JUDGMENT S.K. Sahoo, J. - The appellant/petitioner Joint Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Bhubaneswar has filed this interim application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condoning the delay of seventy five days in preferring the Criminal Appeal under section 42 of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as PML Act) challenging the order dated 06.05.2019 passed by the Chairman, Appellate Tribunal, PML Act, New Delhi whereby the Appellate Tribunal set aside the order dated 01.12.2015 passed by the Adjudicating Authority under the PML Act, New Delhi in O.A. 29 of 2015. 2. This interim application for condonation of delay has been filed basically on the ground that after receiving the copy of the impugned order dated 06.05.2019 of the Appellate Tribunal on 31.05.2019, decision to prefer an appeal before this Court was taken by the competent authority of the petitioner and in that respect, permission was sought for from the Headquarters of the Enforcement Director, New Delhi and due to procedural formalities, there has been delay in presenting the appeal beyond the prescribed period of limitation of sixty days as provided under section 42 of the PML Act. The delay caused is neither intentional nor wilful for which a lenient view should be taken in condoning the delay in preferring the appeal. 3. The respondent/opposite party Mr. Sarosh Yazdani has filed reply to the interim application for condonation of delay stating, inter alia, that the Appellate Tribunal passed the order on 06.05.2019, which was communicated to both the parties on the same day and the present appeal was filed on 18.09.2019, which was after 135 days and thus, it is barred by law of limitation as provided under section 42 of PML Act. The interim application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of delay is barred by section 71 of the PML Act as the latter overrides the inconsistent provisions in other laws for the time being in force. The interim application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of delay is barred by section 71 of the PML Act as the latter overrides the inconsistent provisions in other laws for the time being in force. It is further stated that the averments made by the petitioner are not supported by any evidence qua the date of communication of the order dated 06.05.2019 passed by the Appellate Tribunal and mere mention of the term procedural delay cannot be considered as sufficient cause to the satisfaction of the Court in terms of the proviso to section 42 of the PML Act and therefore, the interim application for condonation of delay is not maintainable and it also suffers from manifest illegality as envisaged under sections 42, 46, 65 and 71 of the 2002 Act. 4. An additional affidavit has been filed by the appellant/petitioner stating, inter alia, that though the learned Appellate Tribunal has ordered to communicate the impugned order dated 06.05.2019 by Dasti to both the parties, but the Registrar of the Appellate Tribunal by its letter served the copy of the order to the respondent/opposite party, his counsel and to the Director, Directorate of Enforcement, New Delhi even though the Joint Director, Directorate Enforcement, Bhubaneswar was the sole respondent before the Appellate Tribunal. It is further stated that the Registrar of the Appellate Tribunal has never served a copy of the impugned order upon the Joint Director, Directorate Enforcement, Bhubaneswar Zonal Office. It is further stated that the impugned order dated 06.05.2019 was forwarded by the office of the Director, Enforcement Directorate, New Delhi to the Regional Special Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Eastern Region, Kolkota and Joint Director, Directorate Enforcement, Bhubaneswar Zonal Office vide letter dated 24.05.2019, which was received by the Directorate of Enforcement, Bhubaneswar Zonal Office on 07.06.2019 and that apart the scanned copy of the letter dated 09.05.2019 of the Registrar, Appellate Tribunal along with the copy of the impugned order has also been received from the Assistant Director, Link Cell, Office of the Regional Special Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Regional Office, Kolkata by the Joint Director, Directorate Enforcement, Bhubaneswar vide e-mail dated 31.05.2019. It is further stated that though under the law, the Appellate Tribunal was suppose to communicate its order dated 06.05.2019 to the Joint Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Bhubaneswar Zonal Office who was the sole respondent before the learned Appellate Tribunal, but the learned Appellate Tribunal forwarded the impugned order to the Head Office of the appellant at New Delhi. The appellant/petitioner first came to know about the impugned order of the learned Appellate Tribunal only from the e-mail dated 31.05.2019 as aforesaid and thereafter, steps were taken to prefer the appeal and accordingly, appeal was filed before this Court on 18.09.2019 and thus, the delay in filing the appeal is neither intentional nor willful but due to the delay in receiving the impugned order as well as the time spent in obtaining legal opinion and necessary permission/ approval from the competent authority to file the appeal. 