JUDGMENT 1. This Second Appeal under Order 3 of the High Court of Meghalaya (Jurisdiction over District Council Courts) Order, 2014 read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been preferred against the judgment dated 03.02.2021, passed by the Judge, District Council Court in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 1 of 2020. 2. The brief facts of the case are that, the appellants who are members of the Umran Dairy Presbyterian Church, Ri Bhoi District, were compelled to institute a suit before the District Council Court when differences and disputes arose with the respondent over the control and management of the church. The said title suit was registered as Title Suit No. 16 of 2020, and was filed along with a Misc. Case being Misc. Case No. 16 of 2020, for grant of temporary injunction. The learned Sub-Ordinate District Council Court on being prima facie satisfied, by order dated 03.08.2020, was pleased to pass an order of adinterim injunction, firstly, restraining the respondent from entering into and interfering with the administration and management of the church and secondly, that the opposite party/respondent was to immediately stop issuing threats or restrict the petitioners and other members of the church from using the Church Graveyard, the Church as well as the School. The respondent against the said ad-interim injunction order preferred an appeal before the Judge, District Council Court who by judgment and order dated 03.02.2021, quashed and set aside the order dated 03.08.2020. Aggrieved by the order of the Lower Appellate Court, the appellants are before this court by way of the instant appeal. 3. Considering the nature of the dispute and the points involved herein, this Court is disposing of this matter at the stage of admission hearing itself. The counsel for the appellants has also filed the substantial questions of law that are to be taken into consideration at the time of hearing this appeal and the same are reproduced hereinbelow: a) Whether the Appellate Court has exceeded its jurisdiction and acted arbitrarily in deciding the issue for grant of temporary injunction finally when the appeal was filed only against ex-parte ad-interim order passed by the Trial Court? b) Whether the Appellate Court, without any finding as to the perversity of the ad interim injunction order granted by the trial court, could have decided the petition for grant of temporary injunction when the respondent has not even filed his show cause? c) Whether the Appellate Court exceeded its jurisdiction in going into the merits of the case akin to a mini trial while deciding the appeal which is limited to the question as to whether the ad interim injunction granted by the trial court is proper or not? d) Whether the Appellate Court has committed gross irregularity in coming to a finding that the appellant own and possess the Church building, the Graveyard and the School while deciding the issue as to whether the trial court was correct in granting the ex-parte interim injunction? 4. The counsel for the appellants, Mr. T.T. Diengdoh, learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. C.C.T. Sangma, learned counsel submits that disputes arose in the year 2013, between the appellants and the respondent with regard to the administration and management control of the church which resulted in many unfortunate incidents such as, weddings, church services which were disrupted and the appellants denied entry into the church. This apart, the learned Senior counsel submits in July, 2020 even the burial of the child was sought to be disallowed by the respondent in the church graveyard and it was only with the intervention of the District Administration that the same could be completed. Learned senior counsel submits that having no alternative, the Title Suit was instituted by the appellants and in the Misc. application for injunction, the Sub-Ordinate District Council Court was pleased by order dated 03.08.2020, to grant ex-parte ad-interim injunction on being prima facie satisfied as to the case of the appellants. The learned Senior counsel submits that thereafter, the respondent being aggrieved by the ad-interim injunction order, then directly preferred an appeal before the learned Judge, District Council Court who then set aside the ad-interim injunction order dated 03.08.2020 and closed the injunction proceedings. 5. The learned Senior counsel submits that thereafter, the respondent being aggrieved by the ad-interim injunction order, then directly preferred an appeal before the learned Judge, District Council Court who then set aside the ad-interim injunction order dated 03.08.2020 and closed the injunction proceedings. 5. The learned Senior counsel submits that the Appellate Court acted in excess of jurisdiction in deciding the entire matter of injunction, when the said appeal was only against the grant of ad-interim injunction by the Trial Court and in fact, the learned Lower Appellate Court virtually conducted a mini trial which is not permissible in law while adjudicating such matters. He also submitted that, though no perversity in findings of the Trial Court were found, the Lower Appellate Court, inspite of the main injunction application still pending before the Trial Court, decided the entire matter of injunction, by finally determining all the issues in question by way of the impugned order. He further submits that, while passing the impugned judgment the Lower Appellate Court lost sight of the fact that, no single individual or group can be bestowed with the ownership of church properties including the graveyard which in fact, should be made accessible to all and members of the church. 