JUDGMENT : Shivashankar Amarannavar, J. This appeal has been filed by the unsuccessful plaintiff challenging the judgment and decree dated 29.11.2018 passed in O.S. No. 5395/2011 by XII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru whereunder the suit of the plaintiff filed for the relief of specific performance came to be dismissed. 2. The parties will be referred as per their ranking before the trial Court. 3. Brief facts of plaintiff's case is as under : Defendant No. 1 representing himself to be owner of the suit schedule property offered to sell the suit schedule property. One Smt. Pushpanjali Reddy had introduced the plaintiff to defendant No. 1 in relation to purchase of the suit schedule property and upon mutual negotiations, the property was agreed to be purchased for a total consideration of Rs.1,80,00,000/-. The term of understanding was reduced into writing as per the agreement of sale dated 02.09.2008 and same was registered before the Sub-Registrar, Indiranagar, Bengaluru. Under the agreement, plaintiff had paid a sum of Rs.20,00,000/-as advance under the cheques referred to in the agreement and the balance sale consideration amount had to be paid at the time of registration of the sale deed. Clause-II of the agreement contemplated that the transaction had to be completed within a period of three months, however, subject to the condition that the plaintiff would secure and produce the documents referred to sub-clauses (a) to (s). Though the documents had not been secured on 09.09.2008, defendant No. 1 had again approached the plaintiff seeking for further advance on the ground that the same was required to meet his exigencies. At the request of defendant No. 1, further sum of Rs.7,50,000/-was paid by means of cheque bearing No. 172853 drawn on Bank of India, V.V. Puram Branch, Bengaluru and a separate receipt was also executed by defendant No. 1 in this regard. Defendant No. 1 was specifically required to obtain no objection letter from his daughter and even a draft of the letter was given, so that the transaction could be completed, as defendant No. 1 was expressing that he was in a hurry to leave the country to join his daughter. It was also represented by defendant No. 1 that he intended to execute General Power of Attorney in the name of his friend Sri. It was also represented by defendant No. 1 that he intended to execute General Power of Attorney in the name of his friend Sri. Ramesh Rao after obtaining no objection from his daughter and sale transaction could be completed through the Power of Attorney holder by paying the balance sale consideration. Defendant No. 1 who was a greedy person had not secured no objection letter and had not executed the registered sale deed as per the contract, despite plaintiff being ready to perform his part of contract. It was further contended that defendant No. 1 instead of complying the agreement terms, made allegation against the plaintiff that the agreement in question is obtained under fraud, undue influence and mis-representation. Since defendant No. 1 did not execute the sale deed, he got issued legal notice and as defendant No. 1 did not comply with legal notice he filed a suit for specific performance of the agreement pleading that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of contract and it was defendant No. 1 who was not ready to perform his part of contract. 4. Defendant No. 1 in his written statement has pleaded as under : Plaintiff with the assistance of people upon whom defendant No. 1 was depending, had secured the agreement by fraud, undue influence, misrepresentation and taking undue advantage of trust and confidence reposed by defendant No. 1 on plaintiff. The plaintiff had exercised undue influence by playing fraud and had secured suit agreement and the consent given by him under the agreement was not a free consent and he further contends that he had already transferred the property by gifting the same in favour of his daughter and hence, the suit was not maintainable. His specific contention was that the suit schedule property was worth Rs.7,20,00,000/-. By playing fraud, misrepresentation and coercion plaintiff had entered into agreement for a meager amount and it was definite case of defendant No. 1 that in the guise of registering the agreement, draft copy was shown and by noticing mistake, page No. 3 of the agreement was cleverly replaced by getting signature on a blank paper. By playing fraud, misrepresentation and coercion plaintiff had entered into agreement for a meager amount and it was definite case of defendant No. 1 that in the guise of registering the agreement, draft copy was shown and by noticing mistake, page No. 3 of the agreement was cleverly replaced by getting signature on a blank paper. In the original draft the consideration amount of the suit schedule property was mentioned as Rs.7,20,00,000/-and in the registered agreement, it was mentioned as Rs.1,80,00,000/-and he was not allowed to contact neither his daughter nor he was allowed to peruse or read the document. With other contentions he had prayed for dismissal of the suit. 5. Plaintiff impleaded defendant No. 2 as defendant No. 1 had executed registered gift deed in favour of defendant No. 2 and she has also filed detailed written statement, almost reiterating the contentions raised by her father i.e., defendant No. 1. 