JUDGMENT : A.K.Jayasankaran Nambiar & Gopinath.P., JJ “I do not doubt the right of Parliament and of the executive to place restrictions upon a man's freedom. I fully agree that the fundamental rights conferred by the Constitution are not absolute. They are limited. In some cases the limitations are imposed by the Constitution itself. In others, Parliament has been given the power to impose further restrictions and in doing so to confer authority on the executive to carry its purpose into effect. But in every case it is the rights which are fundamental, not the limitations; and it is the duty of this Court and of all courts in the land to guard and defend these rights jealously. It is our duty and privilege to see that rights which were intended to be fundamental are kept fundamental and to see that neither Parliament nor the executive exceed the bounds within which they are confined by the Constitution when given the power to impose a restricted set of fetters on these freedoms; and in the case of the executive, to see further that it does not travel beyond the powers conferred by Parliament. We are here to preserve intact for the peoples of India the freedoms which have now been guaranteed to them and which they have learned through the years to cherish, to the very fullest extent of the guarantee, and to ensure that they are not whittled away or brought to nought either by Parliamentary legislation or by executive action.” Vivian Bose. J. in Ram Singh v. State of Delhi, AIR 1951 SC 270 We are in these writ petitions concerned with the personal liberty of detenues under the COFEPOSA Act. Their relatives have come forth with these petitions seeking their immediate release through the issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus. Inasmuch as the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as the respondents advanced lengthy arguments before us, we have thought it apposite to first draw out the contours, and explain the nature, of the jurisdiction that we exercise in such matters, before proceeding to examine the facts of the individual cases. The concept of Liberty: 2. The English philosopher John Stuart Mill considered a society in which liberties were not respected as one that, irrespective of the form of its governance, was never free. The concept of Liberty: 2. The English philosopher John Stuart Mill considered a society in which liberties were not respected as one that, irrespective of the form of its governance, was never free. For him a free society was one where liberty existed as an absolute and unqualified concept. Liberty comprised essentially of three components viz. (i) liberty of thought and expression - the freedom to express your ideas and beliefs; (ii) liberty of tastes and pursuits - the freedom to do what one wants without any obstruction from fellow citizens so long as it did not harm them and (iii) liberty of combination of individuals - the freedom to unite for any purpose not involving harm to others. The worth of a State lay in the worth of the individuals composing it and accordingly, a free State was one where the collective liberties of its citizens were duly recognised and respected. Liberty under our Constitution: 3. Our Constitution recognises the concept of Liberty - of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship. This is borne out in its Preamble. In order to understand the true sense in which the concept of liberty was perceived by the framers of our Constitution, we have to first understand the nature of the Constitution itself. As observed by Granville Austin,[Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution; Cornerstone of a Nation], “The Indian Constitution is first and foremost a social document for majority of its provisions are either directly aimed at furthering the goals of the social revolution or attempt to foster this revolution by establishing the conditions necessary for its achievement. The core of the commitment to social revolution lies in Parts III and IV, in the fundamental rights and in the Directive Principles of State Policy. Together, they constitute the Conscience of the Constitution. The provisions of Part III and IV have their roots deep in the struggle for independence and they were included in the Constitution in the hope that one day the tree of true liberty would bloom in India.” 4. Under our Constitution, therefore, personal liberty in its fullest sense is sought to be achieved through the guarantee of the fundamental freedoms in Part III. This was designed to fulfill the aspiration of the Indian people to enjoy the same extent of personal freedom in India, as were enjoyed by their colonial masters in England. Under our Constitution, therefore, personal liberty in its fullest sense is sought to be achieved through the guarantee of the fundamental freedoms in Part III. This was designed to fulfill the aspiration of the Indian people to enjoy the same extent of personal freedom in India, as were enjoyed by their colonial masters in England. More importantly, the thrust of the protection of fundamental rights is in respect of each individual so as to bring about an egalitarian society where all citizens were equally free. Liberty is therefore no longer the sole preserve of a select few in society. The guarantee against violation of fundamental rights is achieved not only through negative obligations imposed on the State, not to interfere with the liberties of citizens, but also through the positive obligation imposed on the State to protect the citizens rights from encroachment by society. Preventive Detention - a jurisdiction of suspicion: 5. Art. 21 of our Constitution states that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. As an express limitation on legislative power, the Article envisages that the word “law” contained therein has the same meaning as the American phrase “due process of law”, meaning thereby a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. Art.22 of our Constitution, however, carves out an exception in the case of preventive detention by making it clear that the procedural safeguards against arbitrary arrest and detention, that are ordinarily available to persons in our country, are not applicable to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention. The latter, it must be noted, deprives a person of his liberty consequent to proceedings where there is no charge formulated, offense proved, or criminal conviction warranted by legal evidence. It is a jurisdiction of suspicion and is justified on the argument that preventive justice requires action to be taken to prevent apprehended objectionable activities. Notwithstanding the disgruntlement of our people with similar laws under colonial rule, the decision to retain a provision for preventive detention was a deliberate one taken by the makers of our constitution. It is a jurisdiction of suspicion and is justified on the argument that preventive justice requires action to be taken to prevent apprehended objectionable activities. Notwithstanding the disgruntlement of our people with similar laws under colonial rule, the decision to retain a provision for preventive detention was a deliberate one taken by the makers of our constitution. It therefore comes as no surprise that, notwithstanding that the concept of preventive detention runs counter to the principle of protection against arbitrary arrest and detention guaranteed in most democratic republics governed by the rule of law, and recognised by the United Nations under Art.9 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights to which India is a signatory, the Indian Government entered a reservation to Art.9 of the ICCPR by making it clear that it takes the position that the provisions of the Article shall be so applied as to be in consonance with the provisions of clauses (3) to (7) of Art.22 of the Constitution of India, [Derek P Jinks, ‘The Anatomy of an Institutionalised Emergency: Preventive Detention and Personal Liberty in India’ - (2001) 22 Michigan Journal of International Law 311, 27]. 6. Our constitution, while conceding the power of preventive detention, has nevertheless, through clauses (4) to (7) of Art.22, provided procedural safeguards with a view to protecting the citizen against arbitrary and unjustified invasion of personal liberty, and our courts have zealously tried to uphold and enforce these safeguards[Smt. Icchu Devi Choraria v UOI & Ors - 1980 (4) SCC 531 ; UOI v Yumnam Anand M - 2007 (10) SCC 190 ; Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel v UOI - 1995 (4) SCC 51 ]. Consequently, if the detaining authority wants to preventively detain a smuggler, it can certainly do so, but only in accordance with the provisions of the constitution and the law, and if there is a breach of any such provision, the rule of law requires that the detenu must be set at liberty, however wicked or mischievous he may be. It is therefore that when an application for a writ of Habeas corpus is filed before us, we feel duty bound to satisfy ourselves that all the safeguards provided by the law have been scrupulously observed, and the citizen is not deprived of his personal liberty otherwise than in accordance with law. It is therefore that when an application for a writ of Habeas corpus is filed before us, we feel duty bound to satisfy ourselves that all the safeguards provided by the law have been scrupulously observed, and the citizen is not deprived of his personal liberty otherwise than in accordance with law. While considering such applications, our courts do not follow strict rules of pleading, and often relax the rigour of the evidentiary rules governing burden of proof. The detaining authority, on the other hand, is called upon to place all materials before the court to show that the detention is legal and in conformity with the mandatory provisions of the law authorizing such detention. Preventive Detention - Procedural Safeguards: 7. Art.22 (4) of our constitution mandates that no law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than three months unless an Advisory Board constituted in accordance with the said provision has reported its opinion as regards sufficient cause for such detention not exceeding the maximum period prescribed under the relevant statute, or the statute concerned expressly provides for a prolonged detention without obtaining the opinion of the Advisory Board. Grounds, and communication thereof: 8. Art.22 (5) states that when a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the detaining authority shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds, save such facts which the authority considers to be against public interest to disclose, on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. S.3 (3) of the COFEPOSA Act fixes the outer time limit for communicating the grounds of detention as ‘not later than five days and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing not later than fifteen days from the date of detention’. Thus, the immediate serving of the grounds of detention and the affording of an opportunity to make a representation against the order of detention are the barest minimum safeguards which must be observed before an executive authority can be permitted to preventively detain a person and ‘thereby drown his right of personal liberty in the name of public good and social security’[State of Bombay v Atma Ram Vaidya - AIR 1951 SC 157 ; Khudiram Das v State of West Bengal - AIR 1975 SC 550 ]. 9. For an effective communication of the grounds of detention to the detenu, they must be furnished in their entirety. If there are any documents, statements or other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention, they must also be communicated to the detenu, because being incorporated in the grounds of detention, they form part of the grounds, and the grounds furnished to the detenu cannot be said to be complete without them. It has to be borne in mind that the primary object of communicating the grounds of detention to the detenu is to enable the detenu, at the earliest opportunity, to make a representation against his detention, and he cannot make an effective representation unless he is also furnished copies of the documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention. The right to be supplied copies of the documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention, without any delay, flows directly as a necessary corollary from the right conferred on the detenu to be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the detention, because unless the former right is available, the latter cannot be meaningfully exercised. If the grounds of detention, as above, were not furnished to the detenu within the time permitted under the law, the continued detention of the detenu would be illegal and void.