ORDER : 1. This writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking the following relief: “to issue a writ order or direction more particularly one in the nature of WRIT OF MANDAMUS declaring the action of respondents in retention of the Rowdy Sheet No.640A/GU dated 15-04-1997 on the petitioner as illegal, irregular arbitrary unconstitutional unjustified and without jurisdiction and violative of the Andhra Pradesh Police Standing Orders and offends Articles 14 and 21 of Constitution of India and consequently quash the rowdy sheet and direct the respondents not to interfere with life and liberty of the petitioner in any manner” 2. It is the case of the petitioner that petitioner is resident of KVP colony, 2/1 Guntur and he was running pharmaceutical shop in the name and style of “Mani Medical and Fancy Stores”, Flat No.C-1, Sai Villa Apartments, Lalapuram Road, Chuttugunta, Guntur from 30.10.2012 till June, 2019. Thereafter, shifted shop to own premises at Plot No.760, KVP Colony, Guntur. The petitioner suffered heart strokes stents are inserted due to blockages. He needs regular and periodical checkup. As the petitioner was blessed with a daughter and wife being working woman, he has to take care of his daughter. Due to opening of rowdy sheet against the petitioner, he is not able to do justice to his family and concentrate on his business. Further, it is stated that, the petitioner is leading respectable life while carrying on business and never involved in any criminal activities. Due to political rivalry, the petitioner is implicated in false cases. 3. It is also submitted that, the petitioner shifted to Hyderabad in the year 1998 and stayed there till his marriage in 2009. After marriage, the petitioner moved to Vijayawada and he has been shuttling between Guntur and Vijayawada and now settled at Guntur. History sheet was opened in 1997 on political pressures, implicating him the following list of cases in which the petitioner has been arrayed as accused: S. No Crime No Offences Police station/Court 1 Cr.No.35 of 1993 Sections 354, 509, 427, 510 I.P.C Nagarampalem (L&O) P.S, Guntur Town 2 P.R.C.No.3 of 1997 Section 354 I.P.C IV Additional Munsif Magistrate, Guntur 3 C.C.No.67 of 1997 Sections 448, 427 & 506 IPC IV Additional Munsif Magistrate, Guntur 4 Cr.No.24 of 1997 Sections 323 & 452 IPC Nagarampalem (L&O) P.S, Guntur Town 4. The petitioner submitted that the above crimes were registered against him at the instance of local politicians. During the year 1997, the petitioner is working as NSUI District General Secretary and he was very active in all the student activities in the district, persons having eye sore lodged false complaints which was not registered by the police. During surprise visits made by the then Chief Minister in the year 1997, one lady who is inimical to him, gave complaint against the petitioner in the police station and also approached Superintendent of Police, Guntur. The police found that the complaint is false and did not register complaint. Then that lady complained the same to the then Chief Minister during his surprise visit. The Hon’ble Chief Minister after listening her grievance in public, scolded police officers from the rank of S.I to S.P. Immediately, all the police registered three false complaints and on the next day arrested the petitioner and his friends. Rowdy/history sheets were also opened on the same day illegally without following due procedure. Initially, rowdy sheet was opened at Kothapet Police Station, Guntur and the same was transferred to Nagarampalem Police Station, Guntur, since the petitioner shifted his residence and that the petitioner did not involve in any case and consequently, the petitioner made a request to the respondents to close the rowdy sheet, but no action was taken and his request was not considered. 5. On account of opening rowdy sheet, reputation of this petitioner is lowered and absolutely there is no ground for opening and continuation of rowdy sheet against this petitioner, as such, he cannot be classified as rowdy within the meaning of rowdy as per Police Standing Order 601. It is also contended that a rowdy sheet can be opened if any person is classified as rowdy, if such person habitually commit, attempt to commit or abet the commission of offence involving breach of the peace. In plain language, a person who habitually commit, attempt to commit or abet the commission of offences alone can be classified as a rowdy and rowdy sheet can be opened, provided such offence relates to involving breach of peace. In plain language, a person who habitually commit, attempt to commit or abet the commission of offences alone can be classified as a rowdy and rowdy sheet can be opened, provided such offence relates to involving breach of peace. If the offence even habitually committed, or attempted to be committed or abet commission of offence, but not involving a breach of peace, would not enable and authorize the police officer concerned to open rowdy sheet and classify a person as rowdy. But, here the petitioner did not involve in any crime. It is further contended that, on account of domiciliary visits, rights of this petitioner guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India are violated. Article 21 of the Constitution of India guarantees right to life with dignity and right to live as a dignified man, carries with it the right to reputation. Right to life guaranteed by Article 21 and such right cannot be deprived except in accordance with the procedure established by law. Such laws which authorize the police to open rowdy sheets and keeping surveillance are required to be very strictly construed. Therefore, opening of rowdy sheet and continuation of the same except in accordance with law would amount to infringement of fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, thereby, the petitioner sought to issue writ of mandamus declaring the action of respondents in continuation of Rowdy Sheet No.640-A/GU dated 15.04.1997 against the petitioner as illegal, arbitrary and unconstitutional. 6. The third respondent/Sub Divisional Police Officer, West Division, Guntur filed counter affidavit, denying material allegations, inter alia contending that the petitioner herein has scant respect towards law and he involved at present in the following criminal cases registered on the file of Nagarampalem Police Station and Old Guntur Police Station of Guntur District. 1. Cr.No.21 of 97 u/s 354 IPC of Kothapet Police Station. 2. Cr.No.22 of 97 u/s 448, 427 and 506 IPC of Kothapet Police Station. 3. Cr.No.35 of 93 u/s 354, 509, 427 of Nagarampalem Police Station. 4. Cr.No.24 of 1997 u/s 323, 452 IPC of Nagarampalem Police Station. 5. Cr.No.104 of 2012 u/s 302, 307, 379, 109, 120 (B) r/w 34 IPC of Old Guntur Police Station 7. 2. Cr.No.22 of 97 u/s 448, 427 and 506 IPC of Kothapet Police Station. 3. Cr.No.35 of 93 u/s 354, 509, 427 of Nagarampalem Police Station. 4. Cr.No.24 of 1997 u/s 323, 452 IPC of Nagarampalem Police Station. 5. Cr.No.104 of 2012 u/s 302, 307, 379, 109, 120 (B) r/w 34 IPC of Old Guntur Police Station 7. The third r    espondent submitted that the above cases were ended in acquittal and in view of the involvement of the petitioner in the above criminal cases, to curb and curtail his unlawful activities with iron hand after obtaining permission from the then Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Guntur Town Division, a rowdy sheet has been opened against the petitioner herein in the year 1997 on the rolls of Kothapeta Police Station and subsequently on the point of jurisdiction, the same was transferred to Nagarampalem Police Station of Guntur District in the year 2016 and the same is being continued and renewed from time to time till December, 2019. The third respondent also submitted in the counter affidavit that, though there are no cases registered or pending against the petitioner, however, due to fear of the petitioner, no one is coming forward to the police station to lodge any fresh complaint and in view of the public interest and mainly to safeguard the interests of the residents of Nagarampalem where, the petitioner is residing, rowdy sheet is being continued. Unless and until a close watch is being maintained against the unlawful activities of the petitioner herein, there is every chance that he may repeat the offences, thereby the petitioner is not entitled to any relief and requested to dismiss the writ petition. 8. During hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner placed on record the copy of calendar and judgment in S.C.No.12 of 2017 and S.C.No.13 of 2016 on the file of Judge, Family Court-cum-XII Additional District and Sessions Judge, Guntur, to establish that he was found not guilty and acquitted for various charges. 8. During hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner placed on record the copy of calendar and judgment in S.C.No.12 of 2017 and S.C.No.13 of 2016 on the file of Judge, Family Court-cum-XII Additional District and Sessions Judge, Guntur, to establish that he was found not guilty and acquitted for various charges. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on judgments of Supreme Court in Dhanji Ram Sharma v. Superintendent of Police, North District, Delhi Police and others, 1966 AIR (SC) 1766, High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Sunkara Satyanarayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1999 (6) ALT 249 and B. Satyanarayana Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, Secretary, Home Department, Hyderabad, 2004 (1) ALD (Cri) 387 and on the strength of those judgments, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that, opening of rowdy sheet and it’s continuation is illegal and requested to issue writ of mandamus as stated supra. 9. Whereas, learned Assistant Government Pleader for Home supported action of the respondents, since the petitioner is involved in as many as six crimes and in some of the cases, charge sheets were also filed, but, the petitioner was found not guilty. However, there is a threat to the public where the petitioner is living and they are not coming forward to lodge any complaint against this petitioner due to apprehension. Consequently, the petitioner is not entitled to claim any relief in this petition. 10. Considering rival contentions, perusing the material available on record, the point that arose for consideration is: “Whether opening of Rowdy Sheet No.640-A/GU against this petitioner and it’s continuation be declared as illegal and arbitrary?. If so, whether any direction be issued to close the rowdy sheet against this petitioner, now pending on the file of Nagarampalem Police Station?” POINT : 11. Undisputedly, the petitioner was tried and acquitted for various offences. Thereafter, no charge sheets were filed against this petitioner either for the offences punishable under Sections 302 or 307 I.P.C. It is an undisputed fact that, no further crimes were registered against the petitioner, subsequent to acquittal, finding him not guilty on the file of competent court in S.C.No.31 of 2016 on the file of Judge, Family Court-cum-XII Additional District Judge, Guntur. 12. 12. The first ground urged before this Court is that, when Standing Order 601 specifies as to the circumstances under which a rowdy sheet can be opened, mere filing of one charge sheet against the petitioner is not sufficient, as Clause (12) specifically contemplated filing of “charge sheets” i.e. plural and placed reliance on the judgment of this Court reported in B. Satyanarayana Reddy v. The State of Andhra Pradesh, W.A.No.1874 of 2003 dated 04.11.2003, wherein the Division Bench of this Court held as follows: 10. The question that is required to be considered in every case is as to when a person can be called as a person who habitually commit, attempt to commit or abet the commission of offences involving a breach of the peace? Whether involvement of a person even in a solitary case resulting in a breach of the peace is enough to characterise such person as a person who habitually commit, attempt to commit or abet the commission of offences involving a breach of the peace? The very expressions 'habitually commit', 'attempt to commit' and 'abet the commission of' offences indicate the requirement that at least two or more cases have been registered against the person concerned to characterise such person as a person who habitually commit, attempt to commit or abet the commission of offences. 12. We are required to notice that the word 'habit' implies a tendency or capacity resulting from the frequent repetition of the same acts. The words by 'habits' and 'habitually' imply frequent practice or use. The word 'habit' means persistence in doing an act, a fact which is capable of proof by adducing evidence of the commission of a number of similar acts. 