JUDGMENT Even though, the matter is posted under the caption ‘For admission’, as the pleadings are complete, with the consent of the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Standing Counsel for the respondents, this Court deems it appropriate to dispose of the main Writ Petition. 2. Challenge in the present Writ Petition is to the notification dated 06.09.2017 issued by the 2nd respondent under Section 3(1) of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962 (for short, ‘the PMP Act’), proposing to lay pipelines from Paradeep to Hyderabad. 3. According to the petitioners, they own house site plots in Narava village, Pendurthi Mandal, Visakhapatnam District and the proposed pipelines will pass through the said house plots. 4. Earlier, the petitioners herein approached this Court, by way of filing Writ Petition No.13439 of 2020, wherein the petitioners herein challenged the subject notification dated 06.09.2017, issued under Section 3(1) of the PMP Act. This Court, way of an order dated 07.12.2020, partly allowed the said Writ Petition, setting aside the notification under Section 6(1) of the PMP Act to the extent of lands of the petitioners, while maintaining the notification dated 06.09.2017 issued under Section 3(1) of the PMP Act and further directed to issue notices to the petitioners and to afford opportunity of personal hearing on their objections and to pass appropriate orders on merits in accordance with the governing laws and rules expeditiously and further directed that till the completion of the said exercise, the respondents should not meddle with the properties of the petitioners. Pursuant to the said order, the 3rd respondent-competent authority, who is also shown as 4th respondent by name in the present Writ Petition, issued notices, calling upon the petitioners to submit their objections and in response to the notices, the petitioners herein submitted their objections on 03.02.2021. 5. While the things being so, now by way of the present Writ Petition, the petitioners herein are assailing the notification dated 06.09.2017 issued by the 2nd respondent under Section 3(1) of the PMP Act, principally on the ground that the very appointment of the 4th respondent, who is a retired Tahsildar, as a competent authority, is impermissible, in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 6. 6. Resisting the Writ Petition and denying the averments and allegations made in the writ affidavit, a counter affidavit, deposed by the 3rd respondent, has been filed. 7. Heard Sri M.S.R.Chandra Murthy, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri V.Ashok Ram, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent-Indian Oil Corporation, apart from perusing the material available on record. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners argues that the questioned notification is highly illegal, arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Articles 14, 21 and 300A of the Constitution of India and opposed to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Laljibhai Kadvabhai Savaliya and others Vs. State of Gujarat and others, (2016) 9 SCC 791 = 2017(2) ALD 118 SC and opposed to the very spirit and object of the provisions of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962. In elaboration, it is further contended by the learned counsel that the impugned notification is neither sustainable nor tenable and the very appointment of the 4th respondent as competent authority cannot be sustained and the 3rd respondent does not fall under any one of the categories indicated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above referred judgment and the 4th respondent is not a legally trained person. 9. On the contrary, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent-Corporation contends that the very Writ Petition filed by the petitioners herein is not maintainable and the petitioners herein cannot be permitted to maintain the present Writ Petition, as the petitioners herein already suffered an order of this Court in Writ Petition No.13439 of 2020, wherein this Court declined to interfere with the validity of the present notification issued under Section 3(1) of the PMP Act. It is further contended by the learned counsel that the judgment, on which the learned counsel for the petitioners places reliance, would not render any assistance to the case of the petitioners herein and filing of the letter under the Right to Information Act, 2005, on 06.07.2020, would not give the petitioners a fresh cause of action to maintain the present Writ Petition, as the earlier Writ Petition came to be filed only after submitting the said application. In support of his submissions and contentions, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent-Corporation takes the support of the following judgments: (1) Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. and others Vs. In support of his submissions and contentions, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent-Corporation takes the support of the following judgments: (1) Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. and others Vs. Yashwant Gajanan Joshi and others, AIR 1991 SC 933 . (2) Gude Narsimha Rao and others Vs. Union of India and others, 2018 (3) ALD 419 . (3) Dasari Kesavulu Vs. Union of India and others, 2020 (3) ALD 92 . (4) Barkatbhai V. Narasindani and others Vs. Patel Filters Ltd, 2005 GLH(3) 166. 