[Smt. Icchu Devi Choraria v UOI & Ors - 1980 (4) SCC 531 ; Ramachandra A Kamat v UOI & Ors - 1980 (2) SCC 270 ] 10. We believe in this connection that the reference to ‘grounds of detention’ in Art.22 (5) of our constitution, as well as in S.3 of the COFEPOSA Act, must be taken as alluding to the train of thought in the detaining authority, leading from a consideration of the offensive acts/omissions attributed to the detenu, to the formation of the opinion that the detenue ought to be detained in order to prevent the commission of prejudicial acts in future. An effective communication of the grounds for detention must therefore include a communication of the reasons that weighed with the detaining authority for forming such an opinion based on the material scrutinized by him. An effective communication of the grounds for detention must therefore include a communication of the reasons that weighed with the detaining authority for forming such an opinion based on the material scrutinized by him. The said requirement can be deduced from the decision of the nine judge bench of the Supreme Court in Amratlal Prajivandas, [Attorney General for India v Amratlal Prajivandas - 1994 (5) SCC 54 ] that held, while interpreting the provisions of S.5A of the COFEPOSA Act, that though ordinarily one act may not be held sufficient to sustain an order of detention, one act may sustain an order of detention if the act is of such a nature as to indicate that it is an organized act or manifestation of organized activity. The gravity and nature of the act is also relevant and the test is whether the act is such that it gives rise to an inference that the person would continue to indulge in similar prejudicial activity. That inference by the detaining authority can be arrived at only after an application of mind as to the nature of the act, which exercise must be apparent from the reasons furnished by him for his decision. Subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority: 11. The detaining authority cannot merely state that he is satisfied that the person is required to be detained; he must go further and state the reasons why he came to be so satisfied on the basis of the material available and scrutinized by him. The supply of reasons is what clothes his ‘subjective satisfaction’ with the legitimacy that is required of action designed to deprive a person of his/her fundamental right to personal liberty. In its absence, the detenu does not get an effective right of representation against the detention, or an opportunity to show that there were no valid reasons to support the same. It is by now well settled that the subjective satisfaction that informs the decision of the detaining authority is amenable to judicial review in an application for habeas corpus. While the statute may express the confidence of the legislature in an authority entrusted with the power to detain a citizen, the principles integral to the rule of law that inform the exercise of judicial review recognise that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority cannot be absolute. While the statute may express the confidence of the legislature in an authority entrusted with the power to detain a citizen, the principles integral to the rule of law that inform the exercise of judicial review recognise that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority cannot be absolute. Accordingly, if it were found that the order of the detaining authority is not based on any relevant material, or does not contain any reason for his decision, this court would step in to free the detenu from the shackles of an illegal detention. This is not to say that the court would substitute its opinion for that of the detaining authority or objectively assess the material considered by the said authority. The court would only ascertain as to whether any relevant material existed, on the basis of which the detaining authority could have arrived at his subjective satisfaction through a proper application of mind to the said material. A reviewing authority can satisfy itself of the application of mind by the detaining authority only by looking at the reasons furnished for the detention by the said authority. Unexplained delay vitiates detention: 12. The procedural safeguards envisaged for the detenu also mandate that the communication of the grounds of detention, as also the consideration of the representation of the detenu against the order of detention, have to be within the time prescribed by the statute. An unexplained delay at any stage, commencing from the passing of the detention order to its execution and thereafter, during the stages of making of the representation by the detenu and a consideration of the same by the detaining authority, sponsoring authority and the advisory board, will vitiate the detention order and entitle the detenu to an immediate release from detention. If the delay is caused on account of any indifference or lapse in considering the representation such delay will adversely affect further detention of the prisoner. It is therefore for the authority concerned to explain the delay, if any, in disposing the representation. In that process, it is not enough to say that the delay was very short as the test is not the duration or range of delay, but how it is explained by the authority concerned. It is therefore for the authority concerned to explain the delay, if any, in disposing the representation. In that process, it is not enough to say that the delay was very short as the test is not the duration or range of delay, but how it is explained by the authority concerned. [K.M.Abdullah Kunhi and B.L.Abdul Khader v UOI - 1991 (1) SCC 476 ; Rajammal v State of Tamil Nadu - 1999 (1) SCC 417 ; Rattan Singh & Anr v State of Punjab & Ors - 1981 (4) SCC 481 ; Vijay Kumar v State of J&K & Ors - 1982 (2) SCC 43 ; Youssef Abbas v UOI - 1982 (2) SCC 380 ; Prabhakar Shankar Dhuri v SH.S.G.Pradhan & Ors - 1971(3) SCC 896 ; Abdul Nasar Ismail v State of Maharashtra - 2013 (4) SCC 435 ] A delay in executing the detention order may also vitiate the detention since an unexplained delay leads the court to infer that there was no subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority as regards the need to detain the detenu. However, merely because the execution of the order of detention is delayed, the proposed detenu cannot take advantage of the passage of time and claim that the ‘live and proximate link’ has snapped, especially when it is found that the delay was on account of his recalcitrant conduct in evading arrest[Saeed Zakir Hussain Malik v State of Maharashtra & Ors - 2012 (8) SCC 233 ; Subhash Popatlal Dave v UOI & Ors - 2014 (1) SCC 280 ]. Manner of consideration of representation: 13. The constitutional right to make a representation under Art.22 (5), by necessary implication, guarantees the constitutional right to a proper consideration of the representation. As regards the manner in which such representations are to be considered by the various authorities it has been clarified that the detaining authority, the appropriate government as well as the advisory board have to independently consider the representation of the detenu. The obligation of the government to consider the representation is different from the obligation of the board to consider the representation at the time of hearing the references. The government considers the representation to ascertain essentially whether the order is in conformity with the power under the law. The obligation of the government to consider the representation is different from the obligation of the board to consider the representation at the time of hearing the references. The government considers the representation to ascertain essentially whether the order is in conformity with the power under the law. The board, on the other hand, considers the representation and the case of the detenu to examine whether there is sufficient cause for the detention. In that sense, the consideration by the board is an additional safeguard and not a substitute for consideration of the representation by the Government. [K.M.Abdullah Kunhi and B.L.Abdul Khader v UOI - 1991 (1) SCC 476 ; Ankit Ashok Jalan v UOI & Ors - 2020 (16) SCC 127 ] 14. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles, we proceed to examine the facts in the individual cases before us. The fate of the detenues, and their claim for restoration of their personal liberty, will depend upon our findings on the following issues viz. (i) Whether there was a significant lapse of time between the last prejudicial act of the detenu and the order of detention passed in relation to him? An unexplained delay in passing the order of detention would cast doubts on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that informed the order of detention. (ii) Whether there was any significant and unexplained delay in the execution of the detention order through an arrest of the detenu? An unexplained delay would suggest that the detaining authority was not serious in implementing the detention order and consequently, that there was no perceived need to detain the detenu. (iii) Whether the grounds of detention were served on the detenu within the time permitted under Art. 22(5) of our Constitution read with the provisions of the COFEPOSA Act? (iv) Whether the communication of the grounds of detention, in terms of Art.22 (5) of our Constitution, was complete in all respects and included copies of all material relied upon by the detaining authority while passing the detention order? (v) Whether the communication of the grounds of detention were sufficient to enable the detenu to submit his representation against the detention before the detaining authority, appropriate government and the advisory board? (vi) Whether the representation of the detenu was considered expeditiously and without delay by the authorities concerned? (v) Whether the communication of the grounds of detention were sufficient to enable the detenu to submit his representation against the detention before the detaining authority, appropriate government and the advisory board? (vi) Whether the representation of the detenu was considered expeditiously and without delay by the authorities concerned? Any unexplained delay in consideration of the representation would vitiate the detention order itself and entitle the detenu to an immediate release from custody. (vii) Whether the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, as regards the need for detention, was based on relevant material and contained reasons that would demonstrate an application of mind by the said authority? 15. W.P (Crl) No.255 of 2020 arises out of an order of detention issued on 31-03-2017 having regard to certain incidents relating to smuggling of cigarettes while W.P (Crl) Nos.279 & 280 of 2020 are connected, and relate to orders of detention issued against two individuals who are brothers, on 18-07-2019 in relation to certain incidents of smuggling of gold. Since several of the legal issues raised are common to all three cases, we deem it appropriate to dispose these cases by this common judgment. 16. We have heard the submissions of Sri. P.A. Augustian the learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P (Crl) No.255 of 2020, Sri. M.Ajay, the learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P (Crl) Nos.279 & 280 of 2020, Sri.Jaishankar V. Nair, Sri.Suvesh.R.Menon, Sri Daya Sindhu Sreehari, learned Central Government Counsel for the Union of India, Sri. K.A. Anas, learned Government Pleader appearing for the State of Kerala and Sri. S. Manu, the learned counsel appearing for the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (hereinafter referred to as ‘the DRI’). 