'Habitually' must be taken to mean repeatedly or persistently. (See: The Law Lexicon). It is thus clear that unless the acts complained of are more than one, it cannot be held that the involvement of a person even in a solitary case itself forms the basis for classifying such person as 'habitually committing the offences' involving disturbance to the public peace and tranquillity. 14. The appellant in the instant case is involved in one criminal case and charge sheet was filed against him under Sections 324, 323 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The offences alleged against the appellant herein have nothing to do with the breach of peace. 14. The appellant in the instant case is involved in one criminal case and charge sheet was filed against him under Sections 324, 323 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The offences alleged against the appellant herein have nothing to do with the breach of peace. The solitary incident, in which the appellant herein is alleged to have involved, itself cannot constitute any basis or ground to classify him as a rowdy-sheeter. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment in Dhanji Ram Sharma vs. Superintendent of Police, North District, Delhi Police, AIR 1966 SC 1766 , a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that the condition precedent for opening a history sheet is that such person should be reasonably believed to be habitually addicted to crime or to be an aider or abettor of crime. In order to justify opening of a history sheet, the Supreme Court opined that the police officer must have a reasonable belief based on reasonable grounds. 14. In Vijay Narain Singh vs. State Of Bihar, AIR 1984 SC 1334 , another three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that the expression ‘habitually’ would mean ‘repeatedly’ or ‘persistently’ implying a thread of continuity, stringing together similar repetitive acts, and a single act or omission would not characterize an act as ‘habitual’. The Supreme Court was of the opinion that to qualify as a ‘habit’, a person must have grown accustomed to leading a life of crime, whereby it would be a force of habit, inherent or latent, in an individual with a criminal instinct, with a criminal disposition of mind, that makes him dangerous to society in general. This judgment was rendered in the context of preventive detention but the observations made therein as to the connotations and interpretation of the expression ‘habitual’ are of relevance. 15. In Majid Babu vs. Government of A.P. 1987 (2) ALT 904 , a learned Judge of this Court was dealing with opening of a rowdy sheet under Standing Order 742. The learned Judge held that two instances of involvement in criminal cases would not make a person a ‘habitual offender’ and that at least. 16. In the present case, rowdy sheet was opened against the petitioner not on the ground of habitual commission of offences, but on the ground that a charge sheet was filed against the petitioner. The learned Judge held that two instances of involvement in criminal cases would not make a person a ‘habitual offender’ and that at least. 16. In the present case, rowdy sheet was opened against the petitioner not on the ground of habitual commission of offences, but on the ground that a charge sheet was filed against the petitioner. Subsequently, the petitioner was found not guilty and acquitted. The above judgment mostly dealt with a situation where a rowdy sheet was opened on the ground that the petitioner was habituated to commit offences, causing breach of peace. Therefore, the principle laid down in the above judgment cannot be applied to the present facts of the case. At this stage, it is relevant to refer to the circumstances under which a rowdy sheet can be opened under the orders of SP/DCP and ACP/SDPO while extracting Andhra Pradesh Police Manual (A.P.P.M henceforth) Standing Order 601. A rowdy sheet may be opened in accordance with Standing Order No.601 of the Andhra Pradesh Police Manual, Standing Order No.601 reads as follows: “The following persons may be classified as rowdies and Rowdy Sheets (from 80) may be opened for them under the orders of the SP/DCP and ACP/SDPO. 1. Persons who habitually commit, attempt to commit or abet the commission of, offence involving a breach of the peace, disturbance to public order and security. 2. Persons bound over under Sections 106, 107, 108 (1) (i) and 110 (e) and (g) of Cr.P.C. 3. Persons who have been convicted more than once in two consecutive years under sections 59 and 70 of the Hyderabad City Police Act or under Section 3, Clause 12, of the A.P. Towns Nuisances Act. 4. Persons who habitually tease woman and girls and pass indecent remarks including offences. 5. Persons who have been charge sheeted under the offence of rape. 6. Persons who have been charge sheeted under the offences of PCSO act, 2012 and Acid Attacks. 7. Rowdy Sheets for the rowdies residing in one Police Station area but found frequenting the other PSs area, can be maintained at all such Police Stations. 8. Persons who intimidate by threats or use of physical violence or other unlawful means to part with movable or immovable properties or in the habit of collecting money by extortion from shopkeepers, traders and other residents. 9. Persons who incite and instigate communal/caste or political riots. 10. 8. Persons who intimidate by threats or use of physical violence or other unlawful means to part with movable or immovable properties or in the habit of collecting money by extortion from shopkeepers, traders and other residents. 9. Persons who incite and instigate communal/caste or political riots. 10. Persons detained under the AP Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land-Grabbers Act, 1966 for a period of 6 months or more. 11. Persons on whom charge sheets filed under the offence of assault on public servants, under Arms Act and such offences punishable with imprisonment of 2 years or more 12. Persons on whom charge sheets filed under the offence of murder and attempt to murder. 13. Persons on whom charge sheets filed under the offence of chain snatching. 14. Persons who are convicted for offences under the Representatives of the Peoples Act, 1951, for rigging and carrying away ballot papers, Boxes and other polling material.” 