JUDGMENT : (Prayer: Second Appeal is filed under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code, against the judgment and decree of the Learned Principal District Judge, Karur, dated 23.04.2003 in A.S.No.80 of 2002 reversing the judgment and decree of the Principal District Munsif Court, Karur in O.S.No.29 of 2000.) 1. The plaintiffs are the appellants herein. 2. The plaintiffs filed O.S.No.29 of 2000, before the Principal District Munsif Court, Karur for permanent injunction not to disturb their possession over the suit schedule properties. The suit was decreed as prayed for. The defendant filed A.S.No.80 of 2002 before the Principal District Court, Karur. The first appeal was allowed and the suit was dismissed. As against the same, the plaintiffs have filed the present second appeal. 3. The plaintiffs had contended that they had purchased the suit schedule property from one, Swaminathan on 15.02.1996. The plaintiffs had further contended that the defendant which is a Nationalised Bank is attempting to interfere with their possession over the suit schedule properties and hence, the present suit. 4. The defendant filed a written statement contending that though the said Swaminathan is the owner of the suit schedule property, he had created a equitable mortgage by depositing the title deeds of the suit schedule property with the Bank on 01.02.1994 and thereafter, he has extended the said mortgage on 15.05.1996. The defendant further contended that on 21.05.1996, the said Swaminathan had created an equitable mortgage on suit schedule property by depositing the original sale deeds. Since the said Swaminathan had defaulted in payment, the Bank had filed O.A.No.374 of 1994 before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Chennai and recovery certificate has also been issued as against the said Swaminathan and two other persons who were the guarantors for the loan. 5. The defendant further contended that the plaintiffs have created a fraudulent document on 15.02.1996 and the plaintiffs have no title or possession over the suit schedule property. The fact that the plaintiffs have not received the original documents at the time of purchasing the suit schedule properties will indicate that they are not the bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration. The defendant further contended that in view of the provisions of Recovery of debts due to Bank and Financial Instructions 1993, (RDDB Act) Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a Civil suit. 6. The defendant further contended that in view of the provisions of Recovery of debts due to Bank and Financial Instructions 1993, (RDDB Act) Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a Civil suit. 6. The trial Court decreed the suit as prayed for after giving a finding that the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs under Exhibit A2 has been properly registered and only after the registration of the sale deed on 15.02.1996, an equitable mortgage has been created in favour of the Bank on 21.05.1996. Hence, the said equitable mortgage will not bind the plaintiff. Based upon the said findings, the trial Court decreed the suit as prayed for. 7. The First Appellate Court held that the documents filed on the side of the defendant would establish that the plaintiffs' vendor has created an equitable mortgage with the defendant Bank and hence, the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs is not valid. The First Appellate Court also found that the proceedings have been initiated before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Chennai by the defendant Bank and the same are pending. The First Appellate Court also found that Exhibit A2 in favour of the plaintiffs is sham and nominal. The First Appellate Court also found that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction in view of Section 18 of Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institution Act, 1993. 8. That apart, the First Appellate Court found that the Debt Recovery Tribunal is a higher forum and any injunction granted by the Civil Court, will be in violation of Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act. On the above said grounds, the First Appellate Court reversed the judgment and decree of the trial Court and dismissed the suit. As against the same, the present second appeal has been filed. 9. The second appeal has been admitted on the following substantial questions of law: “a) Whether the powers and authorities conferred to Debts Recovery Tribunal under Sections 17 and 18 of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks & Financial Institutions Act, 1993 would bar the suit for bare injunction in respect of possession filed in a Civil Court? b) Whether the Lower Appellate Court is right in law in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to grant injunction in respect of possession of the suit property? b) Whether the Lower Appellate Court is right in law in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to grant injunction in respect of possession of the suit property? c) Whether the Lower Appellate Court is right in law in holding that the District Munsif Court has no jurisdiction to grant injunction by virtue of Section 41(b) of Specific Relief Act? d) When cause of action to the suit is specifically pleaded and when evidence was let in to that effect, whether the lower appellate Court is right in law in assuming that there is no cause of action for the suit for bare injunction filed by the appellants?” 10. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the mortgage in favour of the Bank has been created only on 21.05.1996 whereas the suit schedule properties have been alienated in favour of the plaintiffs on 15.02.1996 itself. Hence, the said Swaminathan was not having any title over the suit schedule properties while he has mortgaged the suit schedule properties in favour of the defendant Bank. The learned counsel for the appellants further contended that the plaintiff is not a party to the Debt Recovery Tribunal proceedings. That apart, they are neither the borrowers nor the guarantors of the defendant Bank. Hence, the bar under the Section 18 of Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institution Act, 1993, will not be attracted in the circumstances of the present case and the Civil suit is maintainable. The learned counsel further contended that the present suit is not an anti-suit injunction to attract Section 41 (b) of the Specific Relief Act. The present suit has been filed seeking permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule properties. 11. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents contended that the vendor of the plaintiff has created an equitable mortgage by depositing the original title deeds with the Bank on 01.02.1994. Thereafter, the guarantee was continued on 15.05.1996 and again on 21.05.1996. The defendant Bank has already initiated O.A.No.374 of 1994, before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Chennai and recovery certificate has also been issued as against the vendor of the plaintiffs and the guarantors. Hence, the present suit filed by the plaintiffs is clearly barred under Section 18 of RDDB Act. Thereafter, the guarantee was continued on 15.05.1996 and again on 21.05.1996. The defendant Bank has already initiated O.A.No.374 of 1994, before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Chennai and recovery certificate has also been issued as against the vendor of the plaintiffs and the guarantors. Hence, the present suit filed by the plaintiffs is clearly barred under Section 18 of RDDB Act. The learned counsel for the respondents further contended that any injunction granted by the Civil Court would amount to preventing the authorities under RDDB Act from enforcing the recovery orders passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Chennai. 12. I have carefully considered the submissions on either side. 13. The plaintiffs had purchased the suit schedule property under Exhibit A2 on 15.02.1996. According to the plaintiffs, their possession has been disturbed by the officials of the defendant Bank and hence, they have filed the present suit. 14. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the defendant contended that there is no necessity for the Bank to indulge unlawful activities. The learned counsel for the respondents further contended that the original sale deeds have been deposited by the vendor of the plaintiffs with the defendant Bank and an equitable mortgage has been created. The Bank has also initiated recovery proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Chennai and was successful in obtaining a recovery certificate as against the vendor of the plaintiffs. In such circumstances, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction and even assuming that the Civil Court has got jurisdiction an injunction cannot be granted in view of Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act. 15. A perusal of Exhibit B29 will show that on 01.02.1994, an equitable mortgage has been created in favour of the Bank by the vendor of the plaintiffs namely, Swaminathan. However, the parent documents of the plaintiffs namely, the sale deeds under Exhibits B15 to B18 have not been deposited by the said Swaminathan. Only this security was extended on 15.05.1996. Hence, Exhibit B29 does not strengthen the case of the defendant. A perusal of Exhibit B30 indicates that the originals of Exhibits B15 to B18 sale deeds in fact have been deposited by the plaintiffs' vendor, Swaminathan in favour of the defendant Bank and an equitable mortgage has been created on 21.05.1996. Only this security was extended on 15.05.1996. Hence, Exhibit B29 does not strengthen the case of the defendant. A perusal of Exhibit B30 indicates that the originals of Exhibits B15 to B18 sale deeds in fact have been deposited by the plaintiffs' vendor, Swaminathan in favour of the defendant Bank and an equitable mortgage has been created on 21.05.1996. A perusal of the said document also indicates that along with 4 original sale deeds, 10 other documents have been obtained from the said Swaminathan. The Encumbrance certificates have been obtained only for a period covering 1965 to 02.08.1994. Even though an equitable mortgage has been created on 21.05.1996, the Bank has not chosen to insist upon the mortgagor to obtain encumbrance certificate at least up to 31.04.1996. If such an encumbrance certificate had been produced, it would have revealed, that on 15.02.1996 itself, the said Swaminathan has alienated the suit schedule properties and he did not have any right or title over the suit schedule properties, when he created an equitable mortgage on 21.05.1996. Hence, it is clear that when an equitable mortgage was created by the vendor of the plaintiffs, he was not having title over the same and he had already alienated the properties in favour of the plaintiffs. The defendant Bank cannot rely upon Exhibits B29 or B30, because an equitable mortgage has been created in favour of the Bank only after the alienation in favour of the plaintiffs. 