6. Trial Court based upon the pleadings of the parties had framed the following issues: 1. Whether plaintiff proves defendant entered into agreement of sale in respect of suit schedule property on 02.09.2008? 2. Whether plaintiff proves he has paid a sum of Rs.20,00,000/-to defendant as advance in sale consideration? 3. Whether plaintiff proves again as per request of defendant he has paid Rs.7,50,000/-to defendant on 09.09.2008? 4. Whether plaintiff proves defendant has executed supplementary agreement on 18.12.2008 as contended? 5. Whether plaintiff was ever ready to perform his part of contract? 6. Whether suit is barred by law of limitation? 7. Whether defendant proves plaintiff hatched criminal conspiracy with an intention of cheating him to conclude transaction for Rs.1,80,00,000/-? 8. Whether defendant proves he was informed by plaintiff that he would pay balance of Rs.7,00,00,000/-? 9. Whether plaintiff is entitled for the relief of special performance of contract? 10. What Decree of Order? 7. Plaintiff got himself examined as P.W.1 and his GPA holder was examined as P.W.2 and in all, got marked Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.38. Defendant No. 1 got himself examined himself as D.W.1 and got marked Ex.D.1 to Ex.D.51. 8. Trial Court after hearing the arguments on both sides and after considering the oral and documentary evidence has answered issue No. 1, 4, 5, 6 and 9 in the negative and issue Nos. 2, 3, 7 and 8 in the affirmative and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. 9. Heard the arguments of Sri. 8. Trial Court after hearing the arguments on both sides and after considering the oral and documentary evidence has answered issue No. 1, 4, 5, 6 and 9 in the negative and issue Nos. 2, 3, 7 and 8 in the affirmative and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. 9. Heard the arguments of Sri. D.R. Ravishankar, learned counsel appearing for appellant/plaintiff and Sri. Giridhar S.V, learned counsel appearing for respondent/defendant Nos. 1 and 2. 10. Learned counsel appearing for appellant has contended that execution of Ex.P.1 and Ex.P.3 are admitted but the defence is voidable circumstances and such defence is not made out for; i. vague pleadings not in accordance with Order 6 Rule 4; ii. inconsistent stand in Ex.D.41 written statement and cross-examination; iii. theory of blank paper is not proved; and iv. defence of alleged mistake in property number is admitted as false in the cross-examination of D.W.1. Elaborating his submissions, he has contended that Ex.D.44 was stated to be a fabricated document and the same was mentioned in notice at Ex.P.30 and upon confrontation to P.W.1 the said document was denied and no further steps were taken to prove said document. It is his further submission that D.W.1 admits that he was not in touch with Smt. Pushpanjali Reddy, Sri. Ramesh Rao and Smt. Anjali Reddy but seeks to produce Ex.D.42, Ex.D.43 and Ex.D.45 as affidavits which are inadmissible in evidence under Section 30. It is his further submission that execution of Ex.P.33 and Ex.P.34 at the relevant point of time is not in dispute and voidable circumstances are neither pleaded nor proved. It is his further submission that Ex.P.37 and Ex.P.38 are admitted which sets out the theory of coercion in respect of Ex.P.3. It is his further submission that contention of defendant No.1 that value as per Ex.D.12 to Ex.D.24 is not of assistance as admittedly the guideline value was Rs.1,50,00,000/-and agreed consideration was Rs.1,80,00,000/-and notification is produced along with I.A. No. 2. It is his further submission that as per explanation 1 to Section 20(2) inadequacy of consideration is not a ground to deny specific performance of contract. It is his further submission that as per explanation 1 to Section 20(2) inadequacy of consideration is not a ground to deny specific performance of contract. It is his further submission that the contention of defendant No. 1 that lack of readiness and willingness is demonstrated as false with reference to Ex.P.11, income tax returns where the net taxable income is Rs.3,28,00,000/-at the relevant point of time