JUDGMENT V.K. Birla, J. 1. Heard Sri Ashok Khare, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Gyan Prakash, learned Counsel for the petitioners-Bank and Sri Amrendra Pratap Singh, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 3 and perused the record. Learned ASGI has accepted notice on behalf of respondents No. 1 and 2. 2. This bunch of petitions involves identical controversy and therefore, with consent of learned Counsel for the parties, the petition being Writ-C No. 2340 of 2021 is being taken up as the leading case. 3. The petition has been filed challenging the impugned order dated 31.1.2020 and Form (R) notice for payment of gratuity dated 5.2.2020 passed by the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central)/Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 in Case No. A-48 (38) of 2018 (Shri Dilip Kumar Shukla v. The Chairman, Purvanchal Bank and another). 4. By the impugned order, the Controlling Authority (respondent No. 2 herein) under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') allowed the claim/application filed by the contesting respondent No. 3 under Rule 10 (i) of the Act read with section 7(4) of the Act after condoning the delay in filing the said application. 5. A preliminary objection was raised by Sri Amrendra Pratap Singh, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 3 on the ground that the petitioner-Bank has efficacious alternative statutory remedy under section 7 (7) of the Act before the Appellate Authority. Therefore, present petition is not maintainable. He submits that once the statutory alternative remedy is available under the aforesaid provisions, there is no occasion to entertain present petition under the Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the same is liable to be dismissed on the ground of availability of statutory alternative remedy itself. 6. Replying the preliminary objection, Sri Khare, learned Senior Counsel submits that the order passed by the Controlling Authority is wholly without jurisdiction and therefore, availability of statutory remedy would not be a bar in the present case. He submits that sending the matter from one Authority, who has committed jurisdictional error, to another Authority under the same Act would not, in any case, be efficacious alternative remedy and therefore, present petition is maintainable. He submits that sending the matter from one Authority, who has committed jurisdictional error, to another Authority under the same Act would not, in any case, be efficacious alternative remedy and therefore, present petition is maintainable. He submits that the preliminary objection that the order passed by the Controlling Authority is appealable under the Act, was raised in Writ-C No. 20437 of 2018 (Purvanchal Bank, Head Office Mohiddidpur and another v. Chief Labour Commissioner and others) and was rejected by Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court on the ground that any order, which is bereft of reasons or findings on the facts and circumstances brought before the statutory Authority, cannot withstand the test or scrutiny and cannot be allowed to survive merely on the ground that the said order is appealable before a higher Authority. He further submits that the services of the respondent No. 3 are governed by Service Regulations, namely, Purvanchal Gramin Bank (Officers & Employees) Service Regulations, 2010 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Regulations') framed under section 30 of the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the RRB Act). He submits that Regulation 72 of the Regulations governs the gratuity payable to an officer or an employee. Drawing attention to various provisions of the Act as well as of the Regulations, he submits that in the Regulations, a distinction has been drawn in case of an 'officer' and that of an 'employee', therefore, in the present case, the gratuity is to be calculated as per the Regulations as applicable to an officer. He pointed out that in the present litigation, all are officers of the Bank. He submits that second proviso to clause 3 of Regulation 72 of the Regulations uses the expression "last pay drawn" applicable to the 'officer' and therefore, the said provision covers the same. He submits that the third proviso as applicable to an 'employee' includes the basic pay, dearness allowance and special allowance etc., therefore, there being a clear distinction between the two and thus, interpretation of term "pay" as applicable in case of an 'employee' cannot be made applicable to an 'officer'. He further pointed out that the Controlling Authority has Authority only to interpret the provisions of the Act and has no Authority to interpret the provisions of Regulations as applicable on the bank employee. He further pointed out that the Controlling Authority has Authority only to interpret the provisions of the Act and has no Authority to interpret the provisions of Regulations as applicable on the bank employee. He further submits that even otherwise the maximum limit upto which gratuity can be awarded under the Act is only Rs. 10,00,000/-, therefore, the Controlling Authority has no jurisdiction to decide the dispute above that limitation and under no circumstances, he can direct payment of gratuity over and above Rs. 10,00,000/-. He pointed out that as per Regulation 72 of the Regulations, the amount of gratuity is to be calculated in two modes; one, in accordance with the provisions of Service Regulations and second, in accordance with the provisions of Payment of Gratuity Act and as per sub-regulation (2) of Regulation 72 of the Regulation, the amount whichever is higher. He submits that in case the amount calculated as per Regulation is less and the amount as per the Act is higher, the officers shall be entitled for the higher amount, however, with a ceiling of Rs. 10,00,000/-. He further pointed out that admittedly, the amount calculated as per the Regulation was less than Rs. 10,00,000/- and calculation of the amount as per the Act was higher, therefore, as per the ceiling, a sum of Rs. 10,00,000/- as provided under the Act had already been paid to the contesting officers, which had been accepted by them without protest. 