JUDGMENT : S. KANNAMMAL, J. 1. This Second Appeal is preferred against the judgment and decree, dated 22.06.2016, passed in A.S. No. 21/2007 on the file of IV Additional District Judge, Tiruvallur at Ponneri, reversing the judgment and decree, dated 11.10.2007, in O.S. No. 170/2004 passed by the District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate, Tiruvotriyur. First defendant is the appellant herein. 2. The case of the plaintiffs before the trial Court in a nutshell is as follows: 2.1. The plaintiffs, who have been struck off by the lower appellate Court, are the original plaintiffs. The original plaintiffs filed the suit in O.S. No. 170/2004 on the file of the District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate, Tiruvotriyur, for declaration and permanent injunction. It is the case of the plaintiffs that the suit property in S. No. 1088/2A1 in T.S. No. 11, to an extent of 0.45.5 hectares and S. No. 1088/2A3 in T.S. No. 10 to an extent of 0.15.5 originally belong to the first plaintiff. Patta, chitta and adangal stand in the name of the plaintiff. Subsequently, the suit schedule property has been settled in favour of the second plaintiff through a settlement deed dated 30.12.2003. Since then, the plaintiffs were in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property by putting up a superstructure and also a compound wall. While so, a notice dated 21.05.2004 came to be issued by the defendant stating that they would demolish the compound wall on the northern side as it stands in the property of the defendant. A reply has been given by the plaintiffs on 31.05.2004. In the said reply, it has been stated that while the Madhavaram Municipality made an attempt to demolish the compound wall, a suit has been filed in O.S. No. 14 of 2004 and an interim order has also been obtained. Hence, it is the case of the plaintiff before the trial Court that the notice dated 21.05.2004 is vindictive, capricious and arbitrary. 2.2. The case of the defendants before the trial Court is that the Government has allotted 28.68 acres of land in S. Nos. 1086-20, 1087-2 and 1088/1-6 to an extent of 20 acres, 2 acres and 6.68 acres respectively, which has been taken possession by the 1st defendant on 05.08.1967 and there is no sub division. 2.2. The case of the defendants before the trial Court is that the Government has allotted 28.68 acres of land in S. Nos. 1086-20, 1087-2 and 1088/1-6 to an extent of 20 acres, 2 acres and 6.68 acres respectively, which has been taken possession by the 1st defendant on 05.08.1967 and there is no sub division. It is their case that in the said land, the plaintiffs are attempting to construct a compound wall, which has been objected and a case has also been registered in Crime No. 58 of 2004. Thereafter the plaintiffs agreed to stop the construction in the said portion. It is their further case that the plaintiffs have nothing to do with the said portion of the land and they have encroached the said portion by constructing a compound wall, which is illegal and permission has not been obtained from the Municipality for constructing the said compound wall. O.S. No. 14 of 2004 is still pending. Though the plaintiffs have stated that for S. No. 1088/2A3 measuring 0.15.5 Acres, there is a settlement deed in favour of the 2nd plaintiff, no such settlement deed has been produced and hence, the possession of the disputed area in the said land is illegal and the plaintiffs have to be evicted from the encroached portion. 3. During the course of trial, the trial Court framed the following issues: (1) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the relief of declaration? (2) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the relief of permanent injunction? 4. Before the trial Court, the first plaintiff examined himself as PW-1 and marked Exs.A1 to A8. The defendant examined himself as DW-1 and marked Exs.B1 to B3. 5. The Trial Court, on consideration of the pleadings and on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, found that the plaintiffs are not entitled to get any relief and dismissed the Suit, vide judgment and decree dated 11.10.2007. The plaintiffs, aggrieved by the dismissal of the Suit, filed A.S. No. 21 of 2007 on the file of the IV Additional District Court, Tiruvallur, at Ponneri. 6. The Lower Appellate Court, on going through the grounds of appeal, formulated the following points for determination: (i) Whether trial Court finding is erroneous or perverse and it is liable to be set aside? (ii) Whether the appeal is liable to be allowed? 7. 6. The Lower Appellate Court, on going through the grounds of appeal, formulated the following points for determination: (i) Whether trial Court finding is erroneous or perverse and it is liable to be set aside? (ii) Whether the appeal is liable to be allowed? 