ORDER : 1. The accused in Special Case (NDPS) No.220/2020 on the file of Principal District and Sessions Judge, Bidar has approached this Court under Section 439 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short 'Cr.PC.') seeking grant of regular bail. 2. Brief facts which are necessary for the disposal of this petition are as under: The Excise Sub-Inspector, Aurad Range, Aurad intercepted a lorry bearing No.HP-19/B-2187 on a credible information that opium is being transported in the said lorry on 29.12.2019 at about 3.45 p.m. in Vanamarpalli check post on the road from Degalur to Aurad. On search of the said lorry, raid party found five plastic bags containing opium of one kilogram each. They have seized the opium as the driver of the lorry pleaded ignorance and did not posses any licence to transport the same. Thereafter, they took 200 grams of opium from each of the bag for the purpose of sample and drawn a mahazar. They arrested the driver of the lorry and lodged a report with Excise Aurad-B Range Police Station. The accused/petitioner approached the District Court for grant of regular bail which was rejected by the learned Special Judge by order dated 15.12.2020. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner/accused Sri R.S.Lagali vehemently contended that the petitioner is innocent of the offences alleged against him and he was only a driver of the lorry in question and therefore sought for grant of bail. He further contended that absolutely there is no material either in the contents of mahazar or in the statements of the persons who have participated in the raid that petitioner was in conscious possession of the seized opium bags. He also contended that materials available on record does not establish direct or indirect nexus with the seized article insofar as the accused/petitioner is concerned and thus sought for grant of bail. He also contended that there is no compliance of Section 50 of the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substance Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as 'NDPS Act' for short) and therefore, the entire raid proceedings stood vitiated as is enunciated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in catena of judgments and thus sought for grant of bail. He also contended that there is no compliance of Section 50 of the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substance Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as 'NDPS Act' for short) and therefore, the entire raid proceedings stood vitiated as is enunciated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in catena of judgments and thus sought for grant of bail. He also contended that the petitioner being the resident of Atwan village, Amb taluk in Una district of Himachal Pradesh was no way connected with the contraband materials alleged to have been seized by the excise police and thus a false case has been foisted by the police for statistic purpose and thus sought for grant of bail. He also contended that charge sheet having been filed, the main apprehension of the prosecution that the petitioner may not cooperate with the investigation and would tamper the prosecution evidence is now not available for the prosecution and thus sought for grant of bail. 4. In support of his arguments, he relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Directorate of Revenue and Another Vs. Mohammed Nisar Holia reported in (2008) 2 SCC 370 wherein it has been held as under: "HEAD NOTE A: Narcotic Drugs and Phychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – Sections 42, 43 and Section 43 Explanation – Search in place not open to the public though situated in public place ( a room of a hotel) based on prior information – Applicability of Section 42 or Section 43 – Room in hotel if a “public place” under Section 43 Explanation – Held, whereas “hotel is a public place, a room thereof occupied by a guest may not be – Information as to offence in question received by office of Directorate of Revenue Intelligence – said information not reduced into writing by officer who received it but by PW-1 who was later on conveyed the message by the said office – High Court setting aside conviction of respondent accused on basis that statutory requirements of Section 42 had not been complied with – Sustainability – Held, in the instant case, statutory requirements under Section 42 had not been complied with – Hence, judgment of High Court does not suffer from any legal infirmity – words and phrases – “Public place”. 5. 5. Per contra, learned High Court Government Pleader vehemently contended that the seized article is opium as per the Forensic Science Laboratory report and the same is weighing 5 kgs. and therefore it is commercial quantity and as such, the offences alleged against the petitioner are grave in nature which not only violates the provisions of law but, has got a great impact on the society at large and therefore, gravity of the offence is so high which would per-se disentitle the petitioner from obtaining an order of grant of bail by resorting the special powers of this Court under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. He further argued that the petitioner being the resident of a remote place i.e., Atwan village, Una district of Himachal Pradesh, if he is let on bail, there is every possibility that he would flee away from justice and accordingly sought for dismissal of the bail petition. 