ORDER : R. DEVDAS, J. Petitioners herein are before this Court calling in question the order dated 04.07.2005 passed by the Assistant Commissioner and the order dated 07.05.2014 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, under the provisions of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978, (hereinafter referred to as ‘PTCL Act, for short). A preliminary objection is raised at the hands of the private respondents that this writ petition is filed after delay of more than four years and therefore the writ petition is liable to be rejected on the sole ground of delay and laches. It is also submitted that the 4 appeal which was preferred by the petitioners herein before the Deputy Commissioner should not have been rejected on the ground that the appeal was filed after the delay of six years, since the order of the Assistant Commissioner is dated 04.07.2005 and the appeal was preferred in the year 2011. 2. The brief facts of the case are that land bearing Sy.No.119, New No.304 measuring 1 acre 18 guntas situated at Madanahalli Village, Gowribidanur, Kolar District was granted in favour of Sri M.Rangaswamy on 24.04.1964. The said M.Rangaswamy sold the land in favour of Sri K.V.Krishnappa on 17.09.1968. The said Sri K.V.Krishnappa got the land converted from agricultural purposes to non-agricultural purposes on 26.06.1991 in terms of the order passed by the Tahsildar. Although doubts are raised against the order of conversion passed by the Tahsildar, that issue need not be gone into at this juncture. The petitioners herein purchased the converted land from the wife and children of Sri K.V.Krishnappa under a sale deed dated 12.06.1996. Sri R.Dayananda, claiming to be the son of the original grantee filed an application under Section 5 of the PTCL Act before the Assistant Commissioner during the year 2004. Smt. Savithramma, w/o late K.V.Krishnappa was arraigned as the respondent in the proceedings. The Assistant Commissioner proceeded to hold that the sale transaction was in violation of the conditions of grant and therefore declared that the sale deed dated 17.09.1968 is void and consequently directed resumption and restoration of land in favour of the legal representatives of original grantee. 3. Smt. Savithramma, w/o late K.V.Krishnappa was arraigned as the respondent in the proceedings. The Assistant Commissioner proceeded to hold that the sale transaction was in violation of the conditions of grant and therefore declared that the sale deed dated 17.09.1968 is void and consequently directed resumption and restoration of land in favour of the legal representatives of original grantee. 3. It is the contention of the private respondents that consequent to the orders passed by the Assistant Commissioner and there being no appeal filed by Smt. Savithramma, the lands were restored in favour of the legal representatives of the original grantee i.e., private respondents herein. Thereafter the revenue records were mutated in favour of the private respondents vide MR No.26/2009-10. 4. The petitioners herein approached the Deputy Commissioner during the year 2011 calling in question the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner dismissed the appeal by order dated 07.05.2014. This writ petition is filed on 05.02.2019. Therefore, preliminary objection was raised at the hands of the private respondents that the writ petition having been filed after the delay of 4 years, the same is required to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches alone. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that although the appeal was filed by the petitioners before the Deputy Commissioner, no information was made available to the petitioners regarding the dismissal of the appeal. Therefore, the writ petition came to be filed in the month of February, 2019 since the possession was sought to be taken from the petitioners during the 1st week of January, 2019. On the other hand, it is submitted that in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi Vs State of Karnataka and Another, reported in 2017 SCC Online SC 1862 and Vivek M. Hinduja and others Vs. M. Ashwatha and others, reported in 2018 (1) Kar. L.R. 176 (SC), the application having been filed after an enormous delay of more than 25 years, the application itself should have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. Moreover, it is submitted that it is an admitted fact that Sri K.V.Krishnappa after purchasing the land got the same converted from agricultural to non-agricultural purposes during the year 1991 and thereafter the petitioners herein purchased the converted land during the year 1996. Moreover, it is submitted that it is an admitted fact that Sri K.V.Krishnappa after purchasing the land got the same converted from agricultural to non-agricultural purposes during the year 1991 and thereafter the petitioners herein purchased the converted land during the year 1996. Therefore, while placing reliance on a decision of this Court in the case of The Tibetian Childrens Village in W.P.No.15802/2007 disposed of 07.04.2017, the learned counsel submits that this Court has held that after a granted land is converted under Section 95 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, there would be deemed alienation and consequently the land does not remain as granted land as defined under the provisions of the PTCL Act and therefore the Assistant Commissioner should have rejected the application on the ground that the land lost the character of agricultural land or granted land by virtue of the alienation/conversion order passed by the competent authority and therefore the Assistant Commissioner should have rejected the application. The learned counsel would further submit that the decision in the case of the Tibetian Childrens Village was upheld by the Division Bench in the case of Smt.Ningamma /vs./ The Tibetian Childrens Village in W.A.No.4092/2017 decided on 09.04.2009. 6. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the private respondents would submit that the petitioners cannot press for the application of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi Vs State of Karnataka and Another, reported in 2017 SCC Online SC 1862 and Vivek M. Hinduja and others Vs. M. Ashwatha and others, reported in 2018 (1) Kar. L.R. 176 (SC), since those decisions will not apply to cases which have attained finality before the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It is submitted that the appeal under Section 5A of the Act was preferred by the petitioners herein during the year 2011 and the Deputy Commissioner dismissed the appeal on 07.05.2014. It is further submitted that the petitioners are trying to take the advantage pf the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court and have filed this writ petition in the month of February, 2019 and therefore the writ petition is liable to be rejected on the ground of delay and laches. 7. It is further submitted that the petitioners are trying to take the advantage pf the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court and have filed this writ petition in the month of February, 2019 and therefore the writ petition is liable to be rejected on the ground of delay and laches. 7. On the question of converted lands, which was raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the learned counsel for private respondents would submit that the decision in the Tibetian Childrens Village was in the context that of the original grantee himself converting the land from agricultural to non-agricultural purposes and thereafter selling the property, not as an agricultural land, but as an converted land. 8. It is therefore submitted that it is an admitted position that in the present case, the original grantee or his legal representatives had not converted the land, it is only the purchaser Sri K.V.Krishnappa who got the land converted during the year 1991. Therefore, the decisions cited by the learned counsel cannot be made applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. Moreover, it is submitted that while deciding the case in Tibetian Childrens Village, this Court has not noticed the earlier decision of this Court in the case of Smt. Muniakkayyamma /vs./ Assistant Commissioner, Doddaballapur Sub-division and others reported in 2005(4) KCCR 2953 , where this Court held that the Deputy Commissioner while acting as an authority under Section 95 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act may use the inputs as to whether the land is a granted land, granted in favour of the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes and grant or refused permission for conversion, in one way or the other. However the Deputy Commissioner while hearing an appeal under Section 5A of the PTCL Act is required to examine the question by applying the provisions of the Act. The mere fact that earlier the Deputy Commissioner had permitted diversion of the user that by itself cannot be presumed or deemed permission under sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the Act. The permission under sub-section(2) of Section 4 of the Act is one to be given by the Government and not by the Deputy Commissioner. The mere fact that earlier the Deputy Commissioner had permitted diversion of the user that by itself cannot be presumed or deemed permission under sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the Act. The permission under sub-section(2) of Section 4 of the Act is one to be given by the Government and not by the Deputy Commissioner. It was held that at any rate permission for conversion under 95 of the KLR Act granted by the Deputy Commissioner does not in one way or the other detract of the compliance of sub-section(2) of Section 4 of the Act which is a statutory requirement, non compliance of which automatically follows in terms of sub-section(1) of Section 4 of the Act. The learned counsel submits that the decision in Smt. Muniakkayyamma’s case has been upheld by the Division Bench in W.A.No.3656/2005, decided on 06.07.2010. 9. Heard the learned counsels and perused the petition papers. 