7. Since the suit property has been subsequently sold to one Malaichamy and Ushanandini, the petition praying for impleading the said purchasers was allowed and they have been impleaded as appellants by the lower appellate Court. Before the lower appellate Court, on the side of the appellants, who are the respondents herein, it is stated that if it is found that certain portion has been encroached by them, they are ready and willing to make payment for the said encroachment and, accordingly, they sought for execution of sale deed in favour of the defendants for the said encroached portion. A petition has been filed by the appellants therein for appointing an Advocate Commissioner for measuring the property. Subsequently, an Advocate Commissioner was appointed and the Advocate Commissioner has filed his report along with the sketch. As per the said report, it is found that the appellants therein have encroached 7955 sq. ft. of land in S. No. 1088/1 and the same has been accepted by both sides. During the course of arguments before the lower appellate Court, since the appellants therein had agreed to pay Rs. 800/- per sq. ft. which was objected to by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent Company therein, the lower appellate Court suo motu fixed Rs. 850/- per sq. ft. and arrived at a sum of Rs. 67,61,750/- towards compensation and for sale of the encroached portion by the respondent Company. Accordingly, the lower appellate Court disposed of the appeal by granting two weeks' time for the respondent Company to sell the encroached portion in favour of the appellants/plaintiffs and execute a sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs, after receiving consideration. It is also ordered by the lower appellate Court that if any proceedings are pending before any Court of law with regard to the suit properties, the parties have to withdraw the same and the encumbrance in respect of the suit property has to be removed and the registration in respect of the said encroached portion has to be executed in favour of the appellants therein. 8. 8. Aggrieved by the finding rendered by the lower appellate Court, the respondent/defendant Company is before this Court with the present Second Appeal. 9. While admitting the Second Appeal, this Court framed the following Substantial Questions of law: “1. Whether the lower appellate Court was right in granting a decree directing sale of the property by the appellant to the respondents in a suit filed by the respondents seeking a declaration that the notice issued by the appellant requiring the respondents to remove the encroachment is bad in law? 2. Whether the lower appellate Court was right in fixing the value of the property without any evidence being made available and directing sale of the property? 10. Learned counsel for the appellant/defendant has raised the following grounds: (1) When the suit is for declaration and permanent injunction, the lower appellate Court failed to appreciate the fact that the suit is for limited purpose of declaring that the notice issued by the defendant dated 21.04.2004 is illegal. (2) The finding of the lower appellate Court directing the defendant Company to sell the encroached portion of the property, which is a Government property, to the plaintiffs/impleaded third party is untenable and baseless and the same is liable to be dismissed. (3) The lower appellate Court has failed to consider the specific finding of the trial Court with regard to the merits of the matter and resorted to sell the property belonging to the defendant company based on the memo filed by the appellants and the act of selling the property in a suit is absolutely unfounded in law. (4) The lower appellate Court has failed to consider the specific finding of the trial Court in rejecting the claim made by the plaintiffs, which is for declaration of notice dated 21.04.2004 issued by the defendant in respect of the encroached portion of the property belonging to the defendant. (5) The lower appellate Court has failed to consider that the original plaintiffs had not filed a suit for declaration with regard to the suit schedule property, but for the notice issued by the defendant. (5) The lower appellate Court has failed to consider that the original plaintiffs had not filed a suit for declaration with regard to the suit schedule property, but for the notice issued by the defendant. (6) As per Ex.A8, sale deed, dated 09.03.1971, when the suit property is sought to be purchased by the plaintiffs and the northern boundary of the property is depicted as the property belonging to the defendant, the lower appellate Court has failed to advert to the finding rendered by the trial Court with regard to Ex.A8. (7) The disputed portion of the property is situated in S. No. 1088/1 as according to the defendant. However, the property of the plaintiffs is comprised in S. No. 1088/2A3. (8) The lower appellate Court failed to appreciate the specific case of the appellant that the property in question, where the compound wall is situated, is comprised in S. No. 1088/1 to an extent of 6.68 cents and it belonged to TALCO industries and the same was allotted in terms of the Award No. 6/67 dated 05.08.1967, which is in peaceful possession and occupation of the defendant. While that being so, the sale of