JUDGMENT Sanjay Kumar; CJ.:-- [1] The applicants, nine in number, seek condonation of the delay of 528 days in filing an appeal against the judgment and order dated 20.09.2018 passed by a learned Judge of this Court in W.P(C) No.519 of 2018. [2] Notice having been ordered; affidavits-in-opposition were filed by Mr. A.Romenkumar, learned counsel for respondents 1 to 5, viz., the petitioners in W.P(C) No.519 of 2018, and Mr. N.Zequeson, learned counsel, appearing for the officials of the Manipur Technical University, respondents 7 and 8. Copious arguments having been advanced by Mr. B.P.Sahu, learned senior counsel for the applicants; Mr. A.Romenkumar, learned counsel for respondents 1 to 5; and Mr. N.Zequeson, learned counsel for respondents 7 and 8; supported by some written arguments and an abundance of case law, this application is amenable to disposal by way of this rather lengthy order. [3] At the outset, we may note that the applicants were not parties to the writ petition filed by respondents 1 to 5 herein. Their challenge was to the Notification dated 23.05.2018 issued by the Manipur Technical University (hereinafter, ‘the University’), proposing to fill up various teaching and nonteaching posts in its service. They also prayed for a direction to the University to provide them regular appointment from the date of their initial appointment on contract basis as Assistant Professors, along with consequential benefits. By the judgment and order dated 20.09.2018, the learned Judge set aside the impugned Notification dated 23.05.2018 in respect of the writ petitioners and directed the University to provide them regular appointment from the date of their initial appointment. Pursuant to the very same Notification dated 23.05.2018, the applicants were appointed in the service of the University on 17.12.2018. They were appointed as Assistant Professors in the Departments of Mathematics, (applicants 1 and 5), Physics (applicant 2), Electronics & Communication Engineering (applicants 3, 4, 6, 7 and 9) and Chemistry (applicant 8). At that time, respondents 1 to 5 herein, the writ petitioners, were working in the University on contract basis as Assistant Professors in Professional Communication (English) (respondent 1), Computer Science & Engineering (respondent 2), Electrical Engineering (respondent 3), Civil Engineering (respondent 4) and Mechanical Engineering (respondent 5). At that time, respondents 1 to 5 herein, the writ petitioners, were working in the University on contract basis as Assistant Professors in Professional Communication (English) (respondent 1), Computer Science & Engineering (respondent 2), Electrical Engineering (respondent 3), Civil Engineering (respondent 4) and Mechanical Engineering (respondent 5). While so, the Board of Management of the University, at its meeting held on 29.06.2020, took note of the Cabinet decision dated 11.02.2020 with regard to regularization of the services of Assistant Professors appointed on contract/guest basis from the date of their joining and passed a Resolution advising the University to constitute a Verification Committee for that purpose. Significantly, this Resolution made no mention of the judgment and order dated 20.09.2018 passed in W.P(C) No.519 of 2018. The applicants challenged the aforestated Resolution dated 29.06.2020 in W.P(C) No.344 of 2020 before this Court. It is their claim that it was only during the hearing of this case that they came to know of the said judgment and order dated 20.09.2018. More specifically, they assert that it was on 09.07.2020 that the learned State counsel informed the Court that the process of regularization was initiated in compliance with the direction of this Court in W.P(C) No.519 of 2018. Thereafter, W.P(C) No.344 of 2020 was dismissed by the learned Judge on 30.12.2020. One of the observations made by the learned Judge in the dismissal order was that the petitioners therein, the present applicants, could not question the actions taken by the authorities in compliance with the judgment and order dated 20.09.2018 passed in W.P.(C) No.519 of 2018 without challenging the same. The learned Judge therefore held that W.P(C) No.344 of 2020 was not even maintainable. Perhaps taking a cue from these observations, the applicants filed an appeal against the said judgment and order dated 20.09.2018 passed in W.P.