6. Having heard the arguments of both sides and perused the materials available on record, it is seen that the head of the raid party on credible and definite information, intercepted the lorry bearing No.HP-19/B-2187 near Vanamarpalli check post on Degalur to Aurad road. The raid party comprised of excise staff, CPI, Deputy Superintendent of Excise and the complainant. On enquiry, the accused/petitioner did not satisfactorily answer the raid party resulting in grave suspicion to the raid party about the material in the lorry and they proceeded to search the lorry. On such search, raid party was able to seize five plastic bags and prima facie they found material in polythene bags is opium. They took out 100 grams from each of the bags as sample and seized the same and drafted a mahazar. The accused/petitioner was taken to custody by raid party and produced before the Special Judge. Thereafter, the petitioner was sent to judicial custody and from then onwards, the accused/petitioner is in custody. 7. The investigation agency has conducted a detailed investigation and filed charge sheet and the matter is now pending before the Special Judge for trial. What are the guidelines while dealing with a bail petition of an accused alleged of the offences punishable under NDPS Act is no longer res-integra. 8. Gainfully this Court places its reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Kerala v. Rajesh, reported in (2020) 12 SCC 122 . What are the guidelines while dealing with a bail petition of an accused alleged of the offences punishable under NDPS Act is no longer res-integra. 8. Gainfully this Court places its reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Kerala v. Rajesh, reported in (2020) 12 SCC 122 . The relevant paragraphs are culled out hereunder: “17. The jurisdiction of the court to grant bail is circumscribed by the provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It can be granted in case there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence, and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. It is the mandate of the legislature which is required to be followed. At this juncture, a reference to Section 37 of the Act is apposite. That provision makes the offences under the Act cognizable and non-bailable. It reads thus: “37. Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)— (a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable; (b) no person accused of an offence punishable for offences under Section 19 or Section 24 or Section 27-A and also for offences involving commercial quantity shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless— (i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and (ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail.” (emphasis supplied) 18. This Court has laid down broad parameters to be followed while considering the application for bail moved by the accused involved in the offences under the NDPS Act. In Union of India v. Ram Samujh [Union of India v. Ram Samujh, (1999) 9 SCC 429 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1522] , it has been elaborated as under: “7. This Court has laid down broad parameters to be followed while considering the application for bail moved by the accused involved in the offences under the NDPS Act. In Union of India v. Ram Samujh [Union of India v. Ram Samujh, (1999) 9 SCC 429 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1522] , it has been elaborated as under: “7. It is to be borne in mind that the aforesaid legislative mandate is required to be adhered to and followed. It should be borne in mind that in a murder case, the accused commits murder of one or two persons, while those persons who are dealing in narcotic drugs are instrumental in causing death or in inflicting death-blow to a number of innocent young victims, who are vulnerable; it causes deleterious effects and a deadly impact on the society; they are a hazard to the society; even if they are released temporarily, in all probability, they would continue their nefarious activities of trafficking and/or dealing in intoxicants clandestinely. Reason may be large stake and illegal profit involved. This Court, dealing with the contention with regard to punishment under the NDPS Act, has succinctly observed about the adverse effect of such activities in Durand Didier v. State (UT of Goa) [Durand Didier v. State (UT of Goa), (1990) 1 SCC 95 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 65] as under: (SCC p. 104, para 24) ‘24. With deep concern, we may point out that the organised activities of the underworld and the clandestine smuggling of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances into this country and illegal trafficking in such drugs and substances have led to drug addiction among a sizeable section of the public, particularly the adolescents and students of both sexes and the menace has assumed serious and alarming proportions in the recent years. Therefore, in order to effectively control and eradicate this proliferating and booming devastating menace, causing deleterious effects and deadly impact on the society as a whole, Parliament in its wisdom, has made effective provisions by introducing this Act 81 of 1985 specifying mandatory minimum imprisonment and fine.’ 