JUDGMENT Raghvendra Singh Chauhan, J. - Leave granted. Aggrieved by the acquittal of the respondent-accused, Mr. Vipul, under Section 302/34 of IPC, the State of Uttarakhand has challenged the judgment dated 06.03.2021, passed by the learned IIIrd Additional District & Session Judge, Rudrapur, District Udham Singh Nagar. 2. Briefly, the facts of the case are that, on 20.10.2010, Mr. Arun Kumar (P.W. 1), lodged a complaint with P.S. Rudrapur, District Udham Singh Nagar, wherein he claimed that "on the same day around 12:30 PM, there was a fight between his brother, Mohit, and Rakesh. During the fight, Rakesh stabbed his brother on stomach. Due to the injury, Mohit fell on the ground; Rakesh ran away. At the time of the incident, he was at his shop located at Sanjay Nagar Market. As soon as he was informed about the incident, he ran to the place of incident. He discovered that his brother was lying on the ground, and was bleeding from his stomach. He, immediately, informed his parents at home. Consequently, his mother also came there. The complainant took his brother in an auto to the nearest Government Hospital. But, considering the condition of his brother, his brother was referred to Sushila Tiwari Hospital". 3. Initially, the case was registered for the offence under Section 307 of IPC. However, with Mohit's death, the case was converted and registered for offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC. 4. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined six witnesses, and submitted fourteen documents. The accused neither examined any witness, nor submitted any document. After going through the evidence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused-respondent, Mr. Vipul. Hence, the present appeal before this Court. 5. Mr. J.S. Virk, the learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State, has contended that, firstly, despite ample evidence produced by the prosecution, the learned Trial Court has erred in acquitting the respondent-accused. Secondly, according to Bhola Pandey (P.W. 4), an eye-witness, he had seen that both Vipul and Rakesh were assaulting the deceased. Therefore, Vipul's presence at the scene of crime cannot be doubted. Despite the over-whelming evidence, the learned Trial Court has acquitted the respondent-accused. 6. Heard the learned counsel, and perused the impugned order. 7. Secondly, according to Bhola Pandey (P.W. 4), an eye-witness, he had seen that both Vipul and Rakesh were assaulting the deceased. Therefore, Vipul's presence at the scene of crime cannot be doubted. Despite the over-whelming evidence, the learned Trial Court has acquitted the respondent-accused. 6. Heard the learned counsel, and perused the impugned order. 7. It is, indeed, trite to state that in a case of direct evidence, the prosecution is required to prove its case beyond a shadow of doubt. 8. There are certain established principles with regard to the jurisdiction of the High Court while dealing with an acquittal order. In the case of Sampat Babso Kale v. State of Maharashtra, [ (2019) 4 SCC 739 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the principles with regard to the powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against an acquittal order. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:- 8. With regard to the powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal, the law is well established that the presumption of innocence which is attached to every accused person gets strengthened when such an accused is acquitted by the trial court and the High Court should not lightly interfere with the decision of the trial court which has recorded the evidence and observed the demeanour of witnesses. This Court in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka [ (2007) 4 SCC 415 , laid down the following principles: (SCC p. 432, para 42) "42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." 9. In the case of State of Rajasthan v. Naresh, [ (2009) 9 SCC 368 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court opined that "an order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there are some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused". 10. These principles have recently been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Anwar Ali & another v. State of Himachal Pradesh, [ (2020) 10 SCC 166 ]. Therefore, these settled principles of criminal jurisprudence would have to be kept in mind while examining the legality or illegality of the impugned judgment. 11. It is, indeed, trite to state that the scope of interference with an acquittal order is extremely limited. In case, the view taken by the learned Trial Court is a reasonable and plausible one, then the acquittal order should not be interfered with lightly by the Appellate Court. 11. It is, indeed, trite to state that the scope of interference with an acquittal order is extremely limited. In case, the view taken by the learned Trial Court is a reasonable and plausible one, then the acquittal order should not be interfered with lightly by the Appellate Court. It is only when the learned Trial Court has failed to admit an evidence, which was admissible, or ignored the evidence, which was readily available on record, or mis-appreciated the evidence, or has acquitted the accused on the basis of surmises and conjectures, or there is perversity in the reasoning of the learned Trial Court, only in such circumstances, would the Appellate Court be justified in overturning the verdict of acquittal and in convicting the accused. Therefore, while dealing with an acquittal order, the Appellate Court has to reassess the evidence available on record, and evaluate the reasoning given by the learned Trial Court. 12. A bare perusal of the testimony of Mr. Arun Kumar (P.W. 1) clearly reveals that in his cross-examination, he clearly admits that he did not mention Vipul's name (respondent-accused) in the F.I.R. lodged by him. Moreover, in the FIR, no overt act was assigned to Vipul. In fact, the F.I.R. was lodged only against Rakesh. Moreover, the overt act of stabbing the deceased in his stomach was assigned to Rakesh, and not to Vipul. 13. Although, Arun Kumar (P.W. 1) claims that his friends Mithilesh, Bhola, Kapil Sapan and others were standing near the place of incident, only Mithilesh Sarkar (P.W. 2) and Bhola (P.W. 4) have been examined. According to Mithilesh Sarkar (P.W. 2), they rushed at the scene of crime only after hearing the shouts of Mohit. Thus, there is contradiction between the testimonies of Arun Kumar (P.W. 1), and Mithilesh Sarkar (P.W. 2). For, according to Arun Kumar (P.W. 1), his friends Mithilesh, Bhola, Kapil Sapan were standing right next to the place of incident. Yet, according to Mithilesh Sarkar (P.W. 2), they were not standing near the place of incident. They rushed to the scene of crime only after hearing shouts and cries of Mohit. Even Bhola (P.W. 4) admits, in his cross-examination, that by the time he and others reached at the place of incident, the incident had already occurred. Yet, according to Mithilesh Sarkar (P.W. 2), they were not standing near the place of incident. They rushed to the scene of crime only after hearing shouts and cries of Mohit. Even Bhola (P.W. 4) admits, in his cross-examination, that by the time he and others reached at the place of incident, the incident had already occurred. The said admission clearly belies his claim in his examination-in-chief that he is an eye-witness of the actual incident, which was described by him in his examination-in-chief. 14. Due to the glaring gaps in the evidence produced by the prosecution, the learned Trial Court was justified in acquitting the respondent-accused, Mr. Vipul, on the following grounds:- Firstly, that the presence of the respondent-accused, Mr. Vipul, at the scene of crime is unclear. Secondly, the allegation made by the prosecution against the respondent-accused, Mr. Vipul, that he hit the deceased on the head with stick (Danda), or that he caught hold the deceased, is unproven. Thirdly, that even the alleged eye-witness admits that the incident had already occurred at the time he reached at the place of incident. Hence, the view taken by the learned Trial Court is a reasonable one. 15. Hence, the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond a shadow of doubt. Therefore, the learned Trial Court is certainly justified in acquitting the respondent-accused, Mr. Vipul. 16. For the reasons stated above, this Court does not find any merit in the present appeal. Hence, the appeal is hereby dismissed. 17. Pending application, if any, stands rejected.