17. The basic facts & the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties in each of the Writ Petitions, the contentions raised, the precedents relied upon and our findings on each of the contentions are as follows: W.P.(Crl.) 255 of 2020: 18. The petitioner is the mother of one Mohammed Mahasin who has been detained pursuant to Ext.P1 order of detention issued by the 2nd respondent on 31-03-2017. Though the detention order was issued on 31-03-2017, the aforesaid Mohammed Mahasin (hereinafter referred to as 'detenue') was arrested and detained under that order only on 12/13-07-2020. The petitioner is the mother of one Mohammed Mahasin who has been detained pursuant to Ext.P1 order of detention issued by the 2nd respondent on 31-03-2017. Though the detention order was issued on 31-03-2017, the aforesaid Mohammed Mahasin (hereinafter referred to as 'detenue') was arrested and detained under that order only on 12/13-07-2020. On 15-02-2016 the detenue was apprehended at Bangalore with about 45 cartons of imported cigarettes having a market value of Rs.40,50,000/-and an international price/value of Rs.19,44,000/-. The statement recorded from the detenue at that time revealed that the said consignment of cigarettes had been imported through Cochin Port after concealing the same in a consignment of gypsum powder. The detenue was granted bail on 16-02-2016, which came to be cancelled on 19-02-2016 on account of non-compliance of bail conditions. On being further remanded, the detenue remained in custody till 01-06-2016, on which date he was again granted bail by the competent Court. About 6 months later, 06-09-2016 the officers of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence intercepted a cargo of about 672 pieces of gypsum board, and on examination it was revealed that 6560 cartons of cigarettes having a market value of 2,20,41,600/-, and an international price/value of 94,46,400/-, was concealed amongst the imported items. The statement recorded from various persons associated with the aforesaid import of gypsum boards revealed the role of the detenue in the smuggling activity. It may not be out of place to mention here that the modus operandi, and the item smuggled (foreign cigarettes bearing the brand name 'Gudang-Garam') were identical in respect of the smuggling incident which was detected on 15-02-2016 at Bangalore and that which was detected on 06-09-2016 at Vallarpadam, Kochi. 19. On 02-02-2017 a proposal was made by the 4th respondent sponsoring authority, for detention of the detenue under the provisions of the COFEPOSA Act. The detaining authority received this proposal on 07-02-2017. The proposal was placed before the screening committee on 22-02-2017 and, on 31-03-2017, Ext.P1 order of detention was issued. It is not disputed that on the date of issuance of Ext.P1 order i.e., 31-03-2017, the detenue was not in India and he remained abroad till he arrived in India on 12/13-07-2020 on which date he was detained and served with the order of detention. The grounds of detention were served on the detenue on 22-07-2020. It is not disputed that on the date of issuance of Ext.P1 order i.e., 31-03-2017, the detenue was not in India and he remained abroad till he arrived in India on 12/13-07-2020 on which date he was detained and served with the order of detention. The grounds of detention were served on the detenue on 22-07-2020. Although the detenue preferred a representation to the Advisory Board on 07-09-2020, the same was rejected by the Advisory Board on 01-11-2020. Thereafter, through Ext.P11 order dated 01-10-2020 the detaining authority confirmed Ext.P1 order under Section 8 (f) of the COFEPOSA Act, and ordered the detention of the detenue for a period of one year with effect from 22-07-2020. This order of detention is challenged on various grounds and is alleged to be in violation of the procedural safeguards incorporated into Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India and the provisions of the COFEPOSA Act. 20. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Saeed Zakir Hussain Malik v. State of Maharashtra, 2012 (3) KLJ 468 to contend that the fact that the order of detention dated 31-03-2017 was executed only on 12-07-2020 is sufficient to establish that the very purpose of passing an order of preventive detention became unattainable since such orders are issued to prevent the detenue from engaging in prejudicial activities for the period specified in the order of detention. He would submit that no proper explanation has been given regarding the inordinate delay in executing the order of detention. He refers to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Indradeo Mahato v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1973 SC 1062 to contend that a long gap between the order of detention and the actual detention shows that there was no real and genuine apprehension that the detenue was likely to act in a manner prejudicial to public interest in the manner specified under Section 3 of the Act. He refers to the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Smt. Najama v. State of Maharashtra and others, 1996 (1) Bom.CR 181 to contend that the failure to apprehend the detenue within a reasonable time from the order of detention, and the casual and lethargic manner in which the authorities have attempted to serve the order of detention, shows that there was a complete absence of reasons to curtail the personal liberty of the detenue through an order of preventive detention under the COFEPOSA Act. He would submit that the live and proximate link between the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention had been clearly snapped. He then refers to the judgment of the Supreme Court in T.A. Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala and others, AIR 1990 SC 225 again to contend that the dates on which the alleged prejudicial activities took place, the date of issuance of the order of detention and the date of its execution clearly shows that the live link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention had clearly snapped. He also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shafiq Ahmad v. District Magistrate, Meerut and others, (1989) 4 SCC 556 to contend that the failure to take recourse to Sec. 87 & 88 of the Criminal Procedure Code would lead one to believe that the delay was unreasonable and that that there was no real and genuine apprehension that the petitioner was likely to act in any manner prejudicial to public interest. 21. The learned counsel also refers to the guidelines issued by the Central Economic Intelligence Bureau dated 02-07-2001, regarding the procedural safeguards required to be followed in dealing with matters arising under the COFEPOSA Act, to show that if at all there was an apprehension of the nature contemplated under Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act, it was the duty of the sponsoring/detaining authority to issue an order of detention, as quickly as possible after the incident which led to the formation of a belief that an order of preventive detention had to be issued in the case on hand. He submits that the guidelines also require the expeditious execution of a detention order and that if the person against whom the order of detention had been issued, was absconding, steps are required to be taken immediately under Section 7 of the COFEPOSA Act. He submits that the guidelines also require the expeditious execution of a detention order and that if the person against whom the order of detention had been issued, was absconding, steps are required to be taken immediately under Section 7 of the COFEPOSA Act. He would point out that, in the facts of the present case, a publication as contemplated under Section 7 (1) (b) of the COFEPOSA Act was issued only on 11-07-2017. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi in Manish Gadodia v. Union of India and another, [Judgment dated 04-12-2014 in W.P (Crl.) No.1695/2014] to contend that the unexplained delay in passing and serving the detention order is a violation of the constitutional safeguards under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India. The learned counsel then contends, with reference to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in A. Vellanai Pandian v. Collector, that non-placing of materials before the Advisory Board (in particular the order-in-original following the adjudication of the Bangalore incident that took place on 15-02-2016) vitiated the order of detention. 22. After the hearing in this case was concluded, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed an argument note in which certain additional contentions have been raised. In particular these additional contentions are (i) that there is a delay of nearly 4 ½ years in initiation of prosecution against the detenue; (ii) that non-cancellation of the bail order vitiates the order of detention; (iii) that even in the absence of a specific representation addressed to the detaining authority, the representation before the advisory board ought to have been considered and disposed of by the detaining authority; (iv) the failure to supply certain pages of the bail order which is relied upon document vitiates the order of detention; and (v) that the delay in disposal of Exhibit P 12 and P13 representations filed before the Government of India and the detaining authority respectively vitiates the order of detention. Considering the fact that this is a case involving personal liberty of an individual we propose to consider these grounds/contentions as well. 23. The learned counsel appearing for the DRI contends that there is no delay in passing the order of detention considering the fact that the last prejudicial activity, which was noticed by the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), was on 06-09-2016. 23. The learned counsel appearing for the DRI contends that there is no delay in passing the order of detention considering the fact that the last prejudicial activity, which was noticed by the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), was on 06-09-2016. It is submitted that following the incident on 06-09-2016, the DRI was continuing with the investigation, as is evident from the documents relied upon in the order of detention. He relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Rajendrakumar Natvarlal Shah v. State of Gujarat and others, (1988) 3 SCC 153 to contend that, considering the nature of the activity, and the purpose for which the COFEPOSA Act was enacted, there is a real likelihood of some delay being occasioned between the prejudicial activity contemplated in under Section 3 (1) of the COFEPOSA Act and the making of an order of detention. He placed specific reliance on paragraphs 9 and 10 of the aforesaid judgment to contend that, often a time-consuming investigation would be required before a proposal for an order of detention is initiated. He submits, with reference to the findings in paragraph 10 of the aforesaid judgment, that the courts must make a distinction between delay in making an order of detention and the delay in complying with the procedural safeguards under Articles 22 (5) of the Constitution of India. He submits that, on the facts of the instant case, if at all there has been any delay in issuing an order of detention, the same was only on account of the detailed investigation that was required to be carried out before an order of detention was issued. He also placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Malwa Shah v. State of West Bengal, (1974) 4 SCC 127 to buttress his contention that delay in issuing the order of detention is not fatal to the order itself. The learned counsel also places reliance on the judgment in Mukesh Tikaji Bora v. Union of India and others, (2007) 9 SCC 28 , to contend that a detenue who was absconding cannot have a complaint regarding the non-execution of the order of detention. The learned counsel also places reliance on the judgment in Mukesh Tikaji Bora v. Union of India and others, (2007) 9 SCC 28 , to contend that a detenue who was absconding cannot have a complaint regarding the non-execution of the order of detention. He submits that the Supreme Court in Mukesh Tikaji Bora (supra) also placed reliance on its earlier judgment in Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji v. State of Tamil Nadu and others, 1979 Crl.LJ 462 where it was held that, insofar as an absconding detenue is concerned, the live link between the incident and the purpose of detention was not snapped but strengthened on account of the conduct of the detenue. In reply to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the authorities could have served the grounds of detention immediately on the issuance of Exts.P1 & P2, the learned counsel submits that the time for serving the grounds of detention had been validly extended though Ext.P3 on account of the COVID-19 pandemic and that, unlike in the case of Ext.P1 & P2, the contents of the grounds of detention could not have been made known to the detenue immediately on the serving of Exts.P1 & P2 or within the period of 5 days as contemplated in Section 3 (iii) of the COFEPOSA Act. 24. The learned Government Pleader appearing for the State of Kerala vehemently opposed the contentions raised on behalf of the detenue and detailed the steps taken by the authorities to execute the order of detention. He would submit that the delay in executing the order could not, in the facts of this case, vitiate the order of detention. 