7. Crux of the argument of Sri Khare, learned Senior Counsel is that: clearness allowance is not included in last drawn pay as per Regulation 72 of the Regulations; the Controlling Authority under the Act has no jurisdiction to grant gratuity above Rs. 10,00,000/- and therefore, direction to pay amount above Rs. 7. Crux of the argument of Sri Khare, learned Senior Counsel is that: clearness allowance is not included in last drawn pay as per Regulation 72 of the Regulations; the Controlling Authority under the Act has no jurisdiction to grant gratuity above Rs. 10,00,000/- and therefore, direction to pay amount above Rs. 10,00,000/- is without jurisdiction; 'Officer' and 'Employee' are two different categories as per Service Regulations and calculation of gratuity is governed by second and third proviso of the Regulation 72 of the Regulations; clearly the Controlling Authority lacks pecuniary jurisdiction; and once the amount of gratuity has been accepted as calculated under the Service Regulation without protest, if any claim is filed or dispute is raised before the Controlling Authority, he had no jurisdiction to condone the delay; the Controlling Authority had no jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of Service Regulations as he is an Authority only under the Payment of Gratuity Act and therefore, the interpretation given by the Controlling Authority that in the term 'pay' as given in the Service Regulations, which governs the category of officers, dearness allowance is also included in the basic-pay by necessary implications, is wholly without jurisdiction; and once it is accepted that service conditions are to be governed by the Service Regulations, the officer cannot insist upon having the best out of the two schemes as scheme has to be accepted or rejected in toto. Submission, therefore, is that the order of the Controlling Authority is without jurisdiction and the issue involved in the present bunch of petitions goes to the root of the matter wherein interpretation of any fact or factual dispute is not required and purely jurisdictional issue is to be decided, therefore, the statutory alternative remedy is no bar and writ petition is maintainable. 8. In support of his argument to the merit of the case to contend that the order of the Controlling Authority is without jurisdiction and that the preliminary objection regarding availability of statutory remedy by way of appeal under the provisions of the Act has already been rejected, learned Counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on a judgment dated 4.7.2018 passed by Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court in Writ-C No. 20437 of 2018 (Purvanchal Bank, Head Office Mohiddidpur and another v. Chief Labour Commissioner and others). He has also referred to the interim orders passed by this Court in Writ-C No. 22082 of 2019, Writ-C No. 24879 of 2020, Writ-C No. 14568 of 2019 and to a recent judgment of Hon'ble Division Bench of Chhattisgarh High Court dated 28.1.2021 passed in bunch of writ appeals being WA No. 436 of 2020 (Chhattisgarh Rajya Gramin Bank through the Chairman, Mahadevghat Road, Sunder Nagar, Raipur, Chhattisgarh v. Arun Phansalkar) and other connected writ appeals and in Vidarbha Konkan Gramin Bank v. The Appellate Authority and another 2020 (166) FLR 452 (Bom.), touching upon the jurisdictional error committed by the Controlling Authority. 9. In reply to the arguments raised by Sri Ashok Khare, learned Senior Counsel, Sri Amrendra Pratap Singh, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 3, placing reliance on a judgment dated 16.10.2020 of learned Single Judge in a bunch of petitions being S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7359 of 2019 (Rajasthan Marudhara Gramin Bank, Jodhpur through its Chairman, Head Office Tulsi Tower, 9th B Road, Sardarpura, Jodhpur v. The Appellate Authority, Under Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 and The Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central), Ajmer) along with connected matters passed by Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur, submits that issue has been settled by the Rajasthan High Court on merits and therefore, no such jurisdictional issue or any other issue as has been raised by Sri Khare, learned Senior Counsel is involved in the present case. He has also placed reliance on a judgment of Chhattisgarh High Court passed in Writ Petition (L) No. 55 of 2020 (Chhattisgarh Rajya Gramin Bank through the Chairman, Mahadev Ghat Road, Sunder Nagar, Raipur v. Meghraj Pathak and others) dated 31.8.2020 and in a judgment of Calcutta High Court passed in W.P. No. 19538 (W) of 2018 (Chinmoy Majumder and others v. Paschim Banga Gramin Bank and others) dated 5.7.2019; the judgment of Kerala High Court in WP (C) No. 32386 of 2015 (W) (Muralee Mohanan KT and others v. Corporation Bank and others) dated 15.10.2019; and the judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court in WP No. 9182 of 2017 (All India Gramin Bank Pensioners Organization Unit, Rewa v. Madhyanchal Gramin Bank and another) dated 6.9.2018 along with other connected petitions, which was affirmed by the Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court passed in WA No. 1318 of 2018 (Madhyanchal Gramin Bank and another v. All India Gramin Bank Pensioners Organization Unit) along with connected matters wherein special appeals filed were dismissed. It was pointed out that the aforesaid judgment of Hon'ble Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court was taken up to Hon'ble Supreme Court by the Bank by filing Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos. 11113-11115 of 2019 (Madhyanchal Gramin Bank and another v. All India Gramin Bank Pensioners Organisation Unit, Rewa etc.), which was dismissed vide order dated 7.5.2019. Submission, therefore, is that alleged jurisdictional issue involved in the present case is now, in fact, no longer available to him and the present petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of alternative statutory remedy, in case the petitioners-Bank wishes to further challenge the order of the Controlling Authority. 