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2021 DIGILAW 356 (TS)

Talla Srinivas Goud v. Ghanapuram Srinivas Reddy

2021-11-23

CHILLAKUR SUMALATHA

body2021
ORDER : Heard on both sides. 2. Challenge in this civil revision petition is the order of the Court of Junior Civil Judge, Medak in I.A.No.164 of 2017 in O.S.No.07 of 2015, by which the learned Judge dismissed the petition filed by the revision petitioner herein under Section 151 C.P.C. seeking police aid, with an observation that the aggrieved party though obtained an order of temporary injunction cannot seek for police aid for implementation of the said order invoking Section 151 CPC and if necessary, has to file an application for contempt under Order 39 Rule 2-A C.P.C. or to resort to Order 21 Rule 32 C.P.C. 3. Though notice was served upon the respondent, he failed to represent before the Court. 4. After giving anxious consideration to the submissions of learned counsel for the revision petitioner, the short point that falls for consideration is : Whether Section 151 C.P.C. empowers a civil Court to grant police aid for proper implementation of its Order of temporary injunction granted under Order 39 C.P.C. 5. In the case on hand, the petitioner filed a suit for permanent injunction seeking to restrain the respondent and his men from interfering with his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the land in Survey No.746/E1 admeasuring Ac.0.41 ½ guntas and in Survey No.746/E2 admeasuring Ac.0.14 ½ guntas, totalling Ac.0.29 guntas of Narsingi Village of Medak District. I.A.No.46 of 2015 filed for temporary injunction was ordered on 09.02.2015 and on 06.03.2015, the said order was made absolute. Subsequently, the petitioner moved I.A.No.164 of 2017 contending that on 16.04.2017 the respondent tried to damage the standing paddy crop, but he resisted him with the help of adjacent land owners, but he left the place threatening to damage his paddy crop in future and on that he approached the police, Narsingi for help. But police refused to extend help on the ground that the case is civil in nature and they advised him to get protection orders from the Court and therefore, a direction has to be given to the police to give protection so that he could save his possession of the suit land and the standing paddy crop. The respondent resisted the application contending that the suit is of the year 2015 and he is ready to produce evidence on his behalf and in the meantime, grant of police protection is not required. The respondent resisted the application contending that the suit is of the year 2015 and he is ready to produce evidence on his behalf and in the meantime, grant of police protection is not required. Learned Judge of the trial Court, dismissed the application with the following observations. “...Order XXI Rule 32 is the procedure which has to be resorted to for the executing the decree for injunction. When the law required that such a decree can be executed by attachment of the property of the judgment debtor or by detention in civil prison or both, there cannot be a third method of directing police to ensure obedience for decree of perpetual injunction. It will be altogether different matter to direct the police to take the judgment debtor into custody for violation of decree of perpetual injunction and direct the authorities of civil prison to detain the judgment debtor in the prison. The power of arrest and detention may not include the power to direct the police to ensure due obedience of the decree of perpetual injunction.” 6. Sections 36 to 74 C.P.C. deals with the execution of decrees and Order 21 C.P.C. contains elaborate procedure for execution of decrees passed by the civil Courts. 7. The learned Judge of the trial Court mainly based her reliance upon the judgment rendered by this Court in the case of D.Tulja Devi and others v Margam Shankar and another, 2010(2) ALD 732 (DB). But the facts of the said case are distinguishable. The petitioners in the said case, who are the plaintiffs to the suit filed a suit for permanent injunction and a decree was passed in their favour and thereafter they filed an Execution Petition (EP) and in the said Execution Petition they filed an Execution Application (EA) under Section 151 CPC praying the Court to direct the Station House Officer to ensure due obedience of the decree passed by the Court. Thus, the factual position in the case is entirely different. In the case on hand, the suit is not yet disposed of. As earlier discussed, pending suit, the petitioner moved an application for grant of temporary injunction and temporary injunction admittedly was granted in his favour and despite of granting temporary injunction, the respondent tried to interfere with the possession of the petitioner over the suit property and tried to damage the standing crop. As earlier discussed, pending suit, the petitioner moved an application for grant of temporary injunction and temporary injunction admittedly was granted in his favour and despite of granting temporary injunction, the respondent tried to interfere with the possession of the petitioner over the suit property and tried to damage the standing crop. Hence the petitioner sought for the aid of police to protect his rights. But police refused to extend any help on the ground that the dispute is civil in nature and unless and until there are orders from the Court, they cannot extend any help and in those circumstances, he moved an application for grant of police aid. Therefore, the decision rendered by this Court referred to supra cannot be applied to the facts and circumstances of this case. The Presiding Officers of the Courts are bound to go through the entire text in the judgments of the superior Courts and then to arrive at a conclusion whether those rulings can be applied to the cases that are being dealt with. If that exercise is not done, it may result in wrong application of the legal position, which ultimately affects the rights of the parties. 