17. One of the contention of the petitioner is that, according to Clause (12) of the Standing Order, the word ‘charge sheets’ for the offences is mandatory, but filing of charge sheet in the case for such offence is not sufficient to open rowdy sheet. This question was considered by the learned single Judge of this Court in “Yerramseti Venugopal Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, Writ Petition Nos.17667, 17668, 18301 & 18305 of 2019 dated 12.05.2020” this Court held as follows: “Therefore, a close scrutiny of Order 601 pellucidly tells us that offences like Rape, Acid attacks, offences under POCSO Act, 2012, offences involving assault on public servants, committing offences under Arms Act appear to have been rated as grave offences by the framers of the A.P. Police Manual and considered that a single charge sheet for such offences was sufficient for opening rowdy sheet. It is in this context when Serial No.12 is perused, it is mentioned therein that persons on whom charge sheets filed under the offence of murder and attempt to murder (302 & 307 IPC), can be classified as rowdies and rowdy sheets can be opened. There is no gain saying that the offence of murder and its attempt are grave offences. There is no gain saying that the offence of murder and its attempt are grave offences. So, going by the previous entries in Serial Nos.5, 6, & 11, it can be said that a single charge sheet for the offence of murder (302 IPC) or attempt to murder (307 IPC) is suffice to open a rowdy sheet. As rightly pointed out by the learned Government Pleader, plural noun “charge sheets” is employed because two distinct offences i.e., murder and attempt to murder are referred there. In my considered view, Serial No.12 can also be interpreted otherwise as-“persons on whom charge sheet is filed under the offence of murder or attempt to murder (302 & 307 IPC)”. Therefore, this Court agrees with the contention of the learned Government Pleader that a single charge sheet is suffice. Even otherwise, as submitted by him, the term “charge sheets” can be interpreted as singular noun “charge sheet” by virtue of Section 3(35) of the A.P. General Clauses Act, 1891 which says that words in the singular shall include the plural and words in the plural shall include the singular. In the case of Rinku Alias Hukku (supra), the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court interpreted the word “activities” appearing in Section 2(c) of the U.P. Gangsters and Anti-social Activities Prevention Act, 1986 as “activity”. In the instant case, if the word “charge sheets” is interpreted as “charge sheet”, then Serial No.12 shall be read as “Persons on whom charge sheet is filed under the offence of murder or attempt to murder (302 or 307 IPC). For the aforesaid reasons I am unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for petitioners that more than one charge sheet is essential” (Emphasis supplied) 18. In view of law declared, filing of single charge sheet for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 307 I.P.C is sufficient to enable the police to open rowdy sheet against this petitioner. However, it was not the contention of the respondents in the entire counter affidavit, but the contention is that, in case the rowdy sheet is directed to be closed, the petitioner may cause disturbance to the public peace and tranquillity of the area, where the petitioner is residing. However, it was not the contention of the respondents in the entire counter affidavit, but the contention is that, in case the rowdy sheet is directed to be closed, the petitioner may cause disturbance to the public peace and tranquillity of the area, where the petitioner is residing. Similarly, no person is coming forward to lodge a report against this petitioner apprehending danger in the hands of the petitioner, but this was also considered by the learned single Judge of this Court in “Yerramseti Venugopal Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh” (referred supra) and in the absence of any material to substantiate such contention, it would not form the basis for continuance of rowdy sheet against this petitioner, as it would infringe the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 19. By applying the same principle to the present facts of the case, continuation of Rowdy Sheet No.640A/GU opened against the petitioner on the ground that the villagers/residents of the area are apprehending threat from the petitioner because of his criminal background, is rejected, while declaring that continuation of Rowdy Sheet even after acquittal of the petitioner i.e. more than four years is only a lame excuse, it is arbitrary and violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 20. One of the major contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that, on account of domiciliary visits, right to freedom and right to privacy guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India are violated by the respondents and it’s subordinates. 21. No doubt, every citizen of the country is entitled to enjoy the right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, i.e. right to life and liberty, which is inclusive of right to privacy. 22. In Sunkara Satyanarayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2000 (1) ALD (Crl.) 117 (A.P), the learned single Judge of this Court considered the principle laid down by the Apex Court in Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1963 AIR (SC) 1295, wherein the Seven-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court considered the constitutional validity of Regulation 236 of the Police Regulations. The Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld Clause (a) and Clauses (c), (d) and (e) of Regulation 236 of U.P. Police Regulations. The Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld Clause (a) and Clauses (c), (d) and (e) of Regulation 236 of U.P. Police Regulations. These regulations permitted the Superintendent of Police to put into practice surveillance measures like secret picketing, thorough periodical enquiries, reporting by constables about the movements of the person, the verification of movements and recording history sheets with all information bearing on the conduct of the person. The Court struck down Regulation 236(b) which authorises 'Domiciliary visits at night' as violating Article 21 of the Constitution. In arriving at the conclusion the Supreme Court quoted with approval the following passage of Justice Field in Munn v. Illinois, 94 US 113 : 24 LEd 88 (1877), wherein it was held as follows: "By the term 'life' as here used something more is meant than mere animal existence. The inhibition against its deprivation extends to all these limits and faculties by which life is enjoyed. The provisions equally prohibits the mutilation of the body or amputation of an arm or leg or the putting out of an eye or the destruction of any other organ of the body through which the soul communicates with outer world. The Court then held that an unauthorised intrusion into a person's home and disturbance caused to him thereby, is as it were the violation of a common law right of a man-an ultimate essential of ordered liberty, if not of the very concept of civilisation.” 