JUDGMENT : 1. These appeals are filed under Section-4 of Karnataka High Court Act, 1961 to challenge the order dated 22.03.2011 passed by the learned Single Judge of this court in Writ Petition No.17480/2004. Writ Appeal No.4220/2011 is filed by the respondents while Writ Appeal No.4599/2011 is filed by the petitioner in the writ petition. The writ petitioner shall henceforth be referred as ‘delinquent’ while the employer shall be referred as ‘bank’. 2. The facts leading to the filing of writ petition No.17480/2004 are that, the delinquent was working as Deputy Manager (Cash) at SSI Peenya II Stage Branch of the Bank at Bangalore from 14.3.1996. Due to shortage of staff, the delinquent was burdened with clerical duties which required him to collect cash from Peenya Industrial Estate Branch of the bank. It is stated that by a letter dated 18.09.1998, the Peenya Industrial Estate Branch reported to the local Head Office of the bank that on 06.08.1996 requesting a cash remittance of Rs.10 lakhs. The letter authorized a clerk named M.N. Kiran to collect the cash and his signature was attested. The author in whose name this letter dated 06.08.1996 was addressed, denied its authenticity on the ground that it was forged. However, the Peenya Industrial Estate Branch had released the cash of Rs.10,00,000/-which remained unaccounted at the SSI Branch. It was mentioned in the letter 18.09.1998 that, one Sri. A.R. Balasubramanian was the AGM of the SSI Branch at the material point of time, who denied his signature found on the letter dated 06.08.1996. The Head Office directed Mr. M.R. Srinath, an AGM working at the Head Office to investigate the matter. The said officer recorded the statement of the delinquent on 28.09.1998 and thereafter submitted a report to the bank absolving the delinquent from the illegality alleged. Thereafter, the local Head Office submitted a complaint to the CBI on 10.11.1998, based on which the FIR was registered. The delinquent claimed that when he was in custody of CBI, self incriminating statements were secured forcibly. Based on some undisclosed report of the CBI and at its instance, Disciplinary Enquiry was initiated by an order dated 07.10.1999. The delinquent was placed under suspension on the ground that further investigation was pending into the alleged acts of misconduct committed by him. A charge sheet date 23.12.2000 was issued, which was replied by the delinquent. Based on some undisclosed report of the CBI and at its instance, Disciplinary Enquiry was initiated by an order dated 07.10.1999. The delinquent was placed under suspension on the ground that further investigation was pending into the alleged acts of misconduct committed by him. A charge sheet date 23.12.2000 was issued, which was replied by the delinquent. An Enquiry Officer was appointed after refusing to accept the objections filed by the delinquent and the enquiry commenced on 30.04.2001. It is stated that, though the articles of charge contained three documents, but at the enquiry 41 documents were allowed to be marked and the witnesses who were not found in the list of witnesses, were examined. Based on these irregular proceedings, the Enquiry Officer submitted a report holding that charge No.1 was proved while charge No.2 was partly proved. The Disciplinary Authority issued a notice enclosing therewith a copy of the Enquiry Report, called upon the delinquent to submit his statement on the findings of the Enquiry Officer. The delinquent submitted an elaborate reply. But the Disciplinary Authority ignored the reply and held the delinquent guilty of the charges and dismissed him from service in terms of the order dated 21.06.2003. A statutory appeal filed by the delinquent against the order of the Disciplinary Authority was summarily dismissed. Hence, the delinquent filed writ petition No.17480/2004 challenging the order of the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority. 3. The delinquent contended before the learned Single Judge that the entire enquiry lacked bona fide but violated every procedure prescribed and was in absolute violation of the principles of natural justice. He contended that the alleged incident occurred on 06.08.1996 while the enquiry was commenced on 30.04.2001 and therefore, he contended that it was highly improbable that the witnesses could have remembered the incident and narrated it with precision. He contended that the delinquent was routinely collecting cash from the office of the Peenya Industrial Estate and was bringing it to SSI Branch and it was improbable for the witnesses cited at the enquiry to remember one such remittance on a particular day that too 4 years prior to the date on which the evidence was tendered. He also contended that the officer appointed by the Bank Mr. He also contended that the officer appointed by the Bank Mr. M.R.Srinath had exonerated the delinquent of any wrong doing and that the enquiry was based on a presumptuous report of the CBI, which was not furnished to the delinquent. He also contended that all norms were flouted at the enquiry and the witnesses at the enquiry were clearly led by the Enquiry Officer. The delinquent made a pointed reference to the statement of PW.2 to the CBI and though he insisted the same to be marked, the Enquiry Officer adjourned the enquiry and thereafter ruled against the delinquent on the ground that the statements could not be marked unless the Investigating Officer was examined at the enquiry. He also contended that the voluminous documents relied upon in the enquiry were not part of the charge sheet