8. Submitting that the Court below erred in refusing to grant police aid, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner could neither file an execution petition under Order 21 Rule 32 CPC nor an application for contempt under Order 39 Rule 2-A CPC as there was no concrete breach on the part of the respondent and as his only request was to grant aid for implementation of the order and for implementation of the said order of temporary injunction, neither Order 21 Rule 32 C.P.C. nor Order 39 Rule 2-A C.P.C. is applicable. He stated that the learned Judge erroneously dismissed the application with a direction to invoke those provisions, if aggrieved, despite the fact that the interim injunction granted was made absolute. He also submits that in the light of the dismissal of the said application, though an order of temporary injunction is granted, it is of no use to the petitioner and therefore, the petitioner approached this Court challenging the said order and for necessary police aid. 9. He also submits that in the light of the dismissal of the said application, though an order of temporary injunction is granted, it is of no use to the petitioner and therefore, the petitioner approached this Court challenging the said order and for necessary police aid. 9. Where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise that any property in dispute in a suit, is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree, or where the defendant threatens, or intends, to remove or dispose of the property with a view to defrauding his creditors or the defendant threatens to dispossess the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit, the Court may by order grant temporary injunction to restrain such act. The Court as established by law is bound to see whether its interference is necessary to protect the parties from irreparable loss, which appears to occur before the legal right is established at the trial. The interim relief in all cases would be granted only when the Court is prima facie satisfied that the party applying such a relief is entitled to right of protection. In the case on hand, the trial Court has granted ad interim injunction and made the same absolute. However, the trial Court failed to entertain the application for grant of police aid to implement the relief granted. The learned Judge no where in her order made a mention that the petitioner is not entitled for such a relief. The observation is that the petitioner ought to have invoked either Order 21 Rule 32 CPC or Order 39 Rule 2-A C.P.C. Order 21 Rule 32 CPC can be invoked where a decree for specific performance of contract or for restitution of conjugal rights or for an injunction has been passed and where the opposite party fails to obey the said decree. It is laid down that where there is disobedience of a decree of injunction, the aggrieved party can seek for detention of the opposite party in the civil prison or attachment of his property or both. 10. For the purpose of effective understanding, the said provision (Order 21 Rule 32 CPC ) is extracted hereunder. It is laid down that where there is disobedience of a decree of injunction, the aggrieved party can seek for detention of the opposite party in the civil prison or attachment of his property or both. 10. For the purpose of effective understanding, the said provision (Order 21 Rule 32 CPC ) is extracted hereunder. “Decree for specific performance for restitution of conjugal rights, or for an injunction: (1) Where the party against whom a decree for the specific performance of a contract, or for restitution of conjugal rights, or for an injunction, has been passed, has had an opportunity of obeying the decree and has wilfully failed to obey it, the decree may be enforced in the case of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights by the attachment of his property or, in the case of a decree for the specific performance of a contract or for an injunction by his detention in the civil prison, or by the attachment of his property, or by both. (2) Where the party against whom a decree for specific performance or for an injunction has been passed is a corporation, the decree may be enforced by the attachment of the property of the corporation or, with the leave of the Court, by the detention in the civil prison of the directors or other principal officers thereof, or by both attachment and detention. (3) Where any attachment under Sub-rule (1) or sub-rule(2) has remained in force for six months, if the judgment-debtor has not obeyed the decree and the decree-holder has applied to have the attached property sold, such property may be sold; and out of the proceeds the Court may award to the decree-holder such compensation as it thinks fit, and shall pay the balance (if any) to the judgment-debtor on his application. (4) Where the judgment-debtor has obeyed the decree and paid all the costs of executing the same which he is bound to pay, or where at the end of six months from the date of the attachment, no application to have the property sold has been made, or if made has been refused, the attachment shall cease. (4) Where the judgment-debtor has obeyed the decree and paid all the costs of executing the same which he is bound to pay, or where at the end of six months from the date of the attachment, no application to have the property sold has been made, or if made has been refused, the attachment shall cease. (5) Where a decree for the specific performance of a contract or for an injunction has not been obeyed, the Court may, in lieu of or in addition to all or any of the processes aforesaid, direct that the act required to be done may be done so far as practicable by the decree-holder or some other person appointed by the Court, at the cost of the judgment-debtor, and upon the act being done the expenses incurred may be ascertained in such manner as the Court may direct and may be recovered as if they were included in the decree. 