ORDER : 1. With a view to appreciate the submissions made across the bar, it will be necessary to refer to the facts of the case. 2. W.P.No.29534/2019 has been filed essentially for challenging the constitutional validity of a part of clause (e) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B of the Karnataka Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1994 (for short ‘the said Rules of 1994’) as amended by the Karnataka Minor Mineral Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2016 (for short ‘the Amendment Rules of 2016’) and the Karnataka Minor Mineral Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2017 (for short ‘the Amendment Rules of 2017’). 3. As far as the petitioner in this petition is concerned, he is also challenging the endorsement dated 9th March 2019 issued by the third respondent which is at Annexure-A. On 27th June 2015, an application was made by the petitioner for grant of a quarrying lease. The application was pending on 12th August 2016 when the said Rules of 1994 were amended by the Amendment Rules of 2016. On 6th June 2017, an endorsement was issued by the Senior Geologist rejecting the application of the petitioner. In a Revision Petition filed by the petitioner, the said endorsement was set aside. On th March 2019, the first impugned endorsement at Annexure-A was issued. By the said endorsement, the application made by the petitioner was rejected on the ground that as required by clause (e) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B of the said Rules of 1994, the lease deed ought to have been executed within a period of twenty-four months as provided therein. A communication was issued on 19th March 2019 (Annexure-A) to the petitioner communicating the rejection of the application. A prayer is made for setting aside Annexure-A. 4. W.P.No.30958/2019 has been also filed for challenging a part of clause (e) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B of the said Rules of 1994 as amended by the Amendment Rules of 2016 and the Amendment Rules of 2017. In this case, the challenge is to the endorsement at Annexure-M which lays down that the lease deed had to be executed by 11th August 2018. 5. In this case, the challenge is to the endorsement at Annexure-M which lays down that the lease deed had to be executed by 11th August 2018. 5. In W.P.No.30959/2019, the substantive prayer is for challenging the same part of clause (e) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B. There is also a challenge to the endorsement issued on 10th April 2019 holding that the lease deed ought to have been executed within twenty-four months from 12th August 2016. 6. W.P.No.30960/2019 contains the same challenge to the part of clause (e) as in the earlier cases and there is also a challenge to the endorsement issued as per Annexure-M by which, a reliance was placed on that portion of clause (e) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B which is the subject matter of challenge in companion petitions. 7. W.P.No.4034/2020 contains a prayer directing the respondents to execute a lease deed in accordance with the provisions of the said Rules of 1994. It is contended that on the basis of the application made by the petitioner on 24th June 2006, a notification was issued on 10th August 2018 (Annexure-D) providing for grant of a lease to the petitioner under the said Rules of 1994. The prayer in the petition is for issue of a writ of mandamus directing execution of the lease deed. 8. Before we refer to the submissions made across the bar, it is necessary to make a reference to Rule 8-B as it existed after the amendments made by the Amendment Rules of 2016 and 2017. We are reproducing only sub-rules (1) and (2) of Rule 8-B which read thus: "8-B. Status of applications received.-(1) All applications received and pending for grant of lease or license prior to the date of commencement of the Karnataka Minor Mineral Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2016, shall become ineligible including the applications received for grant of mining leases of the minerals that are now classified as minor mineral. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1), the following shall remain eligible on and from the commencement of the Karnataka Minor Mineral Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2016, namely.- (a) Applications received upon the notification issued under rule 8B existed before the Karnataka Minor Mineral Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2016. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1), the following shall remain eligible on and from the commencement of the Karnataka Minor Mineral Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2016, namely.- (a) Applications received upon the notification issued under rule 8B existed before the Karnataka Minor Mineral Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2016. (b) Where the Committee that existed under the provisions of Rule 11 or District Task Force Committee has recommended for grant of a quarrying lease or license for grant of mining lease, before the commencement of the Karnataka Minor Mineral Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2016. (c) Where in the case of minerals now re-classified as minor mineral by the Central Government by Notification No. S.O. 423(E), dated 10-2-2015, no objection certificates from revenue and forest departments and the approved mining plan from the Indian Bureau of Mines (IBM) have been received before commencement of the Karnataka Minor Mineral Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2016. (d) Applications received and