ORDER : 1. This case is taken up through video conferencing. 2. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the office order contained in letter no.1536 dated 25.08.2020 (Annexure-10 to the writ petition) passed by the Managing Director, Jharkhand State Food & Civil Supplies Corporation Limited (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the Corporation’)-respondent no.2, whereby the petitioner has been blacklisted for a period of three years (till August, 2023) from participating in any tender for appointment of Transportation-cum-Handling contractors as well as other tenders to be invited by the respondent no.1 during the said period and the earnest money deposited by the petitioner has been forfeited. 3. During the course of argument, the learned counsel for the petitioner confines his prayer only to the extent of quashing the order of blacklisting dated 25.08.2020. 4. The factual background of the case as stated in the writ petition is that the respondents floated a tender on 16.04.2020 for appointment of Transportation & Handling Contractors by the Corporation in 24 districts of Jharkhand through the respondent no.2 for Transportation & Handling of Food grains/Paddy/Sugar/Pulses/Oilseeds/Edible Oil/Empty Jute Bags/Bales etc. for the period 2020-22. The petitioner submitted his tender for being appointed as transporter/handling agent for the district of Palamau besides other districts and he was declared a successful tenderer being L-1 for the revenue district of Palamau and to that effect letter no.1267 dated 20.07.2020 was issued to him with a direction to deposit the security amount as well as to execute the agreement. Thereafter, vide letter no.1293 dated 20.07.2020, the petitioner was directed to appear for signing the agreement with original copies as well as photostat copies of the technical documents submitted with the tender documents, however, during the said period the petitioner was under home quarantine on medical advice, as he was suspected to have tested COVID-19 infection. As such, the petitioner made an application before the respondent no.2 on 27.07.2020, intimating that he had been confined in home quarantine on medical advice and could appear to execute the agreement only after being tested negative of Covid-19 infection and thus requested to extend the period for execution of agreement. Subsequently, the respondent no.2 issued letter no.1393 dated 29.07.2020, informing the petitioner that the date for executing the agreement expired on 27.07.2020, however, the petitioner neither deposited security amount nor ensured the execution of agreement. Subsequently, the respondent no.2 issued letter no.1393 dated 29.07.2020, informing the petitioner that the date for executing the agreement expired on 27.07.2020, however, the petitioner neither deposited security amount nor ensured the execution of agreement. Further, the petitioner was called upon to ensure signing of the agreement within next 24 hours failing which the earnest money deposit would stand forfeited and appropriate action would be taken against him in accordance with law. On receipt of the said letter, the petitioner again made a representation before the Managing Director on 30.07.2020, intimating him that his office staff and collegues were tested positive for COVID-19 on 25.07.2020 and he was in home quarantined for 14 days. The respondents were requested through the said representation to extend the period of execution of agreement by 30 days. The respondent no.2 vide his letter no.1466 dated 13.08.2020 acknowledged the representation of the petitioner and granted him time till 14.08.2020 for depositing the security amount and execution of the agreement. On receipt of the letter dated 13.08.2020, the petitioner made a representation dated 17.08.2020 before the respondent no.2 intimating that he was tested positive for COVID-19 on 10.08.2020. Hence, his period of home quarantine was extended by 21 days and his premises were sealed in terms of the guidelines issued by the Department of Health & Family Welfare, Government of Jharkhand. Accordingly, the petitioner requested the respondents to extend the date of execution of the agreement till his recovery from COVID-19 infection. Thereafter, the respondent no.2 issued letter no.1525 dated 24.08.2020 directing L-2 bidder, namely, M/s Sildiliya Construction, Palamau at Daltonganj to deposit earnest money and to ensure signing of agreement. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was not in a position to ensure his presence for signing of agreement having tested positive for COVID-19. The action of the respondents in not extending the period for execution of agreement as well as forfeiting the earnest money deposit is highly arbitrary. It is also submitted that inability of the petitioner in executing the agreement and depositing the security amount despite having been declared L-1 in the reverse e-Auction was due to the situation beyond his control. Hence the action of the respondents in passing the impugned order dated 25.08.2020 is capricious, malafide and bad in law. It is also submitted that inability of the petitioner in executing the agreement and depositing the security amount despite having been declared L-1 in the reverse e-Auction was due to the situation beyond his control. Hence the action of the respondents in passing the impugned order dated 25.08.2020 is capricious, malafide and bad in law. No show cause notice was issued to the petitioner, seeking explanation as to why he should not be blacklisted. It is not the case of the petitioner that he ever sought permission to withdraw his tender and hence the provision of Clause 31 of the Request For Proposal (in short ‘RFP’) is not attracted in the instant case. It is further submitted that Clause 43.4 of the RFP does not speak of blacklisting, rather it only provides for forfeiture of EMD and allotment of the work to the next bidder at the L-1 rate in the situation when successful bidder fails or is evading in complying the procedures of tender after getting confirmation about acceptance of bid. Thus the action of the respondents in blacklisting the petitioner is beyond the scope of Clause-43.4 of the RFP. The petitioner has already deposited the earnest money of Rs.2,05,322,90/- which has been forfeited and as such the action of the respondents in forfeiting the security amount as well as at the same time blacklisting him for three years amounts to double jeopardy. It is further submitted that before issuing the impugned order, it was mandatory on the part of the respondents to follow the principles of natural justice and to provide sufficient opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Blacklisting of a transporter is penal in nature and has far reaching effect in so far as he will be prevented from participating in various bids to be invited by the Central Government, State Government or any other instrumentality of the Government. The respondents should have issued a show cause notice to the petitioner before passing the impugned order, however, no such notice was issued to him prior to passing of the same. The petitioner is a young man who earns his livelihood from transportation business and if the impugned order of blacklisting is not set aside, he will suffer irreparable loss and injury. 6. The petitioner is a young man who earns his livelihood from transportation business and if the impugned order of blacklisting is not set aside, he will suffer irreparable loss and injury. 6. The learned counsel for the respondents submits that the petitioner having been found the lowest bidder was invited by Jharkhand State Food and Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. (in short ‘JSFC’) vide Headquarters’ letter bearing no.1267 dated 20.07.2020 to enter into an agreement for the said purpose, but he did not come forward to execute the agreement. Reminders were also sent to the petitioner vide letter no.1393 dated 29.07.2020 and letter no.1466 dated 13.08.2020 for execution of agreement and depositing the security money, but he neither entered into an agreement with JSFC nor deposited the security money. The JSFC had to incur huge financial loss due to non-execution of agreement by the petitioner. It has been specifically mentioned in Clause 31 of the RFP that withdrawal of a tender during this interval shall result in blacklisting of the tenderer for three years. The respondent no.2 has passed the impugned office order, as contained in letter no.1536 dated 25.08.2020 in view of the provisions of Clause 31 and Clause 43.4 of the RFP, whereby the petitioner has been blacklisted for three years and the earnest money deposited by him has been forfeited. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. The petitioner has put challenge to the order of the respondent no.2 blacklisting him for three years invoking the provisions of Clauses 31 and 43.4 of the RFP. 8. To appreciate the rival contentions of the parties, it would be appropriate to quote the aforesaid provisions of the RFP for the ready reference, which read as under:- “31. Withdrawals of Tender No tender shall be withdrawn in the interval between the deadline for submission of tenders in the e-Auction platform and the expiration of the period of validity of the tender specified by the Tenderer in its tender. Withdrawal of a tender during this interval shall result in blacklisting of the Tenderer for three years. 43. Security Deposit 43.1 …………. 43.2 …………. 43.3 …………. 43.4 If Bidder, after getting confirmation about acceptance of Bid, fails to submit security deposit, signing of agreement and execution of contract or evades the same, then EMD deposited would automatically get ceased without any hearing. 43. Security Deposit 43.1 …………. 43.2 …………. 43.3 …………. 43.4 If Bidder, after getting confirmation about acceptance of Bid, fails to submit security deposit, signing of agreement and execution of contract or evades the same, then EMD deposited would automatically get ceased without any hearing. His bid will be considered invalid and Corporation will have right to accept the bid of any other bidder at the L-1 rate. No objection of successful bidder will be acceptable here.” 9. Thus, clause 31 empowers the authority to pass an order of blacklisting if the tender is withdrawn by the successful bidder between the deadline for submission of tenders in the e-Auction platform and the expiration of the period of validity of the tender specified by the tenderer in its tender notice. Further, Clause 43.4 provides that if the bidder even after confirmation about acceptance of bid, fails to submit security deposit, signing of agreement and execution of contract or evades for the same, then his EMD shall automatically be ceased without any hearing and the corporation shall have right to proceeded with any other bidder at L1 rate. 10. On perusal of the record, it appears that the confirmation letter was issued to the petitioner on 20.07.2020, directing him to execute the agreement and to deposit the security money within a week from the date of issuance of the said letter. Thus, the petitioner was allowed time till 27.07.2020 to fulfil the said formalities, however, it transpires from the letter of the petitioner dated 27.07.2020 along with prescription dated 25.07.2020 annexed with the writ petition that the petitioner was advised