the disputed property to the plaintiffs is totally unsustainable in law. (9) The lower appellate Court failed to consider the case that the plaintiffs in the appeal proceedings are claiming right over the property in S. No. 1088/1, which does not belong to them. (10) The lower appellate Court failed to consider the fact that the patta in respect of the property of the plaintiffs stand only with respect to S. No. 1088/2A1 and S. No. 1088/2A3 as per Ex.A1. (11) The lower appellate Court failed to consider the certificate issued by the Madhavaram Town Land Surveyor that the appeal proceedings are restricted only to S. Nos. 1088/2A1 and 1088/2A3, for which patta, chitta and adangal stand in the name of the plaintiffs. (12) The lower appellate Court has committed an error apparent on the face of record in not having considered the finding of the trial Court that the plaintiffs have not established the case that the compound wall on the northern side is situated within the property belonging to them. (12) The lower appellate Court has committed an error apparent on the face of record in not having considered the finding of the trial Court that the plaintiffs have not established the case that the compound wall on the northern side is situated within the property belonging to them. (13) The lower appellate Court failed to consider the finding of the trial Court that the plaintiffs have not established their case in respect of the property comprised in S. No. 1088/1 by valid documentary evidence. (14) The lower appellate Court has failed to consider the finding of the trial Court that when the disputed compound, wall which was constructed in the property of the defendants, the plaintiffs are not entitled for any declaration and the contra finding of the lower appellate Court directing to sell the property to the plaintiffs is without any basis. (15) The lower appellate Court has committed an error in impleading the third party/subsequent purchasers, when the appeal itself was dismissed for non prosecution, which was filed by the original plaintiffs. (16) The lower appellate Court has committed an error in allowing the appeal in favour of the third party, who were impleaded in the appeal proceedings in respect of the property belonging to the Government, and also setting aside the dismissal order dated 13.07.2009 in an interlocutory application. (17) The lower appellate Court has traversed beyond its jurisdiction by striking out the original plaintiffs and impleading the subsequent purchasers during the pendency of the appeal proceedings, which is nothing but misuse of the process of the Court. (18) Having found that the disputed suit property is a Government land and the plaintiffs have encroached the same, the lower appellate Court ought to have dismissed the appeal and to the contrary, it resorted to issue a direction to the defendant/appellant herein to sell the encroached portion to the plaintiffs and fixed the rate at Rs. 800 per sq. ft. being the guideline value, which is a clear case of non application of mind and abuse of power. (19) The lower appellate Court has failed to advert to the specific memo filed by TALCO that it has lost the land, which is encroached by the plaintiffs. 800 per sq. ft. being the guideline value, which is a clear case of non application of mind and abuse of power. (19) The lower appellate Court has failed to advert to the specific memo filed by TALCO that it has lost the land, which is encroached by the plaintiffs. (20) Appointing an Advocate Commissioner at the instance of the impleaded third party in the appeal proceedings and for the sale of the land by the defendant Company in favour of the third party is without any justification. (21) Though the pendency of the writ proceedings having been brought to notice, the lower appellate Court, without considering the same, rendered a contra finding that there is no objection on the part of the defendants, which is untenable and unsustainable. (22) The finding of the lower appellate Court, based upon the memo issued by the respective parties, is a clear misdirection and without authority, which is not sustainable in the eye of law. (23) The lower appellate Court has resorted to direct the parties to withdraw all the proceedings pending in respect of the suit property in any other Court in terms of the order passed in the appeal, which includes writ proceedings pending on the file of this Court and the same is a clear case of excess of jurisdiction and such an order is without any judicial propriety. (24) The finding of the lower appellate Court in giving a direction to sell the encroached portion of the suit property for the sale value demanded by the encroacher in the civil proceedings is totally unknown to civil jurisprudence. (25) The first appellate Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in passing the judgment by setting aside the dismissal order by the trial Court and resorted to sell the land in question belonging to the defendant to an extent of 7955 sq. ft. at the rate of Rs. 850/- and thereby arriving at an amount of Rs. 67,61,750/- within two weeks and also directing the defendant to effect discharge of encumbrance in respect of the property, which are is absolutely without any basis. 11. By raising these grounds, the appellant has prayed for interference of this Court to set aside the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court. 12. 67,61,750/- within two weeks and also directing the defendant to effect discharge of encumbrance in respect of the property, which are is absolutely without any basis. 11. By raising these grounds, the appellant has prayed for interference of this Court to set aside the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court. 12. Conversely, learned counsel for the respondents would contend that this Second Appeal is to be dismissed on the very fact that only on the appellants consensus the first appellate Court granted decree directing the sale of the property by the appellant. It is further contended that the suit property is not the property of the Government and the same has been given to the appellant TALCO company and the TALCO has every right to deal with the property according to their wish. 13. It is the further contention on the side of the respondents that the respondents are the bona-fide purchasers and the first appellate Court having considered the fact that the respondents spent a huge amount for the construction rightly granted the decree for the sale of the property to the respondents and there is no perversity, which warrants interference by this Court. 14. On the point of appellants' consensus, the learned counsel for the respondents would point out the observations made by the first appellate Court in its judgment about the non objection by the appellants for the memo filed by the respondents for appointment of Advocate Commissioner. 15. Learned counsel for the respondents would also contend that when the appellants herein agreed for the sale of property to the respondents, the appellants are not entitled to prefer any appeal, for which, learned counsel for the appellant vehemently submitted that the appellants never agreed to sell the suit property to the respondents, who are the encroachers and land grabbers. 16. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the respondents; gone through the records and also given thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions. 17. The admitted fact is that the plaintiffs N. Krishnan and Parameswari in O.S. No. 170/2004 had sought for a declaration that notice dated 21.05.2004 issued by the defendant is arbitrary, unlawful and illegal and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their men and agents from in any way demolishing the compound wall in the suit property. 18. 17. The admitted fact is that the plaintiffs N. Krishnan and Parameswari in O.S. No. 170/2004 had sought for a declaration that notice dated 21.05.2004 issued by the defendant is arbitrary, unlawful and illegal and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their men and agents from in any way demolishing the compound wall in the suit property. 18. According to the appellant/defendant, the suit property is a poramboke land given to the defendant by the Government. The first defendant is the General Manager of TALCO and the second defendant is the Estate Officer of TALCO. The trial Court, after considering the oral and documentary evidence, dismissed the suit with a finding that the plaintiffs have not proved that the suit schedule property lies in the suit survey number and that the notice issued by the defendants is valid. The aggrieved plaintiffs preferred an appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial Court. The said appeal was dismissed for default on 13.07.2009. Thereafter, a petition was filed by the third party, namely, the respondents herein in I.A. No. 7 of 2016 to restore the appeal and strike off the names of the original appellants therein, namely, Krishnan and Parameswari, which was allowed by the lower appellate Court on 20.04.2016. Prior to that, I.A. No. 5 of 2016 was also filed by the said third party/subsequent purchasers, namely, Malaisamy and Ushanandini, to implead them as appellants in the appeal in place of the original appellants, which was also allowed by the lower appellate Court on 06.04.2016, as the suit property was purchased by them during the pendency of the appeal. During the pendency of the appeal, the appellants therein filed a memo for appointment of an Advocate Commissioner to find out the encroached area, so that they may be permitted to purchase the same. Accordingly, an Advocate Commissioner was appointed and the suit property was surveyed. As per the Commissioner's report, the original plaintiffs in O.S. No. 170/2004 have encroached 7955 sq. ft. of land. 19. The appellants before the lower appellate Court, who are the subsequent purchasers, during the pendency of the appeal proceedings, came forward to pay Rs. 800/- per sq. ft. towards purchase of the encroached portion. The respondent/defendant therein objected for the same. However, the