pending for grant of lease or licence in case of specified minor minerals before commencement of the Karnataka Minor Mineral Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2016 and for which No Objection Certificate (NOC) have been received in the office of Directorate of Mines and Geology from the Deputy Conservator of Forest for all Lands, Deputy Commissioner in case of Kharab lands, Assistant Commissioner (Revenue) and Deputy Director or Senior Geologist (Joint inspection report) in case of Gomala lands in accordance with the Circular No.RD 72 LGP 98, dated 24-2-1999 before commencement of the Karnataka Minor Mineral Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2016 and shall be considered and disposed by the State Government subject to obtaining No Objection Certificate (NOC) from the Deputy Commissioner of the concerned District before grant; (d-1) Applications received and pending for grant of lease or licence in the case of non-specified Minor Minerals before commencement of the Karnataka Minor Mineral Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2016 and for which No Objection Certificates (NOCs) have been received in the Department of Mines and Geology of the concerned District Office, from the Deputy Conservator of Forest for all lands, Tahsildar in case of Karab lands, Assistant Commissioner and Deputy Director or Senior Geologist (Joint inspection report), in the case of Gomala lands, before commencement of the Karnataka Minor Mineral Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2016, and shall be processed by the Competent Authority as under the existing rules before commencement of the Karnataka Minor Mineral Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2016. (e) These applications shall be considered for grant of quarrying lease or license, or otherwise as per the provisions that existed before the Karnataka Minor Mineral Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2016 subject to fulfillment of the conditions specified for the same, if any and registration of leases or license deed within a period of (twenty-four months) from the date of commencement of the Karnataka Minor Mineral Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2016: Provided that in case of grant of quarrying lease or license covered by clause (b), (c) and (d) of sub-rule (2), the lessee shall pay, in addition to the royalty, an amount which shall be equal to the Average Additional Periodic Payment payable by the holders of quarry lease or license granted through auction within the Taluk if such average is available for the Taluk, or within the District if such average is not available for the Taluk, or within the neighboring Districts if such average is not available for the District, and if such average is not available within the neighboring Districts, such Average Additional Periodic Payment shall be deemed to be fifty per cent of Royalty. This deemed percentage shall be reset after three years based on average obtained in auctions by 31-3-2019; and if no auctions have taken place by 31-3-2019 for deriving the average from Taluk, District or neighboring districts, as the case may be, then the deemed rate will become the final rate for the Average Additional Periodic Payment: Provided further that when such Royalty and Average Additional Periodic Payment is paid, then the payment by the lessee for the District Mineral Foundation shall be as payable by the holders of lease or license through auction: Provided also that in respect of any mineral that are now re-classified as minor minerals by the Central Government vide Notification No.S.O.423(E) dated 10-2-2015, no quarrying lease or license shall be granted except with the previous approval of the State Government.” (underline supplied) 9. During the pendency of the petitions, a very important subsequent event has occurred. The said Rules of 1994 were amended by a notification dated 30th June 2020 by which, the Karnataka Minor Mineral Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2020 (for short ‘the Amendment Rules of 2020’) were brought into force. During the pendency of the petitions, a very important subsequent event has occurred. The said Rules of 1994 were amended by a notification dated 30th June 2020 by which, the Karnataka Minor Mineral Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2020 (for short ‘the Amendment Rules of 2020’) were brought into force. As quoted earlier, the amended clause (e) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B as existed prior to 30th June 2020 provided that the applications for grant of a quarrying lease or licence covered by any of the clauses (a) to (d-1) of sub-rule (2) shall be considered as per the provisions of the said Rules of 1994 as it stood before the Amendment Rules of 2016 came into force subject to fulfillment of the conditions specified in the said clauses (a) to (d-1) and registration of lease or licence deed within a period of twenty-four months from the date of commencement of the Amendment Rules of 2016. Thus, as per clause (e) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B, an embargo was put on the applications falling in any of the clauses (a) to (d-1) of registration of lease or licence deed within a period of twenty-four months from 12th August 2016. It is also necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Amendment Rules of 2020. The amendment to clause (e) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B was made by virtue of Rule 7 of the Amendment Rules of 2020 which reads thus: “7. Amendment of Rule 8-B.