ORDER : 1. The present petition is filed by an independent registered Public Charitable Trust through its Chief Executive, invoking extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and has sought the following reliefs :- “8(A) To quash and set aside the impugned orders annexed at Annexure – A Colly and hold and declare the same as improper, unjust, unconstitutional and unfair and in violation of provisions of the Right to Information Act, 2005. (B) This Hon’ble Court may be pleased to direct the respondent to not to pass any orders in nature of issuing direction of banning, prohibiting and/or blacklisting any citizen from any specific or indefinite time period. (C) To grant any other and further reliefs that may be deemed fit and proper and in the interest of justice.” 2. The petition is filed basically for raising grievance against the impugned order on the premise that the respondent – authorities have no power to blacklist a person who is seeking information and further has no authority to prevent a citizen from soliciting information for a period of five years. Of course, this petition is not filed by those two aggrieved persons who applied and against whom the impugned orders have been passed. But the present – Trust being a charitable Trust has come forward to assail the orders passed in two different applications by the present combined petitions. 3. Learned advocate Mr. Amresh Patel, appearing on behalf of the petitioner – Trust has submitted that a clear error is committed by the respondent – authorities while passing the impugned orders and further has no authority to place the concerned applicant in blacklist and preventing him from soliciting any information. Such orders are frustrating the very object of the Act and therefore, deserves to be quashed and set aside. Learned advocate Mr. Patel has submitted that the present petitioner is an organization, is helping out such kind of victimized citizens through the petitioner – Trust is not concerned about the veracity or information or value thereof. It is only concerned with these two issues where the prohibition is imposed by the authority and placing the concerned applicant in a blacklist, the Trust has no other intention, and no other concerned about the grievance which is tried to be raised by the applicants against whom the orders have been passed. It is only concerned with these two issues where the prohibition is imposed by the authority and placing the concerned applicant in a blacklist, the Trust has no other intention, and no other concerned about the grievance which is tried to be raised by the applicants against whom the orders have been passed. Learned advocate Mr. Patel has submitted that every citizen has a legitimate expectation that the authority concerned will abide by the law, will maintain spirit and the object of the statue and citizens may not be curbed to raise any voice. If the orders in question are allowed to be operated, according to learned advocate Mr. Patel, the same would oppress the citizens to seek any information under the relevant statute. That being the position, the orders in question are required to be quashed and set aside with consequential directions. 3.1. Learned advocate Mr. Patel to strenuously strengthen his submissions has sought to rely upon few decisions which are reproduced hereunder :- 1. Ram Parvesh Singh v. State of Bihar (2006) 8 SCC 381 . 2. People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India (1982) 3 SCC 235 . 3. Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed (1976) 1 SCC 671 . 4. People’s Union for Civil Liberties v . Union of India (2004) 2 SCC 476 . 3.2. After referring to some of the observations made by the Apex Court in the aforesaid decisions has prayed to grant the reliefs as prayed for in the petition. No other submissions have been made. 4. On an advance copy, Mr. Bhargav Pandya, learned Assistant Government Pleader has appeared on behalf of the respondent - authority and has seriously raised an issue that the present petition at the instance of Public Charitable Trust who is not concerned about information, nor concerned about the conduct of the applicant, is also not concerned even about the outcome of the orders and having no interest as such, is not entitled to invoke extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court. The basic issue related to aggrieved person is by now well defined by the Apex Court in a series of decisions. A writ jurisdiction normally may not be exercised in favour of a person who has no concern with the ultimate core issue involved in the proceedings and nor his legal right is infringed. The basic issue related to aggrieved person is by now well defined by the Apex Court in a series of decisions. A writ jurisdiction normally may not be exercised in favour of a person who has no concern with the ultimate core issue involved in the proceedings and nor his legal right is infringed. No writ jurisdiction according to the respectful submission of Mr. Pandya, learned Assistant Government Pleader be exercised in favour of the trust/person who is not aggrieved, not concerned with the subject matter and therefore, this petition at the threshold deserves to be dismissed. Mr. Pandya, learned Assistant Government Pleader has further submitted that to raise the grievance against the impugned orders by the present petitioner – Trust has no relevance or the reason behind challenging the impugned orders is also silent and suspicious and, therefore, for the purpose of facilitating to achieve some hidden agenda the petitioner - Trust may not be allowed to utilize the writ jurisdiction of this Court. 