10. At this stage, learned Senior Counsel submits that the judgment of learned Single Judge of Rajasthan High Court in Rajasthan Marudhara Gramin Bank (supra) was stayed by the Division Bench in D.B. Spl. Appl. Writ No. 503 of 2020 in its order dated 15.12.2020 and therefore, the said order is of no avail to the respondents. He further pointed out that in a recent judgment of Hon'ble Division Bench of Chhattisgarh High Court dated 28.1.2021 passed in Chhattisgarh Rajya Gramin Bank (supra), all such judgments including the dismissal of the special appeal by Hon'ble Apex Court in Madhyanchal Gramin Bank (supra) has been considered and the special appeals were decided in favour of the Bank. He further pointed out that in a recent judgment of Hon'ble Division Bench of Chhattisgarh High Court dated 28.1.2021 passed in Chhattisgarh Rajya Gramin Bank (supra), all such judgments including the dismissal of the special appeal by Hon'ble Apex Court in Madhyanchal Gramin Bank (supra) has been considered and the special appeals were decided in favour of the Bank. Submission, therefore, is that jurisdictional issue is involved in the present case, which is still open. He further submits that it is settled law that mere dismissal of special leave petitions does not settle the law as there is no merger. 11. I have considered the rival submissions on the issue of preliminary objection involved in the present batch of petitions. 12. Before proceeding further, it would be appropriate to take note of provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act and of the Service Regulations as well as of the merits of the case only to the extent to satisfy that if any exceptional circumstance are present in this bunch of petitions so that it may be decided whether alternative statutory remedy is a bar in the present bunch of petitions and the petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of statutory alternative remedy. 13. For ready reference, relevant Regulations of Purvanchal Gramin Bank (Officers and Employees) Service Regulations, 2010 are quoted as under: "1. Definitions- (1) ..... (a) "Act" means the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976 (21 of 1976); (i) "Emoluments" means the aggregate of salary and allowances, if any; (j) "Employee" means an employee of the Bank as classified under clauses (b) and (c) of sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 3, and includes such employee whose services are lent to other organizations under Regulation 75; (l) "Officer" means an officer of the Bank as classified under clause (a) of sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 3; (m) "Pay" means basic pay drawn per month by the officer or employee in a pay-scale including stagnation increments an any part of the emoluments which may specifically be classified as pay under these Regulations. (o) "Salary" means aggregate of pay and dearness allowances. 3. (o) "Salary" means aggregate of pay and dearness allowances. 3. Classification of officers and employees (1) The officers and employees of the Bank shall be classified as follows, namely- Junior Management (i) Scale I (Assistant Manager) Middle Management (ii) Scale II (Manager) (iii) Scale III (Senior Manager) Senior Management (iv) Scale IV (Chief Manager) (v) Scale V (Assistant General Manager) Explanation: For the purposes of these Regulations, the Chairman may designate the officer, as Branch Manager, Regional Manager or General Manager, depending on the work of functions assigned and the scale of the officer. (b) Group 'B'- Office Assistants (Multipurpose). (c) Group 'C'- Office Attendants (Multipurpose). (2) Nothing in this Regulation shall be construed as requiring the Bank to have at all times all the cadres or categories of the officers or employees serving the Bank. 72. Gratuity- (1) An officer or employee shall be eligible for payment of gratuity either as per the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (39 of 1972) or as per sub-regulation (2), whichever is higher. (2) Every officer or employee shall be eligible for gratuity on,- (a) retirement (b) death (c) disablement rendering him unfit for further service as certified by a medical officer approved by the Bank, or (d) resignation after completing 10 years of continuous service, or (e) termination of service in any other way except by way of punishment after completion of 10 years of service. Provided that in respect of an employee there shall be no forfeiture of gratuity for dismissal on account of misconduct except in cases where such misconduct causes financial loss to the bank and in that case to that extent only. Provided that in respect of an employee there shall be no forfeiture of gratuity for dismissal on account of misconduct except in cases where such misconduct causes financial loss to the bank and in that case to that extent only. (3) The amount of gratuity payable to an officer or employee shall be one months pay for every completed year of service or part thereof in excess of six months subject to a maximum of 15 month's pay: Provided that where an officer or employee has completed more than 30 years of service, he shall be eligible by way of gratuity for an additional amount at the rate of one half of a month's pay for each completed year of service beyond 30 years: Provided further that in respect of an officer the gratuity is payable based on the last pay drawn: Provided also that in respect of an employee pay for the purposes of calculation of the gratuity shall be the average of the basic pay (100%), dearness allowance and special allowance and officiating allowance payable during the 12 months preceding death, disability, retirement, resignation or termination of service, as the case may be." (Emphasis supplied) 14. For ready reference, relevant sections' of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 are quoted as under: "2. Definition- In this Act, unless..... (d) "Controlling Authority" means an Authority appointed by the appropriate Government under section 3; (e) "employee" means any person (other than an apprentice) who is employed for wages, whether the terms of such employment are express or implied, in any kind of work, manual or otherwise, in or in connection with the work, of a factory, mine, oilfield, plantation, port, railway, company, shop or other establishment to which this Act applies, but does not include any such person who holds a post under the Central Government or a State Government and is governed by any other Act or by any Rules providing for payment of gratuity; (s) "wages" means all emoluments which are earned by an employee while on duly or on leave in accordance with the terms and conditions of his employment and which are paid or are payable to him in cash and includes dearness allowance but does not include any bonus, commission, house rent allowance, overtime wages and any other allowance. 