by the doctor to stay in home quarantine for 14 days i.e. till 08.08.2020. The respondents again issued letter dated 29.07.2020 directing him to execute the agreement within 24 hours otherwise he would be blacklisted. Thus, the letter dated 29.07.2020 was issued during the period when the petitioner was advised to be in home quarantine and the said letter was replied by the petitioner on 30.07.2020 again informing the respondent no.2 that he was under home quarantine. Thus, the letter dated 29.07.2020 was issued during the period when the petitioner was advised to be in home quarantine and the said letter was replied by the petitioner on 30.07.2020 again informing the respondent no.2 that he was under home quarantine. The respondent no.2 again wrote letter to the petitioner on 13.08.2020 directing him to execute the agreement and deposit the security amount till 14.08.2020 by 5:00 p.m. The said letter was replied by the petitioner on 17.08.2020 stating that he was tested Covid-19 positive on 10.08.2020 and as such as per the advice of the doctor, he was under home quarantine for 21 days. The petitioner has also annexed a copy of prescription of the doctor with the writ petition. Thereafter, the respondent no.2 vide letter no.1525 dated 24.08.2020 invited the L2 bidder to execute the agreement by depositing the security amount mentioned in RFP and vide impugned order dated 25.08.2020 has passed the order of forfeiture of EMD and blacklisting the petitioner for a period of three years (i.e. till August, 2023). 11. On appreciation of the aforesaid facts, it would be evident that the petitioner did not withdraw the bid, rather he repeatedly replied the letters of the respondent no.2 explaining his inability to comply the direction issued by him, as he was in home quarantine as per advice of the doctor. Thus, I am of the view that the respondents have wrongly applied clause 31 of the RFP while passing the order of blacklisting the petitioner. 12. In the case of Kulja Industries Limited Vs. Chief General Manager, Western Telecom Project BSNL and Others, reported in (2014) 14 SCC 731 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “17. That apart, the power to blacklist a contractor whether the contract be for supply of material or equipment or for the execution of any other work whatsoever is in our opinion inherent in the party allotting the contract. There is no need for any such power being specifically conferred by statute or reserved by contractor. That is because “blacklisting” simply signifies a business decision by which the party affected by the breach decides not to enter into any contractual relationship with the party committing the breach. Between two private parties the right to take any such decision is absolute and untrammelled by any constraints whatsoever. That is because “blacklisting” simply signifies a business decision by which the party affected by the breach decides not to enter into any contractual relationship with the party committing the breach. Between two private parties the right to take any such decision is absolute and untrammelled by any constraints whatsoever. The freedom to contract or not to contract is unqualified in the case of private parties. But any such decision is subject to judicial review when the same is taken by the State or any of its instrumentalities. This implies that any such decision will be open to scrutiny not only on the touchstone of the principles of natural justice but also on the doctrine of proportionality. A fair hearing to the party being blacklisted thus becomes an essential precondition for a proper exercise of the power and a valid order of blacklisting made pursuant thereto. The order itself being reasonable, fair and proportionate to the gravity of the offence is similarly examinable by a writ court. 18. The legal position on the subject is settled by a long line of decisions rendered by this Court starting with Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of W.B. where this Court declared that blacklisting has the effect of preventing a person from entering into lawful relationship with the Government for purposes of gains and that the authority passing any such order was required to give a fair hearing before passing an order blacklisting a certain entity. This Court observed: (SCC p. 75, para 20) “20. Blacklisting has the effect of preventing a person from the privilege and advantage of entering into lawful relationship with the Government for purposes of gains. The fact that a disability is created by the order of blacklisting indicates that the relevant authority is to have an objective satisfaction. Fundamentals of fair play require that the person concerned should be given an opportunity to represent his case before he is put on the blacklist.” Subsequent decisions of this Court in Southern Painters v. Fertilizers & Chemicals Travancore Ltd.; Patel Engg. Ltd. v. Union of India; B.S.N. Joshi & Sons Ltd. v. Nair Coal Services Ltd.; Joseph Vilangandan v. Executive Engineer (PWD) among others have followed the ratio of that decision and applied the principle of audialterampartem to the process that may eventually culminate in the blacklisting of a contractor. 19. Ltd. v. Union of India; B.S.N. Joshi & Sons Ltd. v. Nair Coal Services Ltd.; Joseph Vilangandan v. Executive Engineer (PWD) among others have followed the ratio of that decision and applied the principle of audialterampartem to the process that may eventually culminate in the blacklisting of a contractor. 