16. The next issue that arises for consideration is whether the Bar under Section 18 of RDDB Act is attracted in the present case and whether the present Civil suit is barred under the said provision. The issue regarding the maintainability of Civil suit has been considered by this Court in a judgment reported in 2019 (2) CTC 737 in which paragraph Nos.6 and 10 read as follows: “6. Section 18 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, reads as follows: “18. Bar of Jurisdiction.- On and from the appointed day, no Court or other Authority shall have, or be entitled to exercise, any jurisdiction, powers or authority (except the Supreme Court, and a High Court exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution) in relation to the matters specified in Section 17”. Bar of Jurisdiction.- On and from the appointed day, no Court or other Authority shall have, or be entitled to exercise, any jurisdiction, powers or authority (except the Supreme Court, and a High Court exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution) in relation to the matters specified in Section 17”. A reading of the above provision would show that what is barred under the said Act is only proceedings in relation to matters specified under Section 17 of the said Act. In order to be a proceeding under Section 17 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 a proceeding must be essentially for recovery initiated by the Bank or a Counter-claim made against the Bank. It cannot include reliefs sought for by Third parties against the debtor, though the property mortgaged with the Bank happens to be the subject matter of such proceeding. 10. From the above pronouncement of the Hon'ble Full Bench of this Court, it is clear that the bar enacted that any provision which creates a bar on the jurisdiction of a Civil Court must be construed strictly and it would apply only to proceedings, which are completely covered by the bar. I have already extracted both Section 18 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, and Section 34 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest, Act 2002. The language of the both the provisions do no cover a dispute between Third parties relating to Specific Performance of an Agreement of Sale. It may sometime happen that the jurisdiction will over lap and in deciding the question of Specific Performance, the Civil court may also be compelled to decide on the validity of certain encumbrances created by the Agreement Vendor. Such question cannot be said to be barred by the provisions of the two enactments referred to above”. 17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgment reported in 2006 (5) SCC 72 has held as follows: “15. It is evident from Section 17 and 18 of the Debts Recovery Act that civil Court's jurisdiction is barred only in regard to applications by a bank or a financial institution for recovery of its debts. 17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgment reported in 2006 (5) SCC 72 has held as follows: “15. It is evident from Section 17 and 18 of the Debts Recovery Act that civil Court's jurisdiction is barred only in regard to applications by a bank or a financial institution for recovery of its debts. The jurisdiction of civil Courts is not barred in regard to any suit filed by a borrower or any other person against a bank for any relief ”. 18. The Hon'ble Division Bench of our High Court in a judgment reported in 2008 (1) CTC 471 in which Para 11 (d) and (h) has held as follows: 11. Bar of jurisdiction under Section 18 of the 1993 Act: (a)..... (b)... (c)... (d) Section 17 of the 1993 Act relates to “jurisdiction, powers and authority of Tribunals, as quoted hereunder: “Section 17. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of Tribunals. - (1) A Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, the jurisdiction, powers and authority to entertain and decide applications from the banks and financial institutions for recovery of debts due to such banks and financial institutions. (2) An Appellate Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, the jurisdiction, powers and authority to entertain Appeals against any order made, or deemed to have been made, by a Tribunal under this Act” On the other hand, Section 18 of the 1993 Act imposes a “bar of jurisdiction”, which reads as follows: “Section 18. Bar of jurisdiction – On and from the appointed day, no Court or other authority shall have, or be entitled to exercise, any jurisdiction, powers or authority (except the Supreme Court, and a High Court exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution) in relation to the matters specified in Section 17” From the aforesaid provisions, it would be evident that there is no total ouster of jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The ouster is by virtue of Section 18 of the 1993 Act, which sets out that no Court or other authority can try matters of recovery of debts. Insofar as the reliefs which do not pertain to debts, on a plain reading of Section 17 of the 1993 Act, are concerned, there can be no doubt that the Civil Court