JUDGMENT : HARISH TANDON, J. 1. The instant mandamus appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 7th December, 2017 passed by the Single Bench in WP No.163 of 2016 setting aside the order of eviction passed by the Deputy Commissioner with further direction to handover the possession of the property in question to the respondent within six weeks from the date. 2. Before we proceed to deal with the findings returned in the impugned order by the Single Bench, it would be relevant and apposite to record the facts involved in the instant appeal. 3. The dispute relates to a piece and parcel of land measuring about 18 acres, 2 canals and 12 marlas comprised in revenue plot No.166 in Calicut and plot No.4 in Beodanabad. The said land was settled in favour of one Shri K.C.Kuruvilla, since deceased, as licensee in or about the month of September, 1959 for a period of 30 years with effect from 18th September, 1959 for the purpose of cultivation of long lived crops. Such licence was granted in terms of section 4(1)(b) of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (Land Tenure) Regulation (III) of 1926 and the said licence was subject to general provisions of the said Regulation and the Rules made thereunder. 4. Subsequently, the said licensee applied for prior permission under section 5(2) of the said Regulation of 1926 to transfer and convey the right of licence in respect of the subject land in favour of Captain J.C.Datta (since deceased) for residuary period of the licence. By an order dated 6th July, 1968, the permission was accorded under the aforesaid provisions for sale of the subject land and in furtherance of such permission having accorded, the original licensee sold, transferred and conveyed the subject land to Captain J.C.Datta by executing a sale deed dated 14th February, 1969. Since the tenure of the licence was due to expire sometime in 1989 more particularly in the midnight of 17th September, 1989, an application was taken out by the subsequent purchaser on 11th July,1989 for renewal of the said licence for another period of 30 years in terms of the provisions contained in Regulation of 1926. On the basis of the said application, the Assistant Commissioner caused a letter dated 18th May, 1990 to the subsequent purchaser and made requisition of several documents to be produced. 5. On the basis of the said application, the Assistant Commissioner caused a letter dated 18th May, 1990 to the subsequent purchaser and made requisition of several documents to be produced. 5. Amidst the pendency of the said application the subsequent purchaser died on 27th August, 2012 leaving behind him surviving his widow who through her constituted attorney made application dated 5th December, 2013 before the Tehsildar for correction of the record of rights by mutating her name. Keeping all such applications pending the Deputy Commissioner initiated a proceeding being RC Case No.115 of 2015 by issuing a show cause dated 8th May, 2015 calling upon the subsequent purchaser why the land should not be resumed back having expired by efflux of time. The aforesaid show cause notice was issued by the Deputy Commissioner as Revenue officer under the provisions of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands Land Revenue and Land Reforms Regulation, 1966. The widow of the subsequent purchaser appeared through the constituted attorney and in course of the proceeding, the constituted attorney signified the intention of the widow to vacate the land if some time is granted to her. 6. The Deputy Commissioner passed an order dated 15th May, 2015 directing the vacation of the land within three days therefrom. Immediately thereafter an application was taken out by the widow through constituted attorney to prefer an appeal against the order of the Deputy Commissioner which was rejected on 18th May, 2015. However, an appeal was preferred before the appellate authority and an application for stay of the operation of the order was also filed seeking to stay the order vacating the premises in the said appeal. While the said appeal was pending the possession was taken on the same day i.e. 19th May, 2015 which constrained the respondent to file a writ petition being WP No.11183(w) of 2015 seeking stay of the operation of the order dated 15th May, 2015 passed by the Deputy Commissioner and also to remove the padlock put on the main entrance of the property in question. The said writ petition was disposed of extending the time to vacate the premises with liberty to approach the Circuit Bench at Port Blair for listing of the said writ petition. The said writ petition was disposed of extending the time to vacate the premises with liberty to approach the Circuit Bench at Port Blair for listing of the said writ petition. The said order was interim in nature and ultimately, came up before the Single Bench and was disposed of on 30th June, 2015 staying the operation of the order of eviction of the respondent and simultaneously directed restoration of the property in favour of the respondent subject to the undertaking that the widow shall not alienate and/or encumber the said property. It was further directed that the appeal pending before the first appellate authority should be disposed of within eight weeks from the date of communication of the said order. The matter was mentioned before the Circuit Bench on July 6, 2015 and further order was passed upon the authorities to restore the possession immediately in favour of the widow. 