(C) No. 519 of 2018 and now seek condonation of the delay in the presentation thereof. Pertinently, while computing the delay, the applicants altogether excluded the period from mid-March, 2020, to mid-March, 2021, as ‘Corona Period’ and the delay was finally shown as 528 days. The explanation offered is that the applicants came to know of the judgment and order sought to be appealed against only on 09.07.2020, at which point of time Covid-19 Pandemic was holding sway and the orders passed by the Supreme Court of India with regard to extension of limitation came to their rescue. The explanation offered is that the applicants came to know of the judgment and order sought to be appealed against only on 09.07.2020, at which point of time Covid-19 Pandemic was holding sway and the orders passed by the Supreme Court of India with regard to extension of limitation came to their rescue. They accordingly prayed for condonation of this delay in the filing of the appeal. Mr. B.P.Sahu, learned senior counsel, would rely on the decision of the Supreme Court in Hetal Chirag Patel and others v. State of Gujarat and others [ (2018) 7 SCC 703 ], wherein the Supreme Court observed that having regard to the facts and circumstance of that case and keeping in view the fact that the appellants therein were not made parties to the original writ petition, but became aggrieved by the order passed therein, a case for condonation of the delay in filing their appeal was made out. He would also seek support from National Thermal Power Corporation v. Raghunath Pd. & others [AIR 1981 Allahabad 344], wherein a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court observed that an order would ordinarily take effect upon its communication to the parties and that communication is an essential element of the order. This judgment is relied upon in the context of the applicants’ claimed ignorance of the order sought to be appealed against, as it was allegedly never disclosed to them till 09.07.2020. Learned senior counsel would argue that a liberal approach should be adopted while dealing with a condone delay application at the behest of a third party who was unaware of the proceedings but was adversely affected thereby, so that the substantive rights of the parties are not defeated by technicalities. [4] In their affidavit-in-opposition, respondents 1 to 5 raised various issues. Firstly, they contend that this application is defective as it is signed and filed by an Advocate on behalf of the applicants and therefore, it is liable to be rejected on that ground. They would assert that in the discharge of professional obligations, an Advocate is not empowered to file such an application on behalf of his client. Reference is made to Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961, and it is contended that an Advocate is only entitled to practise the profession of law and not to substitute himself for his client. They would assert that in the discharge of professional obligations, an Advocate is not empowered to file such an application on behalf of his client. Reference is made to Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961, and it is contended that an Advocate is only entitled to practise the profession of law and not to substitute himself for his client. Secondly, they contend that as the appeal was not presented within time, the applicants lost their right of appeal. Thirdly, they would contend that the delay is far in excess of that claimed by the applicants, as it would aggregate to 906 days. They assert that the applicants are not entitled to claim any benefit under the Supreme Court orders relating to limitation, as only a vigilant litigant would be entitled to do so, and that the ‘Corona Period’ cannot be excluded. They assert that the law of limitation vested them with certain rights that could not be divested at this stage. In their affidavit-in-opposition, respondents 7 and 8 also contended that the applicants were not entitled to delete the ‘Corona Period’ while calculating the delay in the filing of the appeal. [5] As regards the maintainability of this application, as presently framed and filed, we may note that Chapter IV-A of the High Court of Manipur Rules, 2019, sets out the Rules governing applications for directions, orders or writs (other than in the nature of habeas corpus) under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Rule 3(2) therein provides that an appeal from the judgment and order of a learned Single Judge disposing of an application shall lie to a Division Bench, if preferred within 30 days of the date of such judgment and order. It further provides that the Division Bench may condone the delay in filing an appeal, if good and sufficient cause is shown. Of particular significance is Rule 15 therein, which states that an application under these Rules shall be made by an Advocate or by the party personally. It further provides that the Division Bench may condone the delay in filing an appeal, if good and sufficient cause is shown. Of particular significance is Rule 15 therein, which states that an application under these Rules shall be made by an Advocate or by the party personally. This being the procedure prescribed, we may note that this application was filed in the names of the nine applicants and ended with the endorsement: ’Drawn and filed on behalf of the Applicants by – Usharani Th., Advocate, C/o B.P.Sahu, Sr.Advocate.’ The application was supported by the Affidavit of the first applicant, wherein he identified himself as such and swore to the Affidavit on his behalf and on behalf of the other applicants, claiming to be duly authorized by them. He further stated therein that the Misc. Application was drafted under his instruction and on his behalf and on behalf of the other applicants. The affidavit was duly verified by the deponent on 15.04.2021. In the light of the procedural prescription obtaining under the Rules framed by this Court, permitting Advocates also to file applications, and the manner of presentation of this application, we find no tenable grounds to reject it on technicalities. The general observations of the Supreme Court in Vinoy Kumar v. State of U.P & others [ (2001) 4 SCC 734 ], in the context of discharge of professional obligations by an Advocate, are therefore of no avail. [6] Coming to the more substantial ground urged by the contesting respondents, it is well settled that the law of limitation vests rights in the other side and delay in litigating cannot be brushed aside lightly at the behest of a party who is not vigilant and diligent. However, the case on hand stands on a different footing as the applicants were not parties to the writ petition and were not even in the picture at the time the judgment and order sought to be appealed against was passed therein. The said judgment and order was delivered in September, 2018, and they came to be appointed only in December, 2018. According to them, they were not even aware of the said judgment and order till it was brought to their notice during the hearing of W.P(C) No.344 of 2020 filed by them before this Court. The said judgment and order was delivered in September, 2018, and they came to be appointed only in December, 2018. According to them, they were not even aware of the said judgment and order till it was brought to their notice during the hearing of W.P(C) No.344 of 2020 filed by them before this Court. The specific date in this regard, as per their claim, is 09.07.2020, the day on which it was produced by the State counsel during the hearing of W.P.(C) No.344 of 2020. Notably, the appeal along with this condone delay application were filed much later, on 16.04.2021. However, reliance is placed by the applicants upon the orders of the Supreme Court, in the context of the Covid-19 Pandemic, to get over the delay on their part even after they gained knowledge of the said judgment and order. The computation of the actual delay and the justification offered therefor shall be examined hereinafter but, given the circumstances obtaining in this case, we cannot accept the argument of Mr. A.Romenkumar, learned counsel, that the applicants are deemed to have forfeited their right of appeal. The edicts laid down by the Supreme Court in A.D.Parthasarathy v. State of Andhra Pradesh [ AIR 1966 SC 38 ]; Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and others v. T.T.Muralibabu [ (2014) 4 SCC 108 ]; Basawaraj and another v. Special Land Acquisition Officer [ (2013) 14 SCC 81 ]; Panna Lal v. Murari Lal [ AIR 1967 SC 1384 ]; Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others [ (2013) 12 SCC 649 ]; and M/s M. Ramnarain Private Limited and another v. State Trading Corporation of India Limited [ (1983) 3 SCC 75 ] essentially turned upon delay on the part of a party to the proceedings, unlike the case on hand, and the same are therefore eschewed from consideration. Similarly, the principle that if a question of law before the Court is the same as in a previous case, the judgment of the Court in the former would be binding in the latter case [See Fida Hussain and others v. Moradabad Development Authority & another { (2011) 12 SCC 615 } and Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti v. Prabhakar Maruti Garvali and another { (2007) 11 SCC 668 }], does not apply presently, as the position, both factual and legal, in this case is vastly disparate and distinct from those in the cases cited. Ordinarily, each case would turn upon its own individual facts and only the ratio decidendi laid down in an earlier case would be applied in later cases where a similar question arises. The cases cited by Mr. A.Romenkumar, learned counsel, are not at all akin to or similar to the case on hand and therefore, the observations made therein cannot be extended to this case, which stands on its own independent and peculiar facts. [7] Now, coming to the orders passed by the Supreme Court in ‘In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation’ relating to extension of limitation due to the pandemic. The first of such orders was passed on 23.03.2020. Perusal thereof demonstrates that the Supreme Court took suo motu cognizance of the situation arising out of the challenges posed by the Covid-19 Pandemic and ordered that the period of limitation in filing petitions/ applications/suits/appeals/other proceedings, irrespective of the limitation prescribed, shall stand extended with effect from 15th March, 2020, till further orders. Again, on 08.03.2021, the Supreme Court noted that there was considerable improvement in the situation as lockdowns had been lifted and the country was returning to normalcy and directed that in computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal, application or proceeding, the period from 15.03.2020 till 14.03.2021 should stand excluded. Thereafter, upon the surge of the second wave of the pandemic across the country, a fresh order was passed on 27.04.2021 restoring the order dated 23.03.2020 and in continuation of the order dated 08.03.2020, the Supreme Court directed that the period of limitation, as prescribed under general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, shall stand extended till further orders. In this regard, Mr. A.Romenkumar, learned counsel, would draw our attention to certain observations made by the Supreme Court in Sagufa Ahmed & ors. In this regard, Mr. A.Romenkumar, learned counsel, would draw our attention to certain observations made by the Supreme Court in Sagufa Ahmed & ors. v. Upper Assam Plywood Products Pvt. Ltd. & ors. [ (2021) 2 SCC 317 ]. This order was passed on 18.09.2020, i.e., after passing of the first order dated 23.03.2020 in ‘In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation’. This was a case where an appeal was filed after the extended limitation period therefor also expired on 18.03.2020, i.e., before imposition of the lockdown on 24.03.2020 and the passing of the Supreme Court’s order dated 23.03.2020. However, the appellants sought to place reliance upon the said order dated 23.03.2020. In this context, the Supreme Court observed that the appellants could not take refuge under the said order as what had been extended by the said order was only ‘the period of limitation’ and not the period up to which delay could be condoned in exercise of the discretion conferred by the statute. It was further observed that the said order was intended to benefit vigilant litigants who were prevented due to the pandemic and the lockdown from initiating proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed by law. The Supreme Court also observed that the law would assist only those who are vigilant about their rights and not those who sleep over them. However, in the case on hand, the applicants claim total ignorance of the judgment and order dated 20.9.2018 passed in W.P(C) No.519 of 2018 till 09.07.2020, when a copy thereof was produced before this Court during the hearing of their writ petition, W.P.(C) No.344 of 2020. Though Mr. A.Romenkumar, learned counsel, would contend that the applicants should be imputed with the knowledge of the pendency of W.P(C) No.519 of 2018 due to the interim order passed therein, he is not able to demonstrate with cogent material that the applicants did, in fact, have prior awareness of the said case or the judgment and order passed therein, before 09.07.2020. As already noted supra, the Resolution impugned by the applicants in W.P(C) No.344 of 2020 did not refer to the said judgment and order dated 20.9.2018 and mentioned only the Cabinet decision about regularization of Assistant Professors appointed on contract/guest basis. As already noted supra, the Resolution impugned by the applicants in W.P(C) No.344 of 2020 did not refer to the said judgment and order dated 20.9.2018 and mentioned only the Cabinet decision about regularization of Assistant Professors appointed on contract/guest basis. That being so, we are inclined to accept the applicants’ claim that their knowledge of the judgment and order sought to be appealed against dates back to 09.07.2020 and not earlier. Further, though the appeal along with the present condone delay application were filed only in April, 2021, the later order dated 27.04.2021 of the Supreme Court in ‘In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation’, restoring the earlier order dated 23.03.2020 and excluding not only the period from 15.03.2020 till 14.03.2021 but also the period from 14.03.2021 until further orders, while computing limitation for filing of all judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, comes to the rescue of the applicants, notwithstanding their unexplained lassitude from 09.07.2020 till 15.04.2021. Lastly, coming to the extent of the actual delay in the filing of the appeal, we have already noted that while computing the delay, the applicants excluded the ‘Corona Period’ from mid-March, 2020, till mid-March, 2021, i.e., about 365 days. We have also held that they were entitled to do so as they were entitled to the benefit of the Supreme Court’s orders. In fact, in the light of the Supreme Court’s last order dated 27.04.2021, passed after the filing of this application, the applicants would be entitled to exclude even the period thereafter, viz., 17 days in March, 2021, and 14 days in April, 2021, thereby bringing down the delay further from 528 days to less than 500 days. Given the aforesaid orders of the Supreme Court and the peculiar circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that sufficient cause has been established to condone the delay presently. [8] The application is accordingly ordered, condoning the delay in the filing of the appeal. Registry is directed to number the appeal, if it is otherwise found to be in order, and list the same for hearing on admission expeditiously. A copy of this order shall be communicated online/ through WhatsApp to all the learned counsel.