10. In the above background, now the issues which this Court is called upon to answer in the present Writ Petition are: (1) Whether the petitioners herein are entitled to maintain the present Writ Petition in view of the order passed by this Court in Writ Petition No.13439 of 2020 dated 07.12.2020? (2) Whether the impugned notification dated 06.09.2017 issued by the 2nd respondent under Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962, is sustainable and tenable in view of the facts and circumstances of this case? (3) Whether the 4th respondent, who is a retired Tahsildar can be appointed as the competent authority under the PMP Act in the light of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Laljibhai Kadvabhai Savaliya’s case (1 supra)? 11. The information available before this Court discloses that previously, the petitioners herein invoked the jurisdiction of this Court by way of filing Writ Petition No.13439 of 2020, challenging the validity and the legal sustainability of the notification dated 06.09.2017 issued by the 2nd respondent. This Court, vide order dated 07.12.2020, partly allowed the said Writ Petition and the operative portion of the said order at paragraph No.24 reads as under: "Accordingly, the Writ Petitions are partly allowed and the notification dated 28.05.2019 issued under Section 6(1) of the PMP Act, 1962 so far as it relates to the properties of the petitioners covered by S.No.75 of Narava Village is set aside while maintaining the notification dated 06.09.2017 issued under Sections 3(1), and the Competent authority is directed to issue notice to the petitioners in these writ petitions and afford an opportunity of personal hearing to their objections and pass an appropriate order on merits in accordance with the governing law and Rules expeditiously. Till such exercise is completed, the respondent authorities shall not meddle with the properties of the petitioners.” 12. Till such exercise is completed, the respondent authorities shall not meddle with the properties of the petitioners.” 12. It is also not in controversy that the above said order passed by this Court attained finality. Evidently, in pursuance of the said order, the 3rd respondent issued notices to the petitioners under Section 5 of the PMP Act, calling upon the petitioners to submit their objections and responding to the same, the petitioners herein also submitted their objections. 13. In this context, it would be appropriate and apposite to refer to the relevant provisions of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962. The Parliament enacted the said legislation to provide for the acquisition of right of user in land for laying pipelines for transport of the petroleum and minerals and for the matters connected therewith. Section 2(a) of the PMP Act defines the term ‘competent authority’ and according to Section 2(a) of the PMP Act, ‘competent authority’ means any person or authority authorised by the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, to perform the functions of the competent authority under this PMP Act. Section 3 of the PMP Act deals with the publication of notification for acquisition and Section 4 of the PMP Act deals with power to enter, survey, etc. Section 5 of the PMP Act deals with the hearing of objections and Section 6 of the PMP Act deals with the declaration of acquisition of right of user. Section 7 of the PMP Act empowers the Central Government or State Government or corporation to lay pipelines. Section 10 of the PMP Act deals with the compensation, which obligates the authority to pay compensation towards damage, loss or injury due to the laying of the pipelines. Sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the PMP Act enables either of the parties to approach the learned District Judges against the compensation determined by the competent authority for proper determination by the learned District Judges and according to sub-section (6) of Section 10 of the PMP Act, the decisions of the District Judges under sub-section (2) of Section 10 or sub-section (5) shall be final. Under Section 12 of the PMP Act, the competent authority is also conferred with certain powers of the Civil Courts. 14. Under Section 12 of the PMP Act, the competent authority is also conferred with certain powers of the Civil Courts. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioners places strong reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Laljibhai Kadvabhai Savaliya’s case (1 supra). The Hon’ble Apex Court, while dealing with the subject legislation and the analogous provisions under the Metro Railway (Construction of Works) Act, 1978, at paragraph No.26 of the judgment held as under: "It is axiomatic that a person who occupies the position of Competent Authority under the PMP Act must evoke and enjoy public confidence. Neither the Act nor the Rules framed thereunder deal with the qualifications required of a person before his appointment as Competent Authority nor do they deal with any transparent process for such appointment. We may now turn to see the requirements in that behalf in an enactment which is part material, Section 2€ of the Metro Railway (Construction of Works) Act, 1978 (Metro Act, for short), defines Competent Authority as the one appointed Under Section 16. Section 16(2) then sets out, “a person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Competent Authority unless he is holding, or has held, a Judicial Office, not lower in rank than that of a Subordinate Judge”. Like the PMP Act, the Metro Act also confers power upon the Competent Authority therein to consider objections to the construction of the Metro Railway or any other work and to determine the amount payable for acquisition. The orders passed by the Competent Authority under the Metro Act are also appealable before an Appellate Authority. In our view, the Competent Authority under the provisions of the PMP Act must also be someone who is holding or has held a Judicial Office not lower in rank than that of a Subordinate Judge or is a trained legal mind. If such requirement is not read into and not taken as an integral and essential qualification before appointment of any person as Competent Authority, the provisions in that behalf will not be consistent with the doctrine of fairness Under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. At the same time, we hasten to add that actions taken by the Competent Authority till now, will not in any way stand impaired or be invalidated purely on this count.” 15. At the same time, we hasten to add that actions taken by the Competent Authority till now, will not in any way stand impaired or be invalidated purely on this count.” 15. It is very much manifest from a reading of the above said judgment that the Hon’ble Apex Court made a suggestion to the Union of India to remedy the situation obviously by inserting the provision in the enactment to see that a person of a Subordinate Judge cadre or a person with legal mind performs the duty of the competent authority. 16. Coming to the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the respondent-Corporation -- In Yashwant Gajanan Joshi’s case (2 supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court, when an objection was taken as regards the appointment of Competent Authority, at paragraph No.14, held as follows: "Now we shall consider the question of the appointment of Mrs. A.R.Gadre as competent authority in the present case. There is a clear averment in the affidavit in reply filed by the respondent No.1 in this regard that after the retirement of the competent authority Mr. G.S.Parte, Mrs. A.R.Gadre who was special land officer in Notification dated 6.6.1988. Compensation case was decided by the Additional District Judge in favour of the respondent. Mrs. A.R. Gadre in her own name filed a writ petition No.3606 of 1989 challenging the legality of the award passed by the Additional District Judge. In the said petition she had also prayed for the stay of the further acquisition proceedings. The grievance of the present respondent was that some interim orders of stay were also obtained in the aforesaid writ petition behind the back of the respondent. Even contempt proceedings have also been initiated by the respondent against Mrs. A.R. Gadre and which are still pending before the Bombay High Court. The High Court by the impugned order had removed Mrs. Gadre to function as contempt authority and thereafter the Union of India accepted the above position and sought further time to comply with the directions of the High Court. We have already dismissed the Special Leave Petition filed by the Union of India. Thus taking in view the entire facts and circumstances of the case, we are inclined to take the view that the respondent was right in contending that Mrs. We have already dismissed the Special Leave Petition filed by the Union of India. Thus taking in view the entire facts and circumstances of the case, we are inclined to take the view that the respondent was right in contending that Mrs. A.R. Gadre may have bias while determining the amount of compensation as she herself is a litigating party in this very matter in the High Court against the respondent. An apprehension thus in the mind of the respondent is well founded and on this ground we do not find any justification to interfere with the order of the Bombay High Court holding that the appointment of Mrs. Gadre was not valid. We however wish to make it clear that we do not agree with the general proposition of the High Court that an officer of the corporation cannot be appointed as a competent authority because he may be biased in favour of the corporation by reason of his employment. In the result, we find no force in this appeal and it is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.” 