7. The appellants carried the aforesaid two orders passed by the Single Bench by two separate mandamus appeals being MAT No.25 of 2015 and MAT No.28 of 2015 respectively. Both the mandamus appeals were taken up analogously and the portion of the order by which the Single Bench directed the restoration of the possession was set aside and the portion, by which the statutory appeal filed by the widow was directed to be disposed of within stipulated time, was not interfered with. However, the Court further passed an order that till the disposal of the said appeal, the appellant authorities are restrained from creating any third party interest or encumber the subject land in favour of a third party and shall also ensure protection of the goods of the widow lying thereat. 8. Despite the said direction, the appellate authority did not dispose of the appeal and the widow was advised to withdraw the same with right to challenge the order of eviction before an appropriate forum. The aforesaid application for withdrawal was made as the widow realized and advised by her counsel that the order of eviction is per se a nullity having passed by an authority not conferred with such power. Even an application for withdrawal was not disposed of and another writ petition being WP No.336 of 2015 was filed which was allowed permitting withdrawal of the writ petition with liberty to file a fresh application. 9. Even an application for withdrawal was not disposed of and another writ petition being WP No.336 of 2015 was filed which was allowed permitting withdrawal of the writ petition with liberty to file a fresh application. 9. Subsequently, the respondent filed the instant writ petition challenging the order dated 15th May, 2015 passed by the Deputy Commissioner directing recovery of possession from the widow, as the Deputy Commissioner has no jurisdiction or authority to issue show cause nor can pass an order of eviction under the Regulation of 1966. It is further contended that the subject property having vested with the Central Government, the proceeding for recovery of possession can only be initiated under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Public Premises Act). 10. The aforesaid facts narrated hereinabove are more or less undisputed and the writ petition filed by the respondent was founded on two points. Firstly, the land was settled as a Grant in terms of the Regulation 4(1)(a) of the Regulation of 1926 for a period of 30 years which contains the provisions for renewal thereof and therefore, the action of the authorities in not granting renewal without any justifiable cause is per se illegal. Secondly, the initiation of the proceeding by the Deputy Commissioner under Regulation, 1966 is without jurisdiction as such proceeding can only be initiated under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. 11. The Single Bench while disposing of the writ petition held the first point in favour of the appellant authorities holding that it was not a Grant but a licence under Regulation 4(10(b) of the Regulation of 1926 which does not postulate an automatic renewal upon exercise of an option. However, on the second point it is held that the order of the Deputy Commissioner under Regulation 1966 is bad and illegal as he is not a competent authority under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. Having held so the Court directed the restoration of the possession of the respondent within six weeks from the date of the order. There is no cross-objection filed by the respondent assailing findings returned on the first point and therefore, we should not be detained to record our findings thereupon. 12. Having held so the Court directed the restoration of the possession of the respondent within six weeks from the date of the order. There is no cross-objection filed by the respondent assailing findings returned on the first point and therefore, we should not be detained to record our findings thereupon. 12. So far as the second point is concerned it is no doubt true that the Regulation 1966 has been framed by the President of India in exercise of power conferred under Article 240 of the Constitution of India in relation to the land of the islands. 13. The appellants contend that the Regulation 3 of the said Regulation defines the classes of revenue officers which includes the Deputy Commissioner and in view of such Regulation 17 thereof every revenue officer while exercising the power under the said regulation is to inquire into or decide any question arising for determination between the Government and any person to any proceeding as revenue court. 14. The powers of the revenue court has further been indicated in Regulation 18 and 19 thereof and regulation 24 postulates that any order to deliver possession of any land passed under the said Regulation against the person shall be executed in the manner provided therein. 