JUDGMENT : Mahendra Kumar Goyal, J. 1. This criminal miscellaneous petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed for quashing the order dated 25.04.2019 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge No. 1, Sambhar Lake, District Jaipur in Criminal Revision Petition No. 71/2017 whereby the revision petition against the order dated 15.02.2017 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, Sambhar Lake, District Jaipur in FR No. 891/2016, taking cognizance against the petitioners under Sections 420, 467, 468 & 120-B of I.P.C., has been dismissed. 2. The facts in brief are that Ramchandra lodged an F.I.R. No. 79/2016 dated 15.03.2016 at the Police Station Phulera, Jaipur (Rural) alleging therein that the present petitioners, his daughter & son-in-law respectively, playing fraud upon him, got executed a gift deed dated 17.02.2016 (registered on 18.02.2016) under the pretext of execution of papers for enhancement of pension. The police after investigation submitted negative Final Report No. 891/2016 finding the dispute to be of civil nature. On submission of protest petition, after examining the complainant and his witnesses under Section 200 & Section 202 Cr.P.C. respectively, the learned trial Court took cognizance against the petitioners under Sections 420, 467, 468 & 120-B IPC vide order dated 15.02.2017 which has been affirmed by the learned revisional Court vide its order dated 25.04.2019. 3. Assailing the order, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that no offence under Section 420 I.P.C. is made out inasmuch as no deception/fraud was played by the petitioners upon the complainant who was instigated by his son to lodge the F.I.R. Drawing attention of this Court towards the conclusion drawn by the Investigating Agency while submitting negative Final Report, learned counsel contended that since other daughters of the complainant have categorically stated that the complainant has executed the registered gift deed in favour of the petitioner No. 1, no offence, as alleged, is made out. Referring the provisions of Section 464 IPC, learned counsel submitted that since there is no allegation against the accused-petitioners of making the document in question, i.e., registered gift deed; which, undisputedly, has been executed by the complainant himself, no offence under Section 467 or 468 I.P.C. is made out against them. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court of India in case of Sardar Ali Khan vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2020 SC 626 , in support of his submissions. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court of India in case of Sardar Ali Khan vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2020 SC 626 , in support of his submissions. 4. Lastly, learned counsel submitted that in order to show her bona fide, the petitioner No. 1 has stated during the course of investigation that she was ready to get the gift deed executed in her favour cancelled and she reiterates her submission before this Court also in order to purchase peace in the family. He, therefore, prayed that this criminal miscellaneous petition be allowed and the order impugned be quashed. 5. Learned Public Prosecutor opposed the criminal misc. petition. 6. Heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the record. 7. A perusal of the F.I.R. shows that it contains specific allegation against the present petitioners of getting the gift deed executed under the pretext of execution of documents for enhancement of pension. Therefore, the F.I.R. discloses commission of offence under Section 420 I.P.C. 8. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the police has, after investigation, submitted negative Final Report relying on the statements of other daughters of the complainant and the learned Court erred in taking cognizance ignoring the same, does not deserve acceptance as it is trite that the Magistrate, while taking cognizance, is not bound by the conclusion drawn by the Investigating Agency in its report submitted under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. In the present case, a perusal of the order impugned reveals that the learned court below, after appreciating the material collected by the Investigating Agency including the statements of the witnesses recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and the statements of the complainant as well as his witnesses namely, Ramniwas, Hanuman and Sujaram recorded under Section 200 Cr.P.C. & Section 202 Cr.P.C. respectively, has passed the cognizance order. It has also been appreciated by the learned Court that even sisters of the petitioner No. 1 have, in their statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., expressed a probability only that their father might have executed gift deed in her favour out of his free will. Therefore, it is apparent that the order impugned is based on material on record and does not suffer from any perversity. 9. Therefore, it is apparent that the order impugned is based on material on record and does not suffer from any perversity. 