and the delinquent had no sufficient opportunity to verify the same. He also contended that the enquiry statements of the witnesses were not furnished, which deprived him of effectively cross-examining the witnesses. He therefore, contended that the proceedings before the Enquiry Officer were fraught with illegalities and irregularities and therefore warranted interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 4. Per contra the learned counsel for the respondent -Bank contended that the oral evidence on record indicated that it was the delinquent who presented the vouchers and had received Rs.10,00,000/-in cash and when the delinquent received it inside the cash vault, he and another person were present. He also contended that the signature of Mr. A.R.Balasubramanian and the styling of the letters found in the letter dated 06.08.1996 resembled the handwriting of the delinquent. He also contended that PW.5 identified that it was the delinquent who went with the letter dated 06.08.1996 for cash remittance and he saw the delinquent coming out of the bank along with a boy. He also brought to our notice the evidence of PW.6 who deposed that, he saw the remittance of Rs.10,00,000/-to the delinquent. PW.7 is the manager of the photocopying shop who deposed that the delinquent had visited her shop and got the letter dated 06.08.1996 typed. He therefore contended that this unimpeachable evidence established the charges beyond any doubt. He also brought to our notice the evidence of PW.6 who deposed that, he saw the remittance of Rs.10,00,000/-to the delinquent. PW.7 is the manager of the photocopying shop who deposed that the delinquent had visited her shop and got the letter dated 06.08.1996 typed. He therefore contended that this unimpeachable evidence established the charges beyond any doubt. The learned counsel contended that this court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of Constitution of India should not ordinarily interfere with the findings of the Tribunal as well as the Disciplinary Authority and cannot sit in appeal over their decisions. 5. The learned Single Judge noticed these contentions and also the fact that the delinquent had attained the age of superannuation during the pendency of the writ petition. The learned Single Judge therefore, held that the delinquent is not entitled to any back-wages, but was entitled to the benefit of length of service and consequential benefits. The learned Single Judge in terms of the impugned order allowed the writ petition and set aside the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Labour Court. 6. Being aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge setting aside the order of the Disciplinary Authority and the Labour Court, the bank has filed Writ Appeal No.4220/2011 while the delinquent aggrieved by the order refusing grant of back-wages, has filed Writ Appeal No.4599/2011. 7. During the course of this appeal, the counsel for the bank filed a memo dated 05.02.2019 to place some documents before this court. However, since these documents were not placed before learned Single Judge, the question of considering these documents for the purpose of testing the impugned order would not arise. Hence, these documents are not considered. 8. The learned counsel for the bank took us through the evidence adduced before the Enquiry Officer to contend that the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer was based on acceptable evidence. He also pointed-out to the evidence of PW.7 who deposed that it was the delinquent, who had gone to her photocopying shop to prepare the letter dated 06.08.1996. He also invited our attention to the evidence of PW.2, who deposed that, it was the delinquent who had presented the voucher to receive the cash of Rs.10,00,000/-and that PW.5 had identified that the delinquent had gone to the bank on 06.08.1996 along with a boy. He also invited our attention to the evidence of PW.2, who deposed that, it was the delinquent who had presented the voucher to receive the cash of Rs.10,00,000/-and that PW.5 had identified that the delinquent had gone to the bank on 06.08.1996 along with a boy. Therefore, he contended that since the delinquent was regularly getting the cash remittance, he had misutilised this opportune circumstance in illegally drawing Rs.10,00,000/-. The learned counsel brought to our notice that the delinquent had made substantial investments in Indira Vikas Patra during the same period and had not accounted for it in his statement of assets and liabilities. It is also claimed that the delinquent had made special term deposits with SBI Staff Co-operative Credit Society, Bengaluru, but did not disclose the same. Therefore, he contended that the learned Single Judge ought not to have interfered with the order of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. He claimed that acquittal in a criminal case would not result in exoneration from the domestic enquiry. 9. The learned counsel for the bank relied upon the following judgments: 1) ILR 2002 KAR 2535 (MEHAIBOOBSAB VS. UPALOKAYUKTA & OTHERS 2) 2005 (7) SCC 764 (AJIT KUMAR NAG VS. GENERAL MANAGER (PJ) INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. HALDIA & OTHERS. 