15. As per Regulation 38 (1), the land in the Union Territory of this Island is vested absolutely in the Government and no person shall be deemed to have acquired any property or any right over the same by occupation, prescription or conveyances or in any manner whatsoever except when the conveyance is executed by or under the authority of the Government. 16. The appellants took shelter under the sub-regulation (4) of Regulation 38 to impress upon us that any dispute if arose in respect of any right contemplated under the said sub-regulations 1,2 and 3, the same shall be decided by the Deputy Commissioner being the revenue officer discharging the functions as a revenue court. 17. It is thus contended that in view of harmonious reading of the aforesaid provision, the Deputy Commissioner is competent to initiate proceeding and pass an order for recovery of possession as the respondent had no right to occupy the subject land after expiration of the period by efflux of time. 17. It is thus contended that in view of harmonious reading of the aforesaid provision, the Deputy Commissioner is competent to initiate proceeding and pass an order for recovery of possession as the respondent had no right to occupy the subject land after expiration of the period by efflux of time. However, it is further contended that Regulation, 1926 empowers the Tehsildar to recover the possession and the said power has been vested upon the Deputy Commissioner under the 1966 Regulation. 18. On the other hand, Mr. Sarkar, learned advocate appearing for the respondent submits that the Deputy Commissioner is incompetent to initiate proceeding under Regulation 1966 as the land of this islands has vested with the Central Government and in view of the definition of the Pubic Premises given under section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act, the proceeding can only be initiated under the said Act. 19. Mr. Sarkar further submits that the Public Premises Act, being a special Act, over rides the general or other special Act, because of the non-obstante clause having used therein and, therefore, the recourse under the Regulation, 1966 cannot be made. It is further submitted that in the event if both the special Acts operate on the same field, the special Act enacted subsequently shall have a primacy over the other despite existence of non-obstante clause in both the special Acts and placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of M/s Jain Ink Manufacturing Company vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and another reported in (1980) 4 SCC 435 , Ashoka Marketing Limited and another vs. Punjab National Bank and others reported in (1990) 4 SCC 406 and Ethiopian Airlines vs. Ganesh NarainSaboo reported in (2011) 8 SCC 539 . 20. It is, thus, contended that the order of the Single Bench to that effect does not warrant any interference and, therefore, the instant mandamus appeal is misplaced. Lastly, it is contended that the moment the order of recovery of possession or any action taken thereupon is held to be illegal per se there is no fetter on the part of the Court to direct restoration of the possession which, in fact, has been done in the impugned order passed by the Single Bench. 21. Lastly, it is contended that the moment the order of recovery of possession or any action taken thereupon is held to be illegal per se there is no fetter on the part of the Court to direct restoration of the possession which, in fact, has been done in the impugned order passed by the Single Bench. 21. As indicated above, though the writ petition filed by the respondent was found primarily on two counts, but so far as the plea relating to the automatic renewal of the licence is concerned, we do not intend to delve into for the simple reason that there is no cross-objection taken out by the respondent in the instant appeal. 22. Indubitably, the licence was granted under Regulation 4(1)(b) of the Regulation, 1926 for a period of thirty years subject to the general conditions enshrined therein. The initial proceeding initiated between the parties would evince that such licence was treated as a grant under Regulation 4(1)(a) of the Regulation, 1926 but such contention was not accepted and, therefore, the respondent cannot contend in the instant proceeding that it was a grant not a licence. The stand of the respondent at the later stage of the proceeding would also corroborate the said fact when the respondent abandoned such claim and accepted the position that it was a licence granted under Regulation 4(1)(b) of the Regulation, 1926 and not a grant under Regulation 4(1)(a) thereof. 23. Undisputedly, the period of licence granted on 18th September, 1959 was thirty years which expires in the mid-night of 17th September, 1989. The prior permission was granted by the authority to transfer and convey the residuary period of licence in favour of Capt.Dutta and the original licensee by executing the sale deed on 14th February, 1969 transferred and conveyed the said property to Capt. Dutta. 24. Amidst the pendency of an application for mutating the name in the revenue record by the widow of Capt. Dutta, upon his demise, the show cause notice was issued by the Deputy Commissioner under Regulation, 1966 and the possession was recovered on the basis of the order passed therein. Though initially the respondent proceeded to challenge the order of eviction before the first appellate authority but later on it was not pursued and the challenged is thrown in the writ petition which was disposed of by the impugned order. 