25. The learned counsel appearing for the Union of India completely supported the arguments of the learned counsel for the DRI and prays for a dismissal of the Writ Petition. 26. On a consideration of the rival submissions, the first question that we deem it apposite to consider is whether there was any delay in either issuing the order of detention or executing it? The sequence of events noticed above would reveal that the alleged second prejudicial activity was detected on 6-9-2016. In the month of February 2017, a proposal for preventive detention was initiated by the DRI. The proposal was received by the detaining authority on 7-2-2017, and it was considered by the screening committee on 22-2-2017. The sequence of events noticed above would reveal that the alleged second prejudicial activity was detected on 6-9-2016. In the month of February 2017, a proposal for preventive detention was initiated by the DRI. The proposal was received by the detaining authority on 7-2-2017, and it was considered by the screening committee on 22-2-2017. On 31-3-2017, the order of detention was issued. It is pertinent that insofar as the second prejudicial activity is concerned, the detenue was neither apprehended nor was there any material, other than the uncorroborated statements of those apprehended, to establish his direct involvement in the transaction. However, the statements recorded from those directly involved with that transaction, and the investigations carried out by the DRI revealed that the detenue was part of an organized smuggling racket involved in the smuggling of cigarettes into India. As already noticed, the modus operandi and the smuggled goods were almost identical to that in the earlier incident at Bangalore where the direct involvement of the detenue was established. We are also persuaded to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the DRI that, in some instances, a detailed investigation may be required before even a proposal is put up for the preventive detention of a person involved in smuggling activity. We therefore hold that there is no culpable delay between the alleged prejudicial activities and the date of issuance of the order of detention as would vitiate the order of detention. The question then arises as to whether there was a substantial delay between the date of the order of detention and the date of execution of the order that would suggest that the live link between the prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention had been snapped. The decisions referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner no doubt holds that any unexplained and unjustified delay between the order of detention and its execution would in certain cases demonstrate that there was no live link between the alleged prejudicial activity and the requirement of keeping someone in preventive detention to prevent him from engaging in similar prejudicial activity. Our reading of the precedent suggests that this is an aspect that has to be determined on the facts of each case. Our reading of the precedent suggests that this is an aspect that has to be determined on the facts of each case. In the facts of the present case, it is not disputed that for the entire period from the date of the detention order, until and up to the date of execution of the detention order, the detenue was abroad. It is clear from the affidavits filed by the respondents that efforts were taken to execute the order of detention and that steps as contemplated under Section 7(1)(b) of the COFEPOSA Act were initiated. Under such circumstances, we fail to see how there was any unexplained delay in the execution of the detention order in the instant case. Further, it is trite that an absconding detenue cannot cite a delay in the execution of the order to contend that the detention order must be quashed on that ground. 27. The next question to be considered is whether there was any delay in serving the grounds of detention, in the facts and circumstances of this case. The detenue was detained pursuant to the order of detention on 12/13-7-2017. He was immediately served with a copy of the detention order. Going by the provisions contained in Section 3 (3) of the COFEPOSA Act, the grounds of detention had to be served within an outer time limit of 5 days however making provision for extending the time, in exceptional circumstances to a maximum period of 15 days from the date of detention. The order in this case extending the time limit for serving the order of detention shows that the extra time was granted on account of the COVID-19 pandemic. It is not disputed that the grounds were served on 22-7-2021. In the above circumstances we hold that the extension of the time for serving of the grounds of detention does not amount to violation of the right guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and that the said delay does not vitiate the order of detention. 28. The further contention that, on account of the delay of nearly 4 ½ years in initiation of prosecution against the detenue, the detention order must fail, also does not pass muster. 28. The further contention that, on account of the delay of nearly 4 ½ years in initiation of prosecution against the detenue, the detention order must fail, also does not pass muster. Indeed, the law laid down in Bhut Nath Mete v. State of W.B., (1974) 1 SCC 645 , on which considerable reliance was placed to bolster this contention, does not hold so. That was a case where an order of detention under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 was challenged and the very instances that led to the order of detention were the subject matter of regular criminal prosecution that had resulted in orders of acquittal. It was in these circumstances that it was held: “After all, however well-meaning the Government may be, detention power cannot be quietly used to subvert, supplant or to substitute the punitive law of the Penal Code. The immune expedient of throwing into a prison cell one whom the ordinary law would take care of, merely because it is irksome to undertake the inconvenience of proving guilt in Court is unfair abuse. To detain a person after a court has held the charge false is to expose oneself to the criticism of absence of due care and of rational material for subjective satisfaction.” The facts in this case are quite different and we do find the mere failure to initiate criminal prosecution within reasonable time, to vitiate the order of detention. 29. The contention that non-cancellation of the bail order vitiates the order of detention is based entirely on the decision of the Supreme Court P.M. Hari Kumar Versus Union of India, (1995) 5 SCC 691 . A reading of the judgment in Harikumar (supra) suggests that the decision was one made with reference to the peculiar facts of that case. We cannot read the said judgment as having laid down any absolute principle that failure to apply for, or obtain, cancellation of the bail obtained by the detenue in regular criminal proceedings vitiates the order of detention. We therefore reject this contention. 30. The contention that even in the absence of a specific representation addressed to the detaining authority, the representation before the advisory board ought to have been considered and disposed by the detaining authority also does not appeal to us, in the facts and circumstances of this case. We therefore reject this contention. 30. The contention that even in the absence of a specific representation addressed to the detaining authority, the representation before the advisory board ought to have been considered and disposed by the detaining authority also does not appeal to us, in the facts and circumstances of this case. Amir Shad Khan V. L.Hmingliana, (1991) 4 SCC 39 , on which reliance is placed in support this contention, was a case where the detenue had made a request to the Detaining Authority to take out copies of his representation and forward them to the Central Government for consideration. It was held that the failure to do so vitiated the order of detention. In Gracy (Smt) v. State of Kerala, (1991) 2 SCC 1 the question was whether there would be any infraction of the guarantee under Article 22(5) of the Constitution as a result of Central Government's omission to consider the detenu's representation even when such representation is addressed only to the Advisory Board to which it was submitted during pendency of the reference to the Advisory Board. This question was answered in the affirmative. However, in Jasbir Singh v. Lt. Governor, Delhi, (1999) 4 SCC 228 , Gracy (supra) was distinguished and it was held :- “4. ……. But the question for consideration is when the representation has not been addressed to the Central Government, but is addressed to the Advisory Board, can it be said that the Central Government also owes an obligation to consider the same and decide one way or the other. It may be stated at this stage that while serving the grounds of detention on the detenu it was clearly indicated that if the detenu wishes to make any representation against the order of detention he may do so to the Lt. Governor of the National Capital Territory of Delhi and to the Central Government and for that purpose he may address it to the Lt. Governor or to the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue. It was further stated that if he desires to make any representation to the Advisory Board then he may address to the Chairman, Advisory Board, COFEPOSA State, High Court of Delhi, Sher Shah Road, New Delhi. Governor or to the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue. It was further stated that if he desires to make any representation to the Advisory Board then he may address to the Chairman, Advisory Board, COFEPOSA State, High Court of Delhi, Sher Shah Road, New Delhi. In the decision of this Court in Gracy [ (1991) 2 SCC 1 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 467] relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, what has been stated by the Court is that if there is one representation by the detenu addressed to the detaining authority then the obligation arises under Article 22(5) of its consideration by the detaining authority independent of the opinion of the Advisory Board in addition to its consideration by the Advisory Board and, therefore, when the representation of the detenu was addressed to the detaining authority and in that case it was the Central Government and not to the Advisory Board yet the Advisory Board was duty-bound to consider the same, as such a representation is the only right of the detenu under Article 22(5) of the Constitution. It was further stated that any representation of the detenu against the order of detention has to be considered and decided by the detaining authority and the consideration by the Advisory Board was an additional requirement implied by reading together clauses 4 and 5 of Article 22. In the said case the Central Government was the detaining authority and, therefore, in that case the Court held that the representation