ORDER : The revision petitioner/accused is before this Court assailing the impugned Judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 07.09.2007 passed in Criminal Case No.32/2005 on the file of learned Civil Judge (Jr.Dn.) and J.M.F.C., Navalgund (for short ‘the Trial Court’), convicting him for the offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304(A) of IPC and under Section 134 read with Section 187 of Motor Vehicles Act (for short ‘the M.V.Act.’) and sentencing him to undergo simple imprisonment for two months for the offence punishable under Section 279 of IPC and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment of fine amount, to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two months for the offence punishable under Section 304(A) of IPC and to pay fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine amount, to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month for the offence punishable under Section 134 read with Section 187 of M.V. Act, which was confirmed by the learned Principal District and Sessions Judge, Dharwad (for short ‘the Appellate Court’) vide Judgment dated 31.01.2011 passed in Criminal Appeal No.141/2007. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the informant-Sri Parappa Shivappa Hireholi lodged the first information with Navalgund police on 04.01.2005 against the driver of the lorry bearing Registration No.KA-26/7425 stating that the accused being the driver of the lorry driven the same in a rash and negligent manner so as to endanger the human life, from Navalgund towards Hubballi and dashed to Renuka-a minor girl aged 16 years, while she was crossing the road along with the informant and caused her death at the spot and thereby committed the aforesaid offences. 3. On the basis of the first information, Navalgund Police registered Crime No.3/2005 and the investigation was undertaken. During the investigation, it is revealed that the revision petitioner was the driver of the offending vehicle at the time of accident. After investigation, the charge sheet came to be filed against the accused for the above said offences. The accused has appeared before the Trial Court and pleaded not guilty for the charges leveled against him. 4. The prosecution examined P.Ws.1 to 7 and got marked Exs.P.1 to 7 in support of its contention. After investigation, the charge sheet came to be filed against the accused for the above said offences. The accused has appeared before the Trial Court and pleaded not guilty for the charges leveled against him. 4. The prosecution examined P.Ws.1 to 7 and got marked Exs.P.1 to 7 in support of its contention. The accused has denied all the incriminating materials available on record in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., but has not chosen to lead any evidence in support of his defence. The Trial Court after taking into consideration all these materials came to the conclusion that the prosecution is successful in proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and proceeded to convict him as stated above. When the accused preferred appeal before the Appellate Court, the same came to be dismissed as devoid of merits, confirming the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the Trial Court. 5. Being aggrieved by the impugned Judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial Court, which was confirmed by the Appellate Court, the accused is before this Court seeking to set aside the same in the interest of justice. 6. Heard Sri Dayanand M.Bandi learned counsel for the revision petitioner/accused and Sri Ramesh B.Chigari learned HCGP for the respondent-State. Perused the material including the Trial Court records. 7. It is the contention of the prosecution that the accused being the driver of the lorry bearing Registration No.KA-26/7425, driven the same in a rash and negligent manner so as to endanger the human life, from Navalgund towards Hubballi on 04.01.2005 at 5.00 p.m. and dashed against the victim-Renuka and caused her death. Thereby he has committed the offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304(A) of IPC and under Section 134 read with Section 187 of the M.V.Act. To prove this contention, the prosecution is relying on the evidence of P.W.1, who is the uncle of the deceased and who had accompanied her at the time of incident. This witness being the eyewitness, deposed before the Court regarding the accident caused by the accused. Witness stated that the lorry in question was driven in a high speed and dashed against Renuka while she was crossing the road and he identified the accused before the Court. This witness being the eyewitness, deposed before the Court regarding the accident caused by the accused. Witness stated that the lorry in question was driven in a high speed and dashed against Renuka while she was crossing the road and he identified the accused before the Court. Witness also stated that he filed the first information as per Ex.P.1 and that on the next day the police have came to the scene of occurrence and drawn the spot and seizure mahazars as per Exs.P.2 and 3. This witness was cross-examined at length by the learned counsel for the accused regarding the speed with which the lorry in question was driven. It is suggested to the witness that the deceased herself came and fallen under the lorry and died at the spot. It is suggested that the accused was not either rash or negligent in his driving. All these suggestions were denied by the witness. 8. P.W.2 is the witness for the inquest and seizure panchanams. P.W.3 is cited as an eyewitness, but has not supported the case of prosecution. 9. P.W.4 is the Doctor, who conducted the postmortem examination of the dead body of the deceased. Witness stated that after postmortem examination, he issued the postmortem examination report as per Ex.P.6 and spoke about the cause of death. 10. P.W.5 is the Police Constable, who shifted the dead body of the deceased-girl for postmortem examination. P.W.6 is the Station House Officer, who registered the case against the accused. 11. Ex.P.1 is the first information lodged by P.W.1. Even though the name of the accused is not mentioned in Ex.P.1, the informant stated that he can identify the accused. Ex.P.2 is the inquest panchanama, Ex.P.3 is the spot panchanama. Ex.P.5 is the motor vehicle accident report, according to which, the accident was not due to any mechanical defect in the vehicle. 12. Ex.P.6 is the postmortem report, according to which, the death was due to shock and hemorrhage and injury to brain and the injuries were antemortem in nature. Multiple crush injuries were noted in the postmortem report. 13. Ex.P.8 is the F.I.R. and Ex.P.9 is the spot mahazar drawn by the Investigating Officer. As per this document, the road leading from Navalgund towards Hubballi is having the width of 24 feet, having kachcha road measuring 8 feet on either side. Multiple crush injuries were noted in the postmortem report. 13. Ex.P.8 is the F.I.R. and Ex.P.9 is the spot mahazar drawn by the Investigating Officer. As per this document, the road leading from Navalgund towards Hubballi is having the width of 24 feet, having kachcha road measuring 8 feet on either side. The lorry in question which was proceeding from Navaglund towards Hubballi was found on the extreme right side of the road. The scene of occurrence is also on the right side of the road leaving 16 feet on the left side and 8 feet on the right side. 14. These materials on record, especially the evidence of P.W.1 coupled with the postmortem report and the spot sketch disclose that the offending vehicle had proceeded on the wrong side of the road and caused the accident, which has resulted in the death of deceased-Renuka. Even though P.W.1 was cross-examined at length nothing has been elicited from him to disbelieve his version. The tenor of cross-examination of this witness goes to show that the accused is not denying the fact of accident. He also does not deny the death of the deceased-Renuka due to the accident as narrated by P.W.1. It is interesting to note that the accused never denies that he was the driver of the offending lorry at the time of incident. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the prosecution has not proved rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle to cause the accident in question. It is his contention that P.W.1 has only stated that the vehicle had come in a high speed and caused the accident, which is not sufficient to conclude that the accused was either rash or negligent in his driving. 15. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner has relied on the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka vs. Satish, reported in LAWS(SC) 1996 (3) 111 to contend that high speed is a relative term and it is for the prosecution to bring on record sufficient material to establish as to what it meant by high speed in the facts and circumstances of the case. He also placed reliance on the decision in the case of Abdul Subhan vs. State of Delhi, reported in LAWS (DLH) 2006 9 61, wherein, High Court of Delhi relying on the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Satish (supra) held that the prosecution is not successful in proving either rash or negligent driving by the accused. 16. Per Contra, learned HCGP contended that the accused has not denied the factum of accident and he being the driver of the offending vehicle at the time of incident. No defence whatsoever is taken by the accused during trial. The accused is duty bound to explain as to how the accident had occurred as he is the author of the crime and the fact leading to such accident is especially within his knowledge. The accused has not explained as to how the accident had occurred even in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. The prosecution placed cogent materials to prove its contentions, which are not specifically denied by the accused. On the other hand, when the accused admits the accident caused by him while driving the offending vehicle, is not entitled to take up contradictory defence at this stage. 17. Learned HCGP relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ravi Kapur vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2012) 9 SCC 284 in support of his contention and contended that the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner are no more a good law in view of the later decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 18. On consideration of these rival contentions between the parties, the point that would arise for my consideration is ; “Whether the revision petition is liable to be allowed?” 19. My answer to the above point is in the negative for the following : REASONS 20. In the light of the materials placed before this Court, it is found that the accused has never disputed the factum of accident. On the other hand, he admits that he was the driver of the offending lorry and also admits the accident which has resulted in the death of Renuka. Strangely no defence whatsoever is taken up during the course of cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses. On the other hand, he admits that he was the driver of the offending lorry and also admits the accident which has resulted in the death of Renuka. Strangely no defence whatsoever is taken up during the course of cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses. It is suggested to P.W.1 that the deceased herself came and fallen beneath the lorry, as a result of which, she died. It is interesting to note that even though the Investigating Officer deposed regarding the spot sketch Ex.P.9, the same has not been controverted in any manner. Moreover the accused has not explained as to how the accident has occurred either in the statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. or by stepping into the witness box. 21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ravi Kapur’s (supra) held as under : 12. Rash and negligent driving has to be examined in the light of the facts and circumstances of a given case. It is a fact incapable of being construed or seen in isolation. It must be examined in light of the attendant circumstances. A person who drives a vehicle on the road is liable to be held responsible for the act as well as for the result. It may not be always possible to determine with reference to the speed of a vehicle whether a person was driving rashly and negligently. Both these acts presuppose an abnormal conduct. Even when one is driving a vehicle at a slow speed but recklessly and negligently, it would amount to “rash and negligent driving” within the meaning of the language of Section 279 of IPC. That is why the legislature in its wisdom has used the words “manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life”. The preliminary conditions, thus, are that (a) it is a manner in which the vehicle is driven ; (b) it be driven either rashly or negligently; and (c) such rash or negligent driving should be such as to endanger human life. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the penalty contemplated under section 279 of IPC is attracted. 13. “Negligence” means omission to do something which a reasonable and prudent person guided by the considerations which ordinarily regulate human affairs would do or doing something which a prudent and reasonable person guided by similar considerations would not do. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the penalty contemplated under section 279 of IPC is attracted. 