3. 3. Controlling Authority.-The appropriate Government, may, by Notification, appoint, any officer to be a Controlling Authority, who shall be responsible for the administration of this Act and different Controlling Authorities may be appointed for different areas. 4. Payment of gratuity- (3) The amount of gratuity payable to an employee shall not exceed ten lakh rupees. (5) Nothing in this section shall affect the right of an employee to receive better terms of gratuity under any award or agreement or contract with the employer. 7. Determination of the amount of gratuity- (4) (a)... (b) Where there is a dispute with regard to any matter or matters specified in clause (a), the employer or employee or any other person raising the dispute may make an application to the Controlling Authority for deciding the dispute." (Emphasis supplied) 15. It is not in dispute that all the contesting respondents were officers of the Bank and are governed by the Service Regulations. Definition clause definitely discloses that officer and employee have been defined differently. Regulation 3 provides for classification of officers and employees. Perusal of other provisions clearly indicates that the term 'officer' and the term 'employee' have been differently referred to in most of the provisions of the Regulations. Even the Regulation 39, which provides for penalties towards the officers and employees differently by providing different major and minor penalties. More specifically Regulation 72, draws distinction in both the terms and provides that different mode of calculation is to be adopted in case of an 'officer' and in case of an 'employee'. Reference may be made to second proviso and third proviso to the Regulation 72, which are categorical in nature. Under the Payment of Gratuity Act, a limit has been provided that amount of gratuity payable to an employee shall not exceed Rs.10,00,000 (unamended provisions as applicable in the present bunch of petitions). Under section 3 of the Act, the Controlling Authority who shall be Authority as notified by the appropriate Government to be Controlling Authority who shall be responsible for the administration of this Act and different controlling authorities may be appointed for different areas, meaning thereby, the Controlling Authority would have jurisdiction for the administration of this Act. As per section 4 (3) of the Act, the amount of gratuity payable to an employee shall not exceed Rs. 10,00,000 as already noted. As per section 4 (3) of the Act, the amount of gratuity payable to an employee shall not exceed Rs. 10,00,000 as already noted. Therefore, prima facie, the Controlling Authority would not have jurisdiction over the matters above Rs. 10,00,000/- or in other words, he cannot at all direct payment over and above Rs. 10,00,000/-. In this case, the Controlling Authority has the responsibility of administration of the Act, but it is to be seen that to what extent it can interpret the provisions of the Regulations, which are entirely different in nature. Particularly when the term 'Officer' is not included in the Payment of Gratuity Act and even if for the sake of argument can be deemed to have been included in the term 'employee' as defined in the Act, it is, of course, with the rider as provided therein. 16. At this stage, I am not inclined to deeply go into the merits of the case of the petitioners or of the respondents on merits as at present I am concerned with the maintainability of present petitions, however, broadly speaking, although against the judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Madhyanchal Gramin Bank (supra), special leave petitions were dismissed by Hon'ble Apex Court but as the law is settled that merely because special appeals were dismissed as there is no merger, the same cannot be treated as law having been settled by Hon'ble Apex Court. A reference may be made to a recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Khoday Distilleries Limited (Now known as Khoday India Limited) and others v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Limited, Kollegal (Under liquidation) represented by the Liquidator (2019) 4 SCC 376 : 2019 (200) AIC 148 (SC), paragraphs 26, 26.1 and 26.2 whereof are quoted as under: "26. From a cumulative reading of the various judgments, we sum up the legal position as under : 26.1 The conclusions rendered by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Kunhayammed and summed up in para 44 are affirmed and reiterated. 26.2 We reiterate the conclusions relevant for these cases as under: (Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala (2002) 6 SCC 359 ) SCC p. 384. "(iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non-speaking order or a speaking one. In either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. 26.2 We reiterate the conclusions relevant for these cases as under: (Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala (2002) 6 SCC 359 ) SCC p. 384. "(iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non-speaking order or a speaking one. In either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed. (v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order i.e. gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the Court, Tribunal or Authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country. But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the Court, Tribunal or Authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting the special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties. (vi) Once leave to appeal has been granted and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has been invoked the order passed in appeal would attract the doctrine of merger; the order may be of reversal, modification or merely affirmation. (viii) On an appeal having been preferred or a petition seeking leave to appeal having been converted into an appeal before the Supreme Court jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a review petition