25. Though initially the respondent proceeded to challenge the order of eviction before the first appellate authority but later on it was not pursued and the challenged is thrown in the writ petition which was disposed of by the impugned order. 25. We do not find any difficulty in somewhat settled proposition of law that if the authority has acted beyond the jurisdiction or in complete lack of jurisdiction, such order cannot be said to be legal even it at one point of time, the challenge was made taking recourse to the provision of Regulation, 1966. The order which is per se illegal having passed without jurisdiction cannot withstand with the anvil of law. 26. It is no doubt true that the Regulation, 1966 is a special statute promulgated in exercise of powers under Article 240 of the Constitution of India and equally the Public Premises Act is a special statute enacted by the parliament to operate in the specified field. 27. When two or more Acts operate in the same field, stimulating and incisive problems of interpretation often arises because the statutory interpretation has no conventional protocol and are required to be decided in reference to the object and purpose of the laws under consideration. 28. In Jain Ink Manufacturing Company(supra), the identical question arose wherea Slum Area (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 was found to be have pitted against the Public Premises Act. The Apex Court held that the Public Premises Act, being the latter Act, must have an edge over the Slums Act when both Acts operates in the same filed, in these words: “13. A perusal of section 19 of the Slums Act clearly shows that it is in direct conflict with the Premises Act which expressly provides for the forum for evicting persons in unauthorised occupation of premises which fell in section 2 of the Premises Act. The Premises Act being subsequent to the Slums Act, as amended in 1964, and again being a special Act having a very limited sphere, must necessarily override the Slums Act on the same lines of reasoning as we have indicated in the case of the Rent Act. For these reasons, therefore, the last contention put forward by the counsel for the appellant is also overruled. For these reasons, therefore, the last contention put forward by the counsel for the appellant is also overruled. The High Court had also overruled all these preliminary objections more or less on the same reasons as given by us though not in such details.” 29. The Constitutional Bench in the case of Ashoka Marketing Limited (Supra) reiterated the aforesaid principles in the following: “55. The Rent Control Act makes a departure from the general law regulating the relationship of landlord and tenant contained in the Transfer of Property Act inasmuch as it makes provision for determination of standard rent, it specifies the grounds on which a landlord can seek the eviction of a tenant, it prescribes the forum for adjudication of disputes between landlords and tenants and the procedure which has to be followed in such proceedings. The rent Control Act can, therefore, be said to be a special statute regulating the relationship of landlord and tenant in the Union Territory of Delhi. The Public premises Act makes provision for a speedy machinery to secure eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises. As opposed to the general law which provides for filing of a regular suit for recovery of possession of property in a competent Court and for trial of such a suit in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil procedure, the Public Premises Act confers the power to pass an order or eviction of an unauthorised occupant in a public premises on a designated officer and prescribes the procedure to be followed by the said officer before passing such an order. Therefore, the Public Premises Act is also a special statute relating to eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises. In other words, both the enactments, namely, the Rent Control Act and the Public Premises Act, are special statutes in relation to the matters dealt with therein. Since, the Public premises Act is a special statute and not a general enactment the exception contained in the principle that a subsequent general law cannot derogate from an earlier special law cannot be invoked and in accordance with the principle that the later laws abrogate earlier contrary laws, the Public Premises Act must prevail over the Rent Control Act. 56. 56. We arrive at the same conclusion by applying the principle which is followed for resolving a conflict between the provisions of two special enactments made by the same legislature. We may in this context refer to some of the cases which have come before this Court where the provisions of two enactments made by the same legislature were found to be inconsistent and each enactment was claimed to be a special enactment and had a non obstante clause giving overriding effect to its provisions.” 