4.1. Apart from that, Mr. Pandya, learned Assistant Government Pleader has submitted that this is a writ petition seeking issuance of writ of certiorari and is not to be substituted into PIL where the petitioner – Trust has made an attempt to assail the orders, though not aggrieved personally. That being the position, the petition being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed with appropriate costs. 5. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and having gone through the basic averments made in the present proceedings, prima facie, it is reflecting clearly from the orders that the before the authorities below, the petitioner - Trust was never a party to the proceedings filed under the provisions of Right to Information Act, 2005 and at page 21A, one of the complaints which have been reflecting is filed by one Mr. Chintanbhai Bharatbhai Makwana of Bhavnagar and another proceedings under the Right to Information Act appears to have been filed by one Manojkumar Prabhudas Sarpadadiya of village Sawarkundla, District : Amreli reflecting on page 22 and these respective individual applicants have made an attempt before the authority and have been met with the adverse orders and it is clearly reflecting that these adverse orders have not been challenged undisputedly by those two individual applicants who are residing at different and distance places. 5.1. 5.1. Additionally, it is also clearly visible that this is a registerd Public Charitable Trust, having permanent address at Ahmedabad and the Chief Executive and the trustee is also according to learned advocate Mr. Patel has no concern with those individual applicants. It has been submitted by learned advocate Mr. Patel that the petitioner – Trust is also not concerned about any other issues which are raised by those individual applicants and is only concerned with the prohibitory order and the blacklisting order passed by the authority and as such, in this situation the challenge made by the petitioner is sounding no confidence at all. On the contrary, it clearly reflects that the present petitioner Trust is having some hidden agenda in challenging the impugned orders and that being so, ultimately, the question before the Court is whether to entertain the petition filed by the petitioner – Trust and to allow it to invoke extra ordinary jurisdiction. 6. In view of the peculiar background of facts, prima facie, it clearly revealed from the record that the petitioner was never a party to the original proceedings which were filed by two individual applicants in two different applications and residing at two different places far awary from the petitioner – Trust. It further culled out from the proceedings that those two individual applicants who are faced with such orders have chosen not to challenge the orders and qua them, the orders have become final as it seems. It is only this Trust, under the guise of present writ petition, has made an attempt to high jack the litigation to precipitate further though having no remote connection with those two applicants nor with the applications which were submitted. So this Trust basically in too general form has come to espouse the cause by way of present consolidated petitions which is otherwise also not entertainable in the present form. 7. To understand more accurately the concept of aggrieved party in the context of present statute,a reference is required to be made to relevant provisions of the Act, in addition to other provisions. The Statute has prescribed a specific provision for any party to apply for information as permissible in law and if such person who made an attempt is aggrieved by any of the decisions or even inaction, a specific statutory remedy is provided by way of appeal under Section 19 of the Act. The Statute has prescribed a specific provision for any party to apply for information as permissible in law and if such person who made an attempt is aggrieved by any of the decisions or even inaction, a specific statutory remedy is provided by way of appeal under Section 19 of the Act. A careful reading of the said statutory provisions is clearly indicating that such appeal is filed, by any person who is aggrieved, who does not receive the decision or is aggrieved by any decision of the Public Information Officer as the case may be and as such, any other person stranger to the proceedings, is not provided with such kind of appeal remedy. Even the Regulations which have been framed which are known as Central Information Commission (Management) Regulations, 2007, have also provided the manner and method in which the appeal is to be presented. Even, Rules 2012 have also provided a process of appeal, how to be submitted and before whom and in addition thereto, even Chapter IV of the said Regulations deals with the registration, abatement or returning of appeal. Since, the aforesaid provisions are relevant to the issue, the Court deems it proper to reproduce the same hereunder :- “19. Appeal. (1) Any person who, does not receive a decision within the time specified in sub-section (1) or clause (a) of subsection (3) of Section 7, or is aggrieved by a decision of the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, may within thirty days from the expiry of such period or from the receipt of such a decision prefer an appeal to such officer who is senior in rank to the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Officer, as the case may be, in each public authority. Provided that such officer may admit the appeal after the expiry of the period of thirty days if he or she is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time. (2) Where an appeal is preferred against an order made by a Central Public Information Officer or a State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, under Section 11 to disclose third party information, the appeal by the concerned third party shall be made within thirty days from the date of the order. (2) Where