9. In so far as the reliance placed by the learned counsel on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court of India in case of Sardar Ali Khan (supra) is concerned, Para-9 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:- "9. At the outset it is to be noted that the appellant has purchased the plot in question by sale deed dated 29th December, 1993 which was registered on 5th January, 1994. The father of the 2nd respondent died on 3rd December, 1997. Though the registered sale deed is of 1994, the 2nd respondent filed suit which is pending in O.S. No. 160 of 2008, only in the year 2008 seeking cancellation of sale deed alleging that the aforesaid sale deed was got executed by the appellant and his brother, by making use of the acquaintance with his father, in a false and fraudulent manner. There is no allegation of impersonation or forgery of signatures in the suit filed by the 2nd respondent. It is the case of the appellant that even the 2nd respondent is a signatory to the sale deed as a witness. Though the suit was filed in the year 2008, the 2nd respondent has chosen to file the criminal complaint only in the year 2012 alleging forgery and impersonation. With regard to the validity of the sale deed, matter is seized up before the competent civil court and it is for the civil court to decide whether any fraud is played or not by the appellant, on the late father of the 2nd respondent for obtaining the sale deed. When the very same issue is seized up before the civil court, the 2nd respondent cannot pursue criminal proceedings against the appellant for alleged offence under Sections 418, 419, 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC. Although, it is contended by the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent that complaint filed is not barred by limitation but at the same time it appears, there is no reason for lodging private complaint in the year 2012. The sale deed on which basis the title and possession is claimed by the appellant was registered on 5th January, 1994, suit itself is filed nearly after 14 years. The sale deed on which basis the title and possession is claimed by the appellant was registered on 5th January, 1994, suit itself is filed nearly after 14 years. Even after filing of the suit on 24th August, 2008 there is further about 4 years' delay in filing the criminal complaint against the appellant herein. Allowing the proceedings to go on against the appellant who is stated to be about 87 years, in the above set of facts, is nothing but abuse of the process. It is to be noted that there is no allegation of impersonation and forgery of the signatures in the suit filed by the 2nd respondent. In any event, when the suit filed by the 2nd respondent for cancellation of sale deed, is pending consideration before the competent court of law, the 2nd respondent cannot pursue his complaint in criminal proceedings by improving his case. Having regard to serious factual disputes which are of civil nature, for which civil suits are pending, allowing the 2nd respondent to pursue his complaint in criminal proceedings is nothing but abuse of the process of law. For the aforesaid reasons we are of the considered view that the criminal proceedings are fit to be quashed by allowing this appeal." 10. It is well established principle of law that ratio of a judgment has to be considered in the light of factual matrix involved therein and the judgment cannot be read as Euclid's formula. The Hon'ble Apex Court of India has, in case of Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. & Anr. vs. N.R. Variamani & Anr., AIR (2004) SC 4778, held as under:- "9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. vs. Horton ( 1951 AC 737 at p. 761), Lord Mac Dermot observed: "The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J. as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge." 10. In Home Office vs. Dorset Yacht Co., 1970 (2) All ER 294 Lord Reid said, "Lord Atkin's speech ..... is not to be treated as if it was a statute definition it will require qualification in new circumstances." Megarry, J. in (1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed: "One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of Russell L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament." And, in Herrington vs. British Railways Board ( 1972 (2) WLR 537 ) Lord Morris said: "There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances made in the setting of the facts of a particular case." 11. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper. 12. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus: "Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive." ………….. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive." ………….. "Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it." 11. In Rukmini Narvekar vs. Vijaya Satardekar & Ors.: (2008) 14 SCC 1 , the Hon'ble Apex Court of India held as under:- 20. We have carefully perused the decision of this Court in the State of Orissa vs. Debendra Nath Padhi. Though the observations in paragraph 16 of the said decision seems to support the view canvassed by Shri Rohatgi, it may be also pointed out that in paragraph 29 of the same decision it has been observed that the width of the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and Article 226 of the Constitution is unlimited whereunder in the interests of justice the High Court can make such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice within the parameters laid down in Bhajan Lal case. Thus we have to reconcile paras 16 and 23 of the decision in State of Orissa vs. Debendra Nath Padhi. 21. We should also keep in mind that it is well settled that a judgment of the Court has not to be treated as a Euclid formula [vide Rajbir Singh Dalal (Dr.) vs. Chaudhari Devi Lal University]. As observed by this Court in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. & Anr. vs. N.R. Vairamani, observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's formula nor as provisions of the statute. 22. As observed by this Court in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. & Anr. vs. N.R. Vairamani, observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's formula nor as provisions of the statute. 