is lost thereafter as provided by sub-rule (1) of Order 47, Rule 1 CPC." (Emphasis supplied) 17. The latest judgment on the interpretation of the provisions as quoted above is the judgment of Hon'ble Chhattisgarh High Court in Chhattisgarh Rajya Gramin Bank (supra), which is dated 28.1.2021. The latest judgment on the interpretation of the provisions as quoted above is the judgment of Hon'ble Chhattisgarh High Court in Chhattisgarh Rajya Gramin Bank (supra), which is dated 28.1.2021. Therefore, without speaking much on the merits of the case, the fact remains that jurisdiction of the Controlling Authority has not yet been settled and divergent views of various High Courts are available on the issue in hand. 18. However, on merits of preliminary objection, at this stage for the purpose of considering the exception to the alternative remedy, it would be appropriate to take note of the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Beed District Central Coop. Bank Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and others (2006) 8 SCC 514 : 2006 (111) FLR 710 (SC), paragraphs 10, 11, 13, 14 and 16 whereof are quoted as under: "10. The 'doctrine of blue pencil' was evolved by the English and American Courts. In Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn. Vol. 9), p. 297, para 430, it is stated: "430. Severance of illegal and void provisions.-A contract will rarely be totally illegal or void and certain parts of it may be entirely lawful in themselves. The question therefore arises whether the illegal or void parts may be separated or "severed" from the contract and the rest of the contract enforced without them. Nearly all the cases arise in the context of restraint of trade, but the following principles are applicable to contracts in general." 11. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd Edn. 2005, Vol. 1, p. 553-554, it is stated : "Blue pencil doctrine (test).-A judicial standard for deciding whether to invalidate the whole contract or only the offending words. Under this standard, only the offending words are invalidated if it would be possible to delete them simply by running a blue pencil through them, as opposed to changing, adding, or rearranging words. (Black, 7th Edn., 1999) This doctrine holds that if Courts can render an unreasonable restraint reasonable by scratching out the offensive portions of the covenant, they should do so and then enforce the remainder. Traditionally, the doctrine is applicable only if the covenant in question is applicable, so that the unreasonable portions may be separated. E.P.I, of Cleveland, Inc. v. Basler 12 Ohio App2d 16 : 230 NE2d 552, 556. Traditionally, the doctrine is applicable only if the covenant in question is applicable, so that the unreasonable portions may be separated. E.P.I, of Cleveland, Inc. v. Basler 12 Ohio App2d 16 : 230 NE2d 552, 556. Blue pencil rule/test.-Legal theory that permits a Judge to limit unreasonable aspects of a covenant not to compete. Severance of contract.-"Severance can be effected when the part severed can be removed by running a blue pencil through it without affording the remaining part. Attwood v. Lamont (1920) 3 K 571, (Banking). A rule in contracts a Court may strike parts of a covenant not to compete in order to make the covenant reasonable. (Merriam Webster) Phrase referring to severance (q.v.) of contract. "Severance can be effected when the part severed can be removed by running a blue pencil through it" without affording the remaining part. Attwood v. Lamont (1920) 3 KB 571. (Banking)." 13. We, however, are of the opinion that the said doctrine cannot be said to have any application whatsoever in the instant case. Undoubtedly, the Payment of Gratuity Act is a beneficial statute. When two views are possible, having regard to the purpose, the Act seeks to achieve being a social welfare legislation, it may be construed in favour of the workman. However, it is also trite that only because a statute is beneficent in nature, the same would not mean that it should be construed in favour of the workmen only although they are not entitled to benefits thereof. (See Regional Director, ESI Corpn. v. Ramanuja Match Industries AIR 1985 SC 278 .). 14. Applying the 'Golden Rule of Interpretation of Statute', to us it appears that the question should be considered from the point of view of the nature of the scheme as also the fact that the parties agreed to the terms thereof. When better terms are offered, a workman takes it as a part of the package. He may volunteer therefor, he may not. Sub-section (5) of section 4 of the 1972 Act provides for a right in favour of the workman. Such a right may be exercised by the workman concerned. He need not necessarily do it. It is the right of individual workman and not all the workmen. When the expression "terms" has been used, ordinarily it must mean "all the terms of the contract". Such a right may be exercised by the workman concerned. He need not necessarily do it. It is the right of individual workman and not all the workmen. When the expression "terms" has been used, ordinarily it must mean "all the terms of the contract". While interpreting even a beneficent statute, like, Payment of Gratuity Act, we are of the opinion that either contract has to be given effect to or the statute. The provisions of the Act envisage for one scheme. It could not be segregated. Sub-section (5) of section 4 of the 1972 Act does not contemplate that the workman would be at liberty to opt for better terms of the contract, while keeping the option open in respect of a part of the statute. While reserving his right to opt for the beneficent provisions of the statute or the agreement, he has to opt for either of them and not the best of the terms of the statute as well as those of the contract. He cannot have both. If such an interpretation is given, the spirit of the Act shall be lost. Even in Shin Satellite (supra), this Court stated: "The proper test for deciding validity or otherwise of an agreement or order is "substantial severability" and not "textual divisibility". It is the duty of the Court to sever and separate trivial or technical parts by retaining the main or substantial part and by giving effect to the latter if it is legal, lawful and otherwise enforceable. In such cases, the Court must consider the question whether the parties could have agreed on the valid terms of the agreement had they known that the other terms were invalid or unlawful. If the answer to the said question is in the affirmative, the doctrine of severability would apply and the valid terms of the agreement could be enforced, ignoring invalid terms. To hold otherwise would be "to expose the covenanter to the almost inevitable risk of litigation which in nine cases out of ten he is very ill-able to afford, should he venture to act upon his own opinion as to how far the restraint upon him would be held by the Court to be reasonable, while it may give the covenantee the full benefit of unreasonable provisions if the covenanter is unable to face litigation." 16. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the workman cannot opt for both the terms. Such a construction would defeat the purpose for which sub-section (5) of section 4 has been enacted. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained, which is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. No costs." (Emphasis supplied) 19. Insofar as the maintainability of present petitions on the ground of availability of alternative remedy, it would be appropriate to take note of the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in U.P. State Spinning Co. Ltd. v. R.S. Pandey and another (2005) 8 SCC 264 : 2005 (107) FLR 729 (SC), wherein it was held that normally the High Courts should not entertain the writ petitions unless it is shown that there is something more in a case, something going to the root of the jurisdiction of the officer, something which would show that it would not be a case palpable injustice to the writ petitioner to force him to adopt the remedies provided by the statute. In this case, the issue of maintainability of writ petition on the ground of availability of alternative remedy was discussed in detail. 20. It would be beneficial to refer to paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of U.P. State Spinning (supra) are quoted as under: "14. In Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. (2003) 2 SCC 107 , this Court held that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of the compulsion and the Court must consider the pros and cons of the case and then may interfere if it comes to the conclusion that the petitioner seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; where there is failure of principles of natural justice or where the orders or proceeding are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. 15. In G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd. AIR 1952 SC 192 , CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd. AIR 1985 SC 330 , Ramendra Kishore Biswas v. State of Tripura 1999 (81) FLR 398 (SC), Shivgonda Anna Patil v. State of Maharashtra (1999) 3 SCC 5 , C.A. Abraham v. ITO AIR 1961 SC 609 , Titaghar Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa (1983) 2 SCC 433 , H.B. Gandhi v. Gopi Nath and Sons 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks (1998) 8 SCC 1 , Tin Plate Co. of India Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1998) 8 SCC 272 , Sheela Devi v. Jaspal Singh (1999)1 SCC 209, and Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan (2001) 6 SCC 569 , this Court held that where hierarchy of appeals is provided by the statue, party must exhaust the statutory remedies before resorting to writ jurisdiction. 16. If, as was noted in Ram and Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana (1985) 3 SCC 267 , the appeal is from "Caesar to Caesar's wife" the existence of alternative remedy would be a mirage and an exercise in futility. In the instant case the writ petitioners had indicated the reasons as to why they thought that the alternative remedy would not be efficacious. Though the High Court did not go into that plea relating to bias in detail, yet it felt that alternative remedy would not be a bar to entertain the writ petition. Since the High Court has elaborately dealt with the question as to why the statutory remedy available was not efficacious, it would not be proper for this Court to consider the question again. When the High Court had entertained a writ petition notwithstanding existence of an alternative remedy this Court while dealing with the matter in an appeal should not permit the question to be raised unless the High Court's reasoning for entertaining the writ petition is found to be palpably unsound and irrational. Similar view was expressed by this Court in First ITO v. Short Bros. (P) Ltd. AIR 1967 SC 81 , and State of U.P. v. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. (1977) 2 SCC 724 . That being the position, we do not consider the High Court's judgment to be vulnerable on the ground that alternative remedy was not availed. There are two well-recognised exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of statutory remedies. (P) Ltd. AIR 1967 SC 81 , and State of U.P. v. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. (1977) 2 SCC 724 . That being the position, we do not consider the High Court's judgment to be vulnerable on the ground that alternative remedy was not availed. There are two well-recognised exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of statutory remedies. First is when the proceedings are taken before the forum under a provision of law which is ultra vires, it is open to a party aggrieved thereby to move the High Court for quashing the proceedings on the ground that they are incompetent without a party being obliged to wait until those proceedings run their full course. Secondly, the doctrine has no application when the impugned order has been made in violation of the principles of natural justice. We may add that where the proceedings themselves are an abuse process of law the High Court in an appropriate case can entertain a writ petition. 