and there is no dispute about the ability and resources at the command of the plaintiff to purchase the schedule property. In support of his contentions, learned counsel appearing for appellant/plaintiff has placed reliance on the following decisions: i. Vijayalakshmi Vs. B. Himantharaja Sheety and another reported in ILR 1978 Kar. 913 ii. R. Lakshmikantham Vs. Devaraji, Civil Appeal No. 2420/2018 decided on 10.07.2019 iii. Ranganayakamma and others Vs. K.S. Prakash (D) by L.Rs. and others, Civil Appeal No. 3635/2008 decided on 16.05.2008 wherein it is held that particulars of fraud and misrepresentation have to pleaded with details. iv. Bishnudeo Narain and others Vs. Seogeni Rai and Jagernath, Civil Appeal No. 78/1950 decided on 04.05.1951 wherein at paragraph No. 28 it is observed thus: "28. It is also to be observed that no proper particulars have been furnished. Now if there is one rule which is better established than any other, it is that in cases of fraud, undue influence and coercion, the parties pleading it must set forth full particulars and the case can only be decided on the particulars as laid. There can be no departure from them in evidence. General allegations are insufficient even to amount to an averment of fraud of which any court ought to take notice however strong the language in which they are couched may be, and the same applies to undue influence and coercion. See Order 6, rule 4, Civil Procedure Code." 11. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for respondents/defendants has contended that Section 20 of Specific Relief Act mandates that relief of specific performance is at the discretion of the Court. The terms of the contract coupled with the conduct of the parties as also the circumstances of the mental frame of mind of respondent No. 1 under which Ex.P.1 and Ex.P.3 were entered into demonstrate that appellant/plaintiff had a unfair advantage. The terms of the contract coupled with the conduct of the parties as also the circumstances of the mental frame of mind of respondent No. 1 under which Ex.P.1 and Ex.P.3 were entered into demonstrate that appellant/plaintiff had a unfair advantage. It is his further submission that Specific Relief Act is amended with effect from 01.08.2018 and the said amendment is prospective in nature. It is his further contention that sale deeds -Ex.D.12 to Ex.D.24 demonstrate the price per sq.ft. prevailing in HAL II Stage, Bengaluru prior to the agreement of sale, subsequent to agreement of sale, at the time of institution of suit and also at the time of adjudication of suit. Respondent No. 1 was diabetic and suffering from depression even prior to the agreement of sale due to sudden death of his wife. Medical record as per Ex.D.45 is produced to demonstrate the same. Medical certificates as per Ex.D.33 and Ex.D.34, undoubtedly though subsequent to institution of the suit would also demonstrate the medical condition of respondent No. 1. He would further submit that respondent No. 1 had lost his wife on 11.04.2008 in New-Zealand is demonstrated by Ex.D.35 subsequent to which he traveled to India in June 2008. His daughter returned to New-Zealand in July 2008 and two months thereafter agreement to sell was executed at which time on account of existing conditions of depression as also demise of his wife respondent No. 1 was not in right mental faculties or in the capacity of entering into contract. Respondent No. 1 has produced his financial records as per Ex.D.36, Ex.D.37, Ex.D.39, Ex.D.40 and Ex.D.42. A perusal of the same would reveal that in addition to S.B. Account as on 22.10.2008, respondent No. 1 had clear balance of Rs.69,639.28, a Multi Option Deposit balance of Rs.83,55,639.00. It is his further submission that appellant was never ready and willing to perform the contract. The appellant did not file a suit immediately thereafter. However, he had filed the suit on 26.07.2011 contending Ex.P.3 was executed, which also is not proved. It is his further submission that there is no condition under the agreement to sell stating that daughter of respondent No. 1 has to give no objection or is required to execute the deed of conveyance. The learned counsel for respondent would also submit that entire agreement to sell Ex.P.1 is not on stamp paper. It is his further submission that there is no condition under the agreement to sell stating that daughter of respondent No. 1 has to give no objection or is required to execute the deed of conveyance. The learned counsel for respondent would also submit that entire agreement to sell Ex.P.1 is not on stamp paper. Page No. 3 contains sale consideration. It is his further submission that value of suit schedule property at Rs.7,20,00,000/-has been changed to Rs.1,80,00,000/-after the