22. Thus in our opinion, while it is true that ordinarily defence material cannot be looked into by the Court while framing of the charge in view of D.N. Padhi case, there may be some very rare and exceptional cases where some defence material when shown to the trial court would convincingly demonstrate that the prosecution version is totally absurd or preposterous, and in such very rare cases the defence material can be looked into by the Court at the time of framing of the charges or taking cognizance." 12. In Sardar Ali Khan's case (supra), the glaring facts were that after purchasing the plot by the appellant therein vide registered sale deed dated 29.12.1993 (registered on 05.01.1994), the seller, i.e., father of the respondent died on 03.12.1997. Thereafter, the second respondent filed suit in the year 2008 seeking cancellation of the sale deed and filed the criminal complaint only in the year 2012 alleging forgery and impersonation. One important factor was that the respondent No. 2 was signatory to the sale deed as a witness. In those circumstances, the Hon'ble Apex Court was pleased to hold that since the Civil Court was already seized of the matter, the criminal proceeding could not continue. Whereas, in the present case, the gift deed was registered on 18.02.2016, the F.I.R. was lodged by the complainant immediately thereafter on 15.03.2016 and he filed the suit on 04.04.2016. Therefore, the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court of India in case of Sardar Ali Khan (supra) has no applicability in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In this regard, it would be profitable to refer following judgments:- 13. The Hon'ble Apex Court of India has, in case of M. Krishnan vs. Vijay Singh and Anr., (2001) 8 SCC 645 , held as under: 5. Accepting such a general proposition would be against the provisions of law inasmuch as in all cases of cheating and fraud, in the whole transaction, there is generally some element of civil nature. However, in this case, the allegations were regarding the forging of the documents and acquiring gains on the basis of such forged documents. Accepting such a general proposition would be against the provisions of law inasmuch as in all cases of cheating and fraud, in the whole transaction, there is generally some element of civil nature. However, in this case, the allegations were regarding the forging of the documents and acquiring gains on the basis of such forged documents. The proceedings could not be quashed only because the respondents had filed a civil suit with respect to the aforesaid documents. In a criminal court the allegations made in the complaint have to be established independently, notwithstanding the adjudication by a civil court. Had the complainant failed to prove the allegations made by him in the complaint, the respondents were entitled to discharge or acquittal but not otherwise. If mere pendency of a suit is made a ground for quashing the criminal proceedings, the unscrupulous litigants, apprehending criminal action against them, would be encouraged to frustrate the course of justice and law by filing suits with respect to the documents intended to be used against them after the initiation of criminal proceedings or in anticipation of such proceedings. Such a course cannot be the mandate of law. Civil proceedings, as distinguished from the criminal action, have to be adjudicated and concluded by adopting separate yardsticks. The onus of proving the allegations beyond reasonable doubt, in a criminal case, is not applicable in the civil proceedings which can be decided merely on the basis of the probabilities with respect to the acts complained of. The High Court was not, in any way, justified to observe: "In my view, unless and until the civil court decided the question whether the documents are genuine or forged, no criminal action can be initiated against the petitioners and in view of the same, the present criminal proceedings and taking cognizance and issue of process are clearly erroneous." 14. In Kamaladevi Agarwal vs. State of West Bengal and Ors., (2002) 1 SCC 555 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: "2. In Kamaladevi Agarwal vs. State of West Bengal and Ors., (2002) 1 SCC 555 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: "2. Aggrieved by the impugned order of the High Court quashing her complaint and the order of the Magistrate issuing the process against the respondents for the offences under Sections 465, 468, 471 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, the appellant has approached this Court by way of this appeal for setting aside the order of the High Court with direction to the Magistrate for proceeding with the complaint in accordance with law. It is submitted that the High Court of Calcutta has passed the impugned order in exercise of its power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure completely ignoring the mandate of law as settled by various pronouncements of this Court and other High Court in the country. 7. This Court has consistently held that the revisional or inherent powers of quashing the proceedings at the initial stage should be exercised sparingly and only where the allegations made in the complaint or the F.I.R., even if taken it at the face value and accepted in entirety, do not prima facie disclose the commission of an offence. Disputed and controversial facts cannot be made the basis for the exercise of the jurisdiction. In R.P. Kapur vs. State of Punjab this Court held: "It is well established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal proceedings in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceedings on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of the cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under Section 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an inquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. In exercising its jurisdiction under Section 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an inquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contended that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained. Broadly stated that is the nature and scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 561-A in the matter of quashing criminal proceedings, and that is the effect of the judicial decisions of the point (vide: Shripad G. Chandavarkar In re: Jagat Chandra Mozumdar vs. Queen Empress, Dr. Shankar Singh (Dr.) vs. State of Punjab, Nripendra Bhusan Roy vs. Gobinda Bandhu Majumdar and Ramanathan Chettiyar vs. K. Sivarama Subrahmanya Ayyar." 8. This judgment was reiterated and following in Hazari Lal Gupta vs. Rameshwar Prasad, State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy, State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal and various other pronouncements. 9. Criminal prosecution cannot be thwarted at the initial stage merely because civil proceedings are also pending. After referring to judgments in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal and Rajesh Bajaj vs. State NCT of Delhi this Court in Trisuns Chemical Industry vs. Rajesh Agarwal held: "7. Time and again this Court has been pointing out that quashing of F.I.R. or a complaint in exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court should be limited to very extreme exceptions (vide State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal and Rajesh Bajaj vs. State NCT of Delhi]. 8. In the last referred case this court also pointed out that merely because an act has a civil profile is not sufficient to denude it of its criminal outfit. We quote the following observations: (SCC p. 263, para 10) '10. It may be that the facts narrated in the present complaint would as well reveal a commercial transaction or money transaction. But that is hardly a reason for holding that the offence of cheating would elude from such a transaction. In fact, many a cheatings were committed in the course of commercial and also money transactions.' 10. In Medchl Chemical & Pharma (P) Ltd. vs. Biological E. Ltd. this Court again reiterated the position and held: (SCC pp. 272 & 278, paras 2 & 14) "2. In fact, many a cheatings were committed in the course of commercial and also money transactions.' 10. In Medchl Chemical & Pharma (P) Ltd. vs. Biological E. Ltd. this Court again reiterated the position and held: (SCC pp. 272 & 278, paras 2 & 14) "2. Exercise of jurisdiction under the inherent power as envisaged in Section 482 of the Code to have the complaint or the charge-sheet quashed is an exception rather than a rule and the case for quashing at the initial stage must have to be treated as rarest of rare so as not to scuttle the prosecution. With the lodgment of first information report the ball is set to roll and thenceforth the law takes its own course and the investigation ensues in accordance with the provisions of law. The jurisdiction as such is rather limited and restricted and its undue expansion is neither practicable nor warranted. In the event, however, the court on a perusal of the complaint comes to a conclusion that the allegations levelled in the complaint or charge-sheet on the face of it does not constitute or disclose any offence as alleged, there ought not to be any hesitation to rise up to the expectation of the people and deal with the situation as is required under the law. 14. Needless to record however and it being a settled principle of law that to exercise powers under Section 482 of the Code, the complaint in its entirety shall have to be examined on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint and the High Court at that stage has no authority or jurisdiction to go into the matter or examine its correctness. Whatever appears on the face of the complaint shall be taken into consideration without any critical examination of the same. But the offence ought to appear ex facie on the complaint. Whatever appears on the face of the complaint shall be taken into consideration without any critical examination of the same. But the offence ought to appear ex facie on the complaint. The observations in Nagawwa vs. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi lend support to the above statement of law: (SCC p. 741, para 5) '(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused; (2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and (4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defect, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like.' The cases mentioned by us are purely illustrative and provide sufficient guidelines to indicate contingencies where the High Court can quash proceedings." 11. In Lalmuni Devi vs. State of Bihar, this Court held: (SCC p. 19, para 8) "8. There could be no dispute to the proposition that if the complaint does not make out an offence it can be quashed. However, it is also settled law that facts may give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence. Merely because a civil claim is maintainable does not mean that the criminal complaint cannot be maintained. In this case, on the facts, it cannot be stated, at this prima facie stage, that this is a frivolous complaint. The High Court does not state that on facts no offence is made out. If that be so, then merely on the ground that it was a civil wrong the criminal prosecution could not have been quashed." 17. In view of the preponderance of authorities to the contrary, we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in quashing the proceedings initiated by the appellant against the respondents. If that be so, then merely on the ground that it was a civil wrong the criminal prosecution could not have been quashed." 