5. The respondent/opposite party has filed the counter affidavit to the additional affidavit filed by the appellant/petitioner stating, inter alia, that the interim application for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not maintainable in terms of section 71 read with section 42 of the PML Act. It is further stated that the Joint Director cannot be considered as person aggrieved under section 42 of the PML Act as the Enforcement Directorate is headed by the Director of Enforcement and not by the Joint Director and therefore, it is wrong to state that Joint Director is the person aggrieved in terms of section 42 of the PML Act. It is further stated that when the impugned order has been communicated and served upon the Director, Enforcement Directorate, it is deemed to have been served upon the Enforcement Directorate and once an order is served upon the Director, the Joint Director at Bhubaneswar Zonal Office of Enforcement Directorate needs no separate service of the said order at Bhubaneswar. It is further stated that Joint Director, Directorate Enforcement, Bhubaneswar Zonal Office being under the administrative control of the Enforcement Directorate Headquarters at New Delhi, the Joint Director has no locus to take a plea of non-service of the impugned order. It is further stated that Joint Director, Directorate Enforcement, Bhubaneswar Zonal Office being under the administrative control of the Enforcement Directorate Headquarters at New Delhi, the Joint Director has no locus to take a plea of non-service of the impugned order. Referring to the notification bearing No. G.S.R. 441(E) dated 01.07.2005 published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, it is argued that the Director of Enforcement has been conferred with exclusive power to exercise under section 42 of the PML Act and not the Joint Director. 6. Mr. Gopal Agarwal, learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner submitted that the impugned order dated 06.05.2019 under Annexure-3 came to the knowledge of the appellant/petitioner from the e-mail dated 31.05.2019 and on receiving the copy of the impugned order on 31.05.2019, the appellant/petitioner sought permission from the Headquarters of the Enforcement Directorate, New Delhi and after maintaining due procedural formalities, the appeal was filed on 18.09.2019 and therefore, the delay of seventy five days in preferring the appeal as pointed out by the Stamp Reporter is neither intentional nor willful. He further submitted that the Enforcement Directorate is being a statutory authority under the Government of India and the appellant/petitioner being a subordinate authority of the Directorate, it has to obtain necessary approval/permission and by such process, the delay has been caused. He urged that the delay be condoned and appeal be admitted. 7. Dr. Shamsuddin, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/opposite party while refuting the averments made in the application for condonation of delay as well as the additional affidavit filed by the appellant/petitioner submitted that such an application is totally misconceived and not maintainable in the eye of law and moreover the appellant/petitioner has not explained each days delay in filing the appeal. To buttress his submission, he placed reliance on the decisions of the Honble Supreme Court in the cases of Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise -Vrs.- Hongo India Private Ltd. & Others reported in (2009) 5 Supreme Court Cases Supreme Court Cases 791, M/s. Consolidated Engineering Enterprises -Vrs.- Principal Secretary (Irrigation Department) & others reported in (2008) 7 Supreme Court Cases 169 and Chhattisgarh Electricity State Board -Vrs.- Central Electricity Regulatory Commission reported in (2010) 5 Supreme Court Cases 23. 8. 8. In the case of Hongo India (supra), where the question for consideration was whether the High Court has power to condone the delay in presentation of the reference application under unamended section 35-H(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 beyond the prescribed period by applying section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, it is held as follows : '36. The scheme of the Central Excise Act, 1944 supports the conclusion that the time-limit prescribed under Section 35H(1) to make a reference to the High Court is absolute and unextendable by a court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is well settled law that it is the duty of the court to respect the legislative intent and by giving liberal interpretation, limitation cannot be extended by invoking the provisions of Section 5 of the Act. 37. In the light of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court has no power to condone the delay in filing the "reference application" filed by the Commissioner under unamended Section 35H(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 beyond the prescribed period of 180 days and rightly dismissed the reference on the ground of limitation.' In the case of Consolidated Engineering Enterprises (supra), where the question was posed for consideration is whether the provision of section 14 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to an application submitted under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for setting aside the award made by the arbitrator, it is held as follows: "20.....When any special statute prescribes certain period of limitation as well as provision for extension up to specified time-limit, on sufficient cause being shown, then the period of limitation prescribed under the special law shall prevail and to that extent the provisions of the Limitation Act shall stand excluded. As the intention of the legislature in enacting sub- section (3) of Section 34 of the Act is that the application for setting aside the award should be made within three months and the period can be further extended on sufficient cause being shown by another period of 30 days but not thereafter, this Court is of the opinion that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not be applicable because the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act stands excluded because of the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act." In the case of Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board (supra), where the question came up for consideration is whether section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be invoked by the Court for allowing the aggrieved person to file an appeal under section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 after more than 120 days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity, it is held as follows: "25. Section 125 lays down that any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Tribunal can file an appeal to this Court within 60 days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Tribunal. Proviso to Section 125 empowers this Court to entertain an appeal filed within a further period of 60 days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing appeal within the initial period of 60 days. This shows that the period of limitation prescribed for filing appeals under Sections 111(2) and 125 is substantially different from the period prescribed under the Limitation Act for filing suits, etc. The use of the expression "within a further period of not exceeding 60 days" in the proviso to Section 125 makes it clear that the outer limit for filing an appeal is 120 days. There is no provision in the Act under which this Court can entertain an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal after more than 120 days. 26. There is no provision in the Act under which this Court can entertain an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal after more than 120 days. 26. The object underlying establishment of a special adjudicatory forum i.e. the Tribunal to deal with the grievance of any person who may be aggrieved by an order of an adjudicating officer or by an appropriate Commission with a provision for further appeal to this Court and prescription of special limitation for filing appeals under Sections 111 and 125 is to ensure that disputes emanating from the operation and implementation of different provisions of the Electricity Act are expeditiously decided by an expert body and no court, except this Court, may entertain challenge to the decision or order of the Tribunal. The exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil courts (Section 145) qua an order made by an adjudicating officer is also a pointer in that direction. 27. It is thus evident that the Electricity Act is a special legislation within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, which lays down that where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the one prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application unless they are not expressly excluded by the special or local law." xx xx xx xx 32. In view of the above discussion, we hold that Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked by this Court for entertaining an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal beyond the period of 120 days specified in Section 125 of the Electricity Act and its proviso. Any interpretation of Section 125 of the Electricity Act which may attract the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with Section 29(2) thereof will defeat the object of the legislation, namely, to provide special limitation for filing an appeal against the decision or order of the Tribunal and proviso to Section 125 will become nugatory." 9. Any interpretation of Section 125 of the Electricity Act which may attract the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with Section 29(2) thereof will defeat the object of the legislation, namely, to provide special limitation for filing an appeal against the decision or order of the Tribunal and proviso to Section 125 will become nugatory." 9. Keeping in view the ratio laid down by the Honble Supreme Court, let me analyse some of the relevant provisions of the PML Act to decide the issues raised which are as follows: (i) Whether the date of communication of the order of the Appellate Tribunal as per section 42 of the PML Act is to be calculated from the date the order was communicated to the appellant/petitioner or to the Director, Directorate of Enforcement, New Delhi? (ii) Whether section 5 of the Limitation Act can be invoked for entertaining an appeal filed under section 42 of the PML Act beyond the period specified under the said section? (iii) Whether sufficient cause as mentioned in the proviso to section 42 of the PML Act is to be considered liberally by this Court while entertaining an appeal filed beyond the period of sixty days? Discussion on issue No.(i) : 10. Section 42 of the PML Act reads as follows: '42. Appeal to High Court.- Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal to him on any question of law or fact arising out of such order: Provided that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days. Explanation-For the purposes of this section, 'High Court' means (i) the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the aggrieved party ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain; and (ii) where the Central Government is the aggrieved party, the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the respondent, or in a case where there are more than one respondent, any of the respondents, ordinarily resides or carries on business of personally work for gain.' Section 71 of the PML Act reads as follows: '71. Act to have overriding effect.- The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force.' In view of section 42 of the PML Act, the period of limitation commences from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal to the person aggrieved. Rule 5 of the Prevention of Money-laundering (Appeal) Rules, 2005 (hereafter referred to as 2005 Rules), which deals with service of notice, requisitions or orders, states, inter alia, that an order issued under this Rules shall be served on any person by delivering or tendering the order to that person or the person duly authorized by him, or by sending the order to him by registered post with acknowledgement due to the address of his place of residence or his last known place of residence or the place where he carried on, or last carried on, business or personally works or last worked for gain; or by affixing it on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the premises in which the person resides or is known to have last resided or carried on business or personally works or has worked for gain and that written report thereof should be witnessed by two persons; or if the order cannot be served under any of these means, then by publishing in a leading newspaper (both in vernacular and in English) having wide circulation in the area or jurisdiction in which the person resides or is known to have last resided or carried on business or personally works or last worked for gain. On a conjoint reading of section 42 of the PML Act which states about date of communication of the decision or order to the person aggrieved and the words that person used in Rule 5 of the 2005 Rules makes it clear that the decision or order has to be communicated to the person aggrieved by the modes enumerated in Rule 5. Person aggrieved has not been defined in PML Act. Person aggrieved means a person who is injured or one who is adversely affected in a legal sense. Person aggrieved has not been defined in PML Act. Person aggrieved means a person who is injured or one who is adversely affected in a legal sense. In case of Thammanna Vrs.- K. Veera Reddy and others reported in A.I.R. 1981 Supreme Court 116, it is held that the person aggrieved may vary according to the context of the statute and the facts of the case, nevertheless, normally a person aggrieved must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something. In the case in hand, Himansu Kumar Lal, Joint Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Government of India, Bhubaneswar was the applicant before the Adjudicating Authority in O.A. 29 of 2015 in which the respondent/opposite party Mr. Sarosh Yazdani was defendant no.3. The cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Balasore and the Special Judge (Vigilance), Balasore and charge sheets submitted after investigation made on the basis of two first information reports dated 18.11.2009 and 30.03.2012 indicate that various persons including Government officials and mine owners have committed Schedule Offences under section 13(2) read with section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and under sections 120-B and 420 of the Indian Penal Code and the materials and documents revealed that various Government Officials connived with M/s. Serajuddin & Co. and their stake holders in conducting mining operations beyond the specified area and thereby obtained pecuniary benefit amounting to Rs.1323,35,66,781/- which preliminary appeared to be the proceeds of the crime. The Original Application filed vide O.A. 29 of 2015 by the Joint Director was allowed and some consequential orders were passed. The respondent/opposite party who was the defendant no.3 and three other defendants preferred four separate appeals before the Appellate Tribunal, PML Act, New Delhi under section 26 of the PML Act and in all the appeals, the Joint Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Bhubaneswar was the sole respondent and accordingly, the impugned order dated 06.05.2019 was passed and the appeals were allowed by setting aside the impugned order dated 01.12.2015 passed by the Adjudicating Authority in O.A. 29 of 2015 and it was specifically observed that copy of the order be given dasti to both the parties. In view of the factual scenario and the order passed by the Chairman, Appellate Tribunal, PML Act, New Delhi, I am of the humble view that the Joint Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Bhubaneswar who was the respondent can be said to be the person aggrieved as mentioned in section 42 of the PML Act and therefore, when it is not disputed that date of first communication of the impugned order of the Appellate Tribunal to the Joint Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Bhubaneswar was made on 31st May 2019 by e- mail, the period of limitation of sixty days as per section 42 of the PML Act has to be counted taking into account that date and not from any previous date on which the impugned order of the Appellate Tribunal was served on the Director, Directorate of Enforcement, New Delhi or Regional Special Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Eastern Region, Kolkota. Though the Director, Enforcement Directorate, New Delhi forwarded the order dated 06.05.2019 of the Appellate Tribunal to the Joint Director, Directorate Enforcement, Bhubaneswar vide letter dated 24.05.2019 and it was received at Bhubaneswar Zonal Office on 07.06.2019 but since the said order was earlier received vide e- mail dated 31.05.2019 by the Joint Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Bhubaneswar from Regional Special Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Eastern Region, Kolkota, the said date has to be taken as the date of communication for the purpose of calculating the period of limitation under section 42 of the PML Act. In view of the foregoing discussions, so far as issue no.(i) is concerned, I find substantial force in the argument advanced by Mr. Gopal Agarwal, learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner that the date of communication of the impugned order of the Appellate Tribunal as per section 42 of the PML Act is to be calculated from the date when such order was communicated to the appellant/petitioner i.e. on 31.05.2019 and not from the date when it was communicated to the Director, Directorate of Enforcement, New Delhi. Discussion on issue No. (ii): 11. Coming to issue no.(ii), I am of the humble view that the time limit prescribed under section 42 of the PML Act is absolute and it cannot be extended by this Court under section 5 of the Limitation Act. In other words, by giving liberal interpretation, limitation cannot be extended by invoking the provision of section 5 of the Limitation Act. In other words, by giving liberal interpretation, limitation cannot be extended by invoking the provision of section 5 of the Limitation Act. If any appeal is filed before the High Court beyond the period of sixty days from the date of communication of the order of the Appellate Tribunal to the person aggrieved, then the High Court has to consider the reasons assigned for not filing the appeal within sixty days and on being satisfied that there is sufficient cause which prevented the appellant from filing the appeal within sixty days, the delay can be condoned but the extended period cannot be more than sixty days. Therefore, any appeal filed beyond the period of one hundred twenty days by any person aggrieved to the High Court from the date of communication of the order of the Appellate Tribunal is to be dismissed on the ground of limitation. The specified time limit prescribed under the special law of PML Act shall prevail and to that extent the provision of the Limitation Act shall stand excluded. Section 71 of the PML Act also makes it very clear that the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. Therefore, I am of the humble view that section 5 of the Limitation Act has got no application to condone the delay beyond the outer limit for filing an appeal to this Court which is one hundred twenty days and any appeal filed thereafter cannot be entertained. Discussion on issue no. (iii): 12. Coming to issue no.(iii), the proviso to section 42 of the PML Act empowers the High Court to entertain an appeal not filed within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal to the person aggrieved only if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause in that respect. The satisfaction must be based on the materials available on record and reasons must be given for such satisfaction. The expression sufficient cause employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserve the ends of justice. Law is well settled that each days delay must be explained does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. The doctrine must be applied in rational common sense pragmatic manner. Law is well settled that each days delay must be explained does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. The doctrine must be applied in rational common sense pragmatic manner. There is no presumption that the delay is occasioned deliberately or on account of culpable negligence or on account of malafide. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and law is administered in an even handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step motherly treatment when the State is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. The condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. The State which represents collective cause of the community does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts, therefore, have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of interpretation of the expression sufficient cause. Merit is preferred to scuttle a decision on merits in turning down the case on technicalities of delay in presenting the appeal. What colour the expression sufficient cause would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bonafide nature of the explanation. If the Court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bonafide, then it may condone the delay. If on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay. In the case in hand, since I have already held that the date of communication of the impugned order of the Appellate Tribunal to the appellant/petitioner is 31.05.2019, I have to see what sufficient cause has been shown by the appellant/petitioner in not filing the appeal within sixty days of the date of communication of such order. In the delay condonation application, it has been mentioned that it is an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, which I have already held to be not applicable to condone the delay to an appeal filed under section 42 of the PML Act. In the delay condonation application, it has been mentioned that it is an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, which I have already held to be not applicable to condone the delay to an appeal filed under section 42 of the PML Act. However, even if it is held that the application has been made under a wrong provision of law, but if this Court is shown to be within its power under any other provision, non-mention or wrong nomenclature of the provision cannot disentitle a party to get his benefit. In paragraphs 3 and 4 of the interim application, it has been mentioned that after receiving the copy of the order on 31.05.2019, the decision to prefer an appeal before this Court was taken by the competent authority of the petitioner and permission was sought for from the Headquarters of the Enforcement Directorate, New Delhi to prefer the appeal and thus on account of procedural act only, there has been delay in presenting the appeal beyond the prescribed period of limitation which is neither intentional nor wilful but only for the aforesaid reasons. In the additional affidavit filed by the appellant/petitioner, it is mentioned in paragraph 6 that the impugned order dated 06.05.2019 has came to the knowledge of the appellant/petitioner on 31.05.2019 and thereafter legal opinion and steps were taken to file the appeal and in paragraph 7, it is mentioned that due to delay in receiving the impugned order and time spent for legal opinion and necessary permission/approval from the competent authority to file the appeal, the delay has been caused in filing the appeal. It is not clear as to after receipt of the impugned order on 31.05.2019, when the decision was taken by the competent authority of the petitioner to prefer the appeal and on what date permission was sought for from the Headquarters of Enforcement Directorate, New Delhi to prefer the appeal and on what date, such permission was accorded and when it was communicated to the appellant/petitioner. In absence of any such specific particulars being mentioned either in the interim application or in the additional affidavit filed on behalf of the appellant/petitioner and no document being filed in that respect, the vague averments made about the procedural delay and seeking for legal opinion cannot be a ground to hold that there was sufficient cause on the part of the appellant/petitioner which prevented him from filing the appeal within the period of sixty days as per section 42 of PML Act. On the basis of such averments, in my humble view, the appeal cannot be entertained within a further period of not exceeding sixty days. The issue no. (iii) is answered accordingly. In view of the foregoing discussions, I find no sufficient force in the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner to condone the delay of seventy five days in filing the criminal appeal. Accordingly, the application for condonation of delay being sans merit, stands dismissed. I.A. stands dismissed.