ORDER : 1. This is a revision petition filed against the judgment and decree dated 6th November, 2018, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Srinagar, whereby the court has allowed the application seeking condonation of delay in filing the 1st appeal against an ex-parte judgement and decree for eviction passed in favour of the revision petitioner herein. The court below, by virtue of the judgment and order impugned, has condoned the delay of approximately one year and sixty days. Briefly stated material facts are as under : - 2. A suit for eviction came to be filed by the petitioner herein in the court of learned Munsiff, Srinagar, for eviction of the defendant/respondent herein. Mr. Imtiyaz Sofi, was a counsel engaged by the defendant/respondent initially. Whereafter, it is stated, that Mr. Tasaduq Hussain Khawja, was engaged as a counsel by the defendant in the said suit. It appears that an ex-parte decree was passed by the trial court on 31st October, 2012 and subsequently on 8th April, 2013, an appeal along with application seeking condonation of delay came to be preferred by the respondent herein before the court of Additional District Judge, Srinagar. The application filed by the appellant/respondent herein was allowed. Hence the present revision petition. 3. Counsel for the petitioner assailed the order impugned on the ground that the view expressed by the appellate court in condoning the delay was totally perverse in law. It was vehemently urged that there was no justifiable reason with the appellate court to condone the delay especially when neither the application nor the evidence which was produced in support thereof justified such an order. 4. On a perusal of the order impugned and the record, it can be seen that in the application seeking condonation of delay, the stand of the applicant was that while initially Mr. Imtiyaz Sofi was engaged as counsel on behalf of the defendant/applicant and during the course of trial, another counsel, namely, Mr. Khawja T. Hussain, was engaged, who would either personally appear in the matter or instruct his junior to cause appearance in the matter. Imtiyaz Sofi was engaged as counsel on behalf of the defendant/applicant and during the course of trial, another counsel, namely, Mr. Khawja T. Hussain, was engaged, who would either personally appear in the matter or instruct his junior to cause appearance in the matter. It is stated that the matter was listed on 23rd February, 2012 and when the applicant reached the court, he was informed by the assisting counsel that when the case was called for hearing, the plaintiff was absent, as such the suit had been dismissed in default and he was not required to attend the court till the application seeking restoration of the suit was filed by the respondent and notice thereof received in that regard by the defendant. 5. It is stated that believing the statement made by the said counsel to be true and correct, the applicant went to the office of his counsel Mr. Khawaja T. Hussain and inquired from him about developments of the case. Mr. Khawaja T. Hussain observed that there was no need for the applicant/defendant to appear in the court till fresh proceedings are initiated by the plaintiff under the new Act. It is further stated that believing the statement made by his counsel to be true and correct, the applicant had not appeared before the court further till 22nd April, 2014, when to his surprise he was summoned by the trial court in execution proceedings. 6. In support of the application, Mr. Khawaja T. Hussain, the counsel purportedly engaged by the defendant/applicant had also furnished his affidavit and was subjected to cross examination, as stated by counsel for the parties. The averments attributed to the counsel by the applicant were reiterated and buttressed by the said counsel. 7. The appellate court considered the explanation tendered by the applicant as also the affidavit and statement made on oath by the counsel for the applicant and came to a conclusion that the applicant had made out a case for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. Not only this, the appellate court, to some extent, derived into the merits to see as to in what manner the ex-parte decree had been passed by the court below. Not only this, the appellate court, to some extent, derived into the merits to see as to in what manner the ex-parte decree had been passed by the court below. It was noticed by the appellate court that on 23rd February, 2012, the trial court had fixed the matter on 15th April, 2012 for hearing after noting that the defendant was absent and no witnesses had been produced by the defendant in the matter. The appellate court further noticed that instead of taking up the case on 15th April, 2012, the case was taken up on 16th April, 2012, when the defendant was set ex-parte and the plaintiff was directed to produce the evidence. The order dated 16th April, 2012 further reveals that on the same date two witnesses were produced by the plaintiff, who were examined by the court. Thereafter, the plaintiff chose to lead further evidence. Finally, an ex-parte decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff on 31st December, 2012. 8. The appellate court, upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances and the evidence on record and the averments made in application, came to a conclusion that the delay was required to be condoned, inasmuch as, the applicant would not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late and further that the delay had been sufficiently explained. 9. The main emphasis of the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner today was that the reliance placed by the appellate court on the affidavit and the statement of Mr. Khawaja Tassaduq Hussain, Advocate was totally erroneous in law, inasmuch as, on record, it has not been found that the said counsel had ever filed his power of attorney. In the absence of a power of attorney in favour of the said applicant, it was stated that neither the affidavit nor the averments made in the application could make a good basis for allowing the application for condonation of delay. While the learned counsel for the petitioner may be correct in asserting that a counsel is legally authorized to represent his party based upon a valid power of attorney having been executed in his favour to represent him in a court of law, yet for purposes of condonation of delay, the absence of a power of attorney on record would not by itself be enough to deny the fact that applicant had in fact engaged Mr. Khawaja Tassaduq Hussain as his counsel. More so, when the learned counsel himself furnished his personal affidavit and had also been subjected to cross examination. Needless to say, that the said counsel is a senior and respected member of the Bar. 10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, in my opinion, the view expressed by the appellate court cannot be said to be in any manner without jurisdiction or perverse and I cannot persuade myself to take a view different from the one taken in the order impugned by the court. 11. For the reasons mentioned, the revision petition is found to be without merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.