though may not have been addressed to the Advisory Board but the same was also required to be considered by the Central Government. We fail to understand how the aforesaid ratio can be held to be applicable in the present case where the detaining authority was the Lt. Governor of Delhi. In such a case if the representation had not been addressed to the Central Government even though indicated in the grounds of detention then it cannot be said that any representation made by the detenu to the Advisory Board ought to have been considered by the Central Government. Governor of Delhi. In such a case if the representation had not been addressed to the Central Government even though indicated in the grounds of detention then it cannot be said that any representation made by the detenu to the Advisory Board ought to have been considered by the Central Government. That apart the detenu also did file a representation to the Central Government on 22-6-1994 and the same was disposed of by the Central Government on 12-7-1995 and, therefore, in the said premises, the question of infraction of the constitutional right of the detenu because of the representation addressed to the Advisory Board had not been considered by the Central Government does not arise. This contention, therefore, was rightly rejected by the High Court.” In R. Keshava v. M.B. Prakash, (2001) 2 SCC 145 , considering Gracy (supra) and Jasbir (supra) it was held: - “17. We are satisfied that the detenu in this case was apprised of his right to make representation to the appropriate Government/authorities against his order of detention as mandated in Article 22(5) of the Constitution. Despite knowledge, the detenu did not avail of the opportunity. Instead of making a representation to the appropriate Government or the confirming authority, the detenu chose to address a representation to the Advisory Board alone even without a request to send its copy to the authorities concerned under the Act. In the absence of representation or the knowledge of the representation having been made by the detenu, the appropriate Government was justified in confirming the order of detention on perusal of record and documents excluding the representation made by the detenu to the Advisory Board. For this alleged failure of the appropriate Government, the order of detention of the appropriate Government is neither rendered unconstitutional nor illegal.” Again, in Union of India v. Sneha Khemka, (2004) 2 SCC 570 it was held: - “22. In Gracy [ (1991) 2 SCC 1 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 467], the detenu's case was referred to the Central Advisory Board by the Central Government and during the pendency of the reference before it, a representation was made to the Advisory Board. The Advisory Board considered the reference relating to the detenu made by the Central Government and also the detenu's representation submitted to it and opined that there was sufficient cause to justify his preventive detention. The Advisory Board considered the reference relating to the detenu made by the Central Government and also the detenu's representation submitted to it and opined that there was sufficient cause to justify his preventive detention. The order of the Central Government confirming his detention was passed thereafter. This Court, in the fact situation obtaining therein, held that the detenu has a dual right to get his representation disposed of by the Advisory Board and the detaining authority independently, stating: (SCC p. 7, para 9) “The contents of Article 22(5) as well as the nature of duty imposed thereby on the detaining authority support the view that so long as there is a representation made by the detenu against the order of detention, the aforesaid dual obligation under Article 22(5) arises irrespective of the fact whether the representation is addressed to the detaining authority or to the Advisory Board or to both. The mode of address is only a matter of form which cannot whittle down the requirement of the constitutional mandate in Article 22(5) enacted as one of the safeguards provided to the detenu in case of preventive detention.” After referring to the decision of the Constitution Bench in Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel, (1995) 4 SCC 51 it was held: 26. The decisions of this Court whereupon reliance has been placed by the High Court, therefore, nowhere state that copy of the representation made by the detenu to one authority must be placed before all the authorities and all such authorities also should consider and pass orders on those representations, though really not made to any one of them.” Coming to the facts of this case, we must notice that as in Jasbir Singh (supra), the detenue in this case had made separate representations to the detaining authority and to the Central Government. That apart we also notice that the representation before the advisory board was not made by the detenue but by the petitioner in this case (mother of the detenue). Neither the detaining authority nor the central government was aware of the representation made to the advisory board. The advisory board did not have any responsibility to forward the representation to the detaining authority or to the Central Government. Neither the detaining authority nor the central government was aware of the representation made to the advisory board. The advisory board did not have any responsibility to forward the representation to the detaining authority or to the Central Government. We therefore see no reason to hold that the detention order is bad for the reason that either the detaining authority or the Central Government did not independently consider the representation that was preferred to the advisory board. Our view, as above, stands fortified by the judgment of another Division Bench of this Court in Ayisha Shinas v. Union of India & Ors., I.L.R 2021 (2) Kerala 29. 31. The next contention is that the failure to supply certain pages of the bail order, which is a relied upon document, vitiates the order of detention. Though this is not a matter which is pleaded and upon which the respondents have had a chance to rebut, since this is a matter involving the personal liberty of an individual we have nevertheless attempted to address this issue by referring to the grounds of detention (Ext.P.4). There is a reference to the order on the bail petition in paragraph 26 of Exhibit P4. Thereafter, the detaining authority has, in paragraph 26 referred to the bail orders dated 16-2-2016 and 1-6-2016 for the purpose of establishing that the detenue had not stopped prejudicial activities even after the first incident at Bangalore and had continued with such activities. It is also noted that the bail conditions are likely to be relaxed and that they were not sufficient to prevent the detenu from committing prejudicial activities. Apart from contending that certain pages of the ‘bail order’ are not available in the documents served together with the grounds of detention, there is no pleading or contention regarding the issue. Even assuming that the case put forth by the detenue is correct, we are unable to find that the non-supply of the 4 pages of the bail order has in any manner affected the right of the detenue to make an effective representation. The detenue also did not make a request for the supply of any document. He also did not raise this issue before the advisory board. For these reasons we reject the contention of the detenue that he was not served with clear copies of all the relied upon documents amongst the documents supplied to him. The detenue also did not make a request for the supply of any document. He also did not raise this issue before the advisory board. For these reasons we reject the contention of the detenue that he was not served with clear copies of all the relied upon documents amongst the documents supplied to him. We also hold that the communication of grounds, in the facts of the present case, satisfies the requirements of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India. 33. The next issue is whether Ext.P.12 & P.13 representations made by the petitioner, after the matter was considered by the Advisory Board, were expeditiously considered by the authorities concerned. This is also an issue not pleaded in the Writ petition. However, for reasons already indicated we are inclined not to apply strict rule of pleadings in considering a matter relating to the personal liberty of a citizen. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the detenue had submitted Ext.P12 representation to the 1st respondent and exhibit P-13 representation to the 2nd respondent. The representations are dated 14-10-2020. They have been considered and disposed of by the 2nd respondent on 4-11-2020 and by the 1st respondent, on 6-11-2020. In so far as the representation to the 1st respondent is concerned, that representation was received by the 1st respondent through e-mail, on 15-10-2020. Comments of the detaining authority and the sponsoring authority were sought on 16.10.2020. The sponsoring authority provided its comments on 23-10-2020 and the detaining authority did the same on 5-11-2020. The representation was disposed of on 6-11-2020 which was a Friday. The memo regarding disposal of representation was dispatched by Speed Post on 9-11-2020 and the same was delivered to the Superintendent of Prisons on 13-11-2020 and was served to the detenue the same day. In so far as the representation made to the detaining authority (State Government) is concerned, the same was, as already noticed disposed of on 4-11-2020. We find that both the representations have been disposed of with reasonable expedition and that the detention order is not vitiated in any manner on account of the alleged delay in disposal of the Ext.P.12 & P.13 representations. 34. An incidental issue that arises for consideration is as regards the period of detention of the detenue. We find that both the representations have been disposed of with reasonable expedition and that the detention order is not vitiated in any manner on account of the alleged delay in disposal of the Ext.P.12 & P.13 representations. 34. An incidental issue that arises for consideration is as regards the period of detention of the detenue. As already noticed above the detenue was detained on 12-07-2020 and Ext.P1 order of detention was served on him on 13-07-2020. In Ext.P11 order, the detention is seen confirmed for a period of one year from 22-07-2020. It is stated that this was on account of the fact that on account of the COVID-19 pandemic the detenue was undergoing quarantine for the period from 12/13-07-2020 to 22-07-2020 and therefore that the period of detention should be counted from 22-07-2020. We are of the opinion that the detenue having been detained in terms of Ext.P1 order of detention, on 12-07-2020, the period of one year has to be counted with effect from 12-07-2020 and not from 22-07-2020 as stated in Ext.P11 order. 