JUDGMENT : Biswanath Somadder, J. 1. The instant writ appeal arises in respect of a judgment and order dated 16th November, 2020, passed by a learned Single Judge in WP (C) No.113 of 2018 (Dr. Prasanna Kumar Agarwal v. State Bank of India & ors). 2. By the impugned judgment and order, the learned Single Judge has refused to entertain the writ petition primarily on the ground of inordinate delay and/or laches on the part of the writ petitioner. 3. The appellant before us is the writ petitioner. 4. Upon perusing the impugned judgment and order, we note that the learned Single Judge has taken pains to elaborately consider the issue with regard to inordinate delay and/or laches on the part of the writ petitioner (being appellant before us). Relevant portion of the impugned judgment and order is reproduced hereinbelow:- “19. On the question of delay and laches, the writ petitioner has sought to explain the delay in approaching this Court in para- 12 of the writ petition by maintaining that the delay was unintentional and was caused due to illness. A perusal of the medical certificates which has been annexed to support his contention which has staggered over the period from 2008 to 2017, however, do not adequately make out sufficient cause, inasmuch as, though a writ court in exercise of its extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution undoubtedly, has a power to condone delay if the same is satisfactorily explained, will however not do so, if the person has slept over his rights before taking further legal action. The petitioner it is noted, had immediately on passing of the impugned order dated 01.02.2011, filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority which had rejected the same vide order dated 12.09.2011, but thereafter, did not take any steps to seek further legal remedy and it was only after approximately seven years that he came knocking on the doors of this Court again. 20. The doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity cannot be said to be a technical doctrine and has to be examined on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. Delay cannot be taken to be an absolute bar in such cases but the validity of the defence for the delay must be examined and if not satisfactorily explained a Court can decline to interfere and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. Delay cannot be taken to be an absolute bar in such cases but the validity of the defence for the delay must be examined and if not satisfactorily explained a Court can decline to interfere and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. As discussed, the rule of laches of delay cannot be given a rigid definition, and interference would be called upon only if compelling circumstances exist to warrant the same. In the case at hand, a factor that starkly stands out is the implied waiver, and acceptance of the penalty as imposed, by the petitioner, who chose to not pursue further remedy after the Appellate Authority had rejected his appeal by order dated 12.09.2011, and instead waited for seven long years before filing the instant writ application. Even, if delay is occasioned, the same should be within reasonable limit or time and justified as such. In the case of Veerayee Ammal vs. Seeni Ammal reported in (2002) 1 SCC 134 , the Supreme Court at para-13 held as follows: “13. The word “reasonable” has in law prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the person concerned is called upon to act reasonably knows or ought to know as to what was reasonable. It may be unreasonable to give an exact definition of the word “reasonable”. The reason varies in its conclusion according to idiosyncrasy of the individual and the time and circumstances in which he thinks. The dictionary meaning of the “reasonable time” is to be so much time as is necessary, under the circumstances, to do conveniently what the contract or duty requires should be done in a particular case. In other words it means, as soon as circumstances permit. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s The Law Lexicon it is defined to mean: “A reasonable time, looking at all the circumstances of the case; a reasonable time under ordinary circumstances; as soon as circumstances will permit; so much time as is necessary under the circumstances, conveniently to do what the contract requires should be done; some more protracted space than ‘directly’; such length of time as may fairly, and properly, and reasonably be allowed or required, having regard to the nature of the act or duty and to the attending circumstances; all these convey more or less the same idea.” 21. In this context, it would be also apposite to refer to another judgment which is extracted herein below on the aspect of delay and laches, in the case of Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. & Anr. vs. K. Thangappan & Anr. reported in (2006) 4 SCC 322, wherein in para-6 it has been laid down as follows: “6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.” 22. Though, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner has urged that the delay and laches should be considered in a liberal manner in favour of substantive justice and also the fact that no third party rights are involved, the waiver of the petitioner and his acquiescence to the penalty imposed after seven long years, after review of the quantum of punishment cannot be ignored by this Court. The judgments on which reliance has been placed also do not come to the aid of the petitioner and the explanation afforded cannot adequately justify the long delay. 23. For the reasons aforestated, after careful consideration the instant case does not merit further consideration on the ground of inordinate delay and laches on the part of the petitioner. Being situated thus, this Court declines to examine the matter on its other merits and as such, the writ petition is dismissed and disposed of.” 5. The learned advocate representing the appellant before us has referred to various medical reports and prescriptions annexed to the appeal papers in order to make out a case in favour of the appellant to the effect that the delay in approaching the writ Court was primarily due to his medical condition. The learned advocate representing the appellant before us has referred to various medical reports and prescriptions annexed to the appeal papers in order to make out a case in favour of the appellant to the effect that the delay in approaching the writ Court was primarily due to his medical condition. Learned advocate submitted that the delay and/or laches on the part of the appellant to approach the writ Court was not deliberate and it was a culmination of a series of medical ailments which the appellant/writ petitioner was suffering from all the while, till filing of the writ petition on 11th May, 2018. 6. We, however, are not inclined to accept the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant/writ petitioner for the following reasons :- 7. The records reveal that the subject-matter of challenge before the learned Single Judge was an order dated 12th September, 2011, passed by the appellate authority. The writ petition was filed on 11th May, 2018. The medical documents which are annexed in the appeal papers reveal that the appellant/writ petitioner was suffering from various ailments starting from the year, 2008. The first prescription annexed is that of an orthopedic surgeon by the name of Dr. Tulsi Bhatacharyya, which is dated 17th April, 2008. The next medical document is a CT Scan and Angiography report dated 17th September, 2012, which was done at Woodland Hospital, Shillong, under reference of one Dr. D.S. Sethi, MBBS, MD. The prescription of Dr. D.S. Sethi, MBBS, MD, however, has not been annexed along with the medical report. Be that as it may, if the subject-matter of challenge before the learned Single Judge was an order dated 12th September, 2011, passed by the appellate authority, what could possibly have been a plausible reason to justify the appellant/writ petitioner not approaching the writ Court between 12th September, 2011 and 17th September, 2012, being the date when a CT Scan and Angiography was conducted; the period being slightly more than one year. 8. It is not the case of the appellant/writ petitioner that he was permanently incapacitated at any material point of time so as to be physically prevented from knocking at the door of the writ Court. 8. It is not the case of the appellant/writ petitioner that he was permanently incapacitated at any material point of time so as to be physically prevented from knocking at the door of the writ Court. Indeed, he could be suffering from various ailments but it cannot be held to be a logical conclusion that those ailments alone would have prevented him from approaching the high prerogative Constitutional writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India within a reasonable period of time. 9. Delay defeats equity, as rightly pointed out by the learned advocate representing the State Bank of India. Although there is no period of limitation provided in respect of initiation of proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Court while examining the question of delay is required to do it in the backdrop of the age old principles of equity. In the facts of the instant case, the learned Single Judge while proceeding to dismiss the writ petition has done just that and refused to grant any discretion in favour of the writ petitioner by either entertaining or trying or determining the writ petition. 10. That apart and in any event, the impugned judgment and order dated 16th November, 2020 is supported with cogent and justifiable reasons. In an Intra-Court Mandamus appeal, interference is usually warranted only when palpable infirmities or perversities are noticed on a plain reading of the impugned judgment and order. In the facts of the instant case, on a plain reading of the impugned judgment and order, we do not notice any such palpable infirmity or perversity, which would warrant an interference. 11. For reasons stated above, we do not find any merit in the instant appeal which is liable to be dismissed and stands dismissed accordingly.