-In rule 8B of the said rules, in clause (e), of sub-rule (2) for the words, “if any and registration of leases or license deed within a period of twenty-four months from the date of commencement of the Karnataka Minor Mineral Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2016”, the words “with the approval of the State Government” shall be substituted.” (underline supplied) 10. Thus, that portion of clause (e) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B which is challenged in some of the petitions in this group has undergone a modification and now, the embargo of executing a lease or a licence deed within a period of twenty-four months from 12th August 2016 is no longer a part of clause (e). Thus, that portion of clause (e) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B which is challenged in some of the petitions in this group has undergone a modification and now, the embargo of executing a lease or a licence deed within a period of twenty-four months from 12th August 2016 is no longer a part of clause (e). Now, the question which we have to answer is whether the substitution made by Rule 7 of the Amendment Rules of 2020 will apply to all the applications which are governed by any of the clauses (a) to (d-1) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B. 11. The submissions have been made on the issue of validity of unamended clause (e) mainly in Writ Petition No.29534/2019. The main ground canvassed in the writ petition is that the portion of clause (e) which provides for an outer limit of twenty-four months for execution of the lease deed is manifestly arbitrary. It is submitted that by putting the said condition, the very purpose of carving out exceptions to sub-rule (1) of Rule 8-B of the said Rules of 1994 has been completely defeated. In any case, the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is that the amendment made to clause (e) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B by the said Amendment Rules of 2020 is by way of substitution and therefore, the same will have a retrospective operation. 12. The learned Additional Government Advocate has opposed the petitions and submitted that the amendment made by Rule 7 of the Amendment Rules of 2020 will be prospective and not retrospective. He would, therefore, submit that no interference is called for in writ jurisdiction. 13. We have given careful consideration to the submissions. 14. We have already quoted Rule 7 of the Amendment Rules of 2020. Earlier, clause (e) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B provided that the applications made prior to 12th August 2016 which were pending on 12th August 2016 will be considered as per the provisions that existed before 12th August 2016 subject to fulfillment of the conditions specified in any of the clauses (a) to (d-1) of sub-rule 2 of Rule 8-B and subject to execution of a lease or licence deed within a period of twenty-four months from 12th August 2016. 15. 15. Now, the question is what is the effect of the substitution of the words "if any and registration of leases or license deed within a period of twenty-four months from the date of commencement of the Karnataka Minor Mineral Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2016" in clause (e) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B by the words “with the approval of the State Government”. The question is whether the substitution is retrospective or prospective. The Amendment Rules of 2020 are silent on the question of the effect of the substitution. The issue of retrospective effect of the amendment made by way of substitution was considered by the Apex Court in the case of ZILE SINGH vs STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS, AIR 2004 SC 5100 . 16. Before we refer to the said decision, it is necessary to consider the legislative history insofar as the said Rules of 1994 are concerned. As can be seen from the said Rules of 1994, the same have been framed by the State Government in exercise of the powers under Section 15 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (for short ‘the said Act of 1957’). As can be seen from Section 15 of the said Act of 1957, the rule making power can be exercised by the State Government for making rules for regulating the grant of quarrying leases, mining leases and other mineral concessions in respect of the minor minerals as defined in clause (e) of Section 3 of the said Act of 1957. With effect from 12th January 2015, the said Act of 1957 was amended by incorporating Section 10A. The statement of objects and reasons of the Act No.10 of 2015 show that Section 10A was introduced with the object of eliminating discretion and improving transparency in the allocation of mineral resources. In fact, by the said amendment, auction regime was introduced as a method of allotment of mining leases or prospective licences and other mineral concessions. Hence, it can be said that the auction regime was introduced in the said Act of 1957 with effect from 12th January 2015. 17. Extensive amendments were made to the said Rules of 1994 by the Amendment Rules of 2016. Hence, it can be said that the auction regime was introduced in the said Act of 1957 with effect from 12th January 2015. 17. Extensive amendments were made to the said Rules of 1994 by the Amendment Rules of 2016. One of the main amendments was made by incorporation of Rules 8-A and 8-B. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 8-B provided that all the applications received and pending for grant of lease or licence prior to the date of commencement of the Amendment Rules of 2016 (prior to 12th August 2016) shall become ineligible. Obviously, the said provision was incorporated with a view to give effect to the auction regime. As can be seen from opening portion of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B, it starts with a non-obstante clause and it specifically overrides sub-rule (1) of Rule 8-B. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B carves out exceptions in respect of the certain categories of applications covered by sub-rule (1) of Rule 8-B which have been declared as ineligible. 18. There were initially four exceptions carved out in sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B in the form of clauses (a) to (d). Subsequently, clause (d-1) was added. As can be seen from clauses (a) to (d-1) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B, broadly it can be said that the Legislature created exceptions in case of those applications which were pending on 12th August 2016 where the process was substantially completed. For example, clause (a) deals with the applications received upon the notification issued under Rule 8-B which existed before 12th August 2016. Clause (b) is applicable where the Committee constituted under Rule 11 has recommended for grant of a quarrying lease or licence before 12th August 2016. Clause (c) is applicable in cases of applications which were in respect of minerals which are classified as minor minerals by the notification dated 10th February 2015, where No Objection Certificates from the Revenue and the Forest departments and an approval of mining plan from the Indian Bureau of Mines have been received before 12th August 2016. Clause (d) is in respect of specified minor minerals. Clause (d) is in respect of specified minor minerals. It is applicable when No Objection Certificate has been received from the Deputy Conservator of Forest for all lands, No Objection Certificate has been received from the Deputy Commissioner in case of Kharab lands, a joint inspection report of the Assistant Commissioner (Revenue) and Deputy Director or Senior Geologist is received in case of Gomala lands before 12th August 2016. Clause (d-1) is on par with clause (b) which is applicable to non-specified minor minerals. Thus, it can be said that clauses (a) to (d-1) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B carve out exceptions to sub-rule (1) of Rule 8-B. The exceptions have been carved out in case of the applications which were not merely pending on 12th August 2016 but substantial procedural compliances were made on the basis of the said applications. 19. At this stage, we must note here that clause (e) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B as added by the Amendment Rules of 2016 provided that the applications which are covered by clauses (a) to (d) shall be considered for grant of quarrying lease or licence as per the provisions of the said Rules of 1994 existing before 12th August 2016 subject to fulfillment of the conditions specified in clauses (a) to (d) and subject to condition that registration of lease or licence deed is made within a period of twelve months from the date of commencement of the Amendment Rules of 2016 (i.e., from th August 2016). Thus, clause (e) provided that in the cases covered by clauses (a) to (d) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B, the applications which were pending on 12th August 2016 shall be decided on the basis of the provisions of the said Rules of 1994 which were prevailing before 12th August 2016 subject to the condition that the other conditions are fulfilled and the registration of lease or licence deed is done within a period of twelve months from 12th August 2016. The said provision of twelve months underwent a change by the subsequent Amendment Rules of 2017. The words ‘twelve months’ were substituted by the words ‘twenty-four’ months. The said provision of twelve months underwent a change by the subsequent Amendment Rules of 2017. The words ‘twelve months’ were substituted by the words ‘twenty-four’ months. Even clause (d-1) was added to sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B. Thus, as on the date on which the Amendment Rules of 2020 came into force (30th June 2020), the applications which were pending as on th August 2016 which were falling in any of the clauses (a) to (d-1) were required to be considered on the basis of the said Rules of 1994 without taking into consideration the amendments made by the Amendment Rules of 2016. However, for the applicability of clauses (a) to (d-1) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B, a condition was incorporated in clause (e) of registration of lease or licence deeds within a period of twenty-four months from 12th August 2016. Thus, if the leases or licences were not executed and registered within the said period of twenty-four months, obviously the applications though covered by one of the clauses (a) to (d-1) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B, became ineligible. 20. Now, by the Amendment Rules of 2020, the requirement of getting a lease or a licence deed registered within a period of twenty-four months has been completely dispensed with and by amending the clause (e) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B, it is provided that a lease or a licence can be executed with the approval of the State Government. Thus, the condition of execution and registration of the lease deed within a period of twenty-four months ceased to exist when the Amendment Rules of 2020 came into force on 30th June 2020. 