Suresh Mathew, S/o. K. M. Mathew v. Principal Chief Conservator Of Forests (Planning And Development), Forest Headquarters
2021-01-14
S.MANIKUMAR, SHAJI P.CHALY
body2021
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : S.Manikumar, J. Instant unnumbered cross objection has been filed against the judgment dated 16.11.2020 in W.P.(C)No.24241 of 2020. 2. On this day, when the matter came up for hearing, we were informed that a Hon'ble Division Bench of this court in George J. v. State of Kerala and Others reported in 2019 (3) KHC 755 , has considered the issue as to whether cross objection under Order XLI rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure is maintainable in a writ appeal filed under Section 5 of the Kerala High Court Act. 3. After considering the statutory provisions stated supra, powers of the High Court under Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Section 5 of the Kerala High Court Act, Rule 159 of the Rules of the High Court of Kerala and several decisions including a Full Bench decision of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Jabalur Development Authority v. Y.S. Sachan and Others reported in ILR (2004) M.P. 231, a Hon'ble Division Bench held thus: “3. The law on the maintainability of a cross objection under Order XLI Rule 22 of the C.P.C. has been succinctly laid down in Superintending Engineer and others v. B.Subba Reddy [ AIR 1999 SC 1747 ) as follows: "(i) Appeal is a substantive right. It is creation of the statute. Right to appeal does not exist unless it is specifically conferred. (ii) Cross-objection is like an appeal. It has all the trappings of an appeal. It is filed in the form of memorandum and the provisions of Rule 1 of Order 41 of the Code, so far as these relate to the form and contents of the memorandum of appeal apply to cross-objection as well. (iii) Court-fee is payable on cross-objection like that on the memorandum of appeal. Provisions relating to appeals by indigent person also apply to cross-objection. (iv) Even where the appeal is withdrawn or is dismissed for default, cross-objection may nevertheless be heard and determined. (v) Respondent even though he has not appealed may support the decree on any other ground but if wants to modify it, he has to file cross-objection to the decree which objections he could have taken earlier by filing an appeal.
(iv) Even where the appeal is withdrawn or is dismissed for default, cross-objection may nevertheless be heard and determined. (v) Respondent even though he has not appealed may support the decree on any other ground but if wants to modify it, he has to file cross-objection to the decree which objections he could have taken earlier by filing an appeal. Time for filing objection which is in the nature of appeal is extended by one month after service of notice on him of the day fixed for hearing the appeal. This time could also be extended by the Court like in appeal. (vi) Cross-objection is nothing but an appeal, a cross-appeal at that. It may be that the respondent wanted to give quietus to whole litigation by his accepting the judgment and decree or order even if it was partly against his interest. When, however, the other party challenged the same by filing an appeal statute gave the respondent a second chance to file an appeal by way of cross-objection if he still felt aggrieved by the judgment and decree or order." Can a cross-objection filed by a respondent in a writ appeal filed by the writ petitioner against the dismissal of his writ petition be proceeded with when the writ appeal is withdrawn or dismissed for default? Can the respondent be granted any relief in the writ petition which is not pursued at the appellate stage when the writ petitioner does not seek the issue of any writ or direction? The answer can only be in the negative which is sufficient and more to demolish the contention that a cross-objection is maintainable in a writ appeal filed in the High Court. 4. It has been explained in Section 141 of the C.P.C. that the expression 'proceedings' in any court of civil jurisdiction appearing therein does not include that under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as follows: "141. Miscellaneous proceedings.-The procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction.
Miscellaneous proceedings.-The procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction. Explanation-In this section, the expression 'proceedings' includes proceedings under Order IX, but does not include any proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution." (emphasis supplied) The Supreme Court in the celebrated decision in Puran Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others [ AIR 1996 SC 1092 ] had occasion to consider the impact of Section 141 of the C.P.C. as follows: "When the High Court exercises extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Const itution, it aims at securing a very speedy and efficacious remedy to a person, whose legal or constitutional right has been infringed. If all the elaborate and technical rules laid down in the Code are to be applied to writ proceedings the very object and purpose is likely to be defeated. According to us, in view of the conflicting opinions expressed by the different Courts, the Parliament by the aforesaid amending Act introduced the explanation saying that in Section 141 of the Code the expression "proceedings" does not include "any proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution" and statutorily recognised the views expressed by some of the Courts that writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution shall not be deemed to be proceedings within the meaning of Section 141 of the Code. After the introduction of the explanation to Section 141 of the Code, it can be said that when Section 141 provides that the procedure prescribed in the Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable "in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction" it shall not include a proceeding under Article 226 of the Const itution. In this background, according to us, it cannot be held that the provisions contained in Order 22 of the Code are applicable per se to writ proceedings.
In this background, according to us, it cannot be held that the provisions contained in Order 22 of the Code are applicable per se to writ proceedings. If even before the introduction of the explanation to Section 141, this Court in the case of Babubhai v. Nandlal, ( AIR 1974 SC 2105 ) (supra) had said that the words "as far as it can be made applicable occurring in Section 141 of the Code made it clear that in applying the various provisions of the Code to the proceedings other than those of a suit, the Court has to take into consideration the nature of those proceedings and the reliefs sought for" after introduction of the explanation the writ proceedings have to be excluded from the expression "proceedings" occurring in Section 141 of the Code. If because of the explanation, proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution has been excluded, there is no question of making applicable the procedure of Code 'as far as it can be made applicable' to such proceeding. The procedures prescribed in respect of suit in the Code if are made applicable to the writ proceedings then in many cases it may frustrate the exercise of extra-ordinary powers by the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution."(emphasis supplied) It needs no further elaboration to state that the provisions of Order XLI Rule 22 of the C.P.C. as regards cross-objection cannot be made applicable to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 5.The cross-objector relies on Rule 159 of the Rules of the High Court of Kerala, 1971 ('the Rules' for short) framed by the High Court of Kerala and the relevant part of the same reads as follows: "159. Appeals from decisions of Single Judges-(1) The procedure prescribed for appeals in Order XLIA of the Code, excluding Rule 2 thereof, shall as far as may be, be followed in appeals from decisions of Single Judges in writ matters." (emphasis supplied) Firstly, Order XLIA of the C.P.C. deals with appeals to the High Court from original decrees of subordinate courts and does not deal with appeals to the Division Bench from the judgment of the Single Judge. Rule 1 of Order XLIA of the C.P.C. states that the rules contained in Order XLI shall apply to appeals in the High Court of Kerala with the modifications contained in 'this Order'.