8. Therefore, in order to effectively control and eradicate this proliferating and booming devastating menace, causing deleterious effects and deadly impact on the society as a whole, Parliament in its wisdom, has made effective provisions by introducing this Act 81 of 1985 specifying mandatory minimum imprisonment and fine.’ 8. To check the menace of dangerous drugs flooding the market, Parliament has provided that the person accused of offences under the NDPS Act should not be released on bail during trial unless the mandatory conditions provided in Section 37, namely, (i) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence; and (ii) that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail are satisfied. The High Court has not given any justifiable reason for not abiding by the aforesaid mandate while ordering the release of the respondent-accused on bail. Instead of attempting to take a holistic view of the harmful socio-economic consequences and health hazards which would accompany trafficking illegally in dangerous drugs, the court should implement the law in the spirit with which Parliament, after due deliberation, has amended.” 19. The scheme of Section 37 reveals that the exercise of power to grant bail is not only subject to the limitations contained under Section 439 CrPC, but is also subject to the limitation placed by Section 37 which commences with non obstante clause. The operative part of the said section is in the negative form prescribing the enlargement of bail to any person accused of commission of an offence under the Act, unless twin conditions are satisfied. The first condition is that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to oppose the application; and the second, is that the court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence. If either of these two conditions is not satisfied, the ban for granting bail operates. 20. The expression “reasonable grounds” means something more than prima facie grounds. It contemplates substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The reasonable belief contemplated in the provision requires existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The expression “reasonable grounds” means something more than prima facie grounds. It contemplates substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The reasonable belief contemplated in the provision requires existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. In the case on hand, the High Court seems to have completely overlooked the underlying object of Section 37 that in addition to the limitations provided under the CrPC, or any other law for the time being in force, regulating the grant of bail, its liberal approach in the matter of bail under the NDPS Act is indeed uncalled for. 21. We may further like to observe that the learned Single Judge has failed to record a finding mandated under Section 37 of the NDPS Act which is a sine qua non for granting bail to the accused under the NDPS Act." 9. Applying the legal principles enunciated in the aforesaid decision to the case on hand, it is crystal clear that the raid party was able to seize five (5) kilograms of opium from the lorry which was driven by the petitioner and intercepted by the raid party. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, argued that even assuming that the seizure stands proved, for the sake of argument, it cannot be presumed that the petitioner was having conscious possession of the seized contraband material and therefore, no case is made out against the petitioner and thus sought for grant of bail. 11. Again, possession of which nature amounts to conscious possession for the purpose of NDPS act is no longer res-integra. In this regard, this Court places reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mohan Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2015) 6 SCC 222 wherein it has been held as under: ''11. When one conceives of possession, it appears in the strict sense that the concept of possession is basically connected to "actus of physical control and custody". Attributing this meaning in the strict sense would be understanding the factum of possession in a narrow sense. With the passage of time there has been a gradual widening of the concept and the quintessential meaning of the word "possession". Attributing this meaning in the strict sense would be understanding the factum of possession in a narrow sense. With the passage of time there has been a gradual widening of the concept and the quintessential meaning of the word "possession". The classical theory of the English law on the term "possession" is fundamentally dominated by Savigny-ian "corpus" and "animus" doctrine. Distinction has also been made in "possession in fact" and "possession in law" and sometimes between "corporeal possession" and "possession of right" which is called "incorporeal possession". Thus, there is a degree of flexibility in the use of the said term and that is why the word "possession" can be usefully defined and understood with reference to the contextual purpose for the said expression. The word "possession" may have one meaning in one connection and another meaning in another. 12. The term "possession" consists of two elements. First, it refers to the corpus or the physical control and the second, it refers to the animus or intent which has reference to exercise of the said control. One of the definitions of "possession" given in Black's Law Dictionary is as follows: "Possession.