JUDGMENT : (Prayer: Civil Miscellaneous Appeal filed under Section 30 (1) of the Employees Compensation Act, 1923, against the award and decree dated 11.12.2017 made in W.C.No.360 of 2016 on the file of the Commissioner, Workmen’s Compensation Tribunal, DCL, Coonoor.) 1. The award and decree dated 11.12.2017 made in W.C.No.360 of 2016, is under challenge in the present civil miscellaneous appeal. 2. The National Insurance Company Limited is the appellant and the second opposite party in the claim petition. The respondents who are all the legal heirs of the deceased, filed an application under Workmen Compensation Act seeking compensation on the ground that on 11.12.2011 at about 4.30 a.m., in order to execute the instructions of the fourth respondent R.Varadharaj, the deceased loaded the bus gear box in Mahindra Jeep bearing Registration No.TN 28 U 1690 and driving the same from Coimbatore to Sangagiri via Bavani-Salem Main Road. The said Mahindra Jeep met with an accident by dashing in a Tamarind Tree and the deceased Kumar sustained fatal injuries and thereafter died on 08.10.2012. It is contended that the owner of the Mahindra Jeep is none other than the father of the deceased R.Varadharaj/fourth respondent. 3. In this context, the Deputy Commissioner of Labour adjudicated the issues and arrived a conclusion that the respondent claimants entitled for compensation of Rs.6,51,143/- along with interest at the rate of 12% per annum. Challenging the said award, the Insurance Company has chosen to file the present civil miscellaneous appeal on the substantial question of law that the appellant is not liable to pay compensation, in view of the fact that the respondent claimants had not established the employee-employer relationship between the fourth respondent and the deceased Kumar, which is mandatory. The deceased cannot be presumed as a paid driver and such presumption cannot be the basis for grant of compensation under the insurance policy. 4. This apart, it is contended that the Mahindra Jeep which met with an accident is a private vehicle and not a commercial vehicle or a tourist vehicle. The vehicle being a private vehicle and the son was driving the vehicle, the Deputy Commissioner of Labour ought not to have presumed that the son was working as Driver with his own father and driving a private vehicle and such presumption not supported with any document, is unacceptable. 5. The vehicle being a private vehicle and the son was driving the vehicle, the Deputy Commissioner of Labour ought not to have presumed that the son was working as Driver with his own father and driving a private vehicle and such presumption not supported with any document, is unacceptable. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant reiterated that as far as the private vehicles are concerned, the liability can be questioned by the Insurance Company as Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act insist statutory liability in respect of third person involved in the accident under goods carrier. As far as the private vehicles are concerned, there is no specific mentioning in the statute and therefore, the liability is not a statutory liability and it is a contractual liability. Being a contractual liability, an application filed under the Workmen Compensation Act, the claimants are bound to establish the employee-employer relationship within the meaning of the Workmen Compensation Act, failing which, the liability cannot be fastened on the Insurance Company based on the insurance policy. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the appellant reiterated that fixing of liability based on certain presumptive factors is unsustainable and therefore, on this question of law, the appeal is to be allowed. 6. This apart, there is no statutory liability fastened on the Insurance Company under Section 147 of the Act, in view of the fact that the deceased son was driving the private vehicle stands in the name of his own father. Thus, it is a contractual liability and in order to establish the contractual liability, the claimants ought to have establish the employee-employer relationship as contemplated under the provisions of the Workmen Compensation Act. Therefore, the learned counsel for the appellant is of the firm opinion that the employee-employer relationship was brought in by the claimants only for the purpose of getting compensation under the provisions of the Act and therefore, the Deputy Commissioner of Labour has committed an error in granting compensation. 7. In reliance, the learned counsel for the appellant cited a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Gottumukkala Appala Narasimha Raju & Others Vs. The National Insurance Company Limited and Another, reported in CDJ 2007 SC 246, wherein, the Supreme Court narrated the facts in paragraph Nos.4, 5, 17 of the Judgment which reads as under: “4. The National Insurance Company Limited and Another, reported in CDJ 2007 SC 246, wherein, the Supreme Court narrated the facts in paragraph Nos.4, 5, 17 of the Judgment which reads as under: “4. A tractor bearing No. AP 37P 3717 belonged to Smt. Gottumukkala Venkata Lakshmi, the wife of deceased Bangaru Raju @ Appala Raju. Respondent No. 1 was the insurer of the said vehicle. An accident took place. Bangaru Raju died in that accident while driving the said tractor. How the accident occurred is not known. Claiming a sum of Rs.3 lakhs by way of compensation, a petition before the Commissioner of Workmen’s Compensation in terms of the 1923 Act was filed against Smt. Gottumukkala Venkata Lakshmi, the owner of the tractor, and the insurer herein. According to the claimants, the deceased was earning about Rs.3,000/- per month towards salary and Rs.25/- as Bata per day. 5. The owner of the tractor, being wife of the deceased, raised a contention that she and her husband had been living separately prior to the date of accident and the tractor in question being insured with the 1st respondent herein, she was not liable to pay any amount to the claimant by way of compensation. She, however, examined herself as P.W.1. Although, no such case was made out in the objection filed by the owner of the tractor, it was alleged that her brother had engaged the deceased on a monthly salary of Rs.3,000/- per month and Bata of Rs.25/- per day. 17. The question in regard to the applicability of Section 167 of the 1988 Act fell for consideration in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mastan & Anr. [ (2006) 2 SCC 641 ], wherein it was held: “Section 167 of the 1988 Act statutorily provides for an option to the claimant stating that where the death of or bodily injury to any person gives rise to a claim for compensation under the 1988 Act as also the 1923 Act, the person entitled to compensation may without prejudice to the provisions of Chapter X claim such compensation under either of those Acts but not under both. Section 167 contains a non obstante clause providing for such an option notwithstanding anything contained in the 1923 Act. Section 167 contains a non obstante clause providing for such an option notwithstanding anything contained in the 1923 Act. The “doctrine of election” is a branch of “rule of estoppels”, in terms whereof a person may be precluded by his actions or conduct or silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise would have had. The doctrine of election postulates that when two remedies are available for the same relief, the aggrieved party has the option to elect either of them but not both. Although there are certain exceptions to the same rule but the same has no application in the instant case.” Paragraph Nos.22,23,24 and 28 are also relevant for the purpose of considering the present case which are extracted hereunder: “22. Balasubramanyan, J. in his concurring judgment, opined: “23. The law relating to contracts of insurance is part of the general law of contract. So said Roskill, L.J. in Cehave v. Bremer. This view was approved by Lord Wilberforce in Reardon Smith v. Hansen-Tangen (1976)3 All ER 570 (HL) (All ER p. 576h) wherein he said: “It is desirable that the same legal principles should apply to the law of contract as a whole and that different legal principles should not apply to different branches of that law.” A contract of insurance is to be construed in the first place from the terms used in it, which terms are themselves to be understood in their primary, natural, ordinary and popular sense. (See Colinvauxs Law of Insurance, 7th Edn., para 2-01.) A policy of insurance has therefore to be construed like any other contract. On a construction of the contract in question it is clear that the insurer had not undertaken the liability for interest and penalty, but had undertaken to indemnify the employer only to reimburse the compensation the employer was liable to pay among other things under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Unless one is in a position to void the exclusion clause concerning liability for interest and penalty imposed on the insured on account of his failure to comply with the requirements of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1923, the insurer cannot be made liable to the insured for those amounts.” 23. Unless one is in a position to void the exclusion clause concerning liability for interest and penalty imposed on the insured on account of his failure to comply with the requirements of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1923, the insurer cannot be made liable to the insured for those amounts.” 23. Thus, if the vehicle is covered by an insurance, the insurer may be made a party and it may be liable to indemnify the owner, but the situation in this case is entirely different, as would appear from the discussions made hereinafter. 24. In our considered opinion, it is wholly absurd to suggest that the husband would be a “workman” of his wife in absence of any specific contract. We have no doubt in our mind that for the purpose of proceeding under the 1923 Act, only the appellants have concocted the story of husband and wife living separately. If they have been living separately in view of certain disputes, the question of husband being a “workman” under her appears to be a far-fetched one. 28. Our attention has been drawn to some decisions of the High Courts which have taken different views in regard to the liability of the insurer to be joined as a party in a proceeding under the 1923 Act. It is not necessary for us to into the correctness or otherwise of the said decisions, as in our opinion, there does not exist any bar in the 1923 Act in this behalf. Section 19(1) of the 1923 Act specifically provides that any question in regard to the liability of a person who is required to indemnify the employer must be determined in the proceeding under the said Act and not by way of a separate suit. Thus, a question of this nature should be gone into the proceeding under the 1923 Act.” 8. The Apex Court held that it is wholly observed to suggest that the husband shall be a “workmen”of his wife. This Court is of the considered opinion that in many circumstances, the husband and wife are working as employee-employer. For Example, In a private Educational Institution, if the wife is a Correspondent of the Institution and the husband may be working as a Teacher in the very same Institution. This Court is of the considered opinion that in many circumstances, the husband and wife are working as employee-employer. For Example, In a private Educational Institution, if the wife is a Correspondent of the Institution and the husband may be working as a Teacher in the very same Institution. If the appointment of the husband as a Teacher is approved by the competent Educational Authority and such approval of appointment is produced before the Court for claiming compensation, then, it is to be construed as a valid evidence for the purpose of establishing the employee-employer relationship between the husband and wife. Therefore, in order to establish the jural relationship of employee-employer between the blood relatives, an acceptable evidence must be placed. Mere presumption is insufficient to fix liability. If presumptions are drawn, in such circumstances, it will lead to grant of compensation in an unjust manner. Therefore, the liability must be fixed with reference to the statutory requirements. 9. Once the statutory requirements are met with reference to the documents and evidence between the parties, then, the liability shall be fixed accordingly. This being the principle, this Court is of the opinion that the private vehicle driven by the son, wherein, the father is the owner of the vehicle, the claimants are bound to establish the employee-employer relationship existed at the time of the accident with an irrefutable evidence. Presumption regarding the employee-employer relationship in such circumstances prevailing between the blood relations are certainly impermissible. 10. In the case of Beli Ram Vs. Rajinder Kumar & Another, reported in CDJ 2020 SC 736, the Hon’ble Apex Court of India, ruled as follows in paragraph No.23: “23. When we turn to the facts of the present case there is almost an identical situation where the appellant has permitted to let the first respondent driver drive the truck with an expired licence for almost three (3) years. It is clearly a case of lack of reasonable care to see that the employee gets his licence renewed, further, if the original licence is verified, certainly the employer would know when the licence expires. And here it was a commercial vehicle being a truck. The appellant has to, thus, bear responsibility and consequent liability of permitting the driver to drive with an expired licence over a period of three (3) years. And here it was a commercial vehicle being a truck. The appellant has to, thus, bear responsibility and consequent liability of permitting the driver to drive with an expired licence over a period of three (3) years. The only thing we note is that fortunately there has been no accident with a third party claimant but the person who has caused the sufferance and sufferer are one and the same person, i.e., the first respondent driver. We are, however, dealing with the determination under the Compensation Act and those provisions are for the benefit of the workmen like the first respondent, even though he may be at fault, by determining a small amount payable to provide succor at the relevant stage when the larger issues could be debated in other proceedings. The only exception is in the provisos to Section 3 of the Compensation Act, which is not the factual situation in the present case. The relevant provision reads as under: “3. Employer’s liability for compensation.-(1) If personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter: Provided that the employer shall not be so liable-- (a) in respect of any injury which does not result in the total or partial disablement of the workman for a period exceeding [four] days; (b) in respect of any [injury, not resulting in death, caused by] an accident which is directly attributable to--(i) the workman having been at the time thereof under the influence of drink or drugs, or(ii) the wilful disobedience of the workman to an order expressly given, or to a rule expressly framed, for the purpose of securing the safety of workmen, or (iii) the wilful removal or disregard by the workman of any safety guard or other device which he knew to have been provided for the purpose of securing the safety of workmen.” We are not aware whether any other proceedings have been initiated or not, at least, none that have been brought to our notice. The aforesaid findings of the initial lack of care by the first respondent in not renewing the driving licence would be present, but the lack of care of the appellant as the employer would also arise. The aforesaid findings of the initial lack of care by the first respondent in not renewing the driving licence would be present, but the lack of care of the appellant as the employer would also arise. We have penned down the aforesaid views as such a situation is quite likely to arise in proceedings under the MV Act where a third party is claiming the amount. Proceedings here being under the Compensation Act, the consequences are not flowing to the first respondent as the initial negligent person.” 11. This Court in the case of Bhaskar Vs. G.Selvaraj reported in CDJ 2009 MHC 1652 made an observation as extracted hereunder in paragraph No.19: “19. The third substantial question framed at the time of admission is that whether the respondents 1 and2/claimants were able o prove the jural relationship of employer-employee between the appellant and the deceased Sivakumar. Of course it is the specific averment made in the claim petition that the deceased was employed under the appellant. Some kind of evidence has also been adduced to substantiate the contention of the respondents 1 and 2/claimants 1 and 2 to prove that the deceased was an employee under the appellant at the time of the accident and that the accident itself took place out of and in the course of his employment under the appellant. The same happened to be the evidence of PW-1 to 3. Normally, the High Court, in appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, shall not interfere in a finding on a question of fact. The Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation has given a finding on a question of fact that the deceased Sivakumar was under the employment of the appellant herein.” 12. Section 30 of the Employees Compensation Act contemplates appeals. Accordingly, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from the following orders of the Commissioner as enumerated in Sub Clause a to e. Therefore, the provision contemplates what are all the orders, against which, an appeal shall lie to High Court and the other exceptions in the proviso clause. However, the appeals are to be entertained if any substantial question of law is raised. 13. However, the appeals are to be entertained if any substantial question of law is raised. 13. On this ground, the learned counsel for the respondents /claimants contended that the appeal on hand is not falling within the ambit of Section 30 of the Act, 1923 as there is no valid substantial question of law raised in the present appeal. This apart, it is contended that the mandatory requirement of the deposit of the award amount was done belatedly. Therefore, the appeal is to be rejected. 14. As far as the objections raised with reference to the substantial question of law is concerned, this Court has to examine, what contemplates substantial question of law. It is defined in the Act. Of course, in Civil Procedure Code, Section 100 stipulates that the second appeal may be admitted on substantial question of law. Similar provision is enumerated in the proviso clause 2 Section 30. Therefore, the substantial question of law is to be raised for the purpose of adjudication of appeals under Section 30 of the Employees Compensation Act. Let us now consider what is substantial question of law. Black’s Law Dictionary defines the word “substantial” as extracted hereunder: “1. Of, relating to, or involving substance material 2. Real and not imaginary; having actual, not fictitious, existence 3. Important, essential, and material; of real worth and importance 4. Strong, solid ad firm 5. At least moderately wealthy; possessed of sufficient financial means 6. Considerable in amount or value; large in volume or number . 7. Having permanence or near-permanence; long-lasting 8. Containing the essence of a thing; conveying the right idea even if not the exact details 9. Nourishing, affording sufficient nutriment.” 15. Therefore, any strong, solid and firm question raised which requires a legal interpretation by the higher Court, can be considered as substantial question of law, which is not purely the question of fact. Therefore, it may not be possible for the Courts to arrive at definite conclusion without considering certain facts and circumstances. In certain circumstances, the substantial question of law is to be decided with reference to certain facts and circumstances in a particular case as well as on the basis of the evidence. Therefore, it may not be possible for the Courts to arrive at definite conclusion without considering certain facts and circumstances. In certain circumstances, the substantial question of law is to be decided with reference to certain facts and circumstances in a particular case as well as on the basis of the evidence. In those circumstances, no defence is available to either of the parties to contend that facts cannot be adjudicated and in the event of adjudicating the facts, the proviso clause 2 Section 30 would be attracted and the appeal is to be dismissed. 16. Every litigation is bundled with facts. Without facts, the question of law would not emerge. From and out of the facts, law emulates for consideration in any litigation. Thus, the facts as well as the law are mostly inseparable. Thus, the question of law does not mean, the question must be abstract. In certain circumstances, certain evidences or facts are required to be considered by the Courts for the purpose of coining the substantial question of law which would be relevant and the Higher Courts are empowered to adjudicate such facts those are all interconnected with law as substantial question of law in the interest of justice and more specifically to provide complete justice to the parties. 17. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent claimants cited judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in the case of North-East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation Vs.Sujatha reported in 2018 (2) TNMAC 577 SC, wherein, the Apex Court has held in paragraph Nos.14, 15 and 16 as follows: “14. It is only when the employer deposits the entire awarded money along with the memo of appeal duly certified by the Commissioner, his appeal is regarded as being properly filed in conformity with the requirement of Section 30 of the Act. 15. Such Appeal is then heard on the question of admission with a view to find out as to whether it involves any substantial question of law or not. Whether the appeal involves a substantial question of law or not depends upon the facts of each case and needs an examination by the High Court. If the substantial question of law arises, the High Court would admit the appeal for final hearing on merit else would dismiss in limini with reasons that it does not involve any substantial question/s of law. 16. If the substantial question of law arises, the High Court would admit the appeal for final hearing on merit else would dismiss in limini with reasons that it does not involve any substantial question/s of law. 16. Now coming to the facts of this case, we find that the appeal before the High Court did not involve any substantial question of law on the material questions set out above. In other words, in our view, the Commissioner decided all the material questions arising in the case properly on the basis of evidence adduced by the parties and rightly determined the compensation payable to the respondent. It was, therefore, right affirmed by the High Court on facts.” Citing the above paragraphs, the learned counsel for the respondents reiterated that the employer must deposit the entire award money along with memo of appeal duly certified by the Commissioner in conformity with the requirement of Section 30 of the Act. In view of the said provision, the appeal is to be rejected as the deposit amount was paid belatedly. 18. This Court is of the considered opinion that the appellant has opposed the said contention by stating that the deposit was duly made and the certificate was issued and based on the certificate, the appeal was numbered and notice was ordered to the respondents. Therefore, such ground is not available to the respondents at this point of time and the appeal is filed mainly on the question of liability which is substantial in nature and therefore, the appeal is to be decided on merits. 19. The learned counsel for the respondents cited yet another judgment in the case of T.S.Shylaja Vs. Oriental Insurance Co.Ltd & anr., reported in 2014 (1) TN MAC (1) SC paragraph No.10 is relevant to extract hereunder: “10. The only reason which the High Court has given to upset the above finding of the Commissioner is that the Commissioner could not blindly accept the oral evidence without analysing the documentary evidence which the High Court had failed to appreciate and what was the contradiction, if any, between such documents and the version given by the witnesses examined before the Commissioner. The High Court could not have, without adverting to the documents vaguely referred to by it have upset the finding of the fact which the commissioner was entitled to record. The High Court could not have, without adverting to the documents vaguely referred to by it have upset the finding of the fact which the commissioner was entitled to record. Suffice it to say that apart from appreciation of evidence adduced before the Commissioner the High Court has neither referred to nor determined any question of law much less a substantial question of law existence whereof was a condition precedent for the maintainability of any Appeal under Section 30. In as much as the High Court remained oblivious of the basic requirement of law for the maintainability of an Appeal before it and in as much as it treated the Appeal to be one on facts it committed an error which needs to be corrected.” Citing the above paragraph, the learned counsel for the respondents reiterated that under the scheme of the Act only on substantial question of law, the High Court shall entertain the appeal and in all other circumstances, the appeals are to be dismissed. 20. This Court is of the considered opinion that as far as the present case is concerned, the facts are not disputed. The advanced Law Lexicon enumerates the meaning for the term “substantial question of law”. Accordingly, substantial question of law means “Question of law may be a substantial question as between the parties even though it is not of general importance. Any question of law affecting the rights of the parties would not by itself be a substantial question of law. The important or difficult question would of course be a substantial question. But even if a question is not important or difficult, if there is room for reasonable doubt or difference of opinion on the question, then it would be a substantial question of law. The word substantial, as qualifying “question of law”means of having substance, essential, real of sound worth, important or considerable. 21. The facts regarding the relationship between the deceased and the fourth respondent are not disputed. The vehicle which met with an accident stood in the name of the fourth respondent father. The deceased son admittedly was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. The vehicle is a private vehicle and not a goods carrier or a tourist vehicle. The facts regarding the relationship between the deceased and the fourth respondent are not disputed. The vehicle which met with an accident stood in the name of the fourth respondent father. The deceased son admittedly was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. The vehicle is a private vehicle and not a goods carrier or a tourist vehicle. Considering the facts and circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that the question of law raised regarding the liability both statutory and contractual, is certainly the substantial question of law between the parties to the litigation. In the event of accepting the presumption of the Deputy Commissioner of Labour, regarding the employee-employer relationship, the same would result in bad precedent and even in unjustifiable claims, the awards are to be passed and which is not permissible under the provisions of the Act. 22. Therefore, this Court has no hesitation in arriving a conclusion that the Insurance Company’s liability ought to be ascertained in consonance with the contractual liability or the statutory liability under Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act. As far as the private vehicle is concerned, it is not falling within the ambit of Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act. As far as the Insurance Companies are concerned, their liability are to be fastened based on the terms and conditions of the policy including the statutory liability. Thus, the liability cannot be fastened based on certain presumptive facts as far as the Insurance Companies are concerned. 23. Under the Act, the employee-employer relationship is mandatory. Section 2(dd) defines employee and accordingly, the claimants are liable to establish the employee-employer relationship within the meaning of Section 2(dd) and Section (e) of the Employees Compensation Act. In such circumstances, there is no scope for presumptive conclusion by the authorities competent. 24. In view of the facts and circumstances, this Court has no hesitation in arriving a conclusion that the award passed based on the presumptive relationship between the deceased and the fourth respondent, the son and father, is improper and not in consonance with the provisions of the Act. Therefore, the award dated 11.12.2017 passed in W.C.No.360 of 2016 is set aside. Consequently, C.M.A.No.700 of 2019 stands allowed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed. 25. Therefore, the award dated 11.12.2017 passed in W.C.No.360 of 2016 is set aside. Consequently, C.M.A.No.700 of 2019 stands allowed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed. 25. The appellant Insurance Company is permitted to withdraw the deposited amount along with accrued interest by filing an appropriate application before the competent authority and payments are to be made through RTGS.