17. In Gude Narsimha Rao’s case (3 supra), at paragraph Nos.1, 12 and 13, the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held as under: "1. This Writ Petition has been filed to declare the action of Respondents 1 to 5 in appointing the 6th respondent - Sri A. Venkata Rao, Deputy Collector to act as the ‘Competent Authority’, as defined in Section 2(a) of the Petroleum & Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User In Land) Act, 1962 (for short, ‘the Act’) in regard to HPCL, Vijayawada- Dharmapuri Pipeline Project being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The facts, in brief, are that: the 1st respondent - Union of India in its Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas Department, which is responsible for exploration, production, refining, distribution, marketing, export, import and conservation of petroleum, natural gas, petroleum products and liquefied natural gas in India, initiated Vijayawada-Dharmapuri Pipeline Project and accorded sanction to the 4th respondent HPCL to execute the said project work, by notifying certain lands in Chandarlapadu, Nandigama and Kanchikacherla Mandals, Krishna District. Petitioners herein own and possess various extents of lands in Kadavatikollu Village, Chandarlapdu Mandal. Petitioners herein own and possess various extents of lands in Kadavatikollu Village, Chandarlapdu Mandal. The case of the petitioners is that by virtue of G.O.Rt.No. 1907, General Administration (SC-B) Department, dated 29.8.2017 issued by the 2nd respondent State of Andhra Pradesh, the 6th respondent was appointed as the ‘Competent Authority’, under Section 2(a) of the Act, to perform the functions of the ‘Competent Authority’ prescribed under the said Act. 12. Having considered the respective submissions, at the outset, it may be noted that the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners are three-fold. As regards the contention of bias and the competency of the 6th respondent to perform the functions as the ‘Competent Authority’, the judgment in Trilok Sudhirbhai Pandya’s case is distinguishable as the same has turned on its own facts. The Supreme Court, taking notice of its earlier judgment rendered by a three-judge Bench in Yashwant Gajanan Joshi’s case (cited 3 supra), had categorically found that the said judgment is not applicable in the facts of the case before it, for, the acquisition of right of user was in favour of the 4th respondent, which is a private sector company and this private sector company was paying the salary, allowances and all other incidentals of the competent authority. The said judgment had taken note of the fact that the competent authority in Yashwant Gajanan Joshi’s case was a person in public employment. The ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Yashwant Gajanan Joshi’s case is directly applicable to the facts on hand, though in the said case, on the facts, the appointment of the individual Mrs. A.R. Gadre was found to be suffering from bias and thus, the said individual’s appointment was set aside. However, the law declared therein, in para 14, is to the effect that “We however wish to make it clear that we do not agree with the general proposition of the High Court that an officer of the Corporation cannot be appointed as a ‘competent authority’ because he may be biased in favour of the corporation by reason of his employment”. In paragraphs 12 and 13, the Supreme Court has taken note of the fact that even if the competent authority is an employee of the public-sector Corporation, there would be no bar, and on the other hand, the persons, who had been employed in the Corporation, would be better qualified and experienced person equipped with proper background to decide the amount of compensation. The Supreme Court has also further observed that “It would be too broad a proposition to extend the theory of bias to exclude persons only because such person draws the salary from the bodies like public corporation, State Government or Central Government. It would altogether be a different case if it was a case of a private employer and his employee. We cannot equate the case of a person in private employment with that of a person in public employment. The authorities mentioned above and relied upon by Mr. Dholakia are clearly distinguishable.” In view of the above proposition, there is no justification for this Court to accept the contention of the learned counsel that the 6threspondent competent authority will act in a biased manner. 13. So far as the second contention of the learned counsel is concerned, in the case on hand, there is no dispute that the 6threspondent is an officer of the State of Andhra Pradesh with vast experience and qualifications, the details of which are set out in the additional affidavit filed on behalf of Respondents 2 to 4. It is not necessary to discuss, in detail, the experience of the 6threspondent as this Court can as well take judicial notice of the factum of the functions of a Tahsildar, who was promoted up to the stage of the Deputy Collector, working in the Revenue Department, day in and day out. In those circumstances, there can be no doubt as to the technical and legal competency of the 6threspondent in determining the compensation for right of user of the property of the petitioners to be affected in laying the pipeline by the 6th respondent.” 