3) 2011 (9) SCC 94 (SAMAR BAHADUR SINGH VS. STATE OF UTTAR PRDESH & OTHERS) 4) 2011 (4) SCC 584 (STATE BANK OF BIKANER AND JAIPUR VS. NEMI CHAND NALWAYA) 5) 2012(13) SCC 142 (AVINASH SADASHIV BHOSALE (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. VS. UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS) 6) 2014(3) SCC 610 (STATE OF WEST BENGAL & OTHERS VS. SANKAR GHOSH) 7) 2015(3) SCC 101 GENERAL MANAGER (OPERATIONS) STATE BANK OF INDIA & ANOTHER VS. R. PEIYASAMY) 8) 2016(1) SCC 671 BALJINDER PAL KAUR VS. STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS) 9) 2017(4) SCC 75 (MANAGEMENT OF STATE BANK OF INDIA VS. SMITA SHARAD DESHMUK & OTHERS) 10. Per contra learned counsel for the delinquent contended that, he was framed in the case and that the enquiry conducted by the Enquiry Officer was a clear sham and an attempt to cover-up many officials, who were responsible for the alleged incident. He also contended that, it was hard to believe that the witnesses could remember a stand alone transaction and allege that the delinquent was responsible for the transaction, that too after 4½ years from the date of the commission of the alleged crime. He also contended that, it was hard to believe that the witnesses could remember a stand alone transaction and allege that the delinquent was responsible for the transaction, that too after 4½ years from the date of the commission of the alleged crime. He brought to our notice various circumstances such as the Enquiry Officer himself leading the witnesses who merely concurred by answering ‘Yes’ to the suggestions made by the Enquiry Officer. He therefore, contended that the order passed by the learned Single Judge, in the facts and circumstances, was thoroughly justified and did not call for any interference by this Court. The learned counsel also brought to our notice that the prosecution initiated by the CBI ended in acquittal of the employee. 11. The counsel for the delinquent employee relied upon the following judgments:- 1) ILR 2003 KAR 2911 (B. BALACHANDRA RAI VS. INDIAN TELEPHONE INDUSTRIES LIMITED, BY ITS CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR AND ANOTHER) 2) AIR 1997 SCC 243 (STATE BANK OF BIKANER AND AIPUR VS. SRINATH GUPTA AND ANOTHER) 3) AIR 2015 SC 2904 (RAMESH KUMAR VS. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS) 4) (2013) 10 scc 324 DEEPALI GUNDU SURWASE VS. KRANTI JUNIOR ADHYAPAK MAHAVIDYALAYA (D.ED) AND OTHERS) 12. We have given our anxious considerations to the arguments canvassed by the learned counsel for the parties. 13. As contended by the learned counsel for the delinquent, the initiation of enquiry is based on the allegation by the CBI that the delinquent was involved in the commission of the offence. Therefore, the delinquent was entitled to secure all the records relating to the investigation conducted by the CBI which indicated the involvement of the employee. Even before the enquiry, documents were marked without they being furnished to the delinquent at the time of Articles of Charge and the witnesses were examined though they were not cited in the list of witnesses attached to the Articles of Charge, thereby robbing the employee of an opportunity to effectively represent against the show cause notice. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the delinquently, it is hard to fathom that any person could remember an incident that happened 4 and ½ years prior to initiation of the disciplinary enquiry, that too when the delinquent was regularly doing the same work of collecting cash from the branch of the bank. The enquiry, in the peculiar facts and circumstances. The enquiry, in the peculiar facts and circumstances. of this case, is therefore commenced with a predetermined intention of proceeding against the delinquent alone. A major punishment of dismissal could not be based on conjectures and surmises such as that the signatures found on the incriminating letter dated 06.08.1996 nearly resembled to the handwriting of the delinquent. As a matter of fact, PW2 deposed at the enquiry that, he had not taken the signature of the delinquent at the time of handing over the cash to the employee. This sounded extremely strange. In matters of this nature, it is hard to believe that it was only the delinquent who was involved in the process of drawing a huge sum of Rs.10,00,000/-. There is a set of process and an array of documents that need to be prepared for releasing cash from the vault. It is also shocking as to how a remittance of Rs.10,00,000/-went unnoticed for well-over four years. It is under these circumstances, we feel that the learned Single Judge was right in interfering with the order of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority, which was upheld by the Appellate Authority as well as the Labour Court. The proceedings of the enquiry officer does not instill a sense of regularity but smacks of victimization. At any rate, the Bank was not able to prove the complicity of the employee in the alleged offence. But, that in itself could not arm the delinquent with any right to claim back wages for the period during which he had not worked and therefore there was no corresponding obligation to pay the salary to the employee. The delinquent has not made any attempt to demonstrate that he was not gainfully employed during the period of suspension or after dismissal from service. The reliance on the Judgment of the Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Sarwase, referred supra, cannot help the case of the employee as the facts in that case were entirely different than the one in the present case. In the instant case, the employee may or may not have plotted the crime and in view of such duality, it is improper to order back wages. Hence, we do not find any infirmity in the order passed by the learned Single Judge in refusing to grant any back-wages to the employee. Hence both the appeals fail and are dismissed.