17. In view of the preponderance of authorities to the contrary, we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in quashing the proceedings initiated by the appellant against the respondents. We are also not impressed by the argument that as the civil suit was pending in the High Court, the Magistrate was not justified to proceed with the criminal case either in law or on the basis propriety. Criminal cases have to be proceeded with in accordance with the procedure as prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the pendency of a civil action in a different court even though higher in status and authority, cannot be made a basis for quashing of the proceedings. 15. This Court has, in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 1618/2015, Basant Raj Mehta vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. decided on 01.03.2016, held as under:- 8. The question whether criminal proceedings cango simultaneously where civil proceedings are pending has been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in P. Swaroopa Rani vs. M. Hari Narayana alias Hari Babu, (2008) 5 SCC 765 relevant part of the decision is reproduced hereunder: "11. It is, however, well-settled that in a given case, civil proceedings and criminal proceedings can proceed simultaneously. Whether civil proceedings or criminal proceedings shall be stayed depends upon the fact and circumstances of each case. (see M.S. Sheriff vs. State of Madras, AIR 1954 SC 397 , Iqbal Singh Marwah vs. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370 and Institute of Chartered Accountants of India vs. Assn. of Chartered Certified Accountants, (2005) 12 SCC 226 ). 12. It is furthermore trite that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure would not be attracted where a forged document has been filed. It was so held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah stating: (SCC pp. 387-88, paras 25-26) "25. An enlarged interpretation to Section 195(1)(b)(ii), whereby the bar created by the said provision would also operate where after commission of an act of forgery the document is subsequently produced in court, is capable of great misuse. It was so held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah stating: (SCC pp. 387-88, paras 25-26) "25. An enlarged interpretation to Section 195(1)(b)(ii), whereby the bar created by the said provision would also operate where after commission of an act of forgery the document is subsequently produced in court, is capable of great misuse. As pointed out in Sachida Nand Singh, (1998) 2 SCC 493 after preparing a forged document or committing an act of forgery, a person may manage to get a proceeding instituted in any civil, criminal or revenue court, either by himself or through someone set up by him and simply file the document in the said proceeding. He would thus be protected from prosecution, either at the instance of a private party or the police until the court, where the document has been filed, itself chooses to file a complaint. The litigation may be a prolonged one due to which the actual trial of such a person may be delayed indefinitely. Such an interpretation would be highly detrimental to the interest of the society at large. 26. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that the courts are normally reluctant to direct filing of a criminal complaint and such a course is rarely adopted. It will not be fair and proper to give an interpretation which leads to a situation where a person alleged to have committed an offence of the type enumerated in Clause (b)(ii) is either not placed for trial on account of non-filing of a complaint or if a complaint is filed, the same does not come to its logical end. Judging from such an angle will be in consonance with the principle that an unworkable or impracticable result should be avoided. In Statutory Interpretation by Francis Bennion (3rd Edn.), Para313, the principle has been stated in the following manner: "The court seeks to avoid a construction of an enactment that produces an unworkable or impracticable result, since this is unlikely to have been intended by Parliament. Sometimes, however, there are overriding reasons for applying such a construction, for example, where it appears that Parliament really intended it or the literal meaning is too strong." In regard to the possible conflict of findings between civil and criminal court, however, it was opined: (SCC pp. 389-90, para 32) "32. Sometimes, however, there are overriding reasons for applying such a construction, for example, where it appears that Parliament really intended it or the literal meaning is too strong." In regard to the possible conflict of findings between civil and criminal court, however, it was opined: (SCC pp. 389-90, para 32) "32. Coming to the last contention that an effort should be made to avoid conflict of findings between the civil and criminal courts, it is necessary to point out that the standard of proof required in the two proceedings are entirely different. Civil cases are decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence while in a criminal case the entire burden lies on the prosecution and proof beyond reasonable doubt has to be given. There is neither any statutory provision nor any legal principle that the findings recorded in one proceeding may be treated as final or binding in the other, as both the cases have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced therein." It was concluded: (SCC p. 390, para 33) "33. In view of the discussion made above, we are of the opinion that Sachida Nand Singh has been correctly decided and the view taken therein is the correct view. Section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. would be attracted only when the offences enumerated in said provision have been committed with respect to a document after it has been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court i.e. during the time when the document was in custodia legis. "13. Filing of an independent criminal proceeding, although initiated in terms of some observations made by the civil court, is not barred under any statute." 