an appeal is preferred against an order made by a Central Public Information Officer or a State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, under Section 11 to disclose third party information, the appeal by the concerned third party shall be made within thirty days from the date of the order. (3) A second appeal against the decision under sub-section (1) shall lie within ninety days from the date on which the decision should have been made or was actually received, with the Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission; Provided that the Central Information Commission, or the State Information Commission, as the case may be, against which an appeal is preferred relates to information of a third party, the Central Information Commission or State Information Commission, as the case may be shall give a reasonable opportunity of being heard to that third party. (5) In any appeal proceedings, the onus to prove that a denial of a request was justified shall be on the Central Public Information Officer, or State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, who denied the request. (6) An appeal under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be disposed of within thirty days of the receipt of the appeal or within such extended period not exceeding a total of forty-five days from the date of filing thereof, as the case may be, for reasons to be recorded in writing. (7) The decision of the Central Information Commission or State Information Commission, as the case may be, shall be binding. (7) The decision of the Central Information Commission or State Information Commission, as the case may be, shall be binding. (8) In its decision, the Central Information Commission or State Information Commission, as the case may be, has the power to— (a) require the public authority to take any such steps as may be necessary to secure compliance with the provisions of this Act, including— (i) by providing access to information, if so requested, in a particular form; (ii) by appointing a Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the case may be; (iii) by publishing certain information or categories of information; (iv) by making necessary changes to its practices in relation to the maintenance, management and destruction of records; (v) by enhancing the provision of training on the right to information for its officials; (vi) by providing it with an annual report in compliance with clause (b) of subsection (1) of section 4; (b) require the public authority to compensate the complainant for any loss or other detriment suffered; (c) impose any of the penalties provided under this Act; (d) reject the application. (9) The Central Information Commission or State Information Commission, as the case may be, shall give notice of its decision, including any right of appeal, to the complainant and the public authority. (10) The Central Information Commission or State Information Commission, as the case may be, shall decide the appeal in accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed.” The Right to Information Rules, 2012. “8. (10) The Central Information Commission or State Information Commission, as the case may be, shall decide the appeal in accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed.” The Right to Information Rules, 2012. “8. Appeal to the Commission.—Any person aggrieved by an order passed by the First Appellate Authority or by non-disposal of his appeal by the First Appellate Authority, may file an appeal to the Commission in the format given in the Appendix and shall be accompanied by the following documents, duly authenticated and verified by the appellant, namely:- (i) a copy of the application submitted to the Central Public Information Officer; (ii) a copy of the reply received, if any, from the Central Public Information Officer; (iii) a copy of the appeal made to the First Appellate Authority; (iv) a copy of the Order received, if any, from the First Appellate Authority; (v) copies of other documents relied upon by the appellant and referred to in his appeal; and (vi) an index of the documents referred to in the appeal.” Return of Appeal.—An appeal may be returned to the appellant, if it is not accompanied by the documents as specified in rule 8, for removing the deficiencies and filing the appeal complete in all respects. 10. Process of appeal.—(1) On receipt of an appeal, if the Commission is not satisfied that it is a fit case to proceed with, it may, after giving an opportunity of being heard to the appellant and after recording its reasons, dismiss the appeal: Provided that no appeal shall be dismissed only on the ground that it has not been made in the specified format if it is accompanied by documents as specified in rule 8. (2) The Commission shall not consider an appeal unless it is satisfied that the appellant has availed of all the remedies available to him under the Act. (2) The Commission shall not consider an appeal unless it is satisfied that the appellant has availed of all the remedies available to him under the Act. (3) For the purposes of sub-rule (2), a person shall be deemed to have availed of all the remedies available to him under the Act: (a) if he had filed an appeal before the First Appellate Authority and the First Appellate Authority or any other person competent to pass order on such appeal had made a final order on the appeal; or (b) where no final order has been made by the First Appellate Authority with regard to the appeal preferred, dnd a period of forty five days from the date on which such appeal was preferred has elapsed. 11. Procedure for deciding appeals.—The Commission, while deciding an appeal may.