JUDGMENT : 1. In this intra court appeal under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961 the appellant has assailed the validity of the order dated 04.03.2014 passed by the learned Single Judge by which writ petition preferred by respondent No.1 has been allowed and the order dated 31.07.2012 passed by the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner by which he had held the proceeding initiated by the appellant under Rule 25(2)(v)(b) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Central Rules, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules' for short) to be maintainable. 2. Facts leading to filing of this appeal briefly stated are that the appellant (hereinafter referred to as 'the Union' for short) filed a petition under Rule 25(v)(a) of the Rules. It was averred that some of its members was employed in the establishment of respondent No.1 by respondent No.2 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Management' and 'the Contractor' respectively), by the Contractor as watchman. It was further averred that the members of the Union who have been hired as Watchman by the Contractor are performing similar or same kind of work, however, they are neither paid wages as prescribed in law nor are paid for holidays as is applicable to permanent staff of the Management. A direction in the petition was sought to the Management as well as the Contractor to pay the salary prescribed in Clause (4) of the 9th bipartite settlement and to pay arrears from the date of 9th bipartite settlement and to pay such other benefits as are admissible to its members. 3. The Management thereupon filed a preliminary objection inter alia on the ground that there is no relationship of master and servant between the Management and workmen and the Union has no locus to raise a dispute on behalf of the workmen as the workmen are neither the members of Union nor have authorized the Union to file any petition or to raise any dispute on their behalf. It was further pleaded that the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1970 Act' for short) do not prescribe filing of the petition seeking payment of wages at par with regular employees on the basis of bipartite settlement. It was further pleaded that the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1970 Act' for short) do not prescribe filing of the petition seeking payment of wages at par with regular employees on the basis of bipartite settlement. It was further pleaded that the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner has no jurisdiction to deal with the dispute raised before it and the principles of 'equal pay for equal pay' cannot be applied to the contract labour or to persons employed on contract as the nature of responsibilities and duties are totally different. 4. The Union filed a rejoinder to the aforesaid objections. The Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner by an order dated 31.07.2012 inter alia held that in the absence of any restrictive clause in the Act or the Rules prohibiting a Trade Union of serving employees to espouse the cause of contract labour performing the job of State Bank of India, the petition filed under Rule 25(v)(a) of the Rules is maintainable and the Union has locus to maintain the petition on behalf of its workmen. It was further held that the Management is a necessary party to the lis since, the comparison of work is made between the workers of Management and the Contractor and therefore, both the respondents are necessary parties to prove the merits of the claim. Accordingly, the preliminary objections filed on behalf of the Management were rejected. 5. The aforesaid order was challenged by the Management before the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge vide impugned order dated 04.03.2014 inter alia held that Management is not a necessary party and there is no provision under the Rules, which makes the Management responsible for payment of wages in the event of non compliance of the conditions prescribed under Rule 25(v)(a) of the Rules by the Contractor. It was further held that Section 21(4) of the Act has no application to the situation where the Contractor may have paid wages but has not complied with the condition imposed by under Rule 25(v)(a) of the Rules as definition of 'wages' under Section 2 of the Act read with definition of 'wages' under Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1936 Act' for short) does not cover any additional amount as payable under Rule 25(v)(a) of the Rules. It was further held that there is neither any material on record to prove contract between the Management and the Contractor nor details of contract have been mentioned. Therefore, it is not possible to infer in respect of liability of Management. Accordingly, the order passed by the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner was quashed and the proceeding initiated by the Union against the Management were dropped. In the aforesaid factual backdrop, this appeal has been filed. 6. Learned Senior counsel for the Union has taken us through the record of the case and has submitted that learned Single Judge erred in interfering with the finding of fact recorded by Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner and interfering with the same in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction. It is further submitted that Rule 25(v)(a) the Rules provide that where the workmen employed by the Contractor perform the same or similar work as directly employed by the principal employer, the workmen of the Contractor shall be entitled to same wage rates, same holidays and hours of work and same conditions of service as are applicable to the employee of the principal employer and in case of any disagreement with regard to type of work, the issue has to be decided by the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner. 7. Our attention has also been invited to Rule 25(2)(iv) of the Rules and it is submitted that one of the conditions tow which licence granted under Section 12(1) of the Act is that the rate of wages payable to the workmen by the Contractor shall not be less than rates prescribed under Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and where such rates have been fixed by agreement, settlement or award not less than rates so fixed. It is also argued that expression 'wages' defined under Section 2(h) of the Act has the same meaning as assigned to it under Section 