17. Where under a statute there is an allegation of infringement of fundamental rights or when on the undisputed facts the taxing authorities are shown to have assumed jurisdiction which they do not possess can be the grounds on which the writ petitions can be entertained. But normally, the High Court should not entertain writ petitions unless it is shown that there is something more in a case, something going to the root of the jurisdiction of the officer, something which would show that it would be a case of palpable injustice to the writ petitioner to force him to adopt the remedies provided by the statute. It was noted by this Court in L. Hirday Narain v. ITO (1970) 2 SCC 355 , that if the High Court had entertained a petition despite availability of alternative remedy and heard the parties on merits it would be ordinarily unjustifiable for the High Court to dismiss the same on the ground of non-exhaustion of statutory remedies, unless the High Court finds that factual disputes are involved and it would not be desirable to deal with them in a writ petition. 18. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to take note of the few expressions in R. v. Hillington, London Borough Council (1974) 2 WLR 805, which seems to bring out the position well. 18. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to take note of the few expressions in R. v. Hillington, London Borough Council (1974) 2 WLR 805, which seems to bring out the position well. Lord Widgery, C.J. stated in this case: "It has always been a principle that certiorari will go only where there is no other equally effective and convenient remedy. ......................... The statutory system of appeals is more effective and more convenient than application for certiorari and the principal reason why it may prove itself more convenient and more effective is that an appeal to (say) the Secretary of State can be disposed of at one hearing whether the issue between them is a matter of law or fact or policy or opinion or a combination of some or all of those... whereas of course an appeal for certiorari is limited to cases where the issue is a matter of law and then only it is a matter of law appearing on the face of the order. ......................... An application for certiorari has however this advantage that it is speedier and cheaper than the other methods and in a proper case therefore it may well be right to allow it to be used...I would, however, define a proper case as being one where the decision in question is liable to be upset as a matter of law because on its face it is clearly made without jurisdiction or in consequence of an error of law." 19. After all the above discussion, the following observations of Roskill, L.J. In Hanson v. Church Commrs. (1977) 2 WLR 848 (CA), may not be welcomed but it should not be forgotten also: "There are a number of shoals and very little safe water in the unchartered seas which divide the line between prerogative orders and statutory appeals, and I do not propose to plunge into those seas....." 20. In a catena of decisions it has been held that writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be entertained when statutory remedy is available under the Act, unless exceptional circumstances are made out. 21. In U.P. State Bridge Corpn. In a catena of decisions it has been held that writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be entertained when statutory remedy is available under the Act, unless exceptional circumstances are made out. 21. In U.P. State Bridge Corpn. Ltd. v. U.P. Rajya Setu Nigam S. Karmachari Sangh 2004 (100) FLR 1020 (SC), it was held that when the dispute relates to enforcement of a right or obligation under the statute and specific remedy is, therefore, provided under the statute, the High Court should not deviate from the general view and interfere under Article 226 except when a very strong case is made out for making a departure. The person who insists upon such remedy can avail of the process as provided under the statute. To same effect are the decisions in Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke 1975 (31) FLR 195 (SC), Rajasthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant 1995 (71) FLR 211 (SC), Chandrakant Tukaram Nikam v. Municipal Corpn. of Ahmedabad (2002) 2 SCC 542 , and in Scooters India v. Vijai E.V. Eldred 1999 (81) FLR 87 (SC)." (Emphasis supplied) 21. Although, there are large number of judgments on this issue, however, a reference may be made to the latest judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Maharashtra Chess Association v. Union of India and others (2020) 13 SCC 285 , paragraphs 11, 14, 17, 19 and 20 whereof are quoted as under: "11. Article 226(1) of the Constitution confers on High Courts the power to issue writs, and consequently, the jurisdiction to entertain actions for the issuance of writs. The text of Article 226(1) provides that a High Court may issue writs for the enforcement of the fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution, or "for any other purpose". A citizen may seek out the writ jurisdiction of the High Court not only in cases where her fundamental right may be infringed, but a much wider array of situations. A citizen may seek out the writ jurisdiction of the High Court not only in cases where her fundamental right may be infringed, but a much wider array of situations. Lord Coke, commenting on the use of writs by Courts in England stated: "The Court of King's Bench has not only the Authority to correct errors in judicial proceedings, but other errors and misdemeanours [...] tending to the breach of peace, or oppression of the subjects, or raising of faction, controversy, debate or any other manner of mis-Government; so that no wrong or injury, public or private, can be done, but that this shall be reformed or punished by due course of law...." 14. While the powers the High Court may exercise under its writ jurisdiction are not subject to strict legal principles, two clear principles emerge with respect to when a High Court's writ jurisdiction may be engaged. First, the decision of the High Court to entertain or not entertain a particular action under its writ jurisdiction is fundamentally discretionary. Secondly, limitations placed on the court's decision to exercise or refuse to exercise its writ jurisdiction are self-imposed. It is a well-settled principle that the writ jurisdiction of a High Court cannot be completely excluded by statute. If a High Court is tasked with being the final recourse to upholding the rule of law within its territorial jurisdiction, it must necessarily have the power to examine any case before it and make a determination of whether or not its writ jurisdiction is engaged. Judicial review under Article 226 is an intrinsic feature of the basic structure of the Constitution. 