6. In support of his arguments, the learned senior counsel has placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Kishore Kumar Khaitan & Anr. v. Praveen Kumar Singh reported in (2006) 3 SCC 312 , which deals with the jurisdiction of the Appellate Court in matters when the only limited question was the legality of grant or refusal of ad-interim injunction, when the main application for injunction was still pending before the Trial Court. 7. Learned Senior counsel in closing his submissions submits that, the Lower Appellate Court had erred in law and had acted in excess of jurisdiction in determining the main injunction matter by going to the merits of the issues raised, by relying on the materials placed in appeal, when infact, the matter before it was only with regard to the legality of the ad-interim injunction granted in favour of the appellant and the main injunction matter was yet to be heard. As such, he prays that the impugned order be set aside and quashed. 8. Mr. V.G.K. Kynta, learned senior counsel assisted by Ms. As such, he prays that the impugned order be set aside and quashed. 8. Mr. V.G.K. Kynta, learned senior counsel assisted by Ms. G. Kynta, learned counsel for the respondent submits that there is no error of jurisdiction and notwithstanding the fact that, the main injunction matter was still pending before the Subordinate District Council Court, there was no bar that prevented the respondents from assailing the order in appeal, as this was permitted by Rule 28 of the The United Khasi-Jaintia Hills Autonomous District (Administration of Justice) Rules, 1953. The learned senior counsel also contends that, the instant appeal is not maintainable inasmuch as, though the same is styled as a Second Appeal, under Order 3 of the High Court of Meghalaya (Jurisdiction over District Council Courts) Order, 2014, it has been also filed read with Article 227 of the Constitution which he submits, is not permissible in law. The learned senior counsel thereafter, has extensively dwelt on the facts of the case to show that the Trial Court had erred in law in granting the ad-interim injunction. In this regard, the learned counsel sought to substantiate his submissions by contending that the impugned order is absolutely correct, as there is a clear finding of the Lower Appellate Court on the question of possession which he submits, is with the respondent, as allegedly the appellants had left the congregation and had established another church. Learned senior counsel submits that, the grant of ad-interim injunction in favour of the appellants by the Trial Court has in effect ousted not only the respondents but also the congregation of the Balang Presbyterian Umran Dairy from management control and administration of the Church, Graveyard and School and that the appellants had approached the Trial Court only with the ulterior motive to take over these assets. 9. The learned senior counsel further contends that as on July, 2020 when the suit was instituted by the appellants/plaintiffs before the Trial Court, they were no longer members of the congregation in question, that is the Umran Dairy Presbyterian Church and that the appellant had been recognized as the leader of a new congregation called the Balang Presbyterian Umran Dairy, Nongthymmai District w.e.f., 24.02.2020. In this backdrop he submits that, the Lower Appellate Court on appreciating the materials placed before it, had set aside the ad-interim injunction order of the Trial Court and this exercise he contends, cannot be said to be without jurisdiction, as there were clear infirmities in the findings of the Trial Court. Learned counsel reiterated that, though the main injunction matter may be pending before the Trial Court, it is open to the defendant to file an appeal and for the Lower Appellate Court to take up the matter in terms of The United Khasi-Jaintia Hills Autonomous District (Administration of Justice) Rules, 1953. Learned counsel in support of his submissions, has placed reliance on the following judgments: 1) Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack de Sequeira, (2012) 5 SCC 370 . 2) V. Chandrasekaran v. Administrative Officer, (2012) 12 SCC 133 . 3) Sree Jain Swetambar Terapanthi Vid (S) v. Phundan Singh, (1999) 2 SCC 377 : 1999 SCC OnLine SC 134 at page 381. 4) Ramdev Food Products (P) Ltd. v. Arvindbhai Rambhai Patel, (2006) 8 SCC 726 at page 774. 5) Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd., 1990 Supp SCC 727 at page 731. 6) Seema Arshad Zaheer v. Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai, (2006) 5 SCC 282 at page 294. 7) Judgment and Order dated 4.3.2021 passed in MAF No. 1 of 2020 in Shri Jasper Lee Pakyntein v. Smti Sumarmai Hynniewta by the Hon’ble High Court of Meghalaya. 8) Raghavendra Swamy Mutt v. Uttaradi Mutt, (2016) 11 SCC 235 . 