23. Again in Govind v. State of M.P., 1975 AIR 1378, the Supreme Court considered the constitutional validity of Regulations 855 and 856 of M.P. Police Regulations. These regulations were framed by the Government of M.P. Under Section 46 (2) (c) of the Police Act, 1861. One of the objects of the Act is to prevent commission of offences. Though Regulation 856 permitted domiciliary visits, the Supreme Court upheld the said provision. It was observed that the provision in Regulation 856 for domiciliary visits and other actions by police is intended to prevent the commission of offences. The object of domiciliary visits is to see the person subjected to surveillance is in house and has not gone out for the commission of any offence. Therefore, Regulations 855 and 856 which are statutory in nature were upheld by the Supreme Court. The object of domiciliary visits is to see the person subjected to surveillance is in house and has not gone out for the commission of any offence. Therefore, Regulations 855 and 856 which are statutory in nature were upheld by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court referred to Kharak Singh's case (referred supra) and two Judgments of the United States Supreme Court in Griswold v. State of Connecticut 381 U.S. 479, 14 Led. 2d 510 (1965) and Jane Roe v. Henry Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and held that the surveillance within the limits does not infringe upon the privacy and observed as follows: "The right to privacy in any event will necessarily have to go through a process of case-by-case development. Therefore, even assuming that the right to personal liberty, the right to move freely throughout the territory of India and the freedom of speech create an independent right of privacy as an emanation from them which one can characterise as a fundamental right, we do not think that the right is absolute." 24. While upholding the impugned provisions, the Supreme Court observed: "Depending on the character and antecedents of the person subjected to surveillance as also the objects and limitation under which surveillance is made, it cannot be said surveillance by domiciliary vists would, always be unreasonable restriction upon the right of privacy. Assuming that fundamental rights explicitly guaranteed to a citizen have penumbral zones and that the right to privacy is itself a fundamental right, that fundamental right must be subject to restriction on the basis of compelling public interest. As regulation 856 has the force of law it cannot be said that the fundamental right of the petitioner under Article 21 has been violated by the provisions contained in it: for, what is guaranteed under that Article is that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except by the procedure established by 'law'. We think that the procedure is reasonable having regard to the provisions of Regulations 853(c) and 857. We think that the procedure is reasonable having regard to the provisions of Regulations 853(c) and 857. Even if we hold that Article 19 (1) guarantees to a citizen a right to privacy in his movement as an emanation from that Article and is itself a fundamental right, the question will arise whether regulation 856 is a law imposing reasonable restriction in public interest of the freedom of movement falling within Article 19(5); or, even if it be assumed that Article 19(5) does not apply in terms as the right to privacy of movement cannot be absolute a law imposing reasonable restriction upon it for compelling interest of State must be upheld as valid." 25. For the first time the singular question of validity of retention of history sheet came up before the Supreme Court in Malak Singh v. State of Punjab and Haryana, 1981 AIR 760. To what extent the citizen's 'right' to be let alone be invaded by the duty of the police to prevent crime. This was a question that came up for consideration in Malak Singh's case. The case involved the interpretation of Rule 23.4 of the Punjab Police Rules. These rules were promulgated under the Police Act. Two brothers-Malak Singh and Jaswanth Singh-filed writ petition before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. The prayer in the writ petition was for a direction to the police to remove their names from surveillance register maintained at Police Station 'A' 'Division', Amrithsar. They alleged that they were businessmen and income tax assessees. On account of their political affiliation to Akali party, the Congress M.L.A. implicated them in some criminal cases. All these cases ended in acquittal or discharged. They were detained under MISA but were released as the Advisory Board refused to confirm the detention. As the Deputy Superintendent of Police is inimically disposed to them; they alleged, their photographs were displayed among the notorious criminals. They are asked to attend the police station whenever a senior Police Officer visits the station. They are asked to associate themselves with various investigations. They alleged that there is no material whatsoever on the basis of which the names of the appellants could be entered in the Surveillance Register. The writ petitions were dismissed by the High Court. By Special Leave they preferred appeals before the Supreme Court. They are asked to associate themselves with various investigations. They alleged that there is no material whatsoever on the basis of which the names of the appellants could be entered in the Surveillance Register. The writ petitions were dismissed by the High Court. By Special Leave they preferred appeals before the Supreme Court. In the Supreme Court it was contended that there were no grounds on the basis of which the police could entertain a reasonable belief that the brothers were habitual offenders or receivers of stolen property. Therefore, there is no justification for including their names in Surveillance Register. As surveillance intrudes into personal liberty, the citizen should be given an opportunity to show cause before his name is included in the Surveillance Register. As no notice is issued, inclusion of name in the Surveillance Register is bad. The apex Court referred to Kharak Singh's case (supra) and held that it will be necessary to keep discreet surveillance over repeated bad characters, habitual offenders and other potential offenders. Organised crime cannot be successfully prevented without close watch of suspects. Therefore, permissible surveillance is only to the extent of close watch over the movements of the persons under surveillance and no more. So long as the surveillance is for the purpose of prevention of crime, there cannot be any objection if a person's name is included in the Surveillance Register. While justifying permissible surveillance, the Supreme Court referred to Article 8 of European Convention of Human Rights which permitted interference by Police Authorities to protect democracy, public safety and for prevention of disorder and crime. 26. In Malak Singh's case (referred supra), the Supreme Court cautioned that surveillance which is intrusive and which seriously encroaches on the privacy of a citizen infringing fundamental right under Article 21 and Article 19(1)(d) cannot be permitted. Dealing with the question of giving notice, his Lordship Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy speaking for the Bench held that having regard to the very nature of maintaining history sheet in a confidential and discreet manner, the rule of audi alteram partem has no place. Dealing with the question of giving notice, his Lordship Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy speaking for the Bench held that having regard to the very nature of maintaining history sheet in a confidential and discreet manner, the rule of audi alteram partem has no place. Adverting to the question of reasonable belief, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that police have no licence to enter the names of persons whomsoever they like in the Surveillance Register nor can the surveillance be such as to squeeze the fundamental freedom guaranteed to citizens or to obstruct free exercise and enjoyment of those freedoms. The Supreme Court further held : "Ordinarily the names of persons with previous criminal record alone are entered in the Surveillance Register. They must be proclaimed offenders previous convicts, or persons who have already been placed on security for good behaviour. In addition, names of persons who are reasonably believed to be habitual offenders or receivers of stolen property whether they have been convicted or not may be entered. It is only in the case of this category of persons that there may be occasion for abuse of the power of the police officer to make entries in the Surveillance Register. But, here the entry can only be made by the order of Superintendent of Police who is prohibited from delegating his authority under Rule 23.5. Further it is necessary that the Superintendent of Police must entertain a reasonable belief that persons whose names are to be entered in Part II are habitual offenders or receivers of stolen property. While it may not be necessary to supply the grounds of belief to the persons whose names are entered in the Surveillance Register it may become necessary in some cases to satisfy the Court when an entry is challenged that there are grounds to entertain such reasonable belief." Before examining the case law as decided by this Court, it is apposite to note the intention and objectives behind such provisions dealing with surveillance. There cannot be two opinions that police should vigorously enforce the law. It does not however mean that they should rigorously violate the constitutional values and constitutional rights. In enforcing the law they shall not violate the Supreme law of the Nation. The police are charged with responsibility of controlling crime. Control of crime necessarily involve prevention of crime. There cannot be two opinions that police should vigorously enforce the law. It does not however mean that they should rigorously violate the constitutional values and constitutional rights. In enforcing the law they shall not violate the Supreme law of the Nation. The police are charged with responsibility of controlling crime. Control of crime necessarily involve prevention of crime. To prevent crime it is permissible that police should keep a person known to be habitual offender or known to be 'trouble maker' under a watch. What is most objectionable to civilized mind is the use of extra legal methods by the police for prevention of crimes. Surveillance of a person in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner and contrary to the provisions of law, is one such extra legal method which cannot be countenanced by the Constitutional Court. (Emphasis supplied) 27. Illegal surveillance makes arbitrary and obtrusive intrusions into one's right to privacy and violates Article 21 of Constitution of India. But keeping a person under unobtrusive watch to prevent crime and to maintain law and order, as authorised by law, is reasonable restriction permissible under the Constitution. 28. In Gurubachan Singh v. Commissioner of Police, 1952 AIR 221, and Hari Khemu Gawali v. Deputy Commissioner of Police, 1956 AIR 559, the Supreme Court of India decided the Constitutional validity of Section 27(1) of Bombay Police Act and Section 57 of the said Act. Both the provisions were upheld. In Gurubachan Singh's case, the Supreme Court held that Section 27(1) of Bombay Police Act was made in the interest of general public and to protect them against dangerous and bad characters whose presence in a particular locality may jeopardize the peace and fate of the citizens. Likewise in Hari Khemu Gawali case, the Supreme Court upheld Section 57 of the Bombay Police Act. Both the provisions empowered the Commissioner of Police to direct the person to remove himself outside the State. In Hari Khemu Gawali case the Supreme Court while upholding the provisions held that Article 19(2) to (6) permit the State to impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the freedoms guaranteed under Article 19(1). These restrictions are in the interest of general public, security of the State, public order, decency or morality which may compendiously be described as 'social welfare'. Therefore, an order of extermination or order for keeping a person under surveillance is intended for social welfare. 