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2021 DIGILAW 43 (GAU)

Aroti Tayeng v. State of Arunachal Pradesh

2021-01-28

SONGKHUPCHUNG SERTO

body2021
JUDGMENT : Songkhupchung Serto, J. 1. Heard Mr. T.T. Tara, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and also heard Ms. G. Ete, learned Additional Senior Government Advocate appearing for the State respondents. 2. This is a writ petition challenging the order dated 19.08.2010, issued by the Secretary Social Welfare, Women and Child Department, Government of Arunachal Pradesh, wherein the annual increment of the petitioner's salary for the year 2004 to 2009 was stopped as a penalty for alleged misappropriation of a sum of Rs. 73,580/-. 3. The facts and circumstances leading to the filing of this writ petition briefly stated are as follows; Following a complaint that, the petitioner, while serving as a Child Development Project Officer at Seppa had misappropriated a sum of Rs. 73,580/- which was meant for payment of Honorarium and allowances of Anganwadi Workers and Helpers, a departmental inquiry was ordered. The petitioner was given Article of charge and thereafter, inquiry was conducted by an inquiry officer duly appointed. After the inquiry was completed, the inquiry officer submitted his report on 19.12.2008. In his report, the inquiry officer stated that the petitioner (charged officer) had over-drawn a sum of Rs. 73,580/- during her tenure as CDPO, Seppa but deposited only Rs. 62,180/- for paying honorarium and allowances of Anganwadi Workers and Helpers by mistake or oversight. Therefore, the remaining amount of Rs. 11,400/- may be recovered from her. After the inquiry report was submitted, the disciplinary authority, the Secretary Social Welfare, Women and Child Department, Government of Arunachal Pradesh directed the petitioner (charged Officer) to deposit the amount mentioned above into Government's account. Following the direction, the petitioner deposited the said amount in the Government's account on 29.3.2010by treasury challan. Thereafter on 19.8.2010, the Secretary Social Welfare, Women and Child Department, Government of Arunachal Pradesh issued the impugned order stopping the annual increments of the petitioner for the years 2004 to 2009 as a penalty for the offence charged against her. Being aggrieved by this penalty imposed on her, the petitioner is here before this Court through this writ petition. 4. The petitioner's case as submitted by Mr. Being aggrieved by this penalty imposed on her, the petitioner is here before this Court through this writ petition. 4. The petitioner's case as submitted by Mr. T.T. Tara, learned counsel is that the whole proceeding of the inquiry ordered and conducted against the petitioner came to an end when the order dated 5.3.2010 was issued by the Secretary Social welfare, Women and Child Department, Government of Arunachal Pradesh wherein, the petitioner was directed to deposit a sum of Rs. 11,400/- as recommended by the inquiry officer in his final report and the same was deposited by her. Therefore, the impugned order which stopped the annual increments of petitioner for the years 2004 to 2009 is illegal. And, further in view of the settled principle of law, if the disciplinary authority wants to defer from the findings and conclusions drawn by the inquiry officer and intends to award a punishment different from what is already indicated, the petitioner should have been given a chance of being heard. But since the petitioner was never given any notice before imposing such penalty, the disciplinary authority while issuing the same has violated the principles of natural justice. As such, the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set aside. In support of this submissions stated above, Mr. T.T. Tara cited para-18 and 19 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Punjab National Bank Vs. Kunj Behari Mishra reported in (1998) 7 SCC 84 . The contents of the two paragraphs referred to are given here below; "18. Under Regulation - 6 the inquiry proceedings can be conducted either by an inquiry officer or by the disciplinary authority itself. When the inquiry is conducted by the inquiry officer his report is not final or conclusive and the disciplinary proceedings do not stand concluded. The disciplinary proceedings stand concluded with decision of the disciplinary authority. It is the disciplinary authority which can impose the penalty and not the inquiry officer. Where the disciplinary authority itself holds an inquiry an opportunity of hearing has to be granted by him. When the disciplinary authority differs with the view of the inquiry officer and proposes to come to a different conclusion, there is no reason as to why an opportunity of hearing should not be granted. Where the disciplinary authority itself holds an inquiry an opportunity of hearing has to be granted by him. When the disciplinary authority differs with the view of the inquiry officer and proposes to come to a different conclusion, there is no reason as to why an opportunity of hearing should not be granted. It will be most unfair and iniquitous that where the charged officers succeed before the inquiry officer they are deprived of representing to the disciplinary authority before that authority differs with the inquiry officer's report and, while recording of guilt, imposes punishment on the officer. In our opinion, in any such situation the charged officer must have an opportunity to represent before the Disciplinary Authority before final findings on the charges are recorded and punishment imposed. This is required to be done as a part of the first stage of inquiry as explained in Karunakar's case. 19. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the inquiry authority on any article of charge then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the inquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favorable conclusion of the inquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority, which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer." 5. Ms. G. Ete, learned Additional Senior Government Advocate, appearing for the State respondents, on a query made by the Court submitted that as per the record made available to her, it appears that no such show cause notice or a chance of being heard was given to the petitioner before the impugned order was passed. Ms. G. Ete, learned Additional Senior Government Advocate, appearing for the State respondents, on a query made by the Court submitted that as per the record made available to her, it appears that no such show cause notice or a chance of being heard was given to the petitioner before the impugned order was passed. The learned Government Advocate also referred to the affidavit of the respondents No. 1, 2 and 3, particularly para-16 & 17, wherein the reason for stoppage of the annual increment of the petitioner was stated to be due to none regularisation of the suspended period of the petitioner's service during the pendency of the disciplinary proceeding. 6. Considered the submissions of the learned counsels appearing for the parties keeping in view the facts and circumstances which led to the passing of the impugned order. I have also gone through the judgment referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner and one more judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in the case of Yoginath D. Bagde Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (1999) 7 SSC 739 beginning from para-31 to 38. From these judgments, it is clear that the settled principle of law in such case is a chance of being heard or submitting a representation to the disciplinary authority should be given to the charged officer before such punishment is inflicted. In this case, since the disciplinary authority decided to take a different view from the findings and conclusions drawn by the inquiry officer a show cause notice or a chance of being heard should have been given to the petitioner. It was incumbent upon the disciplinary authority to have given such notice or a chance of being heard to the charged officer/petitioner in view of the settled principle of law. Since it was not done, I am of the view that there has been clear violation of the principle of natural justice. In that view of the matter, the impugned order dated 19.08.2010 is held illegal and therefore, it is quashed and set aside. Since it was not done, I am of the view that there has been clear violation of the principle of natural justice. In that view of the matter, the impugned order dated 19.08.2010 is held illegal and therefore, it is quashed and set aside. Before I part with the judgment I may also add here that the plea of the respondents in their affidavit that the annual increments of the petitioner was stopped due to none regularisation of the suspension period of his service cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the impugned order has to be understood in terms of the language used therein and not in terms of the explanation offered in the affidavit. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly.