ORDER : 1. By way of this petition, under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, t he petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs :- “9(A) Be pleased to admit and allow this petition; (B) Be please to issue a writ of certiorari and/or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside the judgment and order dated 15.01.2021 passed by the Deputy Collector Valuation Department, Bharuch in Stamp/Section- 33/Order/2021/98 in the interest of justice; (C ) Be pleased to say the implementation of the judgment and order dated 15.01.2021 passed by the Deputy Collector, Valuation Department, in Stamp/Section-33/Order/2021/98 till the final disposal of this petition to secure the interest of justice; (D) …….” 2. The case of the petitioner is that the petitioner – Company has changed its name from United Phosphorous Limited to UPL Limited and the Registrar of Companies has issued a certificate to that extent on 11.10.2019. This change in name is not material to the present controversy, but it is mentioned just for the sake of record. There is a plot situated in Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation (for short “GIDC“), bearing no. 750 , admeasuring 404255 sq.mtr., at Jhagadia Industrial Estate and came to be allotted on 04.06.1994 and transferred the said plot property on 17.05.1995 to one Search Chem Industries Limited by way of a registered (lease) deed nos. 447 and 449 on 29.07.197. In an Extra Ordinary General Meeting held on 02.05.2003 in Search Chem Industrial Limited, it has been resolved to change the name of the Company to United Phosphorous Limited and a fresh Certificate was obtained from the office of Registrar of Companies under Section 231 of the Companies Act, 1956 on 15.10.2003. Subsequently, on 27.11.2003, the petitioner-Company filed an application before GIDC informing about the change of the name and in reference to the said application, GIDC replied on 19.12.2003 in view of para 15 of the said letter of GIDC, it was made merely incumbent by GIDC on the petitioner – Company to execute a deed of assignment/declaration for change of name of the Company. As a result of this, a declaration deed came to be executed by the Company and in pursuance to that an order came to be issued by the GIDC on 26.12.2004, incorporating the change of name of the Company. As a result of this, a declaration deed came to be executed by the Company and in pursuance to that an order came to be issued by the GIDC on 26.12.2004, incorporating the change of name of the Company. The petitioner – Company by affixing a stamp duty of Rs.100/- executed the deed of declaration for change in the Company’s name and the said deed was registered at no. 834 before the Sub-Registrar, Jhagadia. The said deed came to be impounded by Sub-Registrar, Jhagadia for deficit of stamp duty and then the said deed came to be referred to the office of the Deputy Collector Valuation Organization, Bharuch on 16.02.2004 whereupon, preliminary notices were issued on 08.10.2014, 04.06.2015, 29.09.2020 and final show cause notice came to be issued on 16.10.2020 and 12.11.2020. The Deputy Collector Valuation Organization, Bharuch, in the final notice dated 16.10.2020 issued under Section 39(1)(b) of the Stamp Act, relied upon one circular dated 04.09.2001 bearing Circular No. 183-2009-3038 and ultimately passed an order on 15.01.2021 in exercise of power under Section 39(1)(b) of the Stamp Act and, therefore, it is the case of the petitioner that this order has been passed after almost a period of 17 years from impounding the documents under Section 33 of the Stamp Act. The case of the petitioner – Company is that the respondent-authority has acted beyond the jurisdiction and on the contrary, to the powers vested in the statute. It is the case of the petitioner that the show cause notice dated 16.10.2020, is contrary to the subject matter involved in the impugned judgment and order dated 15.01.2021. According to the petitioner, the Stamp Duty authority has misinterpreted the provisions of law and wrongly considered the deed of change of name as “instrument” of transfer of lease under Article 57 to Schedule-1 of the Stamp Act and as such, by ascertaining that the order passed by the authority is contrary to the law, this Court may exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as the petitioner is not having any alternative and efficacious remedy. 3. When this petition came to up for consideration before the Court, learned advocate Mr. A.M. Kotwal, appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that the impugned order is not sustainable in view of the fact the same is passed beyond the jurisdiction. 3. When this petition came to up for consideration before the Court, learned advocate Mr. A.M. Kotwal, appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that the impugned order is not sustainable in view of the fact the same is passed beyond the jurisdiction. The documents in question is of the year 2003 and at much belated stage, powers are sought to be exercised by the authority and, as such, on that count also, the order impugned deserves to be quashed and set aside. It has further been contended that the officer in question who passed the order has not interpreted the provisions of Sections 33 and 32-A of the Stamp Act in its true perspective and erroneously came to be conclusion that it is an ‘instrument’ of conveyance under the Act and, thereby, fasten upon the liability on the petitioner. It has further been submitted that this being the situation, since the action of the part of the authority is not sustainable in the eye of law, the petitioner is not having any efficacious remedy in view of the that the if the appeal is to be presented, the petitioner is under an obligation to deposit the same amount as per requirement of statue at the time of furnishing an appeal and as such, when the authority concerned has not acted within the frame work of law, the order impugned be interfered with on the issue of alternative remedy. 