Rule 1 of Order XLIA of the C.P.C. states that the rules contained in Order XLI shall apply to appeals in the High Court of Kerala with the modifications contained in 'this Order'. But neither Order XLI nor Order XLIA applies to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in view of the Explanation to Section 141 of the C.P.C. Secondly, Rule 159 of the Rules can be called in aid to urge that the 'procedure' prescribed for appeals in Order XLIA of the Code, excluding Rule 2 thereof shall be followed in writ appeals. The 'procedure' is definitely distinct from a substantive right to maintain a cross-objection which should be one created by a statute as reiterated in Subba Reddy's case (supra). Rule 159 of the Rules cannot by any stretch of imagination be treated as one in pari materia with Section 5 of the Act under which provision a writ appeal is filed. 6. Mr. N.Sukumaran, Senior Advocate was extremely fair to concede that a cross-objection is not maintainable in a writ appeal and the cross-objector would be taking steps to file an independent writ appeal. The cross-objector was evidently emboldened to file a cross-objection in the writ appeal in view of Muhammed K.B. v. T.V.Achumma and others [ 2016(2) KHC 828 (DB)]. The said decision has been rendered solely on the premise that Rule 159 of the Rules makes applicable Order XLIA including Order XLI Rule 22 of the C.P.C. in 'writ matters'. Mr P.G.Jayasankar, Advocate who always excels in his academic pursuit brought to our notice the following two decisions wherein Order XLI of the C.P.C. has been held applicable to writ appeals: (i) Sayed Abdul Kader Bafakyh and another v. Secretary, GCDA, Ernakulam and others [ 2013(3) KLT 406 (DB)] (ii) State Bank of Travancore, Kottayam and another v. Chinchumol M.S. [ 2015(2) KHC 104 (DB)] The aforesaid decisions dealt with Order XLI Rule 27 of the C.P.C. relating to production of additional evidence in appellate court in the writ appeal as if there are no other provisions enabling the same.
Rule 154 of the Rules enables proof of facts and documents to be tendered by affidavit even in writ appeals and there is no necessity to call in aid Order XLI Rule 27 of the C.P.C. We have no doubt that the decisions of this Court afore-quoted have been rendered overlooking the statutory provisions and binding decisions of the Apex Court. The Explanation to Section 141 of the C.P.C. as well as the decisions in Subba Reddy's case (supra) and Puran Singh's case (supra) are grossly overlooked in rendering the judgments. We therefore unhesitatingly declare the judgments in 2016(2) KHC 828 , 2013(3) KLT 406 and 2015(2) KHC 104 as per incuriam (see: A.R.Antulay v. R.S.Nayak [ (1988) 2 SCC 602 ]). 7. The Full Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh to which Justice Deepak Misra (as he then was) was a party has held in Jabalpur Development Authority v. Y.S.Sachan and others [ILR (2004) M.P.231] as follows: "It is relevant to state that no cross objection is entertained under Article 226 of the Constitution of India like a counter claim in a suit. True it is, in a letter patent appeal the facts and law can be gone into by the court deciding the intra-court appeal but that does not necessarily convey that while hearing an appeal, a cross objection would be entertained when a counter claim or counter relief is not entertained in a writ petition, at the instance of the opposite party or respondent therein. Another facet is worth noting. A cross objection has its own independent existence under the Code of Civil Procedure but the same can not be construed to apply to a proceeding under writ jurisdiction or an appeal arising therefrom. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the decision rendered in the case of Chittoor Co-operative Town Bank Ltd. (supra) has applied concept of the Order 41, Rule 22 in entirety. In our considered opinion the same is not permissible as per the law laid down in the case of Puran Singh (supra). In the case of Puran Singh (supra) the Supreme Court has held that the High Court should be left to adopt its own procedure for granting relief to the persons.
In our considered opinion the same is not permissible as per the law laid down in the case of Puran Singh (supra). In the case of Puran Singh (supra) the Supreme Court has held that the High Court should be left to adopt its own procedure for granting relief to the persons. An appeal from an order made under Article 226/227 is in a different realm altogether and can never be understood to mean that a cross objection which a matter of statutory right under the Code of Civil Procedure would lie to the Court when the LPA is admitted."(emphasis supplied) We are in perfect agreement with the decision in Jabalpur Development Authority's case (supra) and any view contrary to the same taken by this Court earlier would militate against Puran Singh's case (supra). We dismiss the cross-objection as not maintainable without prejudice to the right of the cross-objector to file an independent writ appeal with a petition to condone delay if necessary. Needless to say that the cross-objector was bonafidely pursuing the cross-objection on the basis of the decision in Muhammed K.B.'s case (supra) which however does not lay down the correct law.” 4. Following the decision in George J.'s case, we hold that the instant cross objection is not maintainable under law. Accordingly, the unnumbered cross objection is rejected. Registry is directed to take note of the decision of the Division Bench in George J.'s case in all future cases, whenever cross objections are filed in writ appeals.