18. In Dasari Kesavulu’s case (4 supra), this Court, at paragraph Nos.1, 2, 3, 14, 15, 16 and 17, held as under: "1. This Writ Petition is filed challenging the notification issued under Section 3(1) and declaration under Section 6 of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962 (for brevity ‘the Act’). In Dasari Kesavulu’s case (4 supra), this Court, at paragraph Nos.1, 2, 3, 14, 15, 16 and 17, held as under: "1. This Writ Petition is filed challenging the notification issued under Section 3(1) and declaration under Section 6 of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962 (for brevity ‘the Act’). 2. The case of the petitioner is that he is the absolute owner of the land admeasuring an extent of Ac.9-20 cents in Survey Nos.59/1B and 60/2 of Sunnampadu village, G. Konduru Mandal, Krishna district; the second respondent issued notification under Section 6(1) of the Act on 18.09.2019 declaring that the petitioner’s land is required for laying a pipeline; at that juncture, the petitioner approached the concerned authorities and came to know that Section 3(1) notification was issued under the Act on 06.09.2017 and that objections under Section 5(1) of the Act were called for and that the declaration under Section 6 of the Act has been issued; no notice under Section 3 of the Act was issued to the petitioner and hence he could not file his objections; the declaration under Section 6 of the Act is not communicated to him; the second respondent was appointed as competent authority under the Act and as he was drawing salary and other emoluments, as an employee of the Corporation he will have bias in favour of the Corporation, hence the petitioner filed the present Writ Petition praying to drop all further proceedings. 3. 3. Counter affidavit is filed on behalf of the second respondent stating, inter alia, that the Government of India undertook transportation of petroleum products from Paradip in the State of Odisha via State of Andhra Pradesh to Hyderabad through pipeline project “Paradip - Hyderabad Pipeline Project”; the Indian oil Corporation, a Government of India undertaking, has embarked upon laying prestigious 1212 KMs long pipeline; Section 3(1) notification was published on 11.04.2018 and Section 6 declaration was published on 18.09.2019; individual notice was issued to the petitioner under Section 3(1) of the Act on 17.11.2017 giving 21 days’ time for raising objections under Section 5(1) of the Act, but no objections whatsoever were filed by the petitioner; hence, declaration under Section 6 of the Act was issued; panchanama was also conducted in the presence of Village Revenue Officer and the petitioner refused to sign the panchanama; the substance notices under Sections 3(1) and 6(1) were also published at all the public places as per the Act; the second respondent entered into the Government service as a Probationary Revenue Inspector in the Revenue Department for the State of Andhra Pradesh in the year 1995; he worked as Tahsildar and Mandal Executive Magistrate for more than 4 years from 2010 to 2016 and exercised quasi judicial powers; he completed his B.L Degree and enrolled as an Advocate in 1991; he also practiced at various Courts up to 1995; he also passed Departmental tests in Civil and Criminal, Revenue and Survey tests; for the notices issued under Sections 3(1) and 6(1) of the Act, acknowledgments were also obtained from the petitioner. 14. As seen from the above judgment, it is clear that the said judgment was passed in view of the facts and circumstances of that case and the Full Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court also observed that they do not agree with the general proposition of the High Court that an officer of the Corporation cannot be appointed as a competent authority because he may be biased by reason of his employment. Hence, the said judgment does not apply to the facts of the present case. 15. In Writ Petition No.508 of 2018, decided by the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad, on 20.03.2018, a similar question arose with regard to appointment of competent authority. Hence, the said judgment does not apply to the facts of the present case. 15. In Writ Petition No.508 of 2018, decided by the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad, on 20.03.2018, a similar question arose with regard to appointment of competent authority. In the said case, petitioners therein contended that the 6th respondent, though a Government employee, is being paid by respondents 3 and 4 Corporation and hence, there is every possibility to presume that he will have bias in favour of the Corporation. The facts in the said case are similar to the case on hand. The High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad, after taking into consideration all the three judgments referred to above, came to a conclusion that there is no justification to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner therein that the 6th respondent therein who is a competent authority will act in a biased manner. As the competent authority is also an officer of the State in that case, it was held that as he is an officer of the State with vast experience and qualifications, there can be no doubt, as to the technical and legal competency of the said person in determining the compensation and accordingly dismissed the Writ Petition. 