclusive evidence to prove the guilt of this accused beyond reasonable doubt and as such the case suffers from paucity of evidence. It is also not desirable in public interest to continue the prosecution and I am of the considered view that it is a fit case for withdrawal. In view of the facts and circumstances explained, it is requested to accord consent for withdrawal and permit the prosecution to withdraw in the interest of justice by allowing the petition.” 13. The Court below, on hearing both the sides, passed the impugned orders of the even date, dated 27.06.2009, holding as follows: “The confession of a co-accused is relevant and admissible U/s. 30 of the Evidence Act. Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act lays down that an accomplice shall be a competent witness. Hence the provisions of the Evidence Act are also against the contention of the accused in this regard. The next contention that the E-mail messages do not contain any incriminating material. The E-mail messages are not in the normal language. They refer to a secret incident known to the accused and others only. Hence the provisions of the Evidence Act are also against the contention of the accused in this regard. The next contention that the E-mail messages do not contain any incriminating material. The E-mail messages are not in the normal language. They refer to a secret incident known to the accused and others only. Therefore, the E-mail messages also have something to say against the present accused. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is no material against the accused. The prosecution has filed the charge sheet against the accused stating that he is liable for trial in a criminal case. The records are the same. The documentary evidence against the accused has not improved from the earlier case. Therefore, there is no point in the prosecution contending that under the changed circumstances there is no evidence to substantiate the charge. This is not a case for granting consent for withdrawal of the prosecution. This is a fit case for proceeding with the trial after framing the charge. Hence the petition U/Sec. 321 Cr.P.C. is dismissed. The trial of the case shall be proceeded with for framing charges, if any, call on 09.07.2009.” 14. As seen from the impugned order, the Court below, instead of limiting itself to the aspect as to whether the subject applications were made in good faith, in the interest of public policy and justice and whether the said applications suffer from improprieties or illegalities so as to cause manifest injustice if consent is given, discussed the merits of the case as regards the admissibility of evidence under Sections 30 and 133 of Evidence Act, E-mail messages etc. Further, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner/accused in both these Criminal Revision Cases, the confession of co-accused could not be brought within the sweep of Section 32(1) of POTA and as such, it could not be used against the petitioner/accused in both these Criminal Revision Cases. The learned counsel for the petitioner/accused in both these Criminal Revision Cases would submit that in Crl. R.C. No. 1296 of 2009, the trial against the co-accused was completed and they were convicted for the offence under Section 120B of IPC and acquitted for the offence under Section 153A of IPC by the Court below and the appeals filed by the co-accused before this Court were dismissed. Further, in Crl. R.C. No. 1296 of 2009, the trial against the co-accused was completed and they were convicted for the offence under Section 120B of IPC and acquitted for the offence under Section 153A of IPC by the Court below and the appeals filed by the co-accused before this Court were dismissed. Further, in Crl. R.C. No. 1297 of 2009, the trial against the co-accused is still pending in S.C. No. 74 of 2004 on the file of the Court below. Further, in the subject applications filed under Section 321 Cr.P.C. the Public Prosecutor had categorically stated that there is no conclusive evidence to prove the guilt of the petitioner/accused in both these Criminal Revision Cases and that the case suffers from paucity of evidence and that the confession of the co-accused is inadmissible in evidence. Further, the Government, after careful consideration of the matter, ordered the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from prosecution against the petitioner/accused in both these Criminal Revision Cases, vide G.O.Rt. Nos. 911 and 912, dated 18.05.2006. When the Public Prosecutor, having considered every aspect, was of the opinion that continuation of proceedings against the petitioner/accused would be a futile exercise and accordingly sought permission for withdrawal from prosecution, in view of the facts and circumstances, it cannot be said that the subject applications were made with oblique motive or for extraneous considerations and not made in good faith and in the interest of public policy. Under these circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that according permission to the Public Prosecutor for withdrawal from prosecution by the Court below would have been justified. All the circumstances cumulatively show that the Court below ought to have granted consent to the Public Prosecutor for withdrawal from prosecution. In the circumstances of the case, the Court below ought to have allowed the subject applications. The contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner/accused in both these Criminal Revision Cases do merit consideration. 15. Accordingly, both these Criminal Revision Cases are allowed by setting aside the impugned orders of the even date, dated 27.06.2009, passed in Crl. M.P. No. 1218 of 2006 in C.C. No. 1 of 2004 and Crl. M.P. No. 1228 of 2006 in S.C. No. 225 of 2005 respectively, by the Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge for the trial of Jubilee Hills Car Bomb Blast Case, Hyderabad. M.P. No. 1218 of 2006 in C.C. No. 1 of 2004 and Crl. M.P. No. 1228 of 2006 in S.C. No. 225 of 2005 respectively, by the Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge for the trial of Jubilee Hills Car Bomb Blast Case, Hyderabad. Consequently, the subject applications filed by the Public Prosecutor under Section 321 of Cr.P.C. before the Court below seeking permission to withdraw from prosecution against the petitioner/accused in both these Criminal Revision Cases stands allowed and the petitioner/accused in both these Criminal Revision Cases stand discharged in both the subject C.C. No. 1 of 2004 and S.C. No. 225 of 2005 on the file of Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge for the trial of Jubilee Hills Car Bomb Blast Case, Hyderabad. 16. Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in both these Criminal Revision Cases, stands closed.