-Having control over a thing with the intent to have and to exercise such control. Oswald v. Weigel. The detention and control, or the manual or ideal custody, of anything which may be the subject of property, for one's use and enjoyment, either as owner or as the proprietor of a qualified right in it, and either held personally or by another who exercises it in one's place and name. Act or state of possessing. That condition of facts under which one can exercise his power over a corporeal thing at his pleasure to the exclusion of all other persons. The law, in general, recognizes two kinds of possession: actual possession and constructive possession. A person who knowingly has direct physical control over a thing, at a given time, is then in actual possession of it. A person who, although not in actual possession, knowingly has both the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either directly or through another person or persons, is then in constructive possession of it. The law recognizes also that possession may be sole or joint. If one person alone has actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is sole. The law recognizes also that possession may be sole or joint. If one person alone has actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is sole. If two or more persons share actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is joint." In the said Dictionary, the term "possess" in the context of narcotic drug laws means: "Term 'possess', under narcotic drug laws, means actual control, care and management of the drug. Collini v. State. Defendant 'possesses' controlled substance when defendant knows of substance's presence, substance is immediately accessible, and defendant exercises 'dominion or control' over substance. State v. Hornaday." And again: "Criminal law.--Possession as necessary for conviction of offense of possession of controlled substances with intent to distribute may be constructive as well as actual, United States v. Craig; 105 Wash 2d 120 as well as joint or exclusive, Garvey v. State 176 Ga App 268 . The defendants must have had dominion and control over the contraband with knowledge of its presence and character. United States v. Morando-Alvarez 5210 F 2d 882. Possession, as an element of offense of stolen 15 CRA 743/2004 & 764/2004 goods, is not limited to actual manual control upon or about the person, but extends to things under one's power and dominion. MCConnell vs. State 48 Ala App 523. Possession as used in indictment charging possession of stolen mail may mean actual possession or constructive possession. United States v. Ellison 469 F2d 413. To constitute 'possession' of a concealable weapon under statute proscribing possession of a concealable weapon by a felon, it is sufficient that defendant have constructive possession and immediate access to the weapon. State v. Kelley 12 Or App 496". 13. In Stroud's Dictionary, the term "possession" has been defined as follows: "'Possession' [Drugs (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1964 (c. 64), Section 1(1)]. A person does not lose 'possession' of an article which is mislaid or thought erroneously to have been destroyed or disposed of, if, in fact, it remains in his care and control (R. v. Buswel (1972) 1 WLR 64 ). 14. Dr Harris, in his essay titled "The Concept of Possession in English Law" while discussing the various rules relating to possession has stated that "possession" is a functional and relative concept, which gives the Judges some discretion in applying abstract rule to a concrete set of facts. 14. Dr Harris, in his essay titled "The Concept of Possession in English Law" while discussing the various rules relating to possession has stated that "possession" is a functional and relative concept, which gives the Judges some discretion in applying abstract rule to a concrete set of facts. The learned author has suggested certain factors which have been held to be relevant to conclude whether a person has acquired possession for the purposes of a particular rule of law. Some of the factors enlisted by him are: (a) degree of physical control exercised by person over a thing, (b) knowledge of the person claiming possessory rights over a thing, about the attributes and qualities of the thing, (c) the person's intention in regard to the thing, that is, "animus possessionis" and "animus domini", (d) possession of land on which the thing is claimed is lying, also the relevant intention of the occupier of a premises on which the thing is lying thereon to exclude others from enjoying the land and anything which happens to be lying there; and Judges' concept of the social purpose of the particular rule relied upon by the plaintiff. 