35. The facts relevant for a disposal of both the above writ petitions are that, on 25-12-2018, one Muhammed Shan arrived at Kannur International airport from Abu Dhabi. It was found that he had smuggled gold by concealing the same inside some electrical appliances. It is stated that, together with another person named Bhakthavalsalan, one Abdussameem was waiting outside to receive the aforesaid Muhammed Shan and that Abdussameem had, on coming to know that the aforesaid Muhammed Shan had been intercepted by the officers of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence [DRI], fled that spot. Muhammed Shan and Bhakthavalsalan were taken into custody on the same day. On the basis of further investigation and intelligence inputs, it was learnt that the aforesaid Abdussameem and his brother one Faisal were part of a gang of smugglers who were regularly engaged in the smuggling of gold into India. On the basis of a lookout notice, Abdussameem was arrested on 4-3-2019 while attempting to fly out of Bangalore Airport. A raid carried out at the residential premises of Abdussameem resulted in the recovery of certain documents/diaries that contained details of gold smuggled into India from 25-12-2018. The diary/records were apparently maintained by Faisal, brother of Abdussameem. Both Abdussameem and Faisal were questioned on 4-3-2019/5-3-2019 and their statements were recorded. A raid carried out at the residential premises of Abdussameem resulted in the recovery of certain documents/diaries that contained details of gold smuggled into India from 25-12-2018. The diary/records were apparently maintained by Faisal, brother of Abdussameem. Both Abdussameem and Faisal were questioned on 4-3-2019/5-3-2019 and their statements were recorded. Their arrest was recorded on the evening of 5-3-2019, and they were produced before the competent Magistrate at Thalassery, on 6-3-2019. On 23-3-2019, they were released on bail by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (Economic Officers), Ernakulam. For the purposes of this case it would be relevant to note that in July, 2019, applications were filed by both Abdussameem and Faisal for modification of the bail conditions. On 18-7-2019, orders of detention under the COFEPOSA Act were issued against both Abdussameem and Faisal. It is stated that, though a counter affidavit was filed by the DRI officials on 23-7-2019, resisting the application filed for modification of the bail conditions, no mention was made in the said affidavit of the issuance of the orders of detention. Pursuant to the detention order dated 18-7-2019, Abdussameem was detained on 29-5-2020 and Faisal was detained on 1-7-2020. 36. On 1-7-2020, Abdussameem addressed a request to the detaining authority as well as to the Senior Intelligence Officer of the DRI to supply him with certain materials and documents required for making an effective representation under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India read with the relevant provisions of the COFEPOSA Act. He also pointed out that certain relied upon documents like whatsapp chats, including audio chats, which were analysed by the C-DAC, and the material extracted and supplied by C-DAC in electronic form, were not given to him. This request for relied upon documents/material was disposed on 13-7-2020 by Ext.P11 communication in W.P.(Crl)No.280/2020 stating that, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Ankit Ashok Jalan v. Union of India and others, AIR 2020 SC 1936 , the request would be considered after the matter was disposed by the Advisory Board. Following the procedure before the Advisory Board, which rejected the representation of Abdussameem, the request for documents was rejected by Ext.P13 in W.P (Crl.) No.280/2020. Abdussameem, thereafter, preferred Ext.P14 representation dated 11-8-2020 before the Central Government seeking revocation of his detention order. A similar representation was made before the detaining authority as well. Following the procedure before the Advisory Board, which rejected the representation of Abdussameem, the request for documents was rejected by Ext.P13 in W.P (Crl.) No.280/2020. Abdussameem, thereafter, preferred Ext.P14 representation dated 11-8-2020 before the Central Government seeking revocation of his detention order. A similar representation was made before the detaining authority as well. Ext.P14 representation was rejected by an order dated 31-8-2020 and Ext.P15 representation was rejected by an order dated 26-8-2020. In the meanwhile, following the report of the Advisory Board, the order of detention was confirmed for a period of one year in the case of Abdussameem by Ext.P16 order dated 20-8-2020. 37. Insofar as the case of Faisal is concerned, he had also requested for further materials and documents in order to make effective representations, following the grounds of detention being served on him, on 11-7-2020. Through Ext.P8 dated 27-7-2020, the Government of India rejected this representation as if it were a representation under Art. 22(5), though it was essentially a request for documents. Through Ext.P10 communication dated 10.8.2020, Faisal was also informed that his request dated 22-7-2020 was considered in terms of the law laid down in Ankit Ashok Jalan (supra). By Ext.P15 order dated 16-9-2020, Faisal was informed that, in view of the opinion of the Advisory Board, the order of detention had been confirmed in terms of Section 8(f) of the COFEPOSA Act (See Ext.P15 in W.P.(Crl.) No.279/2020). The orders of detention issued against Abdussameem and Faisal are challenged in separate writ petitions (W.P.(Crl)No.279/2020 relates to the detention of Faisal and W.P.(Crl.) No.280/2020 relates to the detention of Abdussameem). Since the issues and contentions in these two cases are similar we deem it appropriate to consider them together. 38. The first ground of challenge to the order of detention is that there was non-supply of certain relied upon documents that vitiates the order of detention. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the request made by both Abdussameem and Faisal for supply of documents in order to make an effective representation was rejected without any application of mind. In the case of Faisal, the request for documents was considered as a representation under Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India and rejected by Ext.P8 in W.P. (Crl)No.279/2020 on 6-8-2020, whereas in the case of Abdussameem, the request dated 01-07-2020 was rejected only on 13-7-2020 by Ext.P13 in W.P. (Crl.) No.280/2020. In the case of Faisal, the request for documents was considered as a representation under Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India and rejected by Ext.P8 in W.P. (Crl)No.279/2020 on 6-8-2020, whereas in the case of Abdussameem, the request dated 01-07-2020 was rejected only on 13-7-2020 by Ext.P13 in W.P. (Crl.) No.280/2020. He would submit that, while the non-supply of relied upon documents clearly vitiates the detention, in the case of other documents referred to in the grounds of detention, a prejudice has to be necessarily shown. The second ground on which the order of detention is challenged is that there is considerable delay in execution of the detention order which shows that the live link between the alleged prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention has clearly snapped. Thirdly, it is contented that there is considerable delay in the consideration of representations resulting in the order of detention being vitiated. Fourthly, it is contented that in so far as the detenue Faisal is concerned, the representation submitted before the advisory board should have been considered independently by the detaining authority as well. Lastly, it is contended that the failure of the Central Government to consider the requests made for information, independently of the detaining authority, vitiates the order of detention. We now proceed to examine each of these contentions. 39. In support of his contention that the non-supply of documents has vitiated the order of detention, the learned counsel has referred to the following judgments viz. (i) State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya, AIR 1951 SC 157 , where the Supreme Court held that, apart from the right to receive the grounds of detention, the detenu detained under Preventive Detention Law has the right to ask for materials to enable him to make an effective representation. (i) State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya, AIR 1951 SC 157 , where the Supreme Court held that, apart from the right to receive the grounds of detention, the detenu detained under Preventive Detention Law has the right to ask for materials to enable him to make an effective representation. It was held that even if one of the two rights, i.e. first the right to be served with the grounds of detention and then the right to receive copies of documents requested for, was violated, the detention order would be vitiated; (ii) Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra and others, AIR 1962 SC 911 , where the Supreme Court held that in order to make an effective representation, it is not only sufficient that the detenu has been physically delivered the means of knowledge with which to make his representation, but he is also entitled to know with sufficient certainty all the grounds on the basis of which the order of detention is made; (iii) Moti Lal Jain v. State of Bihar and Others, AIR 1968 SC 1509 , in which the Supreme Court held that the communication of grounds and materials cannot be done in a casual manner; (iv) Ramchandra A. Kamat v. Union of India and others, (1980) 2 SCC 270 , where the Supreme Court held that in order to make additional representation, the detenu is entitled to obtain information relating to the grounds of detention, and that, if there is undue delay in furnishing statements and documents referred to in the grounds of detention, the right to make an effective representation is denied; (v) Smt. Icchu Devi Choraria v. Union of India and Others, (1980) 4 SCC 531 , where it was established that the detenu is entitled not merely to a bare recital of the grounds of detention, but copies of the documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention, in order to constitute a proper compliance with clause (5) of Art.22 and sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act and that, if such materials were not supplied, the order of detention would be vitiated; (vi) Mangalbhai Motiram Patel v. State of Maharashtra and others, (1980) 4 SCC 470 , where it was held, following Ramchandra A. Kamat (supra), that all the documents relied upon, on the grounds of detention must be supplied to the detenu; (vii) Kirti Kumar Chamanlal Kundaliya v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 436 , where it was held, referring to Ramchandra A. Kamat (supra) and Thushar Thakker v. Union of India, (1980) 4 SCC 499 , that the detenu is entitled to be furnished with copies of all materials relied upon or referred to in the grounds of detention with reasonable expedition; (viii) Kamala Kanyalal Khushalani v. State of Maharashtra and Another, (1981) 1 SCC 748 , where again it was held that all documents relied upon in the grounds of detention should be supplied to the detenu; (ix) Thahira Haris and others v. Government of Karnataka and others, (2009) 11 SCC 438 , where it was held that the detenu is entitled to be supplied with all particulars sufficient to enable him to make a representation; (x) Beevi Kunju K.A. and another v. Union of India and others, 2020 KHC 167 , where it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that non-supply of certain video footage, which was relied upon by the detaining authority, vitiates the order of detention (This decision is relied on to buttress the contention that non-supply of copy of the electronic media, which contains the visual and other details contained in the report of the C-DAC, vitiates the order of detention); (xi) Sophia Gulam Mohd. Bham v. State of Maharashtra and others, (1999) 6 SCC 593 , where again it was held that non-supply of material documents vitiates the order of detention in as much as non-supply affects the right to make a proper and effective representation; (xii) Thakor Mulchandani v. Assistant Secretary to Govt. of Maharashtra, (1982) 3 SCC 321 , where it was held that even if the materials not supplied to the detenu along with the grounds of detention were those referred to in the statements given by the detenu himself, the detenue had a right obtain such materials; (xiii) Powanammal v. State of Tamil Nadu and Another, (1999) 2 SCC 413 , where it was held that non-supply of relied upon documents clearly vitiates the detention straightaway while the non-supply is of referred documents, the detenu has to show prejudice. 