ORDER : U. Durga Prasad Rao, J. 1. The writ petitioner filed the following 10 writ petitions seeking writ of mandamus declaring the Assessment Orders passed by 3rd respondent on different dates for different tax periods described writ petition wise infra, treating sales of certain equipment as hospital equipment or hospital furniture instead of treating them as medical equipment and levying tax @ 14.5% instead of 5% under Entry 111 of IV schedule to the A.P. Value Added Tax, 2005 (for short, 'the AP VAT Act, 2005') as illegal and consequently pass orders which are deemed fit in the circumstances of the case. Sl. No. Writ Petition No. Assessment period Date of Assessment Order Tax levied (in Rs.) Equipment Remarks/ Note 1. 13540/2017 01.01.2013 to 31.12.2016 30.03.2017 7,28,501 Hospital beds, OT lights, bedside cabinets 2. 13553/2017 September 2010 To December 2012 30.03.2015 13,49,719 -do- 3. 15238/2017 2010-11 31.03.2015 4,29,958 -do- 4. 15244/2017 2009-10 28.03.2014 2,71,537 -do- 5. 15580/2017 2012-13 31.03.2016 2,15,422 -do- 6. 17410/2017 2011-12 09.10.2015 3,04,665 -do- 7. 35385/2017 01.08.2006 to 30.09.2008 27.12.2008 10,44,917 -do- Assessment order was challenged in appeal which was allowed. The Department preferred revision before R2 and allowed. The same was challenged in WP.No.2802/2010. As per the directions of HC, R2 again passed fresh revision order. 8. 21450/2020 2013-14 28.03.2017 1,50,955 -do- 9. 21799/2020 2014-15 29.01.2019 15,86,461 -do- 10. 22163/2020 April 2015 to March 2016 27.12.2019 15,63,960 -do- 2. In W.P. Nos. 21450, 21799 & 22163 of 2020, counters filed by learned Government Pleader for Commercial Taxes opposing the writ petitions on the main contention that the petitioner is carrying on business in medical/hospital equipment and on verifying his returns the Assessing Authority found that the hospital equipment sold by the petitioner during the relevant assessment years is liable to tax @ 14.5% as they come under the residuary schedule V of the A.P. VAT Act. The contention of the petitioner that he was doing business in medical/hospital equipment viz., ICU beds, fowlers beds, semi-fowler hospital beds, emergency stretcher unit, patient examination bed, physiotherapy bed etc. which fall within the description of medical equipment/devices and implants' in Entry No. 111 of Schedule IV and hence, tax is to be levied only 5% on the turnover is far-fetching as the equipment dealt with by the petitioner is only a furniture and therefore, he cannot absolve his liability to pay tax @14.5%. which fall within the description of medical equipment/devices and implants' in Entry No. 111 of Schedule IV and hence, tax is to be levied only 5% on the turnover is far-fetching as the equipment dealt with by the petitioner is only a furniture and therefore, he cannot absolve his liability to pay tax @14.5%. It is further contended that the hospital equipment cannot be equated with medical equipment inasmuch as, the hospital equipment like hospital beds, racks, lockers, operation theatre lights etc. will only answer the description of hospital furniture, but not medical equipment. The term 'medical equipment' means an instrumentality, used with skill either in diagnosis or cure of a disease and therefore, every hospital equipment cannot be treated as medical equipment. The 3rd respondent treated the above equipment as hospital equipment following the CCT's Circular Ref. No. A111(3)/48/2009 dated 20.02.2009 and CCT's Circular reference in CCT's Addl. CCT/Enft/DCTO-1/60/2010 dated 16.11.2010. The Advance Ruling Authority in CTD Order AO. No. 58/2016 dated 21.05.2016 in AR.Com. 42/2009 dated 21.05.2016 pleased to decide the tax liability on the issue of patient cots, patient beds etc. by holding that they do not fall under any of the entries in Schedule I, II, IV and VI of the A.P. VAT Act, 2005 and to be treated as hospital furniture falling under residuary entry of Schedule V. The respondents thus prayed to dismiss the writ petitions. 3. Heard arguments of learned counsel for petitioners Sri P. Balaji Varma and Sri Singam Srinivasa Rao, and learned Government Pleader for Commercial Taxes representing the respondents. 4. While reiterating the petition averments, Sri Balaji Varma would argue that the equipment sold by the petitioner to various hospitals is not a mere hospital furniture, but the said equipment is specifically designed for use in either diagnosis or treatment of the patients in the hospitals and therefore, they squarely fall within the groove of 'medical equipments/devices and implants' as narrated in Entry 111 of Schedule IV and hence exigible to tax @ 5% but not 14.5% as sought to be levied under Schedule V of the AP VAT Act, 2005 by the revenue. He placed reliance on Imperial Surgico Industries Lucknow v. Commissioner of S.T., U.P., (1969) 23 STC 201 , Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Associated Dental & Medical Supply Co., (1976) 37 STC 336, to bolster his case. 5. He placed reliance on Imperial Surgico Industries Lucknow v. Commissioner of S.T., U.P., (1969) 23 STC 201 , Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Associated Dental & Medical Supply Co., (1976) 37 STC 336, to bolster his case. 5. Per contra, while reiterating the counter averments learned Government Pleader for Commercial Taxes would argue that the equipment like hospital beds, racks, lockers, operation theatre lights etc. are used neither for diagnostic nor treatment purpose and therefore, they will not come under the term 'medical equipment/devices/implants" and therefore, the Assessing Authority has rightly assessed the tax liability under residuary entry under Schedule V and hence, the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. He relied upon Deputy Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax and Sales Tax v. E.V. Industries, (1974) 33 STC 308 (Ker). The interpretation of the term 'medical equipments/devices and implants' mentioned in Entry 111 of Schedule IV of the A.P. VAT Act, 2005 is the bone of contention in these writ petitions. The petitioner carries on business in medical/hospital equipments like semi-fowler hospital beds, ABS headboards, Emergency Stretcher Units, Patient examination beds, Physiotherapy beds and other equipment by procuring from M/s. Hebei Pukang Medical Instruments Co. Ltd., China. He is a VAT dealer registered on the rolls of 3rd respondent. Most of the equipments covered in the batch of writ petitions are hospital beds, OT lights, bedside cabinets etc. Neither party described about other type of hospital equipment. In the assessment orders covered by the batch of writ petitions also, the aforesaid equipments are only prominently mentioned. Hence, we will deal with those equipments only in this common order. It should be noted that the term 'medical equipments/devices and implants' is not defined under the A.P. VAT Act, 2005. Hence, a purposive construction of the statute is essential. In Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras v. The Ajax Products Limited, 1965 (1) SCR 700 : (1965) 55 ITR 741 , the Apex Court expounded the method of interpretation of tax statutes by quoting the rule of construction pithily stated by Rowlatt J in Cape Brandy Syndicate v. IRC (1921) 1 KB 64 as follows : "13. xxx. "In a Taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. xxx. "In a Taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used." 14. To put it in other words, the subject is not to be taxed unless the charging provision clearly imposes the obligation. Equally important the rule of construction is that if the words of a statute are precise and unambiguous, they must be accepted as declaring the express intentions of the legislature." In A.V. Fernandez v. State of Kerala, AIR 1957 SC 657 case, the Apex Court elucidated the interpretation of fiscal statutes thus : "29. It is no doubt true that in construing fiscal statutes and in determining the liability of a subject to tax one must have regard to the strict letter of the law and not merely to the spirit of the statute or the substance of the law. If the Revenue satisfies the Court that the case falls strictly within the provisions of the law, the subject can be taxed. If, on the other hand, the case is not covered within the four corners of the provisions of the taxing statute, no tax can be imposed by inference or by analogy or by trying to probe into the intentions of the legislature and by considering what was the substance of the matter." In Hansraj and sons v. State of Jammu and Kashmir's case, 2002 (6) SCC 227 , the Apex Court referring to its earlier decisions, delineated the method of interpretation of tax laws and the instances when benefit of doubt should be given to the tax payer thus : "30. A similar view was taken in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Gujarat-III, Ahmedabad v. Ellis Bridge Gymkhana, [1998] 229 ITR 1 (SC), in which it was observed: "rule of construction of a charging section is that before taxing any person, it must be shown that he falls within the ambit of the charging section by clear words used in the section. No one can be taxed by implication. A charging section has to be construed strictly. No one can be taxed by implication. A charging section has to be construed strictly. If a person has not been brought within the ambit of the charging section by clear words, he cannot be taxed at all." 31. Again in the case of Diwan Bross v. Central Bank of India, Bombay and others, AIR 1976 SC 1503 , a three Judge bench of this Court construing the principles of interpretation of fiscal statutes, quoted with approval, the observations in A.V. Fernandez v. State of Kerala (supra), and in State of Maharashtra v. Mishri Lal Tarachand Lodha, [1964] 5 SCR 230, in which it was observed: "The Act is a taxing statute and its provisions therefore have to be construed strictly, in favour of the subject-litigant". 32. Following the ratio in the aforementioned decisions it was observed: "These observations manifestly show that the courts have to interpret the provisions of a fiscal statute strictly so as to give benefit of doubt to the litigant. The principles deducible from the decisions referred to above are well established and admit of no doubt." 6. Thus, from the above jurisprudential jurimetrics, it is clear that tax or fiscal statutes shall be interpreted with reference to strict letter of law but not merely to the spirit or the substance of the law. In case when two constructions are possible, that one favourable to the tax payer has to be adopted. With this principle, it has now to be seen whether the different varieties of hospital equipments sold by the petitioner) fall within the groove of medical equipment/device/implants as mentioned in Entry 111 of Schedule IV or fall under the term 'furniture' so as to be charged under the residuary entry of Schedule V of the AP VAT Act, 2005. As already stated, the term 'medical equipment/device/implants' is not defined under the Act. The simple words 'equipment/device/implant' may refer to any type and any purpose if they are not qualified by the important prefix 'medical'. Therefore, it is important and germane at this juncture to derive the meaning of the word 'medical' which governs the rest of the words. In New Health New Zealand Incorporated v. South Taranaki District Council and another case, [2018] NZSC 59, the Supreme Court of Newzealand happened to discuss the term 'medical treatment'. Therefore, it is important and germane at this juncture to derive the meaning of the word 'medical' which governs the rest of the words. In New Health New Zealand Incorporated v. South Taranaki District Council and another case, [2018] NZSC 59, the Supreme Court of Newzealand happened to discuss the term 'medical treatment'. The facts were that the local municipal councils of Patea and Waverley undertook fluoridation of water supplied to the public by mixing two compounds viz., Hexafluorosilicic Acid (HFA) and Sodium Silicofluoride (SSF), to raise the level of fluoride content in the water obviously to prevent a tooth decay. The said act was challenged by the appellant New Health New Zealand Incorporated on the plea that the two compounds mixed in the water by the councils are medicines in terms of the Medicines Act, 1981 and while drinking the water the public were ingesting the medicines without their consent and it amounts to forcible medical treatment against the will of the citizens and fell foul of Section 11 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. Then one of the questions arose before the Supreme Court was whether fluoridation amounts to 'medical treatment' in breach of right to refuse such treatment safeguarded under Section 11 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990. In the above context, it was argued on behalf of the appellant that the term 'medical' as defined in the concise Oxford English dictionary means "of or relating to the science or practice of medicine" and whereas the dictionary definition of "treatment" is "the process or manner of treating someone or something in a certain way", "medical care for an illness or injury" and "the use of a substance or process to preserve or give particular properties to something". It is thus argued that medical treatment if purposively interpreted, Section 11 covered the medical treatment whether provided directly or indirectly. This argument weighed with the majority view of the Supreme Court of Nswzealand and the appeal was ultimately allowed. As per Merriam Webster Dictionary, the term 'medical' means 'requiring or devoted to medical treatment'. As per Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, the term 'medical' means 'connected with illness and injury and their treatment'. 