15. The learned author has further proceeded to state that quite naturally the policies behind different possessory rules will vary and it would justify the courts giving varying weight to different factors relevant to possession according to the particular rule in question. According to Harris, Judges have at the back of their mind a perfect pattern in which the possessor has complete, exclusive and unchallenged physical control over the subject; full knowledge of its existence; attributes and location, and a manifest intention to act as its owner and exclude all others from it. As a further statement he elucidates that courts realise that justice and expediency compel constant modification of the ideal pattern. The person claiming possessory rights over a thing may have a very limited degree of physical control over the object or he may have no intention in regard to an object of whose existence he is unaware of, though he exercises control over the same or he may have clear intention to exclude other people from the object, though he has no physical control over the same. In all this variegated situation, states Harris, the person concerned may still be conferred the possessory rights. In all this variegated situation, states Harris, the person concerned may still be conferred the possessory rights. The purpose of referring to the aforesaid principles and passages is that over the years, it has been seen that courts have refrained from adopting a doctrinaire approach towards defining possession. A functional and flexible approach in defining and understanding the possession as a concept is acceptable and thereby emphasis has been laid on different possessory rights according to the commands and justice of the social policy. Thus, the word "possession" in the context of any enactment would depend upon the object and purpose of the enactment and an appropriate meaning has to be assigned to the word to effectuate the said object. 16. Coming to the context of Section 18 of the NDPS Act, it would have a reference to the concept of conscious possession. The legislature while enacting the said law was absolutely aware of the said element and that the word "possession" refers to a mental state as is noticeable from the language employed in Section 35 of the NDPS Act. The said provision reads as follows: "35. Presumption of culpable mental state.- (1) In any prosecution for an offence under this Act, which requires a culpable mental state of the accused, the court shall presume the existence of 17 CRA 743/2004 & 764/2004 such mental state but it shall be a defence for the accused to prove the fact that he had no such mental state with respect to the act charged as an offence in that prosecution. Explanation.-In this section 'culpable mental state' includes intention, motive, knowledge, of a fact and belief in, or reason to believe, a fact. (2) For the purpose of this section, a fact is said to be proved only when the court believes it to exist beyond a reasonable doubt and not merely when its existence is established by a preponderance of probability." 17. On a perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is plain as day that it includes knowledge of a fact. That apart, Section 35 raises a presumption as to knowledge and culpable mental state from the possession of illicit articles. The expression "possess or possessed" is often used in connection with statutory offences of being in possession of prohibited drugs and contraband substances. That apart, Section 35 raises a presumption as to knowledge and culpable mental state from the possession of illicit articles. The expression "possess or possessed" is often used in connection with statutory offences of being in possession of prohibited drugs and contraband substances. Conscious or mental state of possession is necessary and that is the reason for enacting Section 35 of the NDPS Act.” 12. Applying the above legal principles to the case on hand, admittedly lorry was driven by the accused/petitioner and the lorry was moving from Degalur to Aurad. No proper explanation is offered by the accused/petitioner as to the materials found in the lorry when the raid party intercepted the lorry and enquired the petitioner. The same is recorded by the raid party in the mahazar itself. 13. Further, whether the accused/petitioner had conscious possession of the same or not cannot be decided by this Court at this stage by holding a mini trial. As such, the said ground cannot be countenanced by this Court to consider the request of the petitioner for grant of bail. 14. The third limb of the argument canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the raid party did not comply the provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act before they proceeded to search the lorry. In order to appreciated the said submission, it is necessary to cull out Section 50 of the NDPS Act and which reads as under: "50. Conditions under which search of persons shall be conducted.— (1) When any officer duly authorised under section 42 is about to search any person under the provisions of section 41, section 42 or section 43, he shall, if such person so requires, take such person without unnecessary delay to the nearest Gazetted Officer of any of the departments mentioned in section 42 or to the nearest Magistrate. (2) If such requisition is made, the officer may detain the person until he can bring him before the Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate referred to in sub-section (1). (3) The Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate before whom any such person is brought shall, if he sees no reasonable ground for search, forthwith discharge the person but otherwise shall direct that search be made. (4) No female shall be searched by anyone excepting a female. (3) The Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate before whom any such person is brought shall, if he sees no reasonable ground for search, forthwith discharge the person but otherwise shall direct that search be made. (4) No female shall be searched by anyone excepting a female. (5) When an officer duly authorised under section 42 has reason to believe that it is not possible to take the person to be searched to the nearest Gazetted Officer or Magistrate without the possibility of the person to be searched parting with possession of any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance, or controlled substance or article or document, he may, instead of taking such person to the nearest Gazetted Officer or Magistrate, proceed to search the person as provided under section 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974). (6) After a search is conducted under sub-section (5), the officer shall record the reasons for such belief which necessitated such search and within seventy-two hours send a copy thereof to his immediate official superior.]" 15. As such, from the bear reading of the above provisions, in which of the circumstances, Section 50 of NDPS Act would be applicable is also no longer res-integra. In this regard, this Court relies on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Jeet Ram vs. Narcotics Control Bureau, Chandigarh reported in 2020 SCC online 735. The relevant portion of it is culled out hereunder: "10. It is mainly contended . . . . . On close scrutiny of the depositions of the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution as well as on behalf of the accused, we are of the view that the findings recorded by the trial court are contrary to evidence on record and view taken by the trial court was not possible at all, as such the High Court rightly interfered with the same and recorded its own findings to convict the appellant. The trial court acquitted the appellant mainly on the ground that prosecution case was not supported by independent witnesses; conscious possession was not proved; non-compliance of Section 50 of the NDPS Act; proper procedure was not followed in sending the samples for examination and the case of the prosecution was unnatural and improbable. The trial court acquitted the appellant mainly on the ground that prosecution case was not supported by independent witnesses; conscious possession was not proved; non-compliance of Section 50 of the NDPS Act; proper procedure was not followed in sending the samples for examination and the case of the prosecution was unnatural and improbable. As rightly held by the High Court, this Court in the case of State of H.P. v. Pawan Kumar [ (2005) 4 SCC 350 ] has held that Section 50 of the NDPS Act is applicable only in the case of personal search, as such, there is no basis for the findings recorded by the trial court that there was non-compliance of provision under Section 50 of the Act. . . . . . ." 16. In the case on hand, there is no personal search of the accused petitioner as could be seen from contents of mahazar. As such, the ground that there is no compliance of section 50 would not be per se available to the petitioner in accepting his request for grant of bail. 17. In view of the above discussion, even though there cannot be any dispute as to the principles of law enunciated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Directorate of Revenue (Supra) relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner, this Court is of the opinion that the facts involved in the present case are clearly distinguishable from the facts found in the said case and accordingly, the same is of no avail for the accused/petitioner to obtain an order of bail. 18. Thus, it is very much clear as to the parameters required for the Court while dealing with a petition filed under Section 439 of Cr.PC. seeking grant of bail who is accused of an offence punishable under the provisions of the NDPS Act, is subject to the additional parameters found in Section 37 of the NDPS Act, as is held in the case of Mohan Lal (Supra). Therefore, it is for the accused to satisfy the court that there are reasonable grounds to believe that accused is not guilty of the offence alleged against him and he may not likely to commit the similar offence if he is enlarge on bail. In the entire bail petition, there is no whisper in this regard. 19. Therefore, it is for the accused to satisfy the court that there are reasonable grounds to believe that accused is not guilty of the offence alleged against him and he may not likely to commit the similar offence if he is enlarge on bail. In the entire bail petition, there is no whisper in this regard. 19. Thus, mere mention in the bail petition that accused is innocent of the offence alleged against him would not be sufficient enough to exercise the discretionary power vested in this court under the provisions of Section 439 of Cr.PC. in cases of accused charged with the offences under the provisions of the NDPS Act. 20. From the above discussion, the irresistible conclusion that this Court can reach is to hold that the petitioner has failed to make out any grounds whatsoever much less the good grounds to exercise the special powers vested in this Court under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. Accordingly, following order is passed. ORDER The petition is dismissed.