lower appellate Court suo motu fixed the rate at Rs. 850/- per sq. ft. calculated the same for 7955 sq. ft. 800/- per sq. ft. towards purchase of the encroached portion. The respondent/defendant therein objected for the same. However, the lower appellate Court suo motu fixed the rate at Rs. 850/- per sq. ft. calculated the same for 7955 sq. ft. of land and by arriving at Rs. 67,61,750/- ordered the appellants therein to pay the same to the respondents therein within two weeks. The first appellate Court also directed the respondents therein to receive the sale consideration and register a sale deed in favour of the appellants therein. Further, the lower appellate Court also directed the parties to withdraw all the cases pertaining to the suit property before other Courts. 20. On a careful perusal of the entire judgment of the first appellate Court, what comes to be known is that there is no specific word that the appellant herein has agreed to sell the property to the respondents herein. Though the learned counsel for the respondents would contend that the appellant herein has not objected for the memo filed by the respondents before the lower appellate Court that the respondents are willing to pay the amount for the encroached portion and the appellant shall execute a sale deed in favour of the respondents, it does not mean that the appellant herein has agreed to sell the property of 7955 sq. ft. encroached by the original plaintiffs. 21. In the cases of S. Sabapathy Pillay and Others vs. Vanmahalinga Pillai, ILR (1915) 38 Mad. 959 and Kanagarathnammal vs. H. Sama Rao, 1955 (68) LW 763 , relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents, there was a compromise entered into between the parties and the parties endorsed in the applications with regard to their agreement respectively. So, they are not relevant here. 22. As already stated, when there are no specific words that “the appellant herein agreed to sell the property” the ruling in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak and Another, 1982 (2) SCC 463 , relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents, is not applicable to the case on hand, where there is no agreement at all. 23. Each and every case has to be decided on its own merits. Even in the Memo, dated 20.06.2016, filed by the appellant, the appellant herein prayed for a suitable, justifiable and legal remedy in accordance with law. 23. Each and every case has to be decided on its own merits. Even in the Memo, dated 20.06.2016, filed by the appellant, the appellant herein prayed for a suitable, justifiable and legal remedy in accordance with law. The appellant has not agreed to sell the property to the respondents, who are pendente lite purchasers. 24. Adverting to the sale of property, the appellant's counsel would submit that there is a procedure to be adopted for selling the properties and the appellant has no independent right to sell away the property, as argued by the learned counsel for the respondents. 25. Admittedly, the respondents are the pendente lite purchasers and not bona-fide purchasers, as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant. There is a forceful argument by the learned counsel for the appellant herein that the suit filed by the original plaintiffs was for a declaration that notice issued by the appellant herein requiring the original plaintiffs to remove the encroachment is bad in law and for permanent injunction and the trial Court had rightly dismissed the suit by holding that the plaintiffs are not entitled for permanent injunction and the notice of the appellant herein is valid. 26. First Appeal has been preferred by the original plaintiffs against the judgment and decree of the trial Court and during the pendency of the lis, the present respondents purchased the property from the original plaintiffs/appellants and the petitions, one in I.A. No. 5 of 2016 has been filed to array them as appellants and the other in I.A. No. 7 of 2016 to strike off the names of the original plaintiffs, which were allowed. 27. This is a peculiar case, where the original plaintiffs Krishnan and Parameswari in O.S. No. 21 of 2007, having lost their case, preferred an appeal in A.S. No. 21 of 2007 before the IV Additional District Judge, Ponneri, and the same was dismissed for default on 13.07.2009. Subsequently, the respondents herein, who are the subsequent purchasers/third party, restored the appeal and got impleaded themselves as appellants in the said appeal, namely, A.S. No. 21 of 2007. Admittedly, no sale deed was produced by the respondents. Subsequently, the respondents herein, who are the subsequent purchasers/third party, restored the appeal and got impleaded themselves as appellants in the said appeal, namely, A.S. No. 21 of 2007. Admittedly, no sale deed was produced by the respondents. On perusal of the common counter affidavit filed on behalf of the appellant herein in I.A. No. 9/2016, which was filed to appoint an Advocate Commissioner at the instance of the respondents herein, the appellant herein objected for striking