21. Now, we go to the question of whether the substitution made by Rule 7 of the Amendment Rules of 2020 will apply prospectively or retrospectively or retroactively. So far as the interpretation of the amendments made by way of substitution is concerned, the Apex Court has laid down principles in the case of ZILE SINGH (supra). The Apex Court was called upon to decide whether a particular amendment made by substitution will have a retrospective operation. In paragraphs 13 to 15, the Apex Court held thus: “13. It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have a retrospective operation. The Apex Court was called upon to decide whether a particular amendment made by substitution will have a retrospective operation. In paragraphs 13 to 15, the Apex Court held thus: “13. It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have a retrospective operation. But the rule in general is applicable where the object of the statute is to affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impair existing obligations. Unless there are words in the statute sufficient to show the intention of the legislature to affect existing rights, it is deemed to be prospective only — “nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis” — a new law ought to regulate what is to follow, not the past. It is not necessary that an express provision be made to make a statute retrospective and the presumption against retrospectivity may be rebutted by necessary implication especially in a case where the new law is made to cure an acknowledged evil for the benefit of the community as a whole. 14. The presumption against retrospective operation is not applicable to declaratory statutes…. In determining, therefore, the nature of the Act, regard must be had to the substance rather than to the form. If a new Act is “to explain” an earlier Act, it would be without object unless construed retrospectively. An explanatory Act is generally passed to supply an obvious omission or to clear up doubts as to the meaning of the previous Act. It is well settled that if a statute is curative or merely declaratory of the previous law retrospective operation is generally intended…. An amending Act may be purely declaratory to clear a meaning of a provision of the principal Act which was already implicit. A clarificatory amendment of this nature will have retrospective effect. 15. Though retrospectivity is not to be presumed and rather there is presumption against retrospectivity, according to Craies, it is open for the legislature to enact laws having retrospective operation. This can be achieved by express enactment or by necessary implication from the language employed. If it is a necessary implication from the language employed that the legislature intended a particular section to have a retrospective operation, the courts will give it such an operation. This can be achieved by express enactment or by necessary implication from the language employed. If it is a necessary implication from the language employed that the legislature intended a particular section to have a retrospective operation, the courts will give it such an operation. In the absence of a retrospective operation having been expressly given, the courts may be called upon to construe the provisions and answer the question whether the legislature had sufficiently expressed that intention giving the statute retrospectivity. Four factors are suggested as relevant: (i) general scope and purview of the statute; (ii) the remedy sought to be applied; (iii) the former state of the law; and (iv) what it was the legislature contemplated. The rule against retrospectivity does not extend to protect from the effect of a repeal, a privilege which did not amount to accrued right.” (underlines added) 22. In paragraph 20 of the said judgment, the Apex Court referred to its earlier decision in the case of BENGAL IMMUNITY COMPANY LIMITED vs STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS, (1955) 2 SCR 603 . In paragraphs 24 and 25 of its decision in the case of ZILE SINGH, the Apex Court held thus: "24. the substitution of one text for the other pre-existing text is one of the known and wellrecognised practices employed in legislative drafting. 'Substitution' has to be distinguished from 'supersession' or a mere repeal of an existing provision. 25. Substitution of a provision results in repeal of the earlier provision and its replacement by the new provision. If any authority is needed in support of the proposition, it is to be found in West U.P. Sugar Mills Assn. and Ors. V. State of U.P. and Ors., (2002) 2 SCC 645 , State of Rajasthan vs. Mangilal Pindwal, (1996) 5 SCC 60 , Koteswar Vittal Kamath v. K. Rangappa Baliga and Co., (1969) 1 SCC 255 and A.L.V.R.S.T. Veerappa Chettiar v. S. Michael and ors., AIR 1963 SC 933 . In West U.P. Sugar Mills Association and Ors.'s case (supra) a three Judge Bench of this Court held that the State Government by substituting the new rule in place of the old one never intended to keep alive the old rule. In West U.P. Sugar Mills Association and Ors.'s case (supra) a three Judge Bench of this Court held that the State Government by substituting the new rule in place of the old one never intended to keep alive the old rule. Having regard to the totality of the circumstances centering around the issue the Court held that the substitution had the effect of just deleting the old rule and making the new rule operative. In Mangilal Pindwal's case (supra) this Court upheld the legislative practice of an amendment by substitution being incorporated in the text of a statute which had ceased to exist and held that the substituion would have the effect of amending the operation of law during the period in which it was in force. In Koteswar's case (supra) a three Judge Bench of this Court emphasized the distinction between 'supersession' of a rule and 'substitution' of a rule and held that the process of substitution consists of two steps: first, the old rule is made to cease to exist and, next, the new rule is brought into existence in its place." 23. There is one more decision on this aspect which is in the case of GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND OTHERS vs INDIAN TOBACCO ASSOCIATION (2005) 7 SCC 396 . This issue was dealt with by the Apex Court in paragraphs 26 to 29 which read thus: “26. We are not oblivious of the fact that in certain situations, the court having regard to the purport and object sought to be achieved by the legislature may construe the word “substitution” as an “amendment” having a prospective effect but such a question does not arise in the instant case. 27. There is another aspect of the matter which may not be lost sight of. Where a statute is passed for the purpose of supplying an obvious omission in a former statute, the subsequent statute relates back to the time when the prior Act was passed. 28. The doctrine of fairness also is now considered to be a relevant factor for construing a statute. Where a statute is passed for the purpose of supplying an obvious omission in a former statute, the subsequent statute relates back to the time when the prior Act was passed. 28. The doctrine of fairness also is now considered to be a relevant factor for construing a statute. In a case of this nature where the effect of a beneficent statute was sought to be extended keeping in view the fact that the benefit was already availed of by the agriculturalists of tobacco in Guntur, it would be highly unfair if the benefit granted to them is taken away, although the same was meant to be extended to them also. For such purposes the statute need not be given retrospective effect by express words but the intent and object of the legislature in relation thereto can be culled out from the background facts. 29. The question has furthermore to be considered having regard to the language and object discernible from the statute read as a whole. The respondents were not ineligible from obtaining the benefit. Once they are held to be eligible for obtaining the benefit, the amended notification being an exemption notification should receive the beneficent construction.” (underlines supplied) It is in the light of the settled legal principles laid down in the aforesaid decisions that we will have to answer the issue. 24. Coming back to the law laid down in the case of ZILE SINGH (supra), as held by the Apex Court, retrospectivity is not to be presumed in case of any law, rather, there is a presumption against retrospectivity. It was also held that it is open for the Legislature to enact laws having retrospective effect by expressly providing in the enactment or by necessary implication. Therefore, four factors as suggested by the Apex Court will have to be considered. The first factor is general scope and purview. The second one is the remedy sought to be applied. The third is of former state of law. Fourthly, it is also necessary to ascertain what the Legislature contemplated. Moreover, doctrine of fairness is also required to be considered. 25. We may note here that sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B of the said Rules of 1994 was enacted to ensure that certain categories of applications which were pending on 12th August, 2016 should be dealt with as per the said Rules prevailing prior to 12th August 2016. Moreover, doctrine of fairness is also required to be considered. 25. We may note here that sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B of the said Rules of 1994 was enacted to ensure that certain categories of applications which were pending on 12th August, 2016 should be dealt with as per the said Rules prevailing prior to 12th August 2016. We have already held that sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B carves out an exception to sub-rule (1) of Rule 8-B which declares as ineligible all pending applications as on 12th August, 2016. We have already observed that by clauses (a) to (d-1) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B, an exception was carved out to sub-rule (1) of Rule 8-B in cases where substantial progress was made in the matter of processing the pending applications. Thus, the object of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B is to save certain category of applications pending on 12th August, 2016 from attracting ineligibility under sub-rule (1) of Rule 8-B of the said Rules of 1994. 26. If we peruse clauses (a) to (d-1) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B, the applicability of the said clauses depends upon certain acts done prior to 12th August, 2016. If ultimately it is shown that the said acts have been done prior to 12th August, 2016, then the case will fall in the exempted categories specified in sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B. The effect of twenty-four months clause which was there in clause (e) was that even the applicants who were entitled to have the benefit of the exceptions carved out by any of the clauses (a) to (d-1) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B would have been deprived of the same on the ground that the lease deeds were not executed within twenty-four months from 12th August 2016. The execution and registration of a lease deed is not an unilateral act on the part of a lessee as the State Government has to execute the lease. 