16. As the competent authority is also an officer of the State in that case, it was held that as he is an officer of the State with vast experience and qualifications, there can be no doubt, as to the technical and legal competency of the said person in determining the compensation and accordingly dismissed the Writ Petition. 16. Apart from that, the authority under the Act will determine the compensation at the first instance and according to Section 10(2) of the Act, if the amount of compensation determined by the competent authority under sub-section (1) is not acceptable to either of the parties, the amount of compensation shall, on application by either of the parties to the District Judge within the limits of whose jurisdiction the land or any part thereof is situated, be determined by that District Judge and according to sub-section (3) of Section 10 the competent authority or the District Judge while determining the compensation under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), as the case may be, shall have due regard to the damage or loss sustained by any person interested in the land by reason of (i) the removal of trees of standing crops, (ii) the temporary severance of the land under which the pipeline has been laid from other lands belonging to, or in the occupation of, such person; or (iii) any injury to any other property, whether movable or immovable, or the earnings of such persons caused in any other manner and according to sub- section (4) of Section 10 in addition to the compensation, if any, payable under sub-section (1), be liable to pay to the owner and to any other person whose right of enjoyment in that land has been affected in any manner whatsoever by reason of such venting, compensation calculated at 10% of the market value of that land on the date of the notification under sub- section (1) of section 3. And according to sub-section (5) of Section 10 if the market value of the land on the said date shall be determined by the competent authority and if the value so determined by that authority is not acceptable to either of the parties, it shall, on application by either of the parties to the District Judge referred to in sub-section (2) be determined by that District Judge. 17. 17. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and also considering the public interest involved in laying the pipeline, I see no merit in the Writ Petition, hence the same is liable to be dismissed.” 19. In Barkatbhai’s case (5 supra), the High Court of Gujarat, held that the words ‘legally trained mind’ do not mean possessing a degree simpliciter and the legally trained mind would be somebody who has some legal experience or has some experience relating to domestic inquiries on their legal side. 20. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the above mentioned judgments, cited by the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent-Corporation, have absolutely no relevance to the present case on hand in view of the factual and circumstantial variation. 21. On the other hand, according to the learned Standing Counsel for the Indian Oil Corporation, the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Laljibhai Kadvabhai Savaliya’s case (1 supra) would not render any assistance to the petitioners’ case, as in the instant case, the 4th respondent herein is a legally trained person and he fulfils all the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the above referred judgments. 22. In this context, it may be relevant to refer to paragraph Nos.5, 6 and 7 of the counter affidavit, which read as under: "5. In reply to Para 4 of the writ affidavit, it is submitted that in pursuance of the orders of this Hon’ble Court in W.P. No.13439/2020, the 4th respondent issued notices to the Petitioners herein and after receipt of the same, the writ petitioners filed their respective objections on various dates, admittedly. It is submitted that 4th respondent fixed a date i.e., on 15/4/2021, for personal hearing of the objections of the Writ Petitioners. The writ petitioners instead of appearing for the personal hearing before the 4th respondent herein, chose to file the instant Writ petition, which is devoid of any grounds and cause of action. It is denied that the 4th respondent is not qualified to be appointed as the Competent Authority under the said Act. The said Judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, relied upon by the petitioners herein, makes it amply clear that any person with a Trained Legal Mind can be appointed as a Competent Authority. 6. It is denied that the 4th respondent is not qualified to be appointed as the Competent Authority under the said Act. The said Judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, relied upon by the petitioners herein, makes it amply clear that any person with a Trained Legal Mind can be appointed as a Competent Authority. 