40. Per contra, the learned counsel for the DRI would contend that a reading of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ramchandra A. Kamat (supra) suggests that that was a case where the detenu under the Preventive Detention Law was only served with the grounds of detention and not with all materials (relied upon documents etc.) in order to enable him to make an effective representation. He submits that this is clear from paragraphs 7 and 8 of the judgment in the aforesaid case, where a distinction has been made by the Supreme Court in respect of a request for supply of documents referred to in the grounds of detention, and other documents requested for by the detenu. It is also pointed out that, in paragraph 10 of the aforesaid judgment, it is clarified that, for the purposes of making an additional representation, the detenu need have only copies of statements and documents relied on in the grounds of detention and not all the documents that are referred to in the grounds of detention. He therefore submits that, following the development of the law on the subject, decisions such as Atma Ram (supra) & Ramchandra A. Kamat (supra) must not be read in the manner that the learned counsel for the petitioner wants us to read it. He therefore submits that, following the development of the law on the subject, decisions such as Atma Ram (supra) & Ramchandra A. Kamat (supra) must not be read in the manner that the learned counsel for the petitioner wants us to read it. The learned counsel has placed reliance on L.M.S Ummu Saleema v. B.B. Gujaral and Others, (1981) 3 SCC 317 , Radhakrishnan Prabhakaran v. The State of TamilNadu and Others, (2000) 9 SCC 170 , State of TamilNadu and Others v. Adbullah Kadher Batcha and others, (2009) 1 SCC 333 , Syed Farooq Mohammed v. Union of India (UOI) and Others, (1990) 3 SCC 537 and on State of Punjab & Ors v. Jagdev Singh Talwandi, AIR 1984 SC 444 , to contend that a failure to consider the request for documents, other than relied upon documents, is not fatal to the detention order. He submits that there is no obligation on the part of the detaining authority or the sponsoring authority to supply materials other than the relied upon documents. The learned central government counsel would submit that the non-supply of the USB containing the images and other data extracted by the C-DAC does not amount to non-supply of relied upon documents. He submits that a reading of paragraph xxix of the detention order clearly shows that the detaining authority had not relied on any material other than those already supplied to the detenues. He would refer to J.Abdul Hakeem v. State of TamilNadu, (2005) 7 SCC 70 , Radhakrishnan Prabhakaran (supra) & Batcha (supra) to buttress his contention. 41. Our reading of the voluminous precedents leads us to conclude that the law regarding supply of documents requires no re-iteration at our hands. Our summation of the law at the inception of this judgment shows that it is well settled that the detenue has the right to receive all the relied upon documents and also such other documents that may be necessary to enable him to make a proper and effective representation against the order of detention. That said, the question as to whether there was, in fact, a failure to supply any relied upon document is a matter to be determined on a case-to-case basis. That said, the question as to whether there was, in fact, a failure to supply any relied upon document is a matter to be determined on a case-to-case basis. Kirit Kumar Chaman Lal Kundaliya (supra) holds that once the documents are referred to in the grounds of detention it becomes the bounden duty of the detaining authority to supply the same to the detenu as part of the grounds and that there is “no particular charm in the expressions “relied on”, “referred to” or “based on” because ultimately all these expressions signify one thing, namely, that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority has been arrived at on the documents mentioned in the grounds of detention” and further that “the question whether the grounds have been referred to, relied on or based on is merely a matter of describing the nature of the grounds”. Indeed, the decisions in Ummu Saleema; Radhakrishnan Prabhakaran; Batcha, Talwandi & J. Abdul Hakeem (all of which are referred to supra), on which considerable reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the respondents, also do not take a different view. In the facts of these cases, the request for documents is Exhibit P7 in WP (Crl.) 279/2020 and Exhibit P6 in WP (Crl.) 280/2020. These representations are substantially similar in nature save that certain additional materials are also sought for in Exhibit P6 in WP (Crl.) 280/2020. Reference to the grounds of detention supplied to each of the petitioners in these cases (Ext.P.4 in WP (Crl.) 279/2020 and Exhibit P3 in WP (Crl.) 280/2020) show that they begin with the narration of the facts presented by the sponsoring authority. The consideration by the detaining authority is contained in paragraphs 2 to 13 of Ext.P4 in WP (Crl.) 279/2020 and again in paragraphs 2 to 13 Exhibit P3 in WP (Crl.) 280/2020. Keeping in mind the fact that the law requires only the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, and keeping in mind the fact that the jurisdiction to detain under a law providing for preventive detention is ‘a jurisdiction of suspicion’ we have examined Ext.P4 in WP (Crl.) 279/2020 and Exhibit P3 in WP (Crl.) 280/2020 to determine whether the non-supply of documents requested for therein has prevented the detenues from making a proper representation, which is a right guaranteed under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution. Our reading of the detention order, together with the request for documents in the instant cases, leads us to conclude that the denial of the documents requested for has indeed affected the right of the detenues concerned to make a proper and effective representation. We base our findings on the following reasons:- a) A reading of the grounds of detention, and in particular paragraph xxix thereof (in both the cases), shows that there is considerable reliance on the details contained in the USB named “USBSTORE01” which contains the report of the CDAC. A reading of the same paragraph also shows that the report was put to Abdusameem and that he had answered with reference to the contents of that report. A reading of paragraph xxx in the grounds of detention, in both the cases, suggests that the detaining authority had placed considerable reliance on the contents of the report and had noticed and accepted the conclusions drawn by the sponsoring authority regarding the activities of the detenues. We cannot but hold that, the non-supply of a copy of the report in electronic form, that would have enabled the detenues to view it before making a representation, clearly vitiates the order of detention in both these cases. In holding so, we are fortified by the decision in Beevi Kunju (supra). b) The other materials sought for, especially the details regarding any order issued against Riyas & Mujib who are alleged to be part of the same syndicate, retraction statements (if any) in respect of statements given under Section 108 of the Customs Act, and the non-supply of documents clearly shown to be illegible, has also, in our opinion, affected the right of the detenue to make an effective and meaningful representation thereby vitiating the order of detention in both these cases. 42. Though this finding of ours would be sufficient to direct the release of the detenues, we feel that it is only appropriate that we consider the other contentions that have been raised, as well. 43. The next ground raised is that there is a substantial delay in the execution of the detention order which shows that the live link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention has clearly snapped. 43. The next ground raised is that there is a substantial delay in the execution of the detention order which shows that the live link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention has clearly snapped. The learned counsel places reliance on S.K.Serajul v. State of West Bengal, (1975) 2 SCC 78 ; Manju Ramesh Nahar v. Union of India and Others, (1999) 4 SCC 116 ; Kadhar Naina Ushman v. Union of India and Others, (2008) 17 SCC 725 ; Saeed Zakir Hussain Malik v. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2012) 8 SCC 233 and T.A. Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala and others, (1989) 4 SCC 741 where it has been held that the delay in execution of the detention order was found to vitiate the order of detention. The learned counsel for the petitioners would also submit that there was no mention about the order of detention in the counter affidavit filed in the applications for modification of bail conditions, even though the said counter affidavit was filed after the date on which the detention orders were issued. The learned counsel for the petitioners would further submit that the fact that the summons issued by the customs authorities had been duly served on the detenues shows that they were very much available at their house and were not absconding. He says that the lackadaisical attitude in the execution of the detention order clearly points to the lack of bonafides in the detaining authority while recording his subjective satisfaction as regards the need to detain the detenues so as to prevent them for engaging in prejudicial activities in future. 44. The learned counsel for the DRI submits that in the facts and circumstances of these cases there is absolutely no delay in execution of the detention orders. He refers to the various steps taken to ensure the timely execution of the detention orders. He submits that the failure to mention about the order of detention in the counter affidavit filed in the applications for modification of bail conditions does not cause any prejudice to the detenues. He refers to the various steps taken to ensure the timely execution of the detention orders. He submits that the failure to mention about the order of detention in the counter affidavit filed in the applications for modification of bail conditions does not cause any prejudice to the detenues. With reference to Vinod K. Chawala v. Union of India (UOI) and Others, (2006) 7 SCC 337 , Syed Farooq Mohammad v. Union of India (UOI) and Others, (1990) 3 SCC 537 , Meena Jayendra Thakur v. Union of India (UOI) and Others, (1999) 8 SCC 177 and Mukesh Tikaji Bora v. Union of India (UOI) and Others, (2007) 9 SCC 28 ) the learned counsel contends that the alleged delay in the execution of the order of detention against the aforesaid Faisal and Abdussameem was not fatal to the detention order in the facts and circumstances of the case. He submits that both the DRI and the State Police had taken steps under Section 7 of the COFEPOSA Act to secure the arrest and detention of the aforesaid persons. In response to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that there were clear lapses in the execution of the orders of detention since both the detenues were available at their house, he submits that Kartarey and Others v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, (1976) 1 SCC 172 and K.T.M.S. Abdul Cader and others v. The Union of India, (AIR) 1977 Mad 386 are authorities for the proposition that to be an absconder, it is not necessary that a person should have run away from his home, and that it is sufficient if he hides himself to evade the process of law, even if the hiding place be his own home. He also submits, with reference to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the judgment in Indradeo Mahato v. The State of West Bengal, (1973) 4 SCC 4 that the failure to take coercive action does not vitiate the detention order. 