down of the names of original plaintiffs and permitting the subsequent pendente lite purchasers as appellants. The appellant herein has also objected to carry out the amendment. Further, in the said common counter affidavit, in Paragraph 8, it is stated as follows: “8. I submit that to give a quietus, it is just and necessary to appoint an Advocate Commissioner along with the help of a revenue authority with the assistants of the Government approved surveyor to localize the disputed area which is admittedly belonging to TALCO. In this regard, the Industries Commissioner and Director of Industries and Commerce already addressed to District Collector, Thiruvallur District, vide Industries Commissioner D.O.Lr. No. 2407/PDB2/2013, dated 25.2.2015 to survey up Government land Survey No. 1088/2A3 at Madhavaram Village and give the exact encroachment in TALCO. Further, I submit that if there is any encroachment by the said appellants/petitioner, it will be just and necessary that this Hon'ble High Court should decide the issue in my favour legally on behalf of the TALCO on the decision taken if any by the Advocate Commissioner along with the help of a qualified approved surveyor.” From the above, it is evident that the property in question belongs to Government and the appellant herein never agreed to sell the same for any consideration. 28. When the Principal Officer, District Industries Centre, representing TALCO had filed a detailed counter, the observations of the lower appellate Court that the appellant herein has not objected for the respondents' submission as to the sale of the disputed property is highly condemnable. In fact, no where, the appellant herein has agreed to sell away the encroached portion to the respondents herein. Having found that the original plaintiffs in O.S. No. 170/2004 have encroached an extent of 7955 sq. ft. In fact, no where, the appellant herein has agreed to sell away the encroached portion to the respondents herein. Having found that the original plaintiffs in O.S. No. 170/2004 have encroached an extent of 7955 sq. ft. of land and having known that the respondents herein are the pendente lite purchasers, the lower appellate Court ought to have dismissed the appeal by confirming the well considered judgment and decree of the trial Court. 29. The first appellate Court without considering the fraudulent attitude of the original plaintiffs and the pendente lite purchasers (the respondents herein), acted according to the terms put forth by the pendente lite purchasers, who had resorted to implead themselves in the appeal, which was already dismissed for non-prosecution by the original appellants/plaintiffs. 30. The first appellate Court ought to have considered the fact that the respondents herein are fully aware of the encroachment made by the original plaintiffs and knowing fully well about the pendency of the appeal proceedings and having purchased the disputed property, they cannot claim themselves as bona-fide purchasers. 31. When the appeal is against the judgment and decree of the trial Court in dismissing the suit, which was filed for declaring the notice issued by the defendants/appellant herein requiring the plaintiffs to remove the encroachment, is bad in law, the lower appellate Court erroneously exercised its power, beyond jurisdiction. 32. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court are based on compromise between the parties and therefore, the Second Appeal does not lie cannot be countenanced, in view of the fact that there was never a compromise between the parties for sale of the disputed property, belonging to the Government, which can be done only through the procedure known to law. 33. In this context, it is to be stated that when a claim in the suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, such a compromise must be in writing and signed by the parties and there must be a complete agreement between them and that to constitute an adjustment, the agreement or compromise must itself be capable of being embodied in a decree. The fact that the parties entered into a compromise during the hearing of the suit or appeal is considered not to be sufficient and the Courts are expected to insist upon the parties to reduce the terms into writing. In the case on hand, admittedly, no such transaction took place. 