9. From the perusal of above quoted paragraphs, it is clear that civil as well as the criminal proceedings can go simultaneously if the allegation of criminality exists in the F.I.R. 16. In view of the aforesaid judgments, it cannot be held that Sardar Ali Khan (supra) lays down an absolute proposition of law that whenever a document is subject matter of scrutiny before the Civil Court, no criminal proceeding based on such document, can be lodged/continued. 17. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that no offence under Sections 467 & 468 I.P.C. is made out placing reliance upon the first part of Section 464 I.P.C., is misconceived. 17. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that no offence under Sections 467 & 468 I.P.C. is made out placing reliance upon the first part of Section 464 I.P.C., is misconceived. Relevant provisions of Section 464 I.P.C., applicable in this case, reads as under:- 464. Making a false document.-[A person is said to make a false document or false electronic record- First xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Secondly xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx "Thirdly-Who dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, seal, execute or alter a document or an electronic record or to affix his [electronic signature] on any electronic record knowing that such person by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication cannot, or that by reason of deception practised upon him, he does not know the contents of the document or electronic record or the nature of the alteration." As already observed, the F.I.R. contains specific allegations, against the petitioners, of dishonestly and fraudulently inducing the complainant for executing the gift deed under the pretext of execution of documents for enhancement of pension and hence, it discloses commission of offence under Sections 467 & 468 IPC. The allegations stand substantiated from the material on record in the shape of evidence collected by the Investigating Agency and the statements of the complainant and his witnesses recorded under Section 200 & Section 202 Cr.P.C. The Hon'ble Apex Court has, in case of Sonu Gupta vs. Deepak Gupta and Ors.: (2015) 3 SCC 424 , held as under: 8. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. At the stage of cognizance and summoning the Magistrate is required to apply his judicial mind only with a view to take cognizance of the offence, or, in other words, to find out whether prima facie case has been made out for summoning the accused persons. At this stage, the learned Magistrate is not required to consider the defence version or materials or arguments nor is he required to evaluate the merits of the materials or evidence of the complainant, because the Magistrate must not undertake the exercise to find out at this stage whether the materials will lead to conviction or not. 18. Since, the order impugned herein does not suffer from any such illegality or perversity warranting interference by this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., this criminal miscellaneous petition is devoid of merit. 19. Resultantly, this criminal miscellaneous petition is dismissed. 20. There is one disturbing fact in the present case. 18. Since, the order impugned herein does not suffer from any such illegality or perversity warranting interference by this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., this criminal miscellaneous petition is devoid of merit. 19. Resultantly, this criminal miscellaneous petition is dismissed. 20. There is one disturbing fact in the present case. The certified copy of the F.I.R. issued bears stamp of the concerned Court on it in such a fashion so as to render its registration number and date of its registration to be completely illegible. Often, this Court comes across the certified copies of the judgments/orders/record of this Court as well as of the trial court/tribunals wherein, official seals are put on the typed/printed material rendering it illegible and making it very difficult to appreciate the same. 21. Order 6(6)(c) of the General Rules (Civil & Criminal), 2018 provides as under: "(c) The Applicant, except where he is entitled for free of cost of copies, will submit copying stamp at the rate of Rs. 4/- per page. The Reader/Senior Munsarim will affix those stamps on each page of the document looking to the availability/suitability of the space and will make an endorsement of it being true computer generated copy of the Original and will also make other endorsement as required in Case of supply of certified copy by the Copying Section. The Presiding Officer will countersign it." Although, the aforesaid provision is for affixing stamp on the certified copy; but, the same can be taken to be true for putting official seal on it as well. In the aforesaid circumstances, office of this Court as well as all the trial Courts/tribunals are hereby directed to ensure that the official seals on the certified copies of the judgments/orders/record are put in a way not to obstruct their smooth reading. One of the measures to achieve this object can be to reduce the size of the official seal appropriately as leaving more margin to accommodate large seal will result into wastage of precious paper. 22. The Registrar General is requested to circulate a copy of this direction to the office of this Court and all the respective District and Sessions Judges/Tribunals to ensure compliance.