3.1. Learned advocate Mr. Kotwal, has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai & Ors., reported in AIR 1999 SC 22 and thereby, has contended that the High Court powers are not circumscribed by any other statutory remedy even if available to the petitioner and that being so, according to learned advocate Mr. Kotwal, the order impugned required to be interfered with in exercise of extra ordinary jurisdiction. No other submissions have been made. 4. Mr. Sahil Trivedi, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing on an advance copy on behalf of the respondent authority, has submitted that undisputedly, the petitioner is having an alternative efficacious remedy to construe it or change the name as an ‘instrument’ or not. The said finding authority is well be in a position to exercise the discretion and examine the said issue. Sahil Trivedi, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing on an advance copy on behalf of the respondent authority, has submitted that undisputedly, the petitioner is having an alternative efficacious remedy to construe it or change the name as an ‘instrument’ or not. The said finding authority is well be in a position to exercise the discretion and examine the said issue. Statute has undisputedly given a remedy to the petitioner to ventilate the grievance and, therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in series of decisions, recent in time, such discretion of the statutory authority may not be usurped. It seems that the petitioner has thoroughly participated in the proceedings in decision making process by the authority and as such, when these detailed facts have been examined by the authority, finding is not perverse and always subject to challenge before appropriate forum. But then, when the remedy is available to prefer an appeal, no interference be made. It is the petitioner himself who waited for pretty long period and presented the petition only in the month of May, 2021 and now cannot bypass the said statutory remedy at his convenience. The Statute is requiring a pre-deposit before preferring an appeal and when the liability is determined by the authority, the petitioner is trying to make an attempt to see that without the said compliance of the statutory provisions, the High Court should exercise the discretion. This is not a fit case, in which the petitioner be allowed to bypass the remedy. On the contrary, from the reading of the judgment as it is, the petitioner has on his own volition, participated in adjudicating the process. Enough opportunities have been given to him and the order is passed and if the petitioner does not want to avail such remedy, law does not require that the authority should come to the petitioner and get the submissions from him. Here, from the bare reading of the impugned order, it clearly transpires that not only more than adequate opportunities have been given, but it is the petitioner himself, who chose to drag on the issue and now come forward on hyper technicality which can well be examined by the authority which is created under the statute. No-doubt, writ jurisdiction can be exercised by this Court, but the conduct of the petitioner is also very relevant and may not be unnoticed. No-doubt, writ jurisdiction can be exercised by this Court, but the conduct of the petitioner is also very relevant and may not be unnoticed. Here, reading of the order at glace would clearly indicate that it is the petitioner himself, on account of his conduct led the authority to pass the order and as such, this is not an extra ordinary case, nor any circumstance is pointed out to bypass the statutory remedy available to the petitioner. Hence, the petition deserves to be dismissed on that count alone. 5. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective sides and having gone through the impugned order, following circumstances are not possible to be unnoticed since the petitioner is undisputedly having an alternative remedy to ventilate the grievance. 5.1. Here in the instant case, the petitioner has come out with a plea that the authority while passing the impugned order has misinterpreted the provisions of law and wrongly considered the documents in question as ‘instrument of transfer of lease’ under Article 57 of Schedule-1 of the Stamp Act and as such, the decision is erroneous. Apart from that the petitioner has also questioned the decision making process by referring to Section 33 of the Stamp Act and also by pointing out Section 32A of the Act. Now for this point determining statute has substantially created a remedy for aggrieved litigant and as such, when the Act has prescribed a specific mechanism to redress the grievance, it is not proper on the part of the petitioner to just rush down to the Court by invoking extra ordinary jurisdiction. The point of delay in exercising the discretion also can be agitated before the authority which is created under the Statue. From the tenor of the order in question, it appears that more than enough opportunities have been given and only thereafter, the decision is taken and as such, this Court is unable to accept the submission that the decision making process is irregular in any manner. From the tenor of the order in question, it appears that more than enough opportunities have been given and only thereafter, the decision is taken and as such, this Court is unable to accept the submission that the decision making process is irregular in any manner. If the petitioner is agitating the issue of delay, then the petitioner himself should consider the fact that notices have been given right from 2014 onward, practically in every year, which is clearly visible from first page of the order itself and in addition thereto, this order of 15.01.2021 is sought to be challenged by presenting the petition in the month of May, 2021 and as such, right from the year 2014, onward, it appears that the petitioner is dribbling the issue. Thus, it is not possible to accept the submission that there is a gross delay on the part of the authority only in initiating the action, especially, when this point also can be examined by the appropriate authority where