17. The observation extracted above raises an important consideration with respect to the present case. If, by the self-imposed rule, the writ jurisdiction of High Courts is circumscribed by the existence of a suitable alternate remedy, whether constitutional, statutory, or contractual, then a High Court should not exercise its writ jurisdiction where such an alternate remedy exists. Thus, before we address the question of whether or not clause 21 of the Constitution and by-laws compel the Bombay High Court to abstain from entertaining the appellant's writ petition, we must first address ourselves to whether, even in the absence of Clause 21, the existence of an alternate remedy would create a bar on the Bombay High Court entertaining the appellant's writ petition. 19. This argument of the second respondent is misconceived. 19. This argument of the second respondent is misconceived. The existence of an alternate remedy, whether adequate or not, does not alter the fundamentally discretionary nature of High Court's writ jurisdiction and therefore does not create an absolute legal bar on the exercise of the writ jurisdiction by a High Court. The decision whether or not to entertain an action under its writ jurisdiction remains a decision to be taken by the High Court on an examination of the facts and circumstances of a particular case. 20. This understanding has been laid down in several decisions of this Court. In U.P. State Spg. Co. Ltd. v. R.S. Pandey this Court held: (SCC p. 270, para 11) "11. Except for a period when Article 226 was amended by the Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976, the power relating to alternative remedy has been considered to be a rule of self-imposed limitation. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience and discretion and never a rule of law. Despite the existence of an alternative remedy it is within the jurisdiction or discretion of the High Court to grant relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. At the same time, it cannot be lost sight of that though the matter relating to an alternative remedy has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the case, normally the High Court should not interfere if there is an adequate (sic)ficacious alternative remedy." (Emphasis supplied) 22. Perusal of the aforesaid judgments would disclose that as a general rule, the High Court should not entertain the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India where alternative remedy is available, more so, when statutory alternative remedy by way of filing appeal, revision etc. is available. However, law has been settled that in fact, it is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion and the Court may consider the pros and cons of, the case and then may interfere if it comes to the conclusion that where the petitioner seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights or where there is failure of principles of natural justice or where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. Thus, law at this stage is settled that the Courts in extraordinary circumstances may come to the conclusion where the Authority has assumed powers which they do not possess or where there is principle of natural justice or the proceedings themselves are of abuse of process of law. 23. In the present bunch of petitions, the order of the Controlling Authority is being assailed purely on legal ground, particularly asserting that the Controlling Authority under the Act had no jurisdiction to interpret the Service Regulations and to pick up the best out of the two schemes to extend the benefit to an officer although such officer is governed by one scheme only. I find that even the provisions of Regulations regarding payment of gratuity are also in favour of the contesting respondents to the extent that the amount is to be calculated in two modes, one, as per the provisions of Payment of Gratuity Act and second, as per provisions of Service Regulations and shall be entitled to gratuity amount, whichever is higher. Thus, assuming the jurisdiction above Rs. 10,00,000/- by the Controlling Authority goes to the root of the case and the issue of jurisdictional error is clearly involved in the present bunch of petitions. That apart, question whether dearness allowance can be included in term 'pay' or 'last drawn pay' is also purely legal in nature, where no finding of fact is required, power whereof, normally, is available or should be with the Appellate Authority. 24. I am not inclined to say that if matter is relegated to Appellate Authority, it would be a case of "from Caesar to Caesar's wife", however, I am of the prima facie opinion that when it is a question of interpretation of powers or jurisdiction of the Controlling Authority, the department Appellate Authority/the statutory Appellate Authority under the same Act, most likely, would not be inclined to interpret the powers or jurisdiction of the Controlling Authority in a manner so as to curtail or limit the same. 25. In such view of the matter, for the discussion made hereinabove present bunch of petitions is maintainable or at least, I am inclined to entertain the same. 26. Since all the respondents are represented through their Counsel, notices need not be issued. 27. All the respondents are' granted four weeks time to file counter-affidavit. The petitioners shall have three weeks thereafter to file rejoinder-affidavit. 26. Since all the respondents are represented through their Counsel, notices need not be issued. 27. All the respondents are' granted four weeks time to file counter-affidavit. The petitioners shall have three weeks thereafter to file rejoinder-affidavit. 28. List immediately thereafter before the appropriate Court. 29. Until further order of this Court, the effect and operation of the impugned order dated 31.1.2020 and Form (R) notice for payment of gratuity dated 5.2.2020 passed by the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central)/Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 in Case No. A-48 (38) of 2018 (Shri Dilip Kumar Shukla v. The Chairman, Purvanchal Bank and another) shall remain stayed. 30. Matter shall not be treated as tied up or part heard to this Bench.