2(vi) of the 1936 Act under Section 21(4) of the 1970 Act the principal employer has to ensure that workers of the Contractor are paid minimum wages. It is also contended that in view of Section 36(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act even assuming that workman is not a member of the Union, any person can represent the cause of the workman. It is also submitted that the 1970 Act is a social welfare legislation and provisions of the same deserves to be construed liberally. It is also contended that in view of Section 36(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act even assuming that workman is not a member of the Union, any person can represent the cause of the workman. It is also submitted that the 1970 Act is a social welfare legislation and provisions of the same deserves to be construed liberally. In support of aforesaid submissions, reliance has bee placed on decisions in 'SENIOR REGIONAL MANAGER, FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA, CALCUTTA VS. TULASI DAS BAWRI', LAWS (SC) 1997, 490, 'D.P.MAHESHWARI VS. DELHI ADMINISTRATION & OTHERS', 1983 (4) SCC 293 , 'HINDUSTAN STEEL WORKS CONSTRUCTION LTD. VS. THE COMMISSIONER OF LABOUR', 1996 (10) SCC 599 , 'PEOPLES UNION FOR DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS VS. UNION OF INDIA', AIR 1982 SC 1473 , 'GUJARATH ELECTRICITY BOARD VS. HINDU MAZDOOR SABHA', AIR 1995 SC 1893 , 'S.K.VERMAN VS. MAHESH CHANDRA AND OTHERS', AIR 1984 SC 1462 , 'SENIOR REGIONAL MANAGER, FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA VS. TULSI DAS BAINI', 1997 (5) SCC 51 , 'HUSSAINBHAI VS. THE ALATH FACTORY TEZHILATE UNION AND OTHERS', AIR 1978 SC 1410 , 'SANJIT ROY VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN', 1983(1) SCC 525 , 'SHANKAR MUKHARJEE VS. UNION OF INDIA', AIR 1990 SC 532 , 'BSNL VS DEPUTY LABOUR COMMISSIONER', and 2011(5) LLN 322 (MAD). 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the Management submitted that the Union has no locus to espouse the cause of the workmen who are contract labourers as the aforesaid labourers are not the members of the Union and the Union can raise a dispute only for its members. It is also submitted that issue relating to 'equal pay for equal work' and the issue of liability can be determined on the basis of the evidence and contractor alone is liable to pay the amount. It is further submitted that Section 21 of the Act will apply in respect of wages fixed by the Contractor which cannot be less than minimum wages and the recovery of the wages can be made from the principal employer only in respect of wages covered under Section 21 of the Act and not on the principle of equal pay for equal work. It is also urged that at the best Management can be summoned as a witness to disclose the nature of the work and it is neither a necessary party nor a proper party to the lis. It is also urged that at the best Management can be summoned as a witness to disclose the nature of the work and it is neither a necessary party nor a proper party to the lis. It is also urged that since, the question of jurisdiction was involved therefore, the learned Single Judge rightly entertained the petition. In support of aforesaid submissions, reliance has been placed on decisions in 'STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD AND OTHERS VS. NATIONAL UNION WATERFRONT WORKERS', (2001) 7 SCC 1 , 'INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY OF INDIA VS. INTERNATIONAL AIR CARGO WORKERS UNION AND ANOTHER', (2009) 13 SCC 374 , 'STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA VS. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS', (2006) 12 SCC 233 , 'HINDUSTAN STEELWORKS CONSTRUCTION LTD. VS. THE COMMISSIONER OF LABOUR & ORS.', (1996) 10 SCC 599 . 9. We have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. The Supreme Court in D.P.MAHESHWARI, supra, held as follows: "There was a time when it was thought prudent and wise policy to decide preliminary issues first. But the time appears to have arrived for a reversal of that policy. We think it is better that tribunals, particularly those entrusted with the task of adjudicating labour disputes where delay may lead to misery and jeopardise industrial peace, should decide all issues in dispute at the same time without trying some of them as preliminary issues. Nor should High Court in the exercise of their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution stop proceedings before a Tribunal so that a preliminary issue may be decided by them. Neither the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution nor the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 may be allowed to be exploited by those who can well afford to wait to the detriment of those who can ill afford to wait by by dragging the latter from court to court for adjudication of peripheral issues, avoiding decision more vital to them. Article 226 and Article 136 are not meant to be used to break the resistance of workmen in this fashion. Tribunals and courts who are requested to decide preliminary questions must therefore as themselves whether such threshold part-adjudication is really necessary and whether it will nto lead to other woeful consequences. Article 226 and Article 136 are not meant to be used to break the resistance of workmen in this fashion. Tribunals and courts who are requested to decide preliminary questions must therefore as themselves whether such threshold part-adjudication is really necessary and whether it will nto lead to other woeful consequences. After all Tribunals like industrial Tribunals are constituted to decide expeditiously special kinds of disputes and their jurisdiction to so decide is not to be stifled by all manner of preliminary objections and journeyings up and down. It is also worthwhile remembering that the nature of the jurisdiction under Article 226 is supervisory and not appellate while that under Article 136 is preliminary supervisory but the court may exercise all necessary appellate powers to do substantial justice. In the exercise of such jurisdiction neither High Court nor this court is required to be too astute to interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction by special Tribunals at interlocutory stages and on preliminary issues." 10. In ANUP ENGINEERING LTD. Vs. SHREENARAYAN KANAIYALAL (1996) 2 LLJ 751 it was held that in a proceeding under Article 226 arising out of an interim order passed by the Labour Court, the High Court should not decide the main issue as the aforesaid issue has to be adjudicated in the proceedings before the Labour Court. In 'NELTON INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. BIPIN V.PATEL' (2006) 9 SCC 192 , it was held that High Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should not ordinarily interfere with the interim order of the Labour Court unless it is of the opinion that the order of the Labour Court is so perverse that it cannot be reasonably supported. In 'DENA BANK Vs. D.V.KUNDADIA (2011) 15 SCC 690 , it was held that as follows: "It is well settled by this Court that no writ should be entertained against an interim order of the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal. It is only when a final award is given, then a party should be allowed to challenge it if he is aggrieved." 11. Thus, from perusal of aforesaid well settled legal principles, it is evident that in a writ petition challenging the interim order passed by a Labour Court / Insdustiral Tribunal, refusal to interfere is a Rule and interference with the order of Labour Court / Tribunal is an exception. 12. Thus, from perusal of aforesaid well settled legal principles, it is evident that in a writ petition challenging the interim order passed by a Labour Court / Insdustiral Tribunal, refusal to interfere is a Rule and interference with the order of Labour Court / Tribunal is an exception. 12. Before proceeding further, it is apposite to take note of relevant statutory provisions. Section 21 of the 1970 Act, Rule 25(2)(v)(a) of the Rules. 21 Responsibility for payment of wages. - (1) A contractor shall be responsible for payment of wages to each worker employed by him as contract labour and such wages shall be paid before the expiry of such period as may be prescribed. (2) Every principal employer shall nominate a representative duly authorised by him to be present at the time of disbursement of wages by the contractor and it shall be the duty of such representative to certify the amounts paid as wages in such manner as may be prescribed. (3) It shall be the duty of the contractor to ensure the disbursement of wages in the presence of the authorised representative of the principal employer. (4) In case the contractor fails to make payment of wages within the prescribed period or makes short payment, then the principal employer shall be liable to make payment of wages in full or the unpaid balance due, as the case may be, to the contract labour employed by the contractor and recover the amount so paid from the contractor either by deduction from any amount payable to the contractor under any contract or as a debt payable by the contractor. 25. Forms and terms and conditions of license .-(1) Every license granted under subsection (1) of section 12 shall be in Form VI. (2) Every license granted under sub-rule (1) or renewed under rule 29 shall be subject to the following conditions, namely:- (i)xxxxxxx (ii)xxxxxx (iii)xxxxxx (iv)xxxxxx (v)(a) in cases where the workmen employed by the contractor perform the same or similar kind of work as the workmen directly employed by the principal employer of the establishment, the wage rates, holidays, hours of work and other conditions of service of the workmen of the contractor shall be the same as applicable to the workmen directly employed by the principal employer of the establishment on the same or similar kind of work: 13. Thus, from close scrutiny of Section 21(4) of the 1970 Act, it is evident that if the contractor fails to make payment of wages within the prescribed period or makes short payment, then the principal employer shall be liable to make payment of wages in full or the unpaid due full as the case may be and to recover the amount so paid from the Contractor either from deduction from any amount payable to the contractor under any contract or as a debt payable by the Contractor. Thus, the principal employer has to ensure that workers of contractors are paid minimum wages. 14. In the light of aforesaid well settled legal position and the statutory provisions, we may advert to the facts of the case in hand. From perusal of the averments filed under the petition under Rule 25(v)(a), it is evident that the grievance of the Union as pleaded in the petition is that there is a violation of provision of Rule 25(v)(a) of the Rules. The aforesaid factual aspect of the matter is required to be adjudicated and in view of Section 21(4) of the Act the principal employer has to ensure payment of minimum wages to the employees of the Contractor. Therefore, in any case, the Management is a proper party to the lis as its presence is necessary for a fair and complete adjudication of the controversy raised by the Union. However, the question of its liability is required to be determined in the proceedings before the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner. In the instant case, the learned Single Judge while deciding the writ petition, has acted like a Court of appeal and has decided the main issue itself which has to be adjudicated by the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner and ought to have appreciated that even the preliminary objection raised by the Management requires factual adjudication. The order passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained in the eye of law. The same is hereby quashed. We need not advert to the submissions made on behalf of the management as the same would tantamount to adjudication of the controversy on merits. Needless to state that while deciding the lis, the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner shall advert to scope of Rule 25(2)(v)(a) of the Act and Section 21 of the Act. The same is hereby quashed. We need not advert to the submissions made on behalf of the management as the same would tantamount to adjudication of the controversy on merits. Needless to state that while deciding the lis, the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner shall advert to scope of Rule 25(2)(v)(a) of the Act and Section 21 of the Act. The Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner shall make an endeavor to conclude the proceedings expeditiously as the proceedings were initiated in the year 2011. It is made clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the claim of the parties as the same is required to be adjudicated by Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner. In the result, the appeal is allowed.