JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri H.P. Srivastava, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for respondents. 2. Petitioner was working on the post of the driver when he was sent from Lucknow to Bangaluru by truck along with Sri V.K. Saxena, Junior Aircraft Mechanic, and Sri Harish Chandra @ Munna, Cleaner to bring spare parts of a helicopter. The allegations are that on 06.06.1994, they illegally loaded the truck with some teak wood, for which they were arrested in District Adilabad, State of Andhra Pradesh. A criminal case was lodged against them before the Court of Munsif Magistrate, Boath, District Adilabad, State of Andhra Pradesh. On 18.06.1994, the petitioner along with the junior aircraft mechanic and the cleaner was suspended. All three persons were charge-sheeted in a departmental enquiry and they also submitted their reply. The enquiry officer called all the three delinquent employees in person and they again submitted their written explanations. The enquiry officer submitted his report on 14.11.1994. On 04.08.1995 the petitioner was dismissed from service. Thus petitioner filed a writ petition No.4527 (S/S) of 1995 against his dismissal order dated 04.08.1995. During the pendency of the said writ petition, by order dated 12.02.1996, the suspension of both the junior aircraft mechanic and the cleaner were withdrawn and they were permitted to join duties. However, the order conditioned, that, in case they were found guilty in the criminal case they would be dismissed. The trial court by its judgment-dated 04.07.1996 acquitted both the junior aircraft mechanic and the cleaner but convicted the petitioner. As a consequence, both, the junior aircraft mechanic and the cleaner were permitted to continue in their services with all benefits. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the judgment of the trial court. By its judgment dated 30.04.1998, the Sessions Judge, Adilabad allowed the appeal of the petitioner and acquitted him also in the criminal case. The Writ Petition No.4527 (S/S) of 1995 filed by the petitioner against his dismissal was still pending. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the judgment of the trial court. By its judgment dated 30.04.1998, the Sessions Judge, Adilabad allowed the appeal of the petitioner and acquitted him also in the criminal case. The Writ Petition No.4527 (S/S) of 1995 filed by the petitioner against his dismissal was still pending. On 19.09.2011, the same was taken up and the High Court after hearing all the parties concerned, taking into consideration the fact that as a consequence of their acquittal in the criminal case the other two delinquent employees involved along with the petitioner were exonerated in the disciplinary proceedings, permitted the petitioner also to approach the opposite party No.2, Director, Civil Aviation, U.P. for similar relief, as he also now stood acquitted in the said criminal case. The petitioner moved such a representation on 26.09.2011, which was rejected by the Director, Civil Aviation (Maintenance, Security and General Administration Unit), Lucknow Airport, by his order-dated 30.12.2011. Hence, present writ petition is filed by the petitioner challenging, both, the order dated 30.12.2011 whereby his representation is rejected as well as his earlier dismissal order dated 04.08.1995. 3. Learned counsel for petitioner raises two submissions before the Court. The first, that, since the other two persons also involved in the incident were reinstated in service on their acquittal in the criminal case, hence petitioner is also entitled to the same relief on parity. Second, on merits, the petitioner submits that the departmental enquiry conducted by the enquiry officer is illegal as no witness was called or appeared for the department to prove any of the allegations and/or documents against the petitioner. The procedure prescribed for the departmental enquiry was not followed. Only an explanation was taken from the petitioner based on which the enquiry officer submitted his report and the punishment order was passed. In his explanation, the petitioner had denied any wrongdoing on his part and, therefore, the report submitted by the enquiry officer, bereft of any evidence on part of the department, cannot stand. 4. On the other hand, Mr. H.P. Srivastava, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel objected that the present writ petition is a second petition and, therefore, the same is barred by the principle of res judicata, which is equally applicable to the writ proceedings. 4. On the other hand, Mr. H.P. Srivastava, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel objected that the present writ petition is a second petition and, therefore, the same is barred by the principle of res judicata, which is equally applicable to the writ proceedings. Before coming to the merits of the case, it would be appropriate to consider the objection of res judicata raised by the State. 5. The law about the applicability of the principle of res judicata to the writ proceedings is upheld and elaborated in a large number of judgments including in Sarguja Transport Service vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, M.P., Gwalior, and others, (1987) 1 SCC 5 In Paragraph 9, the Supreme Court held that even withdrawal of the writ petition without leave of the court would amount to abandoning of his claim by the petitioner and thus a second writ petition would not be maintainable on his behalf. The relevant paragraph 9 of Sarguja Transport Service (supra) reads: "9. The point for consideration is whether a petitioner after withdrawing a writ petition filed by him in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India without the permission to institute a fresh petition can file a fresh writ petition in the High Court under that Article. On this point the decision in Daryao vs. State of U.P., (1962) 1 SCR 574 is of no assistance. But we are of the view that the principle underlying Rule 1 of Order XXIII of the Code should be extended in the interests of administration of justice to cases of withdrawal of writ petition also, not on the ground of res judicata but on the ground of public policy as explained above. It would also discourage the litigant from indulging in bench-hunting tactics. In any event there is no justifiable reason in such a case to permit a petitioner to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution once again. It would also discourage the litigant from indulging in bench-hunting tactics. In any event there is no justifiable reason in such a case to permit a petitioner to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution once again. While the withdrawal of a writ petition filed in a High Court without permission to file a fresh writ petition may not bar other remedies like a suit or a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India since such withdrawal does not amount to res judicata, the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should be deemed to have been abandoned by the petitioner in respect of the cause of action relied on in the writ petition when he withdraws it without such permission. In the instant case the High Court was right in holding that a fresh writ petition was not maintainable before it in respect of the same subject-matter since the earlier writ petition had been withdrawn without permission to file a fresh petition. We, however. make it clear that whatever we have stated in this order may not be considered as being applicable to a writ petition involving the personal liberty of an individual in which the petitioner prays for the issue of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus or seeks to enforce the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution since such a case stands on a different footing altogether. We however leave this question open." 6. The Privy Council, in Sheoparsan Singh and Ors. vs. Ramnandan Singh and Ors. 1916 ILR 43P.C. 694, while interpreting the principle of res judicata in the context of the Indian law, in paragraph 15 states: "15. There has been much discussion at the Bar as to the application of the plea of res judicata as a bar to this suit. In the view their Lordships take the case has not reached the stage at which an examination of this plea and this discussion would become relevant. But in view of the arguments addressed to them their Lordships desire to emphasize that the rule of res judicata, while founded on ancient precedent, is dictated by a wisdom which is for all time. But in view of the arguments addressed to them their Lordships desire to emphasize that the rule of res judicata, while founded on ancient precedent, is dictated by a wisdom which is for all time. "It had been well said," declared Lord Coke, " interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium, otherwise great oppression might be done under colour and pretence of law ": 6 Coke, 9a. Though the rule of the Code may be traced to an English source, it embodies a doctrine in no way opposed to the spirit of the law as expounded by the Hindu commentators. Vijnanesvara and Nilakantha include the plea of a former judgment among those allowed by law, each citing for this purpose the text of Katyayana, who describes the plea thus: " If a person though defeated at law sue again he should be answered, 'You were defeated formerly.' This is called the plea of former judgment." (See the Mitakshara (Vyavahara), bk. II., ch. i., edited by J.R. Gharpure, p. 14, and the Mayuka, ch. i., Section 1, p. 11 of Mandlik's edition.) And so the application of the rule by the Courts in India should be influenced by no technical considerations of form, but by matter of substance within the limits allowed by law." (emphasis added) 7. The said law settled by the Privy Council is again considered and applied by the Supreme Court in the case of Canara Bank vs. N.G. Subbaraya Setty and Ors., (2018) 16 SCC 228 . After elaborating the applicability and scope of the said principle in number of judgments, the Supreme Court in Canara Bank (supra) in paragraph 5 held: "5. Res judicata is, thus, a doctrine of fundamental importance in our legal system, though it is stated to belong to the realm of procedural law, being statutorily embodied in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. However, it is not a mere technical doctrine, but it is fundamental in our legal system that there be an end to all litigation, this being the public policy of Indian law. The obverse side of this doctrine is that, when applicable, if it is not given full effect to, an abuse of process of the Court takes place. However, there are certain notable exceptions to the application of the doctrine." 8. The obverse side of this doctrine is that, when applicable, if it is not given full effect to, an abuse of process of the Court takes place. However, there are certain notable exceptions to the application of the doctrine." 8. The above judgments make it clear that the principle of res judicata is applicable to the writ proceedings in India. But, the same should not be applied on mere technical consideration of form, but by a matter of substance within the limits allowed by law. Therefore this court is required to inspect the facts and circumstances of the case to decide if the objection of the state has any substance. A perusal of the order-dated 19.09.2011, passed by this Court in the first writ petition, demonstrates that this Court did not consider the submissions of the petitioner challenging his termination order on merits. Since the petitioner raised a fresh ground, that his case was at par with the other two delinquent employees who were discharged in the disciplinary proceedings only because they were acquitted in the criminal case, hence now on his acquittal he should also be discharged, the High Court, noting the said submission, permitted the petitioner to raise the same also before the Director, Civil Aviation, Lucknow, and required the Director to consider the same. From the order dated 19.09.2011 of this Court in the first writ petition it cannot be inferred in any manner that the challenge of the petitioner to his dismissal was decided by this court on merits or that the petitioner had abandoned his challenge to the same in any manner whatsoever. Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel could not show any such facts or circumstance from which this Court can infer that the petitioner ever abandoned any of his rights or claims. Therefore, since the earlier writ petition was not decided on merits the principle of res judicata cannot be applied and since the petitioner has not surrendered challenge to his dismissal even the principle settled in case of Sarguja Transport Service (supra) is not applicable. It would not be appropriate for this Court to take a hyper-technical view and debar the petitioner from submitting his case on merits, which till now is never considered on merits. Thus, the objection of the learned Additional Standing Counsel is rejected. In view thereof, this Court is bound to consider the case of the petitioner on merits. It would not be appropriate for this Court to take a hyper-technical view and debar the petitioner from submitting his case on merits, which till now is never considered on merits. Thus, the objection of the learned Additional Standing Counsel is rejected. In view thereof, this Court is bound to consider the case of the petitioner on merits. 9. On perusal of the order dated 30.12.2012, whereby the representation of the petitioner is rejected, it is found that in the entire order, the Director, Civil Aviation, U.P., Lucknow has nowhere considered the claim of parity raised by the petitioner with the other two persons similarly placed. The Director has only repeated the averments and thereafter rejected the representation of the petitioner on the ground that since the petitioner was in-charge of the vehicle, therefore, it was his duty to ensure that the same was not misused. The junior aircraft mechanic in the vehicle was a person much superior to the petitioner. Once a superior person was present and the entire alleged incident took place in his presence, and further, the said superior person is discharged from departmental proceedings on his acquittal in the criminal case, there is no reason not to give such a benefit to the petitioner also. Similarly, even the cleaner, a person junior to the petitioner, is also discharged from the departmental proceedings on his acquittal from the criminal case. Therefore, the petitioner is also entitled to be treated at par with them and is entitled to a similar discharge from the departmental proceedings on his acquittal in the criminal case. 10. So far as the second submission of the petitioner is concerned, a perusal of the record of departmental proceedings shows that no witness appeared in the departmental enquiry or proved any document against the petitioner. The law in this regard is well settled. 11. 10. So far as the second submission of the petitioner is concerned, a perusal of the record of departmental proceedings shows that no witness appeared in the departmental enquiry or proved any document against the petitioner. The law in this regard is well settled. 11. (A) This Court in Subhas Chandra Sharma vs. Managing Director and another, 2001 (1) UPLBEC 541, said:- "In our opinion after the petitioner replied to the charge-sheet a date should have been fixed for the enquiry and the petitioner should have been intimated the date, time and place of the enquiry and on that date the oral and documentary evidence against the petitioner should have been led in his presence and he should have been given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him and also he should have been given an opportunity to produce his own witnesses and evidence. If the petitioner in response to this intimation had failed to appear for the enquiry then an ex parte enquiry should have been held but the petitioner's service should have not been terminated without holding an enquiry. In the present case it appears that no regular enquiry was held at all. All that was done that after receipt of the petitioner's reply to the charge-sheet he was given a show-cause notice and thereafter the dismissal order was passed. In our opinion this was not the correct legal procedure and there was violation of the rules of natural justice. Since no date for enquiry was fixed nor any enquiry held in which evidence was led in our opinion the impugned order is clearly violative of natural justice." (B) The above judgment was followed by another Division Bench in Subhas Chandra Sharma vs. U.P. Co-operative Spinning Mills and others, 2001 (2) UPLBEC 1475 where Court held: "In cases where a major punishment proposed to be imposed an oral enquiry is a must, whether the employee request, for it or not. For this it is necessary to issue a notice to the employee concerned intimating him date, time and place of the enquiry as held by the Division Bench of this Court in Subhash Chandra Sharma v. Managing Director, (2000) 1 UPLBEC 541 , against which SLP has been dismissed by the Supreme Court on 16-8-2000." (emphasis added) (C) In State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Saroj Kumar Sinha (2010) 2 SCC 772 , the Supreme Court said: "An inquiry officer acting in a quasi-judicial authority is in the position of an independent adjudicator. He is not supposed to be a representative of the department/disciplinary authority/Government. His function is to examine the evidence presented by the Department, even in the absence of the delinquent official to see as to whether the unrebutted evidence is sufficient to hold that the charges are proved. In the present case the aforesaid procedure has not been observed. Since no oral evidence has been examined the documents have not been proved, and could not have been taken into consideration to conclude that the charges have been proved against the respondents. When a departmental enquiry is conducted against the government servant it cannot be treated as a casual exercise. The enquiry proceedings also cannot be conducted with a closed mind. The inquiry officer has to be wholly unbiased. The rules of natural justice are required to be observed to ensure not only that justice is done but is manifestly seen to be done. The object of rules of natural justice is to ensure that a government servant is treated fairly in proceedings which may culminate in imposition of punishment including dismissal/removal from service." 12. From the above facts, it is found that the enquiry held against the petitioner is not held as per the procedure established by law. Thus the punishment order passed against the petitioner on the basis of such an defective and illegal enquiry cannot stand. 13. Given the aforesaid, the writ petition is allowed. Both the order of dismissal dated 04.08.1995 as well as the order dated 30.12.2011 rejecting the representation of the petitioner are set aside. Petitioner would be entitled to all benefits of service as are granted to other two delinquent employees i.e. Sri V.K. Saxena, Junior Aircraft Mechanic and Sri Harish Chandra @ Munna, Cleaner.