11. Coming to Order 39 Rule 2-A CPC., the said provision deals with cases of breach of an order of injunction and envisages that in case of disobedience of an injunction order granted either under Rule 1 or Rule 2 of Order 39 CPC, the Court may order the property of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached, and may also order such person to be detained in the civil prison for a term not exceeding three months, unless in the meantime the Court directs his release. 12. Order 39 Rule 2-A reads as follows: “2-A Consequence of disobedience or breach of injunction: (1) In the case of disobedience of any injunction granted or other order made under Rule 1, or Rule 2 or breach of any of the terms on which the injunction was granted or the order made, the Court granting the injunction or making the order, or any Court to which the suit or proceeding is transferred, may order the property of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached, and may also order such person to be detained in the civil prison for a term not exceeding three months, unless in the meantime the Court directs his release. (2) No attachment made under this rule shall remain in force for more than one year, at the end of which time, if the disobedience or breach continues, the property attached may be sold and out of the proceeds, the Court may award such compensation as it thinks fit to the injured party and shall pay the balance, if any, to the party entitled thereto.” 13. As per the material available on record, the respondent has not executed his act of disobedience towards the injunction order. He attempted to disobey the order. Such being the case, it has to be seen whether Order 21 Rule 32 CPC or Order 39 Rule 2-A CPC comes to the aid of the petitioner herein. 14. The other important aspect that has to be looked into is why the powers granted under Section 151 CPC should not be invoked, when the Courts under the said provision have been granted power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process of the Court. It is the inherent power that is granted through the said provision by the law makers. 15. Section 151 CPC reads as follows: “Saving of inherent powers of the code:- Nothing in this code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of the justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court.” 16. Thus, what can be culminated from the above provision is : 1) Section 151 CPC cannot be invoked where there is an express provision of law under which relief can be claimed by the aggrieved party. 2) To meet the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of the Court, the Courts are well empowered to grant such orders as are required invoking the powers under Section 151 CPC. 3) The powers under Section 151 CPC should only be exercised to supplement the other provisions of the Court and in no circumstances they should be invoked to over ride the other express provisions. 17. Only on the ground that there are other provisions to aid the petitioner, the learned Judge of the trial Court failed to exercise its power under Section 151 CPC. 17. Only on the ground that there are other provisions to aid the petitioner, the learned Judge of the trial Court failed to exercise its power under Section 151 CPC. However, as earlier discussed the case does not fall squarely under the ambit of Order 21 Rule 32 or Order 39 Rule 2-A CPC. 18. In the decision of this Court, which is relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner between Bijiga Papa Rao and others v Jonnalagadda Srinivasa Rao, 2015(2) ALT 63 dealing with similar set of facts, the learned Judge at paras 16 and 17 held as follows: 16. Of course, even the Division Bench accepted that the relief of police protection may be granted in a situation where an application is filed by the person obtaining ad interim injunction alleging that there is a threat of breach, disobedience or violation of order of injunction, subject to proof. I also agree with the view of the Division Bench that when a petition is filed seeking police protection, such order cannot be passed in a routine manner and a high degree of proof is necessary. 17. As held by a Division Bench of this Court in Satyanarayana Tiwari v. SHO, PS, Santoshnagar: AIR 1982 AP 394 (DB), no authority in the State, Revenue or Police, can ignore the finding of the Civil Court or refuse to take steps to see that the order of the Civil Court is implemented and the party, in whose favour there is an order of the Civil Court should get all help to maintain the law and order and the other party cannot be allowed to contravene the injunction order and create law and order problem. No doubt, these observations were made in the context of the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to issue a writ or direction to police to enforce the orders of the Civil Court to provide protection in furtherance of an order of injunction, but in my opinion, the said observations equally apply to a situation where a party approaches a Civil Court for police protection having obtained an interlocutory order for temporary injunction. 19. 19. Negativing the observations of the Court that the order of injunction was made under Order 39 CPC and that its violation could be punished under Order 39 CPC Rule 2(3), CPC and that inasmuch as there was an express provision in that behalf, the inherent powers of the Court under Section 151 CPC could not be invoked and that such injunction orders could not be enforced with police aid, the Division Bench of this Court in Rayapati Audemma V Pothineni Narasimham, AIR 1971 AP 53 at para 5 made the following observations: “......It has to be noticed that Order 39 Rule 2(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides only for punishment by attachment of the property or by detention in civil prison of the person who committed breach. But it does not further provide for implementation of the order of injunction itself. Order 39, Rule 2 (3) cannot be said to be an express provision with respect to implementation of the order of injunction, but is only a provision which provides penalty for disobedience of the order. In such a case there being no other express provision in the Code for enforcement of the order, it is not only proper but also necessary that the Courts should render all aid to the aggrieved party to derive full benefits of the order. Though the order of injunction under Order 39, Civil P. c. is only interim in nature, still it clothes the person who obtained the order with certain rights and he is entitled to enforce the aforesaid right against the party who is bound by the order. No doubt in such a case, the aggrieved party himself could approach the police authorities to prevent obstruction to the enforcement of the order or to the exercise of the right which he derives under the order of Court. But we do not see why when the same person brings to the notice of the court that enforcement of the order is sought to be prevented or obstructed, the court should not exercise its inherent power under Section 151, Civil P. C. and direct the police authorities to render all aid to the aggrieved party in the implementation of the Court's order.” 20. Further the Division Bench at para 9 held as follows: “9. Further the Division Bench at para 9 held as follows: “9. If the police authorities are under a legal duty to enforce the law and the Public or the citizens are entitled to seek directions under Article 226 of the Constitution for discharge of such duties by the Police Authorities we feel that the civil courts can also give appropriate directions under Section 151 Civil P. C. to render aid to the aggrieved parties for the due and proper implementation of the orders of Court. It cannot be said that in such a case the exercise of the inherent power under Section 151, Civil P. C. is devoid of jurisdiction. There is no express provision in the Code prohibiting the exercise of such a power and the Court can give appropriate directions at the instance of the aggrieved parties to the police authorities to render its aid for enforcement of the Court's order in a lawful manner.” 21. Thus, it is clear that inherent power if necessary to meet the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process can be exercised by the Civil Court invoking Section 151 CPC and it has got ample jurisdiction to grant police aid. It has to be observed that powers granted under Section 151 CPC are not limited expressly in any other provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and wide discretion is given to the Courts to aid the aggrieved party and for proper implementation of its Order. The shield granted through an order of injunction is of no use, if the Court cannot come to aid from the attempted invasion. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the observations made by the learned Judge while not granting police aid are unsustainable. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Judge ought to have granted police aid. The duty of the Court is to protect rights of the parties and all orders should ride for the said end. Thus, after all is said as above, before parting with the order, this Court considers desirable to enunciate the following aspects for ready reference of the Courts below:- 1. The duty of the Court is not only to protect the rights and interest of the parties, but also to see that its orders are properly implemented. 2. Thus, after all is said as above, before parting with the order, this Court considers desirable to enunciate the following aspects for ready reference of the Courts below:- 1. The duty of the Court is not only to protect the rights and interest of the parties, but also to see that its orders are properly implemented. 2. Procedure which would meet the ends of justice or which would prevent the abuse of process of the Court should always be followed, as the procedure is handmaid of justice. 3. All revenue and police authorities are under obligation to assist the Courts (civil or criminal) of all cadres for rendering substantial and complete justice to the parties. 4. Breach of orders of the Courts of Justice should be viewed seriously. 5. Grant of an order is of no use if its implementation cannot be fructified. 6. Absence of specific provision of law should not bar the aggrieved of an appropriate remedy. In such cases, inherent powers of the Court should be invoked to protect the rights of the parties. 7. Granting police aid to prevent violation of an order of temporary injunction is always better and desirable, than initiating contempt proceedings or invoking other provisions of law after the order of temporary injunction of the Court is breached. 8. Courts have got ample power to invoke Section 151 C.P.C. to prevent abuse of process of law. 9. An application under Section 151 C.P.C. to grant police aid to prevent breach of an order of temporary injunction is well maintainable. 10. In deserving cases, police aid can be granted to subserve the ends of justice. 11. Unless and until the Court is satisfied that grant of police aid would help in mitigating grave situations such an order should not be granted. 22. By the foregoing discussion and the observations made, the civil revision petition is allowed. The order dated 06.02.2018 passed by the Junior Civil Judge, Medak in I.A.No.164 of 2017 in O.S.No.7 of 2015, is set aside. The petitioner may approach the jurisdictional police station for grant of aid for proper implementation of the order of temporary injunction through an appropriate application and in case such a request is made, the jurisdictional police shall grant aid till the subsistence of the order of temporary injunction. 23. Pending Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs.