JUDGMENT The Court made the following: COMMON JUDGMENT: (per Hon'ble The Chief Justice Sri Raghvendra Singh Chauhan) Leave granted. Aggrieved by the acquittal of the respondent-accused, Mr. Anand Sharma, under Section 368 of IPC and under Section 16/17 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences, 2012 (for short “the POCSO Act"), the State of Uttarakhand has challenged the order dated 16.01.2021, passed by the learned Additional District & Session Judge/ Special Judge POCSO, Haridwar. 2. In order to protect the identity of the victim, neither the name of the victim, nor the name of the complainant, her mother, is being revealed in the present judgment. 3. Briefly, the facts of the case are that, the victim's mother (P.W.2) lodged a complaint before the Police Station Kotwali Nagar Haridwar, District Haridwar, wherein she claimed that on 12.01.2016, her eldest daughter, the victim, left the house without informing anyone at home. Ever since then, she is missing; her whereabouts are unknown. On the basis of this compliant, a missing report, namely Missing Report No.03 of 2016 was recorded. 4. Subsequently, the complainant lodged a complaint against Santosh, co-accused in this case, claiming therein that her daughter had been recovered by the police from the possession of Santosh. The said complaint was registered as Criminal Case No.14 of 2016, for the offences under Sections 363, 366 (A) of IPC. On conclusion of the investigation, the police submitted a charge-sheet against Santosh for the offence under Sections 363, 366 (A), 376(2)(l)(n) of IPC, and for the offence under Section 5(1)/6 of the POCSO Act. The police also submitted a charge-sheet against the present respondent-accused, Mr. Anand Sharma, for the offences under Section 368 of IPC, and for the offence under Section 16/17 of POCSO Act. 5. Since Santosh was a juvenile, by order dated 14.11.2017, the trial of respondent-accused was separated, and the case of Santosh was sent to the Juvenile Justice Board for inquiry. 6. In order to prove its case against the present respondent-accused, Mr. Anand Sharma, the prosecution examined seven witnesses, and submitted twelve exhibits before the learned Trial Court. 7. After going through the evidence produced by the prosecution, the learned Trial Court acquitted the respondent-accused, Mr. Anand Sharma. Hence, the present Government Appeal before this Court. 8. Mr. 6. In order to prove its case against the present respondent-accused, Mr. Anand Sharma, the prosecution examined seven witnesses, and submitted twelve exhibits before the learned Trial Court. 7. After going through the evidence produced by the prosecution, the learned Trial Court acquitted the respondent-accused, Mr. Anand Sharma. Hence, the present Government Appeal before this Court. 8. Mr. J.S. Virk, the learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State, has vehemently contended that the learned Trial Court has erred in acquitting the respondent-accused for the offence under Section 368 of IPC, and for the offence under Section 16/17 of the POCSO Act. Therefore, the impugned judgment deserves to be set-aside. 9. Heard the learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State, and perused the impugned judgment. 10. A bare perusal of the impugned judgment clearly reveals that the victim (P.W. 1) has deposed before the learned Trial that “my Date of Birth is 06.03.2020. I have studied in the Government School at Devpura from Class I to Class V. I do not remember the name of the school. On 12.01.2016, at about 10:00 AM, I had gone to a shop. On the way, I met Anand and Santosh, both of whom are brother. Both of them asked me to go with them. However, I refused. They threatened me that in case I do not go with them, they will kill both of my brothers, and my entire family. Therefore, both of them took me to Dehradun. I would have shouted for help, but they had placed a chemical on my nose. Therefore, I became unconscious. They took to their brother's house in Dehradun. I had my phone with me. I would call, but they broke my SIM card. I told them that I wish to go back home, but they would not let me go. They kept me in a room. Santosh's sister-in-law forcefully made me wear some bangles. Once Santosh had physical relationship with me. When Santosh used to go outside, Anand used to stand as a guard. When Santosh came back, I told him that I would like to go to home, but he did not permit me to do so. Eight days' later, on 20.01.2016, the police rescued me from the house belonging to Anand. I do not remember the name of the colony. They also caught Santosh with me. Anand had already absconded. When Santosh came back, I told him that I would like to go to home, but he did not permit me to do so. Eight days' later, on 20.01.2016, the police rescued me from the house belonging to Anand. I do not remember the name of the colony. They also caught Santosh with me. Anand had already absconded. On the same day, I was medically examined in the Government hospital at Haridwar. That day, my mother was with me. When the statement under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. of the victim was read to the victim, she admitted that she had given this statement. She further claimed that she had given this statement under duress, as Santosh had threatened her". 11. In her cross-examination, the victim informs the Court that “presently her age is nineteen years". She admitted that “earlier she had deposed before the Juvenile Board". She further admitted that “she had informed the Juvenile Board that she knew Santosh. She further informed the Board that Santosh is the resident of Kadhach, Jwalapur. He used to meet her often. They also used to talk on phone. In January, 2016, Santosh informed her that he is going to Badanu. He told her to go to his brother's house in Dehradun". She further claimed that “in January, 2016, Santosh met her on the road. They went to Rishikul Bus Stand, and from there, they went to Dehradun together". She further claimed that “he took her to his brother's house. His brother's name is Anand. Thereafter, Santosh fill the parting of hair with vermilion and told her that they are like husband and wife. Despite her objections, he made physical relationship with her. On 20th, the police recovered them. According to the victim, Santosh had threatened her and one day he had even slapped her". She further claimed that “she has made statement to the police only under duress, as she had been threatened by Santosh". She admits to the facts that “the police had recorded her statement only once". She further claimed that “when she was recovered along with Santosh, he had come with her to the court. Santosh was in handcuffs". She further claimed that “she does not remember as to how many days after her recovery, she was produced before the Magistrate, as it is an old incident". She further claimed that “when she was recovered along with Santosh, he had come with her to the court. Santosh was in handcuffs". She further claimed that “she does not remember as to how many days after her recovery, she was produced before the Magistrate, as it is an old incident". She further claimed that “she was produced before the Magistrate, they took me from ‘the Kotwali (Police Station)', and not from her house". She further claimed that “she does not remember whether her statement under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. was recorded on 21.01.2016 or not". She further admitted that “it is true that when her statement under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. was recorded, only two persons were present in the court hall (the victim and the judge)". She further admitted that “she did not tell the Judge that she had been threatened by Santosh". She further admitted that “in her statement recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C., she had stated that she wanted to marry Santosh, and they were in love with each other". She claimed that “she had made this statement because she was threatened by Santosh". She further admitted that “whatever she has stated against Anand, in her examination-in-chief, she never stated the said facts in her statement under Section 161 of Cr.P.C., recorded by the police". She further admitted that “she has never told anyone anything about the involvement of Anand". She further admitted that “it is true that she knows Santosh, but she does not know Anand". She further admitted that “in her statement given to the Doctor, while she was subjected to medical examination, she did not mention anything about Anand". 12. Even the mother of the victim (P.W. 2), in her cross-examination, clearly admits that “both in her statement recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C., and her deposition before the Juvenile Justice Board, she had never named Anand as an offender in the present case". 13. Dr. Meeta Shrivastav (P.W. 3), in her examination in chief, states that on 20.01.2016, the victim was produced before her for medical examination. In the column “dealing with the precise statement made by the victim", it is written that “the victim told her that she met Santosh in the Mansha Devi Temple. He is seventeen years old. Thereafter, they both started talking to each other over the phone. In the column “dealing with the precise statement made by the victim", it is written that “the victim told her that she met Santosh in the Mansha Devi Temple. He is seventeen years old. Thereafter, they both started talking to each other over the phone. One month later, on 12th January, both of them went to Dehradun. On 19.01.2016, the police recovered them". 14. The learned Trial Court has clearly noticed that the victim had made contradictory statement with regard to the offence under Section 368 of IPC. For, in her statement recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C., she had claimed that she had gone to Dehradun on her own, but in her examination-in-chief, she claimed that both Santosh and his brother have forcefully taken her to Dehradun. Yet, in her cross-examination, she claimed that Santosh had taken her to Dehradun. Hence, vis-à-vis the present respondent-accused, the victim is an untrustworthy witness. Therefore, according to the learned Trial Court, there was no evidence to show that the respondent-accused, Mr. Anand Sharma, hadany role to play in taking the victim to Dehradun. Hence, the learned Trial Court had concluded that neither the offence under Section 368 of IPC, nor the offence under Section16/17 of the POCSO Act was made out against the respondent-accused. 15. There are certain established principles with regard to the jurisdiction of the High Court while dealing with an acquittal order. In the case of Sampat Babso Kale v. State of Maharashtra, [ (2019) 4 SCC 739 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the principles with regard to the powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against an acquittal order. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:- 8. With regard to the powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal, the law is well established that the presumption of innocence which is attached to every accused person gets strengthened when such an accused is acquitted by the trial court and the High Court should not lightly interfere with the decision of the trial court which has recorded the evidence and observed the demeanour of witnesses. This Court in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka [ (2007) 4 SCC 415 , laid down the following principles: (SCC p. 432, para 42) “42. This Court in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka [ (2007) 4 SCC 415 , laid down the following principles: (SCC p. 432, para 42) “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons", “good and sufficient grounds", “very strong circumstances", “distorted conclusions", “glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." 16. In the case of State of Rajasthan v. Naresh, [ (2009) 9 SCC 368 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court opined that “an order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there are some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused". 17. These principles have recently been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Anwar Ali & another v. State of Himachal Pradesh, [ (2020) 10 SCC 166 ]. 17. These principles have recently been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Anwar Ali & another v. State of Himachal Pradesh, [ (2020) 10 SCC 166 ]. Therefore, these settled principles of criminal jurisprudence would have to be kept in mind while examining the legality or illegality of the impugned judgment. 18. It is, indeed, trite to state that the scope of interference with an acquittal order is extremely limited. In case, the view taken by the learned Trial Court is a reasonable and plausible one, then the acquittal order should not be interfered with lightly by the Appellate Court. It is only when the learned Trial Court has failed to admit an evidence, which was admissible, or ignored the evidence, which was readily available on record, or mis-appreciated the evidence, or has acquitted the accused on the basis of surmises and conjectures, or there is perversity in the reasoning of the learned Trial Court, only in such circumstances, would the Appellate Court be justified in overturning the verdict of acquittal and in convicting the accused. Therefore, while dealing with an acquittal order, the Appellate Court has to reassess the evidence available on record, and evaluate the reasoning given by the learned Trial Court. 19. Since, a plausible and reasonable view has been taken by the learned Trial Court considering the fact that there is a contradiction in the testimony of the star witness, the victim, this Court does not find any merit in this appeal. Hence, the appeal is hereby dismissed. 20. Pending application, if any, stands rejected.