7. Therefore, the term 'medical' is associated with diagnosis and treatment of injury or illness either directly or indirectly. Obviously cure and care are part of the medical practice. As per Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, the term 'medical' means 'connected with illness and injury and their treatment'. 7. Therefore, the term 'medical' is associated with diagnosis and treatment of injury or illness either directly or indirectly. Obviously cure and care are part of the medical practice. In that context, the term 'medical equipments, devices and implants' can be understood as those equipments, devices and implants which partake in diagnostic or therapeutic process either directly or indirectly. In view of the employment of the adjective 'medical', more than the material used for their fabrication, the 'purpose for which they were manufactured, will decide whether they come under entry No. 111 of Schedule IV or residuary entry of Schedule V. 8. Testing on the anvil of medical purpose, there can be no demur to emphasise that hospital beds are customized or tailor-made to suit the diagnostic tests, treatment process and also for post-operative care and comfort of a patient. Though for argument sake one may say that a hospital bed can also be used as furniture at home, still it is a misfit to be called as furniture, for, home furniture is meant for elegant and decorative purposes. The same is the case with OT lights. These OT lights are also customized to provide LED (Light Emitting Diode) technology, Shadow less illumination, free rotation etc. to be used in diagnostic and treatment process. By no stretch of imagination the OT lights can be said to be part of home furniture. However, unlike the hospital beds and OT lights, the bedside cabinets and lockers, though customized to some extent for the convenient use of the patients and doctors, still they do not partake in the main task of diagnosis or treatment. Moreover, they can be used as home furniture also. Hence, they cannot be called as medical equipment or device to be categorized under Entry 111 of Schedule IV. So, in substance, while hospital beds and OT lights satisfy the term 'medical equipment', bedside cabinets and lockers do not in our considered view. Moreover, they can be used as home furniture also. Hence, they cannot be called as medical equipment or device to be categorized under Entry 111 of Schedule IV. So, in substance, while hospital beds and OT lights satisfy the term 'medical equipment', bedside cabinets and lockers do not in our considered view. Our view gets fortified by the following decisions cited by the petitioner: (i) In Commissioner of Sales Tax's case, (1976) 37 STC 336 (supra), the question before the High Court of Bombay was whether the Sales Tax Tribunal was justified in holding that the sale of dental chairs manufactured by the respondents therein was covered by Entry 22 of Schedule E and not by Entry 56 of Schedule C of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. The Sales Tax Officer in the assessment order and the Assistant Commissioner in the appeal held that the dental chairs come under the description 'furniture' thus falling under Entry 56 of Schedule C. However, in appeal the Tribunal observed that for an article to come under Entry 56 as 'furniture', it must be an article of convenience or decoration used in the house or place of business and hence, the dental chair cannot be described as furniture. Entry 22 of Schedule E is a residuary entry whereas Entry 56 of Schedule C reads as "iron and steel safes, almirahs and furniture and upholstered furniture". While examining the Tribunal's judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay has observed that meaning of the term describing the goods in the entries in the Schedules to the Sales Tax Act has to be gathered from the trade parlance or the common parlance in the trade. What is trade parlance is a question of fact which can be gathered from evidence and in the absence of such evidence, the entries could be construed according to their dictionary meaning. The Division Bench observed that the Tribunal gathered documentary evidence in the form of pictures and literature with regard to dental chair which clearly shows that the dental chairs are different from ordinary chairs. The Division Bench while agreeing with the Tribunal's judgment, has observed that it would be difficult to accept the contention of the revenue that dental chair shall be regarded as furniture because it is intended for comfort or convenience of the patient. The