10. The contradictory decisions on the question as to whether an order of conversion issued under Section 95 of the KLR Act could be considered as ‘alienation’ or ‘transfer’ under the PTCL Act, need not detain this Court in the present facts and circumstances of this case. As rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the private respondents, in the instant case, the land was not converted by the original grantee. It was got converted by the purchaser Sri K.V.Krishnappa who thereafter sold the converted land in favour of the petitioners herein. Even the decision in the case of Tibetian Childrens Village will not come to the rescue of the petitioners for the very same reason that if the subsequent purchaser gets the land converted from agricultural to nonagricultural purposes, the authorities while considering a case under the provisions of the PTCL act will not be bound by the subsequent developments. If it is found that the first sale transaction is in violation of the conditions of the grant or without previous permission of the government as stipulated under Section 4(2) of the Act, then the Assistant Commissioner is duty bound to pass an order directing resumption and restoration of the land. The factum of the subsequent conversion of the land will not deter or detain the Assistant Commissioner from passing orders for resumption and restoration of land. The factum of the subsequent conversion of the land will not deter or detain the Assistant Commissioner from passing orders for resumption and restoration of land. It is only in a case where the lands are subsequently acquired by any statutory body or the Government that directions could be issued by the authorities acting under the provisions of the PTCL Act to direct payment of compensation in favour of the original grantee or the legal representatives of the original grantee. 11. On the question of whether the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi Vs State of Karnataka and Another and Vivek M. Hinduja and others Vs. M. Ashwatha and others, reported in 2018 (1) Kar. L.R. 176 (SC), are required to be applied to the facts and circumstances of this case, this Court is of the considered opinion that the decision of the Apex Court cannot be made applicable to cases which have attained finality before the decision was rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court. Otherwise, it would open a pandora’s box if the authorities are permitted to reopen the cases and re-agitate the question of delay and laches to a case which has attained finality. Even otherwise, it is a well settled position of law that mainly because there is change in the position of law by virtue of decisions rendered by this Court or by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the cases which have attained finality cannot be permitted to be reopened to apply the subsequent position of law to such cases which have attained finality. 12. As noticed earlier, a preliminary objection was also raised at the hands of the private respondents herein that this writ petition has been filed after a delay of four years after the impugned order was passed by the Deputy Commissioner and that too, to take advantage of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court. The said contention seems to be reasonable. It is evident from the records that the appellants themselves had preferred an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner calling in question the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner. The said contention seems to be reasonable. It is evident from the records that the appellants themselves had preferred an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner calling in question the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner. No doubt, the petitioners were not made parties before the Assistant Commissioner and therefore they had all the reasons to explain before the Deputy commissioner that since they were not made parties to the proceedings before the Assistant Commissioner, delay in approaching the Deputy Commissioner under Section 5A could have been condoned. But the other submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the Deputy commissioner did not intimate the petitioners about the dismissal of the appeal and therefore from the date of knowledge of the orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner, there is no delay in filling the writ petition, cannot be accepted. The learned counsel for the private respondents has pointed out from the statement of objections that the petitioners knew about the orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner and they have filed an application seeking certified copy on 16.03.2015 and therefore the petitioners cannot claim that they were not aware of the orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner. Even otherwise, as noticed herein above, the petitioners being the appellants before the Deputy Commissioner were required to agitate their grievance in accordance with law. In the facts and circumstances of this case there is sufficient force in the submission of the private respondents that this writ petition is filed in the month of February, 2019 trying to take advantage of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi Vs State of Karnataka and Another and Vivek M. Hinduja and others Vs. M. Ashwatha and others, reported in 2018 (1) Kar. L.R. 176 (SC), and seek an order at the hands of this Court to set aside the orders passed by the Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner on the ground of delay and laches on the part of the private respondents in filing the application before the Assistant Commissioner. 13. For the reasons stated above, this Court is of the considered opinion that there is no merit in the present writ petition and consequently, the same stands dismissed.