29. These restrictions are in the interest of general public, security of the State, public order, decency or morality which may compendiously be described as 'social welfare'. Therefore, an order of extermination or order for keeping a person under surveillance is intended for social welfare. 29. In Jolly George Verghese & Another vs. The Bank of Cochin, 1980 AIR 470 the Supreme Court relied on Article 11 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights for interpreting Section 51 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Article 11 of the International Covenant prohibited imprisonment of a person for non-fulfillment of contractual obligation. Is it fair procedure on the touchstone of Article 21 to deprive personal liberty for non-fulfillment of contractual obligation? Adverting to this question, the Supreme Court referred to and approved the following passage from the Judgment of Kerala High Court in Xeviar v. Canara Bank, 1969 Ker. L.T. 927: "The remedy for breaches of International Law in general is not to be found in the law Courts of the State because International Law per se or proprio vigore has not the force or authority of civil law, till under its inspirational impact actual legislation is undertaken. I agree that the Declaration of Human Rights merely sets a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations but cannot create a binding set of rules. Member States may seek, through appropriate agencies, to initiate action when these basic rights are violated, but individual citizen cannot complain about their breach in the municipal Courts even if the country concerned has adopted the covenants and ratified the operational protocol. The individual cannot come to Court but may complain to the Human Rights Committee, which, in turn, will set in motion other procedures. In short, the basic human rights enshrined in the International Covenants above referred to best inform judicial institutions and inspire legislative action within Member State. But apart from such deep reverence, remedial action at the instance of an aggrieved individual is beyond the area of Judicial authority." In Telephone tapping case (supra) the Supreme Court held that Rules of Customary International Law which are not contrary to Municipal Law shall be deemed to be incorporated in domestic law. But apart from such deep reverence, remedial action at the instance of an aggrieved individual is beyond the area of Judicial authority." In Telephone tapping case (supra) the Supreme Court held that Rules of Customary International Law which are not contrary to Municipal Law shall be deemed to be incorporated in domestic law. Referring to Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights which provides for right against obtrusive interference with private life, the Court held that the said Article of the International Covenant does not go contrary to any part of our Law and that Article 21 of the Constitution has to be interpreted in conformity with the International Law. It was held : "The right to privacy-by itself-has not been identified under the Constitution. As a concept it may be too broad and moralistic to define it judicially. Whether right to privacy can be claimed or has been infringed in a given case would depend on the facts of the each case. But the right to hold a telephone conversation in privacy of one's home or office without interference can certainly be claimed as 'right to privacy.' Conversations on the telephone are often of an intimate and confidential character. Telephone conversation is a part of modern man's life. It is considered so important that more and more people are carrying mobile telephone instruments in their pockets. Telephone conversation is an important facet of a man's private life. Right to privacy would certainly include telephone conversation in the privacy of one's home or office. Telephone-Tapping would, thus, infract Article 21 of the Constitution of India unless it is permitted under the procedure established by law." 30. Taking into consideration the law laid down by various Courts in the judgments referred supra, the Courts held that, domiciliary visits amounts to inclusion of privacy. Therefore, in the context of police surveillance against history sheeters and rowdy sheeters, the following principles vis-a-vis right to privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution would emerge : (i) If the surveillance is not obtrusive, the same does not violate the right to privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The same does not either in material or palpable form affect the right of the suspect to move freely nor can it be held to deprive the history sheeter/rowdy sheeter of his personal liberty. The same does not either in material or palpable form affect the right of the suspect to move freely nor can it be held to deprive the history sheeter/rowdy sheeter of his personal liberty. (ii) In testing whether fundamental right of free movement or personal liberty is infringed or not, it is to be remembered that infringment should be direct as well as tangible. If surveillance hurts personal sensitivities, the same is not a violation, for the constitution makers never intended to protect mere personal sensitiveness. (iii) If police surveillance is in accordance with executive/departmental guidelines and not authorised by statute or rules having statutory force, it is for the State to prove that surveillance does not in anyway infringe the fundamental right of the person and that the authorities have followed the guidelines scrupulously in ordering surveillance, (iv) If the action of the police is found to infringe the freedoms guaranteed to the history sheeter/rowdy sheeter and violates his right to privacy, in that, the surveillance is excessively obtrusive and intrusive, it may seriously encroach on the privacy of a citizen as to infringe the fundamental right to privacy and personal liberty under Article 21 as well as the freedom of movement guaranteed under Article 19(l)(d) of the Constitution of India and the same is impermissible, (v) Even where there is statutory sanction for surveillance against history sheeter/rowdy sheeter principle (iv) is equally applicable, if the surveillance is obtrusive. (vi) In either case-whether