30. The aforesaid principle is further reiterated in a latter decision rendered in Ethiopian Airlines (Supra) in the following: “35. Similarly, this Court in the case of Maruti Udyog Limited v. Ram Lal and Others (2005) 2 SCC 638 in para 42 observed as under: "42. In Solidaire India Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd. and Others [ (2001) 3 SCC 71 ], it is stated: ‘9. It is clear that both these Acts are special Acts. This Court has laid down in no uncertain terms that in such an event it is the later Act which must prevail. The decisions cited in the above context are as follows: Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. v. State Industrial & Investment Corpn. of Maharashtra Ltd., Sarwan Singh v.Kasturi Lal; Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank and Ram Narain v. Simla Banking & Industrial Co. Ltd. 10. We may notice that the Special Court had in another case dealt with a similar contention. In Bhoruka Steel Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd. it had been contended that recovery proceedings under the Special Court Act should be stayed in view of the provisions of the 1985 Act. Rejecting this contention, the Special Court had come to the conclusion that the Special Court Act being a later enactment would prevail. The headnote which brings out succinctly the ratio of the said decision is as follows: “Where there are two special statutes which contain non obstante clauses the later statute shall prevail. This is because at the time of enactment of the later statute, the Legislature was aware of the earlier legislation and its non obstante clause. If the Legislature still confers the later enactment with a non obstante clause it means that the Legislature wanted that enactment to prevail. This is because at the time of enactment of the later statute, the Legislature was aware of the earlier legislation and its non obstante clause. If the Legislature still confers the later enactment with a non obstante clause it means that the Legislature wanted that enactment to prevail. If the Legislature does not want the later enactment to prevail then it could and would provide in the later enactment that the provisions of the earlier enactment would continue to apply." ’ ” ” 31. On the conspectus of a law enunciated in the above repots, what can be culled out therefrom is that the ordinary principle of interpretation is that the special Act overrides the general law but when both the special Acts operates in the same filed, the guiding principles would be that a latter enactment would an edge over the earlier enactment operating in a same field, being the special Act. 32. No doubt the provision under 1966 Regulation provides that the land of the islands would vest to the Central Government and in view of the definition of the Public Premises enshrined in section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act, such land comes within the ambit thereof. The power to recover possession under the Public Premises Act through a mechanism provided therein leaves no ambiguity that the recovery can be made from the unauthorized occupant defined therein. The definition of an unauthorized occupant under the Public Premises Act includes a person who was occupying the public premises on the basis of an authority or the grant and such authority has expired or determined. It is a specific case of the appellant that the period of lease in respect of subject property expired by efflux of time and, therefore, the respondent is an unauthorized occupant within the meaning of the Public Premises Act. Apart from the same, our attention is drawn to the orders passed in WP No.252 of 2015 and MAT No.32 of 2015 wherein the appellants/authorities have taken shelter under the Public Premises Act for recovery of possession from the unauthorized occupants and, therefore, the Deputy Commissioner is otherwise incompetent to pass an order for recovery of possession by initiating a proceeding under Regulation, 1966. We, thus, do not find any infirmity or illegality in the order of the Single Bench in this regard. 33. We, thus, do not find any infirmity or illegality in the order of the Single Bench in this regard. 33. However, we cannot concur with the finding of the Single Bench that the moment the proceeding goes, the recovery is inevitable. The possession was taken as far back as 19th May, 1995 and the appellant authority has already resumed the land, and are in possession thereof, since the land of the island stood vest in terms of the Regulation, 1966, and there was an order in one of the proceeding that they would not settle the same in favour of the third party, we feel that it would be appropriate that the order warrants modification. 34. Accordingly, the portion of the order by which the restoration of possession was directed is hereby set aside. The appellant authorities are restrained from dealing with the property in favour of any third party for period of four months from date. If the appellant authority does not initiate a proceeding under the Public Premises Act, within the time indicated hereinabove, the order of the Single Bench directing restoration would automatically revive. 35. With these observations, the appeal is disposed of. I agree.