— (i) receive oral or written evidence on oath or on affidavit from concerned or interested person; (ii) peruse or inspect documents, public records or copies thereof; (iii) inquire through authorised officer further details or facts; (iv) hear Central Public Information Officer, Central Assistant Public Information Officer or the First Appellate Authority, or such person against whose action the appeal is preferred, as the case may be; (v) hear third party; and, (vi) receive evidence on affidavits from Central Public Information Officer, Central Assistant Public Information Officer, First Appellate Authority and such other person against whom the appeal lies or the third party.” The Central Information Commission (Management) Regulations, 2007. “7. Appeal or complaint etc. to be in writing. -Every appeal, complaint, application, statement, rejoinder, reply or any other document filed before the Commission shall be typed, printed or written neatly and legibly and in double line spacing and the language used therein shall be formal and civilised and should not be in any way indecent or abusive. The appeal, complaint or an application shall be presented in at least two sets in a paper-book form. 8. Contents of appeal or complaint. The appeal, complaint or an application shall be presented in at least two sets in a paper-book form. 8. Contents of appeal or complaint. - (1) An appeal or a complaint to the Commission shall contain the following information, namely:- (i) name, address and other particulars of the appellant or complainant, as the case may be; (ii) name and address of the Central Public Information Officer (CPIO) or the Central Assistant Public Information Officer (CAPIO) against whom a complaint is made under section 18 of the Act, and the name and address of the First Appellate Authority before whom the first appeal was preferred under section 19(1) of the Act; (iii) particulars of the decision or order, if any, including its number and the date it was pronounced, against which the appeal is preferred; (iv) brief facts leading to the appeal or the complaint; (v) if the appeal or complaint is preferred against refusal or deemed refusal of the information, the particulars of the application, including number and date and name and address of the Central Public Information Officer to whom the application was made and name and address of the First Appellate Authority before whom the appeal was filed; (vi) prayer or relief sought; (vii) grounds for the prayer or relief; (viii) verification by the appellant or the complainant, as the case may be; and (ix) any other information which may be deemed as necessary and helpful for the Commission to decide the appeal or complaint. (2) The contents of the complaint shall be in the same form as prescribed for the appeal with such changes as may be deemed necessary or appropriate. 9. Documents to accompany appeal or complaint. (2) The contents of the complaint shall be in the same form as prescribed for the appeal with such changes as may be deemed necessary or appropriate. 9. Documents to accompany appeal or complaint. -Every appeal or complaint made to the Commission shall be accompanied by self attested copies/photo copies of the following documents, namely:- (i) The RTI application submitted before the CPIO along with documentary proof as regards payment of fee under the RTI Act; (ii) The order, or decision or response, if any, from the CPIO to whom the application under the RTI Act was submitted; (iii) The First appeal submitted before the First Appellate Authority with documentary proof of filing the First Appeal; (iv) The Orders or decision or response, if any, from the First Appellate Authority against which the appeal or complaint is being preferred; (v) The documents relied upon and referred to in the appeal or complaint; (vi) A certificate stating that the matters under appeal or complaint have not been previously filed, or are pending, with any court or tribunal or with any other authority; (vii) An index of the documents referred to in the appeal or complaint; and (viii) A list of dates briefly indicating in chronological order the progress of the matter up to the date of filing the appeal or complaint to be placed at the top of all the documents filed. 7.1. So from conjoint reading of the aforesaid statutory provisions of the Act, Rules and Regulations, it goes without saying that the aggrieved person is the person against whom an adverse order is passed and against inaction. A person concerned has been given adequate opportunity to assail the orders and as such, outsider or totally stranger to the proceedings cannot be said to have any locus and thereto, in the proceedings where the petitioner was never a party, undisputedly and as such, an attempt which has been made to high jack the proceedings in the midst and to precipitate further for challenging the orders for which a Trust is not concern, is a serious attempt, which cannot be encouraged by the Court. Allowing such attempt by the petitioner would rather a counter productive to the object for which the statue is framed and if the Courts are allowing such kind of total strangers to challenge the orders which have been passed in any other persons, who have no nexus with the petitioner, would lead to chaotic situation, and allowing room for mischief, which is not possible to be unnoticed by this Court, in the present form and in the peculiar background of facts, the petitioner cannot be said to be aggrieved person who can be allowed to challenge the impugned orders. 