JUDGMENT : Sanjib Banerjee, CJ. (Prayer: Appeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the order dated 6.11.2019 passed in W.P.No.39318 of 2015.) 1. The appeal is directed against an order dated November 6, 2019 by which the appellant’s writ petition has been disposed of by noticing that an amount on account of subsidy due to the appellant had been paid by the third respondent bank and by giving liberty to the appellant to make a representation to the first respondent bank to consider waiver of interest on account of the delayed receipt of partial subsidy. 2. The appellant obtained a loan from the first respondent bank in 2012 under a scheme that apparently permitted the appellant to claim subsidy from the third respondent NABARD. There is a document on record to demonstrate that the first respondent Indian Overseas Bank wrote to NABARD on August 16, 2012 indicating that it had sanctioned a loan of Rs.40 lakh against a project outlay in excess of Rs.56 lakh for which a subsidy claim of about Rs.18.88 lakh had been made. The letter was issued to NABARD for the subsidy that the appellant was eligible to receive to be released. 3. The appellant claims that the relevant scheme envisaged the subsidy to be made over immediately to the farmer so that the loan obtained from the bank could be repaid therewith. According to the appellant, the amount of subsidy ultimately released by NABARD in January, 2017 was to the tune of Rs.8,46,625/-. 4. The appellant asserts that the scope of the writ petition was misconstrued by the Writ Court as the Writ Court failed to appreciate that because of the delayed release of the partial subsidy, the appellant had suffered serious prejudice as she was liable to pay interest to the first respondent bank. The appellant also says that the Writ Court failed to notice that NABARD had failed to release the full complement of the subsidy that the appellant was entitled to. The appellant says that as a consequence, the appellant’s account has been declared as NPA by the first respondent bank and steps have been taken against the appellant by such bank. 5. The appellant says that as a consequence, the appellant’s account has been declared as NPA by the first respondent bank and steps have been taken against the appellant by such bank. 5. It is possible that the appellant may have been hard done by on account of the apparently delayed release of the subsidy and the failure on the part of NABARD to release the total quantum of subsidy that had been demanded by the appellant. It is equally possible that there were circumstances beyond the control of NABARD, as would be evident from a letter dated June 18, 2015 addressed by NABARD to the first respondent bank, that the delay was attributable to the bank or the appellant for a joint inspection of the storage facility not being undertaken earlier. It is, similarly, possible that NABARD ought to have released the full quantum of subsidy that the appellant sought. 6. However, any adjudication on the several aspects involved could not have been undertaken in summary proceedings or on affidavit evidence. Ordinarily, petitions entertained under Article 226 of the Constitution are dealt with on affidavit evidence and in a summary manner and not by way of a protracted trial. The appellant’s claim had to be regarded as one for damages on account of the perceived delay on the part of the respondents to the writ petition. A matter of damages can scarcely be assessed in summary manner, whether a case of damages had been made out or, if made out, as to the quantum of damages that ought to be awarded. 7. Even if the submission of the appellant is accepted that the Court of the first instance may not have appreciated the scope of the prayers carried to the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, it cannot be lost sight of that the full-fledged adjudication that the appellant-writ petitioner was seeking would have required an involved process of trial, receipt of evidence and appreciation thereof which is, ordinarily, not undertaken in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. 8. In the fitness of things, the appellant is permitted to institute a suit in respect of her claim against the respondents herein. It will be open to the appellant to urge all grounds notwithstanding the order impugned. 9. 8. In the fitness of things, the appellant is permitted to institute a suit in respect of her claim against the respondents herein. It will be open to the appellant to urge all grounds notwithstanding the order impugned. 9. This order is made without requiring any prior notice to be issued to the respondents herein since the order would not prejudice the respondents and the respondents will be entitled to take whatever defence that may be available to them in accordance with law. In any event, the institution of the suit or even any counter-claim in the first respondent’s claim will not stand in the way of the first respondent pursuing its claim against the appellant in accordance with law. In the event a ground of delay is raised if any proposed suit or counter-claim is sought to be launched, it will be open to the appellant herein to cite Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in respect of the time spent in this Court. 10. The appeal is disposed of on the above basis and by repeating that the judgment and order impugned will not prejudice the appellant herein in any other action that the appellant institutes or defends. W.A.No.218 of 2021 is disposed of without any order as to costs. Consequently, C.M.P.No.1046 of 2021 is closed. Copies of this order should be communicated to the respondents herein by the appellant within a fortnight from date.