45. In the facts of these cases, we notice that as far as the detenue in W.P. (Crl.) No.279/2020 (Faisal) is concerned, the order of detention is dated 18-7-2019. A gazette notification as contemplated under Section 7 of the COFEPOSA Act, was issued on 21-11-2019. This was followed by a paper publication issued on 29-1-2020. Summons’ for appearance were issued on 25-2-2020, 28-2-2020 & 3-3-2020. A gazette notification as contemplated under Section 7 of the COFEPOSA Act, was issued on 21-11-2019. This was followed by a paper publication issued on 29-1-2020. Summons’ for appearance were issued on 25-2-2020, 28-2-2020 & 3-3-2020. Admittedly, these summons’ were duly served although the aforesaid Faisal failed to respond to them. On 9-3-2020, an application for the cancellation of bail was also filed before the Economic Offences Court and the order was executed on 1-7-2020. In the case of the detenue in W.P. (Crl.) No.279/2020 (Abdusameem), the order of detention is dated 18-7-2019. A gazette notification as contemplated under Section 7 of the COFEPOSA Act, was issued on 21-11-2019. This was followed by a paper publication issued on 29-1-2020. A lookout circular was issued on 5-2-2020. Summons’ were issued for appearance on 25-2-2020, 28-2-2020 & 3-3-2020. Admittedly these summons’ were duly served but the aforesaid Abdusameem failed to respond to them. On 9-3-2020 an application for the cancellation of bail was also filed before the Economic Offences Court and on 10-3-2020, a report under Section 7(1)(a) of the COFEPOSA Act was also filed before that Court. The order of detention was executed on 29-5-2020. Kartarey (supra) was not a case under preventive detention law. It however deals with the question as to who is an absconder and holds that “To be an “absconder” in the eye of law, it is not necessary that a person should have run away from his home, it is sufficient if he hides himself to evade the process of law, even if the hiding place be his own home.” In K.T.M.S. Abdul Cader (supra) a Full Bench of the Madras High Court took the same view. We are of the view that in considering the question as to whether the delay in execution of the detention order vitiates the same, the Court can refer to the background facts that led to the issuance of the detention order. There is no other way to determine this question. We are of the view that in considering the question as to whether the delay in execution of the detention order vitiates the same, the Court can refer to the background facts that led to the issuance of the detention order. There is no other way to determine this question. Here, on the facts of these cases, although the allegations that led to the order of detention are in relation to syndicated and organised smuggling of gold, we find the delay in execution of the detention order unjustified, more so when the detaining authority itself did not mention the fact of the detention order in its counter affidavit filed before the Magistrate while opposing the application for relaxation of bail conditions filed by the detenu concerned. It is also significant that while the detaining authority refers to the steps allegedly taken by the police authorities in the State to arrest the detenus, there is no explanation offered for the admitted service of summons on the detenus at their residential address. We are at a loss to understand why the detention orders could not have been executed, by apprehending the detenus much earlier, if indeed the object of the whole exercise was to prevent them from engaging in prejudicial acts in future. The cavalier attitude of the detaining authority in the instant cases cannot be countenanced and, at any rate, cannot justify the continued detention of the detenus concerned. 46. The learned counsel next contends that there is long and unexplained delay in the disposal of representations by the authorities concerned which results in the order of detention being vitiated. The cavalier attitude of the detaining authority in the instant cases cannot be countenanced and, at any rate, cannot justify the continued detention of the detenus concerned. 46. The learned counsel next contends that there is long and unexplained delay in the disposal of representations by the authorities concerned which results in the order of detention being vitiated. He places reliance on Rajammal v. State of TamilNadu, (1999) 1 SCC 417 , where it was held that a representation left attended for five days since the Minister for Law was not available in station, was not a justifiable explanation when the liberty of citizens is involved, on Prabhakar Sankar Dhuri v. S.G. Pradhan and Others, (1971) 3 SCC 896 , which holds that the delay of 16 days is fatal unless there is justifiable explanation when the personal liberty of citizens is in question and the person concerned has been detained without trial, on Venugopal v. State of Kerala and Others, 2015(4) KHC 601 , where it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that the delay from the date of submission of the representation to the date of disposal and communication of the same to the detenu should be explained by the detaining authority, on Ratten Singh and Another v. State of Punjab and Others, (1981) 4 SCC 481 , where it was held that the delay was occasioned in the hands of the Jail Superintendent in forwarding a representation to the Central Government, vitiated the order of detention, on Pebam Ningol Mikoi Devi v. State of Manipur and Others, (2019) 9 SCC 618, where seven days in forwarding the representation to the Central Government was found to vitiate the order of detention, on Vijay Kumar v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Others, (1982) 2 SCC 43 , where again delay in 14 days in transmitting the representation and 19 days in consideration was held as delay for which there was no satisfactory explanation resulting in the order of detention being vitiated, on Youssuf Abbas v. Union of India, (1982) 2 SCC 380 , where again unexplained delay in consideration of representation was held to be fatal to the order of detention, on Abdul Nasar Adam Ismail v. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2013) 4 SCC 435 , where delay in forwarding representation by Jail Superintendent was found to be fatal, on Kenneth Jideofor v. Union of India, Ministry of Finance and Revenue and Ors, Manu/KA/4637/2020 DB KAR, where the representation submitted was forwarded by email only to the sponsoring authority and not to the officer empowered to consider the representation, and the detention order was found to be vitiated as there was no reason not to communicate the representation to the specially empowered officer by email. 47. The learned Central Government Counsel contends that there is absolutely no delay in the consideration of any representation, in these cases. In so far as Faisal, the detenu in W.P (Crl.) 279/2020, is concerned, the representation dated 22-7-2020 submitted by him was received by the detaining authority on 30-7-2020. The comments of the sponsoring authority were sought by the detaining authority on the same day. The sponsoring authority had responded to the detaining authority on 5-8-2020 and the detaining authority had disposed the representation on 6-8-2020. The representation dated 18-8-2020 seeking parole addressed to the detaining authority was received on 19-8-2020. Comments were sought from the Jail Superintendent on 20-8-2020. The comments were received on 23-8-2020. The detaining authority rejected the request on 25-8-2020 and this was intimated to the respective parties on 26-8-2020. In so far as Abdusameem, the detenu in W.P (Cri.) 280/2020, is concerned, the request for copies of documents dated 1.7.2020 was sent to the Joint Secretary (COFEPOSA) and to the sponsoring authority by the Jail Superintendent through registered post. The sponsoring authority received the request before it was received by the Joint Secretary (COFEPOSA) and forwarded their comments through e-mail on 10-7-2020. On request (through telephone) to forward a copy of the representation itself, the sponsoring authority forwarded the same on 10-7-2020 itself. Copy of the representation addressed directly to the Joint Secretary (COFEPOSA) was received by the officer on 13-7-2020. The request/representation was disposed of on the same day i.e. 13-7-2020. Abdusameem thereafter filed Ext.P14 representation before the Central government which was received by the officers concerned on 18-8-2020. Comments were sought regarding the same from the sponsoring authority on 20-8-2020. The comments of the sponsoring authority were received on 28-8-2020 (Friday) at 5.51 P.M. The representation was rejected by a memorandum dated 31-8-2020 (Ext.P.18). Ext.P.15 representation addressed to the detaining authority was received by that authority on 13-8-2020 through e-mail. Comments were sought from the sponsoring authority on 14-8-2020. The hard copy of the representation was received on 18-8-2020 by the detaining authority. The comments from the sponsoring authority were received on 23-8-2020 (a Sunday). The representation was rejected on 26-8-2020 through Ext.P.17. The request for parole for Abdusameem was received by the competent officers of the central government on 18-8-2020. Comments were requested for from the jail authority on 20-8-2020. The comments of the Jail authorities were received on 23-8-2020. The comments from the sponsoring authority were received on 23-8-2020 (a Sunday). The representation was rejected on 26-8-2020 through Ext.P.17. The request for parole for Abdusameem was received by the competent officers of the central government on 18-8-2020. Comments were requested for from the jail authority on 20-8-2020. The comments of the Jail authorities were received on 23-8-2020. The request was disposed of on 25-8-2020 a memo to this effect was issued on 26-8-2020. 48. It is settled that the law frowns only upon unexplained delay. The law surely allows reasonable time to the authorities. As held in K.M.Abdulla Kunhi (supra) there should not be “supine indifference/slackness or callous attitude” in considering the representation. In the facts and circumstances of these cases, we find that there is absolutely no delay in the disposal of the various representations detailed above. 49. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P (Cri.) 279/2020 that the representation made by the detenue (Faisal) to the Advisory Board should have been considered independently by all authorities competent to revoke the order of detention can only be rejected in the light of our findings on the same issue in W.P (Cri) No.255 of 2020. 50. The contention that the failure of the Central Government to consider the requests made for information, immediately after the grounds of detention were served on the detenus, and independently of the detaining authority vitiates the order of detention is only to be rejected. Abdulla Kunhi (supra) on which considerable reliance has been placed to buttress this contention certainly does not hold so. It is true that in Abdulla Kunhi (supra) and in Raziya v. State of Kerala, (2004) 2 SCC 621 which is the other decision relied upon to further this contention, it has been held that the right to make a representation to the advisory board and to the central government are distinct and independent rights and the opinion of the advisory board need not detain the government from exercising its power to revoke an order of detention. While this proposition cannot be doubted, it does not appear to us that the decision lays down a proposition that whenever request for information is made by the detenue to the detaining authority, the central government must independently consider that request. We therefore have no hesitation to reject this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners. 51. While this proposition cannot be doubted, it does not appear to us that the decision lays down a proposition that whenever request for information is made by the detenue to the detaining authority, the central government must independently consider that request. We therefore have no hesitation to reject this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners. 51. We also reject the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the affidavit in these cases should have been sworn to by the detaining authority himself, in view of the decision in Madan Lal Anand (supra). 52. No other point has been raised. 53. In view of our findings, these petitions are disposed of in the following manner: - (i) W.P (Crl.) 255 of 2020 fails and will stand dismissed; subject however to the condition that the detention shall run for a period of one year from 12-07-2020 and not from 22-07-2020 as stated in Ext.P11 order. (ii) W.P (Crl.) 279/2020 & W.P (Crl.) 280/2020 will stand allowed, and the detenus, Sri. Faisal Kudilattummal and Sri.Abdussameem are forthwith set at liberty. Registry shall communicate this direction to the Superintendent of Prison, Central Prison and Correctional Home, Poojapura, Thiruvananthapuram, immediately, and on receipt of the same, the Superintendent of Prison shall release the aforesaid detenus without awaiting for a copy of this judgment, provided they are not wanted in connection with any other case. 54. Before we part with these cases we deem it appropriate to place on record our sincere appreciation for the erudite submissions of counsel who appeared for various parties in these cases.