8. By now in a catena of decisions, the Apex Court has spelt out a boundary related to the grievance of a person and their right to invoke extra ordinary jurisdiction or to invoke a writ jurisdiction. Few observations contained in the decision delivered by the Apex Court in the case of Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed & Ors., reported in (1976) 1 SCC 67, para 37, 38 and 38 deserve to be quoted hereunder since this Court has considered the same. “37. It will be seen that in the context of locus standi to apply for a writ of certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily fall in any of these categories: (i) 'person aggrieved'; (ii) 'stranger'; (iii) busybody or meddlesome interloper. Persons in the last category are easily distinguishable from those coming under the first two categories. Such persons interfere in things which do not concern them. They masquerade as crusaders for justice. They pretend to act in the name of Pro Bono Publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect. They indulge in the pastime of meddling with the judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often, they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity; while the ulterior intent of some applicants in this category, may be no more than spoking the wheels of administration. The High Court should do well to reject the applications of such busybodies at the threshold. 38. The distinction between the first and second categories of applicants, though real, is not always well-demarcated. The High Court should do well to reject the applications of such busybodies at the threshold. 38. The distinction between the first and second categories of applicants, though real, is not always well-demarcated. The first category has, as it were, two concentric zones; a solid central zone of certainty, and a grey outer circle of lessening certainty in a sliding centrifugal scale, with an outermost nebulous fringe of uncertainty. Applicants falling within the central zone are those whose legal rights have been infringed. Such applicants undoubtedly stand in the category of 'persons aggrieved'. In the grey outer-circle the. bounds which separate the first category from the second, intermix, interfuse and overlap increasingly in a centrifugal direction. All persons in this outerzone may not be "persons aggrieved. 39. To distinguish such applicants from 'strangers', among them, some broad tests may be deduced from the conspectus made above. These tests are not absolute and ultimate. Their efficacy varies according to the circumstances of the case, including the statutory context in which the matter falls to be considered. These are: Whether the applicant is a person whose legal right has been infringed ? Has he suffered a legal wrong or injury, in the sense that his interest, recognised by law. has been prejudicially and directly affected by the act or omission of the authority, complained of ? Is he a person who has suffered a legal grievance, a person "against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something" ? Has he a special and substantial grievance of his own beyond some grievance or inconvenience suffered by him in common with the rest of the public ? Was he entitled to object and be heard by the authority before it took the impugned action? If so, was he prejudicially affected in the exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of jurisdiction on (1) United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co.351 U.S.192. (2) Kansas City Power & light Co. v. McKay 350 U. S. Jasbhai Motibhai Desai vs Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed &...on 19 December, 1975 Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1749406/ 16 884. 6-390SCr/76 the part of the authority ? Is the statute, in the context of which the scope of-the words "person aggrieved" is being considered. (2) Kansas City Power & light Co. v. McKay 350 U. S. Jasbhai Motibhai Desai vs Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed &...on 19 December, 1975 Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1749406/ 16 884. 6-390SCr/76 the part of the authority ? Is the statute, in the context of which the scope of-the words "person aggrieved" is being considered. a social welfare measure designed to lay down ethical or professional standards of conduct for the community ? or is it a statute dealing with private rights of particular individuals ? 8.1. The aforesaid observations by the Apex Court are also if to be viewed are in the context of the writ of certiorari which is sought by the concerned person, similar to the case on hand. In addition thereto, even the aforesaid observations of the Apex Court are cited and followed in some 450 times in a passage of time and the recent decisions are also since considered by this Court and found it relevant, some of the observations contained in the decision delivered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bhikabhai Chanabhai Gajera v. Semrala Gopalak Vividh Karyakari Sahakari Mandali Limited, reported in 2020 LawSuit (Guj.) 654 are the relevant observation which this Court found appropriate to reproduce hereunder :- “36. In Jashbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed [ (1976) 1 SCC 671 ] the Supreme Court elaborately discussed the concept of 'an aggrieved person', and observed that in order to have the locus standi to invoke certiorari jurisdiction, the petitioner should be an aggrieved person. If he does not fulfill that characteristic, and if is a 'stranger', the Court will deny him this extra ordinary remedy. 