13. “Negligence” means omission to do something which a reasonable and prudent person guided by the considerations which ordinarily regulate human affairs would do or doing something which a prudent and reasonable person guided by similar considerations would not do. Negligence is not an absolute term but is a relative one; it is rather a comparative term. It is difficult to state with precision any mathematically exact formula by which negligence or lack of it can be infallibly measured in a given case. Whether there exists negligence per Section or the course of conduct amounts to negligence will normally depend upon the attending and surrounding facts and circumstances which have to be taken into consideration by the court. In a given case, even not doing what one was ought to do can constitute negligence. 14. The Court has to adopt another parameter, i.e., “reasonable care” in determining the question of negligence or contributory negligence. The doctrine of reasonable care imposes an obligation or a duty upon a person (for example a driver) to care for the pedestrian on the road and this duty attains a higher degree when the pedestrian happen to be children of tender years. It is axiomatic to say that while driving a vehicle on a public way, there is an implicit duty cast on the drivers to see that their driving does not endanger the life of the right users of the road, may be either vehicular users or pedestrians. They are expected to take sufficient care to avoid danger to others. 15. The other principle that is pressed in aid by the courts in such cases is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. This doctrine serves two purposes – one that an accident may by its nature be more consistent with its being caused by negligence for which the opposite party is responsible than by any other causes and that in such a case, the mere fact of the accident is prima facie evidence of such negligence. Secondly, it is to avoid hardship in cases where the claimant is able to prove the accident but cannot prove how the accident occurred. The courts have also applied the principle of res ipsa loquitur in cases where no direct evidence was brought on record. Secondly, it is to avoid hardship in cases where the claimant is able to prove the accident but cannot prove how the accident occurred. The courts have also applied the principle of res ipsa loquitur in cases where no direct evidence was brought on record. The Act itself contains a provision which concerns with the consequences of driving dangerously alike the provision in the IPC that the vehicle is driven in a manner dangerous to public life. Where a person does such an offence he is punished as per the provisions of Section 184 of the Act. The courts have also taken the concept of “culpable rashness” and “culpable negligence” into consideration in cases of road accidents. “Culpable rashness” is acting with the consciousness that mischievous and illegal consequences may follow but with the hope that they will not and often with the belief that the actor has taken sufficient precautions to prevent their happening. The imputability arises from acting despite consciousness (luxuria). “Culpable negligence” is acting without the consciousness that the illegal and mischievous effect will follow, but in circumstances which show that the actor has not exercised the caution incumbent upon him and that if he had, he would have had the consciousness. The imputability arises from the neglect of civic duty of circumspection. In such a case the mere fact of accident is prima facie evidence of such negligence. This maxim suggests that on the circumstances of a given case the res speaks and is eloquent because the facts stand unexplained, with the result that the natural and reasonable inference from the facts, not a conjectural inference, shows that the act is attributable to some person’s negligent conduct. [Ref. Justice Rajesh Tandon’s An Exhaustive Commentary on Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (1st Edn., 2010). 39. It is true that the prosecution is required to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt but the provisions of Section 313 Cr.P.C. are not a mere formality or purposeless. They have a dual purpose to discharge, firstly, that the entire material parts of the incriminating evidence should be put to the accused in accordance with law and, secondly, to provide an opportunity to the accused to explain his conduct or his version of the case. To provide this opportunity to the accused is the mandatory duty of the court. They have a dual purpose to discharge, firstly, that the entire material parts of the incriminating evidence should be put to the accused in accordance with law and, secondly, to provide an opportunity to the accused to explain his conduct or his version of the case. To provide this opportunity to the accused is the mandatory duty of the court. If the accused deliberately fails to avail this opportunity, then the consequences in law have to follow, particularly when it would be expected of the in the normal course of conduct to disclose certain facts which may be within his personal knowledge and have a bearing on the case.” 22. Thus, the position of law is very well settled, in view of this verdict by the Hon’ble Apex Court. 23. It is also pertinent to note that the accused has not discharged his burden of proving the fact which is especially within his knowledge, as required under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act. The accused has not stated anything as to how the accident occurred, if he was not either rash or negligent in driving. It is not the case where there are no eyewitnesses to the incident. P.W.1 is the eyewitness, who was with the deceased at the time of incident and immediately thereafter he lodged the first information. He identified the accused as the driver of the offending vehicle. These facts and circumstances cannot be ignored while considering the contentions of the parties. If these facts and circumstances are analyzed in the light of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, I do not have any hesitation to hold that the accused being the driver of the offending vehicle driven the same in rash and negligent manner and dashed against the deceased while she was crossing the road, which has resulted in her death and thereby he has committed the offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304(A) of IPC and under Section 134 read with Section 187 of the M.V.Act. 24. I have gone through the impugned Judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the Trial Court, which was confirmed by the Appellate Court. I do not find any infirmity or perversity or illegality in the same. Hence, the revision petition being devoid of merits is dismissed.