Division Bench while agreeing with the Tribunal's judgment, has observed that it would be difficult to accept the contention of the revenue that dental chair shall be regarded as furniture because it is intended for comfort or convenience of the patient. The reason for disagreement was that the primary purpose of a dental chair was not to enable a patient to sit comfortably in it, but to enable the dentist to give proper treatment to his patients. It ultimately held that a dental chair cannot be regarded as an item of furniture, but must be regarded as a specially designed equipment to enable proper dental treatment to be given to patients. Therefore, in the above decision the High Court of Bombay has given prominence to the specific use than the make' or common use of an equipment while fixing its category in the Schedules. (ii) In Imperial Surgico Industries's case, (1969) 23 STC 201 (supra), the Allahabad High Court answered the reference that the articles such as bedside lockers, dressing carriages, instrument trolleys, instrument tables, instrument cabinets, revolving stools and self-propelling chair though may be used as furniture, however, in view of their generally accepted role for which they were made, they cannot be called as furniture. So, in this decision also basing on the main use of the articles their place in the relevant entry of the Act was decided. It should be noted that in this case all the articles including bedside lockers described above are treated as hospital equipment and levied lower rate under Section 3 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. However, in our case since the words equipment, devices and implants are qualified by the term 'medical', only those equipments, devices and implants that partake the role in diagnosis, treatment or care of the patients either directly or indirectly, can be held to be covered under Entry 111 of IV schedule. In that process, bedside lockers and cabinets are excluded from that purview. 9. Then, we have perused the judgment in the case of E.V. Industries, (1974) 33 STC 308 (Ker) (supra) cited by the learned Government Pleader. In that case, item No. 17 in the first schedule to the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 reads as "Safes, Almirahs and Furniture made of iron and steel". 9. Then, we have perused the judgment in the case of E.V. Industries, (1974) 33 STC 308 (Ker) (supra) cited by the learned Government Pleader. In that case, item No. 17 in the first schedule to the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 reads as "Safes, Almirahs and Furniture made of iron and steel". Going by it, the Assessing Authority treated certain articles (though such articles are said to be mentioned in the appendix, same is not enclosed to the judgment) sold by the dealer to the hospitals as falling under item No. 17, levied tax @ 12% of turnover under Section 5 of KGST Act. The said assessment was upheld by the High Court of Kerala taking the popular meaning of the words 'furniture made of iron and steel' into consideration. It is not known whether in KGST Act there is an akin entry like 111 of Schedule IV to the AP VAT Act, 2005. Therefore, this decision cannot be taken as an authority for the case on hand. 10. We have also perused the Circular in Ref. CCT's Addl. CCT/Enft/DCTO-1/60/2010 dated 16.11.2010. Generally, executive fiats will not substitute the statutes. In that context, at the first instance the circular said to be issued by the Commissioner, CT cannot be treated as beacon for the assessing authorities. On the other hand, they should construe the terms of the statute with reference to their popular meaning, or dictionary meaning and also the judicial pronouncements. 11. Thus, we perorate, those equipments, devices and implants which partake in the process of diagnosis, treatment, cure and care of the patients either directly or indirectly, will alone come under Entry 111 of Schedule IV of the AP VAT Act, 2005. Whether a particular equipment, device or implant fulfils the aforesaid test is a question of fact to be determined on case-to-case basis. 12. In the result, the batch of writ petitions are partly allowed by setting aside the impugned assessment orders with a direction to the concerned Assessing Authorities to pass the fresh assessment orders by including the hospital beds and OT lights in Entry No. 111 of Schedule IV and bedsides lockers/cabinets in residuary entry of Schedule V of the AP VAT Act, 2005. No costs. As a sequel, interlocutory applications pending for consideration, if any, shall stand closed.