38. The Apex Court further stated what Salmon J. quoted with approval these observations of James T. J. in In Re Sidebothem [(1880) 14 Ch D 458, 465], and the passage quoted with approval would apply apt and apposite. "The words 'person aggrieved' do not really means a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made. A 'person aggrieved' must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance,' a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something, or wrong fully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something." (Para 30) (emphasis supplied) 39. A 'person aggrieved' must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance,' a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something, or wrong fully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something." (Para 30) (emphasis supplied) 39. The following observations of the Apex Court in Ravi Yashvant Bhoir v. District Collector, Raigad [ (2012) 4 SCC 407 ] explains the concept and the law. "... ... ... A legal right is an averment of entitlement arising out of law. In fact, it is a benefit conferred upon a person by the rule of law. Thus, a person who suffers from legal injury can only challenge the act or omission. There may be some harm or loss that may not be wrongful in the eyes of law because it may not result in injury to a legal right or legally protected interest of the complainant but juridically harm of this description is called damnum sine injuria." (Para 58) "The complainant has to establish that he has been deprived of or denied of a legal right and he has sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In case he has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on, he cannot be heard as a party in a lis. A fanciful or sentimental grievance may not be sufficient to confer a locus standi to sue upon the individual. There must be injuria or a legal grievance which can be appreciated and not a stat pro ratione valuntas reasons i.e. a claim devoid of reasons." (Para 59) 40. The Supreme Court in the Bar Council of Maharashtra vs. M.V. Dabholkar (1975) 2 SCC 702 , opined that the meaning of the words 'person aggrieved' will have to be ascertained with reference to the purpose and the provisions of the statute. It observed that the words 'person aggrieved' correspond to the requirements of locus standi which arises in relation to the judicial remedies. 41. Thus, in order to become entitle to seek a statutory remedy, a person must show and establish that he is injured with a legal wrong. There must be an injury to a legally recognised, legally protected and legally enforceable right. The principle to be applied is that there must be a injuria sine damnum and not the damnum sine injuria for taking a legal action and a legal recourse. There must be an injury to a legally recognised, legally protected and legally enforceable right. The principle to be applied is that there must be a injuria sine damnum and not the damnum sine injuria for taking a legal action and a legal recourse. A damage suffered has to be coupled with legal injury. It is this kind of injury on which the right- enforceability may be based.” 8.3. Yet another decision of recent time delivered by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Arun Yashwant Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra; Commissioner of Co-operation and Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Maharashtra State of Cooperative Election Authority reported in 2021 LawSuit (Bom) 151, in which also, the Court was confronted with the issue related to locus standi and aggrieved person and while disposing of the writ proceedings, some of the observations relevant to the issue have been made, which this Court is persuaded to consider, hence, deems it proper to reproduce hereunder:- “32 There is no doubt regarding the legal proposition that the rights under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be avk 21/25 3-WPST-96919-2020.doc invoked only by an aggrieved person except in the case where the writ prayed is for habeas corpus or quo warranto. Another exception in the general rule is the filing of a writ petition in public interest. The existence of the legal right of the petitioner which is alleged to have been violated is the foundation for invoking jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 33. In Jasbhai Motibhai Desai vs. Roshan Kumar Haji Bashir Ahmed the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraph 13 held as under : "13 .......The expression "aggrieved person" denotes an elastic, and to an extent, an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. At best, its features can be described in a broad tentative manner. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the petitioner's interest, and 9 (1976) 1 Supreme Court Cases 671 avk 22/25 3-WPST-96919- 2020.doc the nature of the prejudice or injury suffered by him. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the petitioner's interest, and 9 (1976) 1 Supreme Court Cases 671 avk 22/25 3-WPST-96919- 2020.doc the nature of the prejudice or injury suffered by him. English courts have sometimes put a restricted and sometimes a wide construction on the expression "aggrieved person"........." 34. Similarly, in Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan (supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraph 9 held as under : "9 ....Only a person who has suffered, or suffers from legal injury can challenge the act/action/order etc. in a court of law. A writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable either for the purpose of enforcing a statutory or legal right, or when there is a complaint by the appellant that there has been a breach of Arun Yashwant Kulkarni vs The State Of Maharashtra Through ... on 16 February, 2021 Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/161299251/ 9 statutory duty on the part of the Authorities. Therefore, there must be a judicially enforceable right available for enforcement, on the basis of which writ jurisdiction is resorted to. The Court can, of course, enforce the performance of a statutory duty by a public body, using its writ jurisdiction at the behest of a person, provided that such person satisfies the Court that he has a legal right to insist on such performance. The existence of such right is a condition precedent for invoking the writ jurisdiction of the courts. It is avk 23/25 3-WPST-96919- 2020.doc implicit in the exercise of such extraordinary jurisdiction that the relief prayed for must be one to enforce a legal right. Infact, the existence of such right, is the foundation of the exercise of the said jurisdiction by the Court........" 