9) 2021 SCC OnLine SC 694- K.N. Nagarajappa and Others v. H. Narasimha Reddy…..Respondent (s). 10) (2015) 4 SCC 292 – Westarly Dkhar and others v. Sehekaya Lyngdoh. 11) A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan, (2000) 7 SCC 695 : page 699. 12) Mohd. Inam v. Sanjay Kumar Singhal, (2020) 7 SCC 327 . 10. Learned senior counsel in conclusion submits that there is no illegality whatsoever, in the impugned order, and in fact, the same had righted a wrong that had been committed by the Trial Court. He therefore prays, the appeal be dismissed. 11. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, it is first to be noted that the instant appeal arises from injunction proceedings which are yet to be concluded before the Trial Court. He therefore prays, the appeal be dismissed. 11. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, it is first to be noted that the instant appeal arises from injunction proceedings which are yet to be concluded before the Trial Court. A fact, that cannot escape the notice of this Court is that the nature of the order passed by the Trial Court is ad-interim, inasmuch as, the defendant/respondent herein, is yet to file a show cause or written statement and the matter is at the very initial stage, pending hearing. In this regard, as in all such cases, the grant of ex-parte ad-interim injunction by the Trial Court on being prima facie satisfied, is an exercise of discretion by the Trial Court and unless the discretion has been exercised illegally, perversely or where the settled principles of law regulating the grant of refusal of interim injunctions are ignored, is normally not interfered with by an Appellate Court to arrive at a different conclusion. In the instant case, as observed earlier the Title Suit and the accompanying application for injunction, were at the very initial stage of the proceedings and the nature of the order itself being ad-interim, naturally meant that the respondent/defendant had adequate recourse to contest the same or to seek its vacation. 12. A perusal of the impugned order shows that, the Lower Appellate Court had delved in great detail into the materials that had been supplied by the respondent in the appeal and arrived at findings, that in fact have gone beyond the scope of the appeal, by rendering a judgment that has ruled categorically that the appellants no longer had any subsisting rights to the church in question, as they ostensibly had shifted the place of worship and that the said church (Presbyterian Church Umran Dairy), was solely under the control and continuous possession of the defendant/respondent including the Graveyard and the School. This finding in the considered view of this Court, has not only gone above and far beyond the scope of the appeal before the Lower Appellate Court, but has effectively non-suited the appellants without even the trial commencing or evidence being led. 13. This finding in the considered view of this Court, has not only gone above and far beyond the scope of the appeal before the Lower Appellate Court, but has effectively non-suited the appellants without even the trial commencing or evidence being led. 13. The Lower Appellate Court while passing the impugned order, it appears had lost sight of the fact that, the injunction matter was still pending for final adjudication before the Trial Court, as by the impugned order, it effectively and conclusively brought the interlocutory proceedings to an abrupt end. For an Appellate Court to interfere, with the exercise of discretion and substitute its own discretion without any finding as to whether the Trial Court order was perverse, capricious or illegal on the face of the record is wholly unjustified, but unfortunately, the same has been occasioned in the instant case. 14. This Court therefore, without going into the factual aspects and the technicalities as raised by the counsel for the respondent/defendant, is of the considered view that the Lower Appellate Court had exceeded its jurisdiction in passing the impugned order without any finding, as to any perversity or gross irregularity which would warrant interference in the exercise of discretionary jurisdiction by the Trial Court and as such, the same is liable to be set aside. 15. Accordingly, the appeal stands allowed. However, as the issue involved is sensitive and the injunction matter deserves expeditious disposal, the respondent/defendant is directed to file a show cause, written statement or any other appropriate application at the earliest preferably within a period of 2 (two) weeks from the date of this order and the learned Trial Court is directed to dispose of the injunction matter as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of 4 (four) weeks thereafter. In the meanwhile, till final disposal of the injunction matter, the parties are directed to maintain status quo as to the management and administration of the Church concerned and the respondent is also directed not to cause obstruction to the use of the graveyard to all the members of the congregation, irrespective to which faction they show their allegiance to. 16. Accordingly, with the abovenoted directions this Appeal stands disposed of. 17. No order as to costs.