the petitioner has approached under the Statute and without examining all these issues, which are tried to be raised since the Court is relegating the petitioner to an alternative remedy it refrains itself from expressing any opinion on merit. Now in light of the aforesaid circumstance, the petitioner has made an attempt to rely upon the proposition laid down by the Apex Court in a well known decision in the case of Whirlpool Corporation (supra), but the said case was on different contextual background and petitioner has to make out his case that it falls within the said criteria so the Court is in respectfully agreement and bound by such proposition, but then, in a peculiar background of facts on hand and in view of the recent trend on proposition on the issue of alternative remedy, this Court is unable to accept the stand of petitioner in view of the recent proposition laid down in the following cases by the Apex Court: (1) In the case of Commissioner of Income-Tax & Ors., v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, reported in (2014) 1 SCC 603 , wherein, the Apex Court has clearly observed on the issue of alternative remedy created under the Statute. Since the Court has considered the same, it deems it proper to reproduce the same hereunder :- “14. Since the Court has considered the same, it deems it proper to reproduce the same hereunder :- “14. In Union of India vs. Guwahati Carbon Ltd., (2012) 11 SCC 651 , this Court has reiterated the aforesaid principle and observed: 8. Before we discuss the correctness of the impugned order, we intend to remind ourselves the observations made by this Court in Munshi Ram v. Municipal Committee, Chheharta, (1979) 3 SCC 83 . In the said decision, this Court was pleased to observe that: (SCC p. 88, para 23). 23. when a revenue statute provides for a person aggrieved by an assessment thereunder, a particular remedy to be sought in a particular forum, in a particular way, it must be sought in that forum and in that manner, and all the other forums and modes of seeking [remedy] are excluded. 15. Thus, while it can be said that this Court has recognized some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy, i.e., where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice, the proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal case, Titagarh Paper Mills case and other similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance still holds the field. Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation.” 5.2. Again this proposal appears to have been continued to be observed by the Apex Court even a recent decision in the case of Agarwal Tracom Private Limited v. Punjab National Bank & Ors., reported in (2018) 1 SCC 626 , in which also emphasis has been made by the Apex Court in para 32 and the observations contained in the said para 32 are reproduced hereunder :- “33………….. 43. 43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. 44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. 45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance.” 5.3. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance.” 5.3. Yet another decision delivered by the Apex Court in the case of D.N, Jeevaraj v. Chief Secretary, Government of Karnataka & Ors., reported in (2016) 2 SCC 653 , wherein also the Apex Court has observed in para 42, which reads as under :- “42. In Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat this Court held that it is primarily the responsibility and duty of a statutory authority to take a decision and it should be enabled to exercise its discretion independently. If the authority does not exercise its mind independently, the decision taken by the statutory authority can be quashed and a direction given to take an independent decision. It was said: Mandamus which is a discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution is requested to be issued, inter alia, to compel performance of public duties which may be administrative, ministerial or statutory in nature. Statutory duty may be either directory or mandatory. Statutory duties, if they are intended to be mandatory in character, are indicated by the use of the words shall or must. But this is not conclusive as shall and must have, sometimes, been interpreted as may. What is determinative of the nature of duty, whether it is obligatory, mandatory or directory, is the scheme of the statute in which the duty has been set out. Even if the duty is not set out clearly and specifically in the statute, it may be implied as correlative to a right. In the performance of this duty, if the authority in whom the discretion is vested under the statute, does not act independently and passes an order under the instructions and orders of another authority, the Court would intervene in the matter, quash the order and issue a mandamus to that authority to exercise its own discretion.” 5.4. At this stage looking to the aforesaid observations the petitioner has not made out any case that the authority will not act or exercise its power independently or will not consider the point which is tried to be raised here and, hence, in absence thereof, this Court is not in a position to assume that the authority will not consider, which is otherwise duty bound under the statue to apply its mind. 6. 6. Considering the aforesaid situation, no case is made out to entertain the petition. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed with no order as to costs. 7. While parting with the order, it is made clear that the dismissal of this petition will not prevent the petitioner from approaching the statutory remedy available where it is open for the petitioner to raise all the permissible contentions available in law and the authority as and when will be approached, shall consider the case in accordance with law on the basis of the available material and shall take suitable decision without being influenced by the dismissal of the present petition as the same is not entertained only on account of the alternative remedy. 8. With the above observations, the present petition stands dismissed.