27. Thus, the legislative intention appears to be to save certain category of applications made for grant of quarrying lease from the purview of sub-rule (1) of Rule 8-B of the said Rules of 1994. 27. Thus, the legislative intention appears to be to save certain category of applications made for grant of quarrying lease from the purview of sub-rule (1) of Rule 8-B of the said Rules of 1994. On satisfaction of the conditions incorporated in any of clauses (a) to (d-1) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B, the applicants who had applied for grant of quarrying lease prior to 12th August 2016 would be eligible to the grant of a lease or a licence. In such cases, what remains to be done is the execution of a lease or a licence which is merely a procedural formality. The execution of a lease depends on the volition of both the parties namely, the State Government and the applicant. Initially in clause (e) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B, it was provided that the applicants will be entitled to the benefit of any of the clauses (a) to (d-1) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B, provided a lease or licence deed is executed within twelve months. The said period was extended to twenty-four months and now by the Amendment Rules of 2020, the embargo of twenty-four months has been removed and it is provided that in the cases where any of the clauses (a) to (d-1) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B are applicable, the lease can be executed with the approval of the State Government. Thus, the intention of the Amendment Rules of 2020 appears to be to give the benefit of the applicability of clauses (a) to (d-1) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8B to all the applicants who were eligible under any of clauses (a) to (d-1), but leases were not executed within the stipulated period of twelve or twenty-four months, as the case may be. Under the un-amended Rules of 1994 as it existed prior to 30th June 2020, the applicants who fulfilled the criteria laid down in any of the clauses (a) to (d-1) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B as on th August 2016, were deprived of a lease or a licence only in view of the failure of the State Government to execute and register the documents within twenty-four months. This defect was sought to be remedied and cured by the Amendment Rules of 2020. 28. Now we come back to the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of ZILE SINGH (supra). This defect was sought to be remedied and cured by the Amendment Rules of 2020. 28. Now we come back to the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of ZILE SINGH (supra). If we consider the four factors laid down thereon, there is merit in the contention that the amendment will apply by way of substitution with retrospective effect. All the four factors apply in the present case. As laid by the Apex Court in the case of GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND OTHERS vs INDIAN TOBACCO ASSOCIATION (supra), this appears to be a case where an attempt was made by the legislature to correct the error in the existing Rules. Even by applying the doctrine of fairness, it will have to be held that the amendment to clause (e) will have retrospective operation. 29. Therefore, to conclude, the substitution made by Rule 7 of the Amendment Rules of 2020 will have a retrospective operation. 30. There is one more aspect of the matter. If a case which is governed by one of the clauses of (a) to (d-1) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B is placed after coming into force of the Amendment Rules of 2020 before the Licensing Authority and if the Licensing Authority is satisfied that the conditions in one of the clauses (a) to (d-1) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B are satisfied, today there is no embargo on the execution of the lease in view of the amendment to clause (e) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B made by the Amendment Rules of 2020. 31. Hence, the petitions deserve to be allowed. In W.P.No.29534/2019, notwithstanding the order dated 8th March 2019, the case of the petitioners will have to be ordered to be considered in the light of the amendment made to clause (e) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B by virtue of Rule 7 of the Amendment Rules of 2020. 32. 31. Hence, the petitions deserve to be allowed. In W.P.No.29534/2019, notwithstanding the order dated 8th March 2019, the case of the petitioners will have to be ordered to be considered in the light of the amendment made to clause (e) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B by virtue of Rule 7 of the Amendment Rules of 2020. 32. Hence, we dispose of the petitions by passing the following order: (i) We direct that the cases of the present petitioners based on any of clauses (a) to (d-1) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B of the said Rules of 1994 shall be considered by the concerned authority of the State in the light of the amendment to clause (e) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8-B made by virtue of Rule 7 of the Amendment Rules of 2020; (ii) We clarify that if in any of these cases, eligibility of the petitioners under any of clauses (a) to (d-1) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8B of the said Rules of 1994 is established, the grant of lease cannot be denied on the ground that the same has not been executed within a period of twenty-four months from 12th August 2016; (iii) Appropriate decision in these cases for grant of the lease shall be taken by the concerned authority of the State Government within a period of three months from today.