36. In the instant petition we do not require much prescience to realize that neither pleadings nor prayers specifically and categorically show infraction of petitioner's legal right and its enforcement thereto. The petition is tellingly silent on this material aspect. There is abysmal failure on the part of the petitioner to exhibit existence of legal grievance which needs to be appreciated and allayed by invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 37. The petition is tellingly silent on this material aspect. There is abysmal failure on the part of the petitioner to exhibit existence of legal grievance which needs to be appreciated and allayed by invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 37. Thus, from the above, it is evident that petitioner has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on. Therefore, he is not a "person aggrieved" and has no locus standi to challenge the constitutional validity of impugned Ordinances and Order. 38 The enduring conclusion from the record is, first, that the petitioner lacks cause of action and, second, that the petitioner has no locus standi. In view of this conclusion, it is not necessary for us to consider the objections raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner against the validity of the impugned Ordinances and Orders on the ground that they contravene Article 14, 19(1)(c), 243-ZJ and 243-ZK of the Constitution of India.” 9. In view of the aforesaid circumstances which are stated herein above and the observations which have been made as indicated above would lead to a conclusion that in the present proceedings, the petitioner – Trust has no locus standi to present the petition and make an attempt to assail the orders which are otherwise to be challenged by really aggrieved persons. 10. In the premise, this Court is of the clear opinion that the petitioner – Trust is not entitle to espouse the cause of any citizens in general even though those citizens are not interested in challenging the orders, writ jurisdiction has its own self imposed limitation which this Court is not in a position to ignore. This private Trust which is projected to be a charitable Trust espousing the cause of the citizens in general has not produced even any trust deed or object thereof and simply has rush down to the Court to challenge the orders as if is personally interested to challenge the same. This private Trust which is projected to be a charitable Trust espousing the cause of the citizens in general has not produced even any trust deed or object thereof and simply has rush down to the Court to challenge the orders as if is personally interested to challenge the same. A Public Charitable Trust are on the contrary expected to act in a reasonable and fair manner, must be expected to act within the four corners of their respective object for which they have been setup and as such, the petitioner itself having not clarified the situation about its existence and its role, it is not open for the petitioner to challenge the orders which have been passed by the authorities in case of individual persons. Since the petitioner – Trust is not concerned about the information, value thereof, and about the conduct of the respective applicants, who are residing at different places, an attempt made by the petitioner – Trust to invoke extra ordinary jurisdiction appears to be mischievous and frivolous one which deserves to be discouraged. If this attempt is allowed to be operated, the same will have the effect of encouraging such kind of individuals who have been dealt with by the authority in appropriate manner. Furthermore, when the authorities have acted in an alleged arbitrary manner or without authority of law, then it is always open for those individual applicants to challenge the decisions which have been personally affected them, but certainly not at the instance of such kind of Public Charitable Trust who are out to misuse their position and this challenge on the part of the petitioner – Trust is clearly not entertainable. Hence, the petition being devoid of merit, at the threshold deserves to be dismissed as being abuse of process of law. 11. At this stage during the course of submissions, Mr. Patel, learned advocate for the petitioner has relied upon few decisions delivered by the Apex Court, and this Court is under an obligation to examine from the said perspective as well and as such, now the said decisions are taken into consideration hereunder:. 11.1. 11. At this stage during the course of submissions, Mr. Patel, learned advocate for the petitioner has relied upon few decisions delivered by the Apex Court, and this Court is under an obligation to examine from the said perspective as well and as such, now the said decisions are taken into consideration hereunder:. 11.1. The first decision which has been relied upon by the learned advocate for the petitioner in the case of J asbhai Motibhai Desai (supra), wherein the ratio is also not that much supporting to the petitioner, on the contrary, while dealing with the writ of certiorari, the Apex Court has observed in certain paragraphs which are quoted by this Court in the earlier part of this order and as such not of much assistance to the petitioner. 