will still retain the jurisdiction Centurion Bank Ltd. v. Indian Lead Ltd., 2000 (100) Comp. Cas. 537. (e)... Insofar as the reliefs which do not pertain to debts, on a plain reading of Section 17 of the 1993 Act, are concerned, there can be no doubt that the Civil Court will still retain the jurisdiction Centurion Bank Ltd. v. Indian Lead Ltd., 2000 (100) Comp. Cas. 537. (e)... (f)... (g).. (h) In the present case, as the plaintiff is neither the Bank/financial institution nor the borrower, the provisions of Section 17 of the 1993 Act are not attracted. It is not the case of the Bank that they filed an Application for recovery of its debt from the plaintiff. The plaintiff who is not a party before the DRT, has only alleged fraud played by the parties to obtain orders from the DRT and therefore, in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court, as referred to above, we hold that the present Suit is not barred by the provisions of 19. The learned Single Judge of this Court in a judgment reported in 2015 (1) MLJ 170 in which Paragraph Nos. 15 and 18 has held as follows: “15. A careful perusal of Section 18 of the said Act would show that it contemplates that no Court shall be entitled to exercise any jurisdiction, powers or authority, except the Supreme Court and the High Court, in relation to the matters specified under Section 17 of the said Act. Thus, it is manifested that only in relation to the matters specified under Section 17 of the Act, the Civil Court's jurisdiction is ousted. While considering the scope of Section 17 of the said Act dealing with the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunals, it is evident that such jurisdiction, powers and authority shall be entertained by the Tribunals in respect of the applications from the Banks and financial institutions for recovery of debts due to such Banks and financial institutions. To put it simply, the jurisdiction of the Tribunals to entertain the applications is only in respect of the applications filed by the Banks and financial institutions, that too for recovery of debts due to them. Thus, such jurisdiction, exclusively to be exercised by the Tribunals, as empowered under Section 17 of the Act, cannot be entertained by the Civil Courts and such entertainment is barred under Section 17 of the said Act. Thus, such jurisdiction, exclusively to be exercised by the Tribunals, as empowered under Section 17 of the Act, cannot be entertained by the Civil Courts and such entertainment is barred under Section 17 of the said Act. Thus, a combined reading of Section 18 and Section 17 of the said Act would only drive this Court to come to a conclusion that the “ bar of jurisdiction” imposed under Section 18 on the Civil Courts, is not total to exercise its jurisdiction in all matters in respect of the disputes between the parties, and on the other hand, such restriction is imposed only in relation to the matters specified under Section 17 of the said Act. So, the bar is only qualified and conditional. 18. Considering the scope of Section 18 of the Act, coupled with a combined reading of Section 17 of the Act and considering the above decisions of the Apex Court, I am of the view that the “bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts” contemplated under Section 18 of the Act, is not a total bar as claimed by the petitioner/fourth defendant and on the other hand, it is only under the circumstances stated therein”. 20. In view of the above said judgments, this Court can easily come to a conclusion that a prayer for permanent injunction to protect the possession of the plaintiffs is not maintainable before the Debt Recovery Tribunal and only a Civil Court has got jurisdiction to entertain such a suit under Section 9 of Civil Procedure Code. That apart, the plaintiffs are not parties to the Debt Recovery Tribunal proceedings. No recovery certificate has been issued as against the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs are neither the borrowers nor the guarantors of the Bank. The plaintiffs are the 3rd party purchasers and had purchased the suit schedule properties 3 months prior to the creation of equitable mortgage by their vendor. The Bank has accepted the equitable mortgage with regard to the suit schedule properties without even obtaining an encumbrance certificate from the mortgagor for the period covering 1994 to 1996, which would have clearly disclose that the mortgagor has already alienated the suit schedule properties and he has no right, title or possession over the suit schedule properties, so as to create an equitable mortgage with the defendant Bank. These facts will clearly establish that a Civil suit is maintainable and it is not barred under Section 18 Recovery of Debts and due to Banks and Financial Institution Act, 1993. 21. The learned counsel for the appellants further contended that the plaintiffs have not established any cause of action for filing present suit on the ground that the defendant Bank is located in Chennai and nobody would have gone to the suit property which is located in Karur to disturb the possession. The defendants while cross-examining the plaintiffs, had suggested that the plaintiffs have not initiated any action as against the Bank officials from Karur Branch. For the said suggestion the plaintiffs had explained that the officials from the Karur Branch had informed them that they have come over the suit schedule properties only under the orders of the officials of the Egmore Branch. This suggestion is put by the defendant during the cross-examination of the plaintiffs will clearly establish that at the instance of the Bank officials of the defendant, the Karur Branch officials have visited the suit schedule properties and created disturbance to the plaintiffs' possession. Hence, the contention of the defendant that the plaintiffs have no cause of action for filing the present suit is not legally sustainable. 22. The First Appellate Court has refused to grant a decree for injunction on the ground that under Section 41(b) the Specific Relief Act, an injunction to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought cannot be granted. According to the First Appellate Court, the District Munsif Court is subordinate to Debt Recovery Tribunal and hence, an injunction decree cannot be granted. 23. The learned Single Judge of this Court in a judgment reported in 2009 (1) CTC 227 in which paragraph nos. 42 to 45 has held as follows: “42. Once it is accepted that an injunction cannot be granted to restrain a person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a Court not subordinate to the Court from which an injunction is sought, then the next question would be as to whether the Debts Recovery Tribunal could be construed as a Court not subordinate to this Court. 43. Once it is accepted that an injunction cannot be granted to restrain a person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a Court not subordinate to the Court from which an injunction is sought, then the next question would be as to whether the Debts Recovery Tribunal could be construed as a Court not subordinate to this Court. 43. The question whether the DRT is a Court subordinate to the High Court, espcecially when the High Court is exercising jurisdiction on its ordinary original side, was considered by a learned Judge of the Calcutta High Court in State Bank of India v. Madhumita Construction Pvt. Ltd., AIR 2003 Cal. 7 . The learned Judge held in paragraph-13.3 that de hors the supervisory jurisdiction and power of the High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution, the Debts Recovery Tribunal cannot be construed as a Court subordinate to the High Court and that while exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction, under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, this Court is only exercising coordinate jurisdiction. Therefore the learned Judge took the view that no injunction can be granted by the High Court while exercising ordinary original jurisdiction (entertaining a Civil Suit), restraining a person from instituting proceedings before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. 44. The words “Court subordinate” or “Court not subordinate” are not defined in the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Therefore these words have to be assigned only their natural meaning, in the absence of an indication in the statute about the sense in which the words are used therein. The Civil Procedure Code speaks of subordinate of Courts in Section 3, in the following manner: “3. Subordinate of Courts:- For the purposes of this Code, the District Court is subordinate to the High Court and every Civil Court of a grade inferior to that of a District Court and every Court of Small Causes is subordinate to High Court and District Court”. 45. Sections 23 and 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, speak of “Court subordinate”, while dealing with the general power of transfer and withdrawal. A reading of these provisions, gives a clue that unless two Courts fall in a line of hierarchy, one cannot be taken to be subordinate or superior to the other.” 24. 45. Sections 23 and 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, speak of “Court subordinate”, while dealing with the general power of transfer and withdrawal. A reading of these provisions, gives a clue that unless two Courts fall in a line of hierarchy, one cannot be taken to be subordinate or superior to the other.” 24. In the present case, admittedly, the Debt Recovery Tribunal and the District Munsif Court does not fall in a line of hierarchy and hence, the District Munsif Court cannot be considered to be subordinate to the Debt Recovery Tribunal. That apart, the bar under Section 41(b) of Specific Relief Act could be attracted only if a prayer has been sought as against the Bank prohibiting them from enforcing the rights under RDDB Act. The present suit is not an anti suit injunction, but based on the property rights of the plaintiffs. Hence, viewed from any angle, the bar under Section 41(b) of Specific Relief Act is not attracted. 25. In view of the above said discussions, the First Appellate Court has grossly erred in holding that the plaintiffs' vendor had created an equitable mortgage in favour of the defendant Bank. The First Appellate Court has also erred in invoking Section 18 of Recovery of Debts and due to Banks and Financial Institution Act, 1993 and Section 41(b) of Specific Relief Act in order to non suit the plaintiffs. The judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court are not legally sustainable and hence, deserves interference by this Court. The judgment and decree of the First Appellate are set aside and judgment and decree of the trial Court are restored. The second appeal is allowed. No costs.