6. The 4th respondent herein is a Retired Tahsildar, who worked in the Revenue Department in the Government of Andhra Pradesh. It is submitted that the 4th respondent is a Post Graduate and has served in the Revenue Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh, for nearly 29 years, in various capacities, before attaining superannuation. More importantly, the 4th respondent served as Deputy Tahsildar for 5 years, in Visakhapatnam District and was promoted and served as Tahsildar and Mandal Executive Magistrate for Koyyuru and Parwada Mandals in Visakhapatnam District, for nearly 2 years, before attaining superannuation. The 4th respondent in his capacity as a Tahsildar, has exercised Quasi Judicial Powers under various Statutes, more particularly, under the A.P. (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956 and A.P. Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfer) Act, 1977, as amended from time to time. The 4th respondent, in his capacity as a Tahsildar and Mandal Executive Magistrate, has dealt with several cases with complicated questions of both facts and law and hence the 4th respondent is a Trained Legal Mind. It is submitted that, in view of the said Qualifications and Experience of the 4th respondent, the 1st Respondent herein appointed the 4th respondent herein as “Competent Authority”, under the PMP Act 1962, in May, 2019, and the 4th respondent has been performing his duties without a blemish and with the highest integrity and Standards. It is, therefore, submitted that any preconceived notions or presumptions, the writ petitioners have, regarding the Experience and Efficiency of the 4th respondent in dealing with complicated facts and law, is clearly baseless and figment of the petitioners’ imagination. Therefore, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 7. In reply to para 5 of the writ affidavit, it is submitted that the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, relied upon by the petitioners, has been misunderstood by the petitioners herein. The said Judgment clearly held that a person with a trained legal mind can be appointed as Competent Authority. 7. In reply to para 5 of the writ affidavit, it is submitted that the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, relied upon by the petitioners, has been misunderstood by the petitioners herein. The said Judgment clearly held that a person with a trained legal mind can be appointed as Competent Authority. The 4th respondent, as has been detailed herein above, is a retired Tahsildar, who was an Executive Magistrate and also exercised Quasi Judicial Powers to conduct enquiries under various statutes. The same would prove beyond any doubt, that the 4th respondent has a Trained Legal Mind and is qualified to be a Competent Authority. It is not out of place to mention herein that this Hon’ble Court, in several reported judgments, upheld the appointments of the Tahsildars and Deputy Collector as Contempt Authorities. It is further submitted that a 3 Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in a Judgement reported in AIR 1991 SC 933 , held that the Central Government has the power to appoint even an employee of a Public Corporation as a Competent Authority.” 23. In view of the above undisputed factual situation, by any stretch of imagination, it cannot be concluded nor be construed that the 4th respondent lacks legal knowledge. Therefore, the contention contra advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners is liable to be rejected and is accordingly rejected. 24. It is also significant to note that as mentioned supra, when the petitioners herein earlier approached this Court by way of filing Writ Petition, questioning the very same notification, this Court while declining to set aside the notification, directed the respondents to conduct enquiry by considering the objections of the petitioners. Therefore, on this ground and having regard to the provisions of Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the present Writ Petition cannot be entertained and the letter addressed by the petitioners herein under the Right to Information Act, 2005, in the considered opinion of this Court, would not give a fresh cause of action to the petitioners herein to maintain the present Writ Petition. 25. 25. The distinction sought to be drawn by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the judgment rendered in Dasari Kesavulu’s case (4 supra) is not relevant, as, in the said case, the subject property was agricultural property, and in the present case, the property is a house property, in the considered opinion of this Court, cannot stand for any judicial scrutiny and there cannot be such distinction in view of the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court. Accordingly, the said contention is also rejected. Therefore, this Court has absolutely no scintilla of hesitation to come to a conclusion that the Writ Petition is devoid of any merits. 26. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed. It is needless to observe that the respondents herein would strictly adhere to the provisions of the statute. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this Writ Petition, shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs of the Writ Petition.