11.2. The second decision which has been relied upon in the case of People’s Union for Democratic Rights (supra), in which the Apex Court was considering the issue of locus standi in case of public interest litigation and that was pertaining to a peculiar background of alleged scam relating to construction work in Asian Games at Delhi and, therefore, the facts were totally different and more so, it was in relation to the public interest litigation and as such, the said decision is of no avail to the petitioner since undisputedly the present petition is not a public interest litigation. 11.3. In addition thereto, two other decisions have been tried to be relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of Ram Parvesh Singh (supra) in which also issue of doctrine of legitimate expectation is dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex Court and while dealing with the said issue the Apex Court has clearly pointed out that a person can have legitimate expectation of a particular treatment, only if representation or promise is made by the authority either expressly or impliedly and further the doctrine of legitimate expectation can be invoked only by someone who had dealings or transactions or negotiations or a legal relationship with the authority and none other can invoke the said doctrine, merely on the ground of general obligation of the authority to act fairly and, therefore, on the contrary, this would discard the petitioner from agitating the issue relating to doctrine of legitimate expectation and, as such, this decision is of no assistance to the petitioner. 11.4. 11.4. The last in line is the decision in the case of People’s Union for Civil Liberties (supra) in which the Apex Court was dealing with the Right to Information, to know and issue of freedom of speech and expression as contained under Article 19(1) (a) and (2) of the Constitution of India and while dealing with such issue, it has been clearly observed that every right legal or moral carried with it a corresponding obligation. It is subject to several exemptions and exceptions indicated in the broad terms. It has been further propounded that if any reasonable restrictions is imposed in the interest of State by reason of a valid piece of legislation, the court normally would respect the legislation policy behind the same and as such essentially the Apex Court was dealing with the issue which has no direct connection with facts on hand and, therefore, none of the decisions which have been pointed out are of any assistance to the petitioner. The Court is surprised that the petitioner has made an attempt to rely upon the decisions which have no applicability and made an attempt to divulge attention from the core issue involved in the petition and hence the attempt deserves to be discouraged. In view of this, no case is made out by the petitioner – Trust. 12. Considering the overall circumstances of the case, the Court is also of the opinion that when a Public Charitable Trust who has no concern with the information, who is not connected with those two persons who can be said to be really aggrieved, residing at a distant places, having no connection, how the petitioner – Trust is very much interested in carrying out the process of challenging the orders by way of filing the present combine writ though having no locus. The petitioner – Trust is said to have been setup and registered under the provisions of Bombay Public Trust Act, is run on the basis of the object for which it has been setup, but unfortunately, the petitioner has neither asserted anything, nor produced trust deed, nor in any form asserted as to how there is any remote nexus with the challenge made in the petition. Simply because a representation is made, the same would not bring the petitioner within the format of aggrieved person. Simply because a representation is made, the same would not bring the petitioner within the format of aggrieved person. That being so, since this petition is not a Public Interest Litigation, the Court is not inclined to accept at the instance of the petitioner. It has also not brought on record as to on account of which conduct, those two persons who are residing quite away from the place of the Trust, are dealt with by the authority in such a manner, for that also, no case is made out and conspicuous silence is made by the petitioner – Trust. This Trust is not run by an individual, but it is by the collective body and as such ought to have thoughtfully presented the petition and not in this improper combine format. The Court see no convincing circumstance to allow the petitioner – Trust to carry out the challenge of the decisions which have taken place against the persons to whom the Trust is a stranger. Whatsoever may be object of the Trust, but such an attempt is not possible to be encouraged otherwise, there will be a possible mischief, whereby, every person who is not connected or concerned, with the real grievance, will come forward and try to misuse the very object for which act is enacted. Allowing this Trust to carry out this kind of challenge which would rather defeat the object of the statue and as such, this Court is not inclined to exercise extra ordinary juridically at the instance of the present petitioner Trust, this attempt is found by the Court is nothing but an example of abuse of process of law. Hence, the petition deserves to be dismissed with costs quantified at Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand only) which is to be deposited before the High Court Legal Services Committee. Accordingly, the present petition stands dismissed with costs as quantified above. Sd/- ASHUTOSH J. SHASTRI, J. After the time of pronouncement of the order, at this stage, learned advocate Mr. Patel, has requested the Court to reduce the amount of costs since the petitioner – Trust is a charitable organization. Accordingly, request is considered, the amount of costs quantified at Rs.25,000/- is reduced to the extent of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand only). Orders accordingly.