police regulations are statutory or where they have no statutory force-there should be sufficient material to induce the opinion that the history sheeters/rowdy sheeters show a determination to lead a life of crime which involves public peace or security only. Mere convictions in criminal cases where nothing imperils the safety of the society cannot be regarded as warrange surveillance under the relevant regulations, however broadly and in whatever language the regulation might have been couched, (vii) In either case-whether the regulation is statutory or non-statutory-domiciliary visits and picketing by the police should be reduced to the clearest cases of danger to community security, and there can be no routine follow-up at the end of a conviction or release from prison in every case. (viii) The above principles that emerge from various binding precedents are only general principles. (viii) The above principles that emerge from various binding precedents are only general principles. As seen from various decided cases of this Court, opening of history sheet or rowdy sheet can be justified only when it is proved before the Court by the State that based on the relevant material the competent police officer has applied mind with due care and considered all aspects in the light of the law and then ordered opening of history sheet or rowdy sheet or ordered continuation or retention of the history sheet. In the beginning of this Judgment, all the relevant decisions of this Court have been referred to and those principles may also have to be kept in mind. 31. In P. Sathiyya Naidu v. The Superintendent of Police, Hyderabad & Others, 2010 (2) ALD (Cri) 545, the learned single Judge of this Court held that, opening of a rowdy sheet will undoubtedly have the effect of causing humiliation to the petitioner and bringing down his dignity and honour in the society. As held by the catena of judgments referred to above, such an action can be resorted to by the police only in the cases of habitual criminals and those, who attempt to commit or abet commission of offences involving breach of peace, disturbance to public order and security. 32. In Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd) and another v. Union of India, (2018) 4 SCC 651 , the Apex Court overruled its earlier decision in Kharak Singh case (referred supra). The judgment of Seven Judges Bench in Kharak Singh case (referred supra) was directly overruled by Nine Judge Bench and observed as follows: “Life and personal liberty are inalienable rights. These are rights which are inseparable from a dignified human existence. The dignity of the individual, equality between human beings and the quest for liberty are the foundational pillars of the Indian Constitution. Life and personal liberty are not creations of the constitution. These rights are recognized by the constitution as inhering in each individual as an intrinsic and inseparable part of the human element which dwells within.” Privacy includes at its core the preservation of personal intimacies, the sanctity of family life, marriage, procreation, the home and sexual orientation. Privacy also connotes a right to be left alone. Privacy safeguards individual autonomy and recognises the ability of the individual to control vital aspects of his or her life. Privacy also connotes a right to be left alone. Privacy safeguards individual autonomy and recognises the ability of the individual to control vital aspects of his or her life. Personal choices governing a way of life are intrinsic to privacy. Privacy protects heterogeneity and recognises the plurality and diversity of our culture. While the legitimate expectation of privacy may vary from the intimate zone to the private zone and from the private to the public arenas, it is important to underscore that privacy is not lost or surrendered merely because the individual is in a public place. Privacy attaches to the person since it is an essential facet of the dignity of the human being.” 33. In view of the law declared by the Apex Court in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd) and another v. Union of India (referred supra), domiciliary visits or keeping surveillance on the movements of this petitioner amounts to intrusion in the life and liberty of the petitioner against whom a rowdy sheet was opened long back and on account of its continuation, the police are keeping strict surveillance besides domiciliary visits. 34. But, here, Andhra Pradesh Police Standing Orders does not authorize such domiciliary visits or surveillance specifically. Even otherwise, such domiciliary visits even if any law is subsisting, that would not only amount to infringement of privacy of an individual, but also life and liberty of an individual. Keeping a watch on the movements of this petitioner including domiciliary visits regularly or occasionally would certainly infringe right to liberty and privacy which is guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India to any citizen. 35. Turning to the facts of the present case, the petitioner was found not guilty in two sessions cases and other crimes were closed against this petitioner. The admission made in the counter affidavit is suffice to conclude that, no case is pending against this petitioner and those crimes were registered long back. Thus, as on date, there is no material to show that the petitioner is continuously involving in any acts causing disturbances to the public peace and tranquillity. In the absence of any material to establish that this petitioner is involved in any acts causing disturbance to the public peace and tranquillity, continuation of rowdy sheet/history sheet against this petitioner is illegal. Accordingly, the point is answered in favour of the petitioner and against the respondents. 36. In the absence of any material to establish that this petitioner is involved in any acts causing disturbance to the public peace and tranquillity, continuation of rowdy sheet/history sheet against this petitioner is illegal. Accordingly, the point is answered in favour of the petitioner and against the respondents. 36. In the result, the writ petition is allowed, directing the respondents/police to close the Rowdy Sheet No.640A/GU on the file of Station House Officer, Nagarampalem Police Station, Guntur Urban, Guntur, opened against the petitioner. No costs. 37. Consequently, miscellaneous applications pending if any, shall also stand closed.