34. Concedingly, the property in question belongs to Government. This is clear from the proceedings of Department of Industries and Commerce, bearing R.C. No. 94122/PDB2/2000, dated 29.01.2001, addressed by the Industries Commissioner and Director of Industries and Commerce, Chepauk, Chennai, to The General Manager, District Industries Centre, Thiruvallur, requesting to take over of TALCO Tannery, Madhavaram, and TALCO Inustrial Etate, Madhavaram, along with the vacant land at Industrial Estate, Madhavaram, By the said proceedings, it was also directed to complete the entire take over process in all aspects at the earliest and report the matter immediately. There is no dispute about that. It is also established by the Advocate Commissioner, appointed by the Court, at the instance of the respondents, in his report. Further, it was not established by the plaintiffs in the suit that the said property belonged to them. While that being so, the respondents, knowing fully well that the property belongs to the Government, purchased the same from the original plaintiffs/appellants during the pendency of the appeal proceedings and invited trouble for themselves. By the said illegal purchase, they cannot claim the property as belonging to them and that they are the bona-fide purchasers. After admitting that the disputed property belongs to Government, the respondent cannot dictate terms for purchase. The very process of proposing to purchase the property encroached at the instance of a subsequent mala-fide purchaser in the court proceedings is an apparent case of abuse of process of Court. Also, the respondents have no locus-standi to seek for purchase of the encroached portion of the property, belonging to the Government. In the considered opinion of this Court, it was a blunder on the part of the lower appellate Court to allow the pendente lite purchasers to get impleaded in the Appeal Suit, by striking off/deleting the original parties. Had that not happened, the proceedings in this case would not have sprung to this miserable level. In the considered opinion of this Court, it was a blunder on the part of the lower appellate Court to allow the pendente lite purchasers to get impleaded in the Appeal Suit, by striking off/deleting the original parties. Had that not happened, the proceedings in this case would not have sprung to this miserable level. At the most, the lower appellate Court ought to have rejected the unlawful and illegal proposal at the instance of the respondents herein seeking to purchase the said property for consideration, after encroachment. Instead, it appointed an Advocate Commissioner for identifying the property Government property for sale in appeal proceedings in favour of the encroachers, which is totally despicable, which is a misuse of process of the Court. It is also not stated anywhere by the appellant Company that they are willing to sell the property for consideration. However, the appellant stated that they have no independent rights to sell the property, as the same pertains to the Government, and there is a specific procedure for the same. More importantly, in G.O.Ms. No. 54, Industries Department, dated 30.10.2000, it is also mentioned that the property belonging to TALCO shall be under the control of the Industries Commissioner and Director of Industries and Commerce, Chepauk, Chennai. 35. In fact, the subject matter was also touched upon by the Hon'ble First Bench of this Court in W.P. No. 9824 of 2014, which was filed by the Department of Industries and Commerce, representing TALCO, appellant herein, seeking for a mandamus, directing the municipal authorities to take appropriate action against the unauthorised illegal construction of superstructure put up by the fifth respondent, who is first appellant herein, in the property bearing S. No. 1088/2A3, measuring an extent of 25033 sq. ft. at No. 50, Madhavaram Village, Thiruvallur District. In the said Writ Petition, the Hon'ble First Bench of this Court, by an order, dated 22.11.2016, directed the parties to work out their remedy in the first appeal. When it was submitted before the Hon'ble First Bench that the fifth respondent therein had filed an application for deposit of the amount and execution of sale deed, the First Bench observed that such an application would not be maintainable, being the matter of execution of the decree. 36. When it was submitted before the Hon'ble First Bench that the fifth respondent therein had filed an application for deposit of the amount and execution of sale deed, the First Bench observed that such an application would not be maintainable, being the matter of execution of the decree. 36. That apart, as against the illegal construction of the superstructure in the property in question, a criminal case was also registered against the respondents herein and the same was also referred to in Crl. O.P. No. 30512 of 2019, which was filed on the file of this Court for quashing the proceedings in C.C. No. 15 of 2016 pending on the file of learned XI Additional Special Judge for CBI Cases against the petitioners therein, who are the respondents herein, and the said Crl. O.P. was also dismissed. 37. Property encroachment is a serious concern in India. It not only puts additional pressure on infrastructure but also increases the burden on the Indian legal system. While property owners are mostly caught un-ware when their property is encroached upon, handling such cases requires an abundance of caution and legal help. In case of encroachment of Government land, when such possession becomes objectionable, it is always open for the Revenue authorities to initiate action under law. A person, who is in possession of Government land and claiming long standing occupation, can never be allowed to urge that the Revenue authorities cannot exercise power after a long lapse of time. 38. Poromboke lands, belonging to the Government, are to be preserved for protecting the environment and for use of the public at large. In this case, it is clearly established that the respondents have encroached the Government poromboke land. Therefore, there cannot be any leniency or misplaced sympathy in respect of such encroachment of the Government land and the authorities competent are bound to protect the same in all respects. 