19. Even the second facet of the scrutiny which the blacklisting order must suffer is no longer res integra. The decisions of this Court in Radha Krishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar; E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N.; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India; Ajay Hasia v. Khalid MujibSehravardi; Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India and Dwarka Das Marfatia and Sons v. Port of Bombay have ruled against arbitrariness and discrimination in every matter that is subject to judicial review before a writ court exercising powers under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. 20. It is also well settled that even though the right of the writ petitioner is in the nature of a contractual right, the manner, the method and the motive behind the decision of the authority whether or not to enter into a contract is subject to judicial review on the touchstone of fairness, relevance, natural justice, non-discrimination, equality and proportionality. All these considerations that go to determine whether the action is sustainable in law have been sanctified by judicial pronouncements of this Court and are of seminal importance in a system that is committed to the rule of law. We do not consider it necessary to burden this judgment by a copious reference to the decisions on the subject. A reference to the following passage from the decision of this Court in Mahabir Auto Stores v. Indian Oil Corpn. should, in our view, suffice: (SCC pp. 760-61, para 12) “12. It is well settled that every action of the State or an instrumentality of the State in exercise of its executive power, must be informed by reason. In appropriate cases, actions uninformed by reason may be questioned as arbitrary in proceedings under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. Reliance in this connection may be placed on the observations of this Court in Radha Krishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar. In appropriate cases, actions uninformed by reason may be questioned as arbitrary in proceedings under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. Reliance in this connection may be placed on the observations of this Court in Radha Krishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar. … In case any right conferred on the citizens which is sought to be interfered, such action is subject to Article 14 of the Constitution, and must be reasonable and can be taken only upon lawful and relevant grounds of public interest. Where there is arbitrariness in State action of this type of entering or not entering into contracts, Article 14 springs up and judicial review strikes such an action down. Every action of the State executive authority must be subject to rule of law and must be informed by reason. So, whatever be the activity of the public authority, in such monopoly or semi-monopoly dealings, it should meet the test of Article 14 of the Constitution. If a governmental action even in the matters of entering or not entering into contracts, fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness, the same would be unreasonable. … It appears to us that rule of reason and rule against arbitrariness and discrimination, rules of fair play and natural justice are part of the rule of law applicable in situation or action by State instrumentality in dealing with citizens in a situation like the present one. Even though the rights of the citizens are in the nature of contractual rights, the manner, the method and motive of a decision of entering or not entering into a contract, are subject to judicial review on the touchstone of relevance and reasonableness, fair play, natural justice, equality and non-discrimination in the type of the transactions and nature of the dealing as in the present case.” 13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in the aforesaid judgment that the power to blacklist a contractor is inherent in the party allotting the contract. There is no need for any such power being specifically conferred by statute or reserved by contractor. When a contract is entered between two private parties, then in case of any breach by one party, the other party has every right to blacklist the defaulter and such right is unqualified. There is no need for any such power being specifically conferred by statute or reserved by contractor. When a contract is entered between two private parties, then in case of any breach by one party, the other party has every right to blacklist the defaulter and such right is unqualified. However, in a situation where an order of blacklisting is passed by the State or its instrumentalities, then such order is within the realm of power of judicial review of the Writ Court and the same has to be tested in the touchstone of the principles of natural justice, doctrine of proportionality, reasonableness and fairness. Thus, even if it is accepted that the power to blacklist was inherent with the respondents, the said order does not appear to be reasonable and fair in factual context of the present case as the petitioner was in home quarantine suffering from Covid-19 infection during the said period. 14. So far the applicability of clause 43.4 of the RFP in the case in hand is concerned, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner fairly submits that he does not want to challenge the order of forfeiture of the EMD as also awarding of work to L2 bidder. Thus there is no need to make any comment on the said part of the impugned order. 15. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned order dated 25.08.2020 is hereby quashed to the extent of blacklisting the petitioner for a period of three years (till August, 2023) debarring him from participating in any tender of the respondents. 16. The writ petition is, accordingly, partly allowed.