39. Encroachment is a social evil and also menace to the society. Encroachments infringe the rights of other persons or even the State. Encroachment of land occurs on account of greediness. Court can never encourage the actions of such greedy persons in respect of their encroachment on the public land. On account of large scale encroachment, the developmental activities of the State are being paralysed. State is bound to act vigilantly and no leniency can be shown in respect of the encroachers. Encroachment of land occurs on account of greediness. Court can never encourage the actions of such greedy persons in respect of their encroachment on the public land. On account of large scale encroachment, the developmental activities of the State are being paralysed. State is bound to act vigilantly and no leniency can be shown in respect of the encroachers. Encroachment is also an offence. Encroachment means unauthorised occupation of land, private or public, by putting up a temporary or permanent structure for residential or commercial use or any other purpose. Encroachment is a passive form of land grab movement, which mirrors person's innate greed for land and his or her natural tendency towards aggrandizement of wealth in any form. Encroachment of Government property is a loss not only for the Government but also the public. Government lands are for the welfare of the public and to create common infrastructure for the usage and benefit of the public. Thus, the matter of encroachment of Government land cannot be treated ordinarily and it should be treated as a grave offence against the State. Persons in illegal occupation of the Government land cannot, as a matter of right, claim regularisation or seek for sale of the same for consideration, which has exactly happened in this case. 40. When the facts remain thus, it was absurd on the part of the learned IV Additional District Judge, Thiruvallur, at Ponneri, to pass such a preposterous order, which is impugned herein, ignoring the well reasoned order of the trial Court, on mere surmises and conjectures, without any material evidence. As stated supra, when the appeal is against the judgment and decree of the trial Court in dismissing the suit, which was filed for declaring the notice issued by the defendant/appellant herein requiring the plaintiffs to remove the encroachment is bad in law, the lower appellate Court erroneously exercised its power, beyond jurisdiction, putting the well established Government property for sale at the instance of the respondents for consideration by fixing a price, without any authority of law. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the order impugned was passed for extraneous considerations and deliberately ignoring the material on record in an arbitrary manner by twisting the facts to extend the benefit to the respondents herein and violating the sound judicial principles. Such capricious orders can never be allowed to stand in jurisprudence. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the order impugned was passed for extraneous considerations and deliberately ignoring the material on record in an arbitrary manner by twisting the facts to extend the benefit to the respondents herein and violating the sound judicial principles. Such capricious orders can never be allowed to stand in jurisprudence. At the same time, this Court cannot also close its eyes and remain a silent spectator when such illegalities take place at the lower rungs of the Judiciary. 41. Therefore, the Substantial Questions of law framed in this appeal are answered in the negative and in favour of the appellant. 42. The other decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents are completely on different sets of facts and not applicable to the present case. Hence, I am not inclined to burden the judgment, by making it voluminous. 43. Second Appeal is, accordingly, allowed with costs of Rs. 10,000/- payable by the respondents to the appellant within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. As such, the judgment and decree, dated 22.06.2016, passed by the IV Additional District Judge, Tiruvallur, at Ponneri in A.S. No. 21 of 2007 are set aside and the judgment and decree, dated 11.10.2007, passed by the District Munsif, Tiruvotriyur, in O.S. No. 170 of 2004 are confirmed. If the amount is not paid by the respondents within the time stipulated as above, it is open for the appellant to initiate revenue recovery proceedings against the respondents through the District Collector concerned. Consequently, the connected C.M.P. No. 10740 of 2020 is closed.