correction in the draft. The appellant/plaintiff has specifically stated in Ex.P.30 that a draft was furnished. Further, refund of money has not been claimed in accordance with Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act and no relief can be granted unless it has been specifically claimed in terms of Section 22(2) of Specific Relief Act and therefore, the appellant is not entitled to refund of money paid as earnest deposit. Any refund of money if granted has to be subject to deductions of legal expenses incurred in prosecuting the suit, this appeal, about 5 writ petitions field by the appellant, one CRP to seek restoration of the suit which was dismissed and one Misc. petition under Section 24 for transfer, for all of which respondent No. 1 had to spend money on account of appellant in the event refund is ordered. 12. We have carefully considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for parties and perused the material on record. The points that arise for our consideration are: i. Whether amended provisions of Specific Relief Act by Act No. 18/2018 would be applicable to the facts of the present case? ii. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the appellant/plaintiff is entitled for specific performance of contract? iii. Whether the appellant/plaintiff has made out a case for production of additional evidence by way of documents as sought in I.A. No. 2/2019 filed under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC? iv. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, impugned judgment and decree of the trial Court is justified? RE. POINT No. (i) 13. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has contended that in view of amendment to Specific Relief Act by Act No. 18/2018 the readiness and willingness on the part of the purchaser/plaintiff is no more valid criteria and invoking the discretionary power under Section 20 of the Act would not arise. RE. POINT No. (i) 13. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has contended that in view of amendment to Specific Relief Act by Act No. 18/2018 the readiness and willingness on the part of the purchaser/plaintiff is no more valid criteria and invoking the discretionary power under Section 20 of the Act would not arise. It is further contended that said amendment is retrospective and applicable to pending proceedings. 14. The Specific Relief Act, 1963 has been amended by Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018 by Act No. 18 of 2018 whereby Section 20 of the Act has been substituted inter alia doing away with the wider discretion of the Courts to grant specific performance introducing substituted performance of contract. In terms of amended Act the concept of jurisdiction to decree specific performance, which was discretionary, is no more available to the cases seeking relief for breach of contracts etc. Old Section 20 of the Act has been substituted by the new amended Section 20 by Act No. 18 of 2018 with effect from 01.10.2019. The contention of learned counsel appearing for appellant/plaintiff is that the said amended provision is applicable to the facts of the present case and hence, finding of the trial Court that the amended provisions of Specific Relief Act are prospective in nature is erroneous. Whether Act as amended by the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act 2018 by Act No. 18/2018 is prospective or retrospective came to be considered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sri. M. Suresh Vs. Smt. Mahadevamma and others, RFA No. 1560/2011 decided on 23.10.2020 wherein this Court has considered the objects of amended Act and also the decisions of the Apex Court and has held as under: "33. In the light of the aforesaid judgments, it is clear that ordinarily, the effect of amendment by ‘substitution’ is that, the substituted provision stands repealed and the amended provision is substituted in the place of earlier provision from the date of inception of the enactment, but it is not absolutely applicable in all circumstances. If the amendment Act expressly specifies that the substituted provision shall come into force from a particular date subsequent to the date of amendment/the date the amendment come into force, the said amendment is prospective in nature notwithstanding such amendment is by way of ‘substitution’. If the amendment Act expressly specifies that the substituted provision shall come into force from a particular date subsequent to the date of amendment/the date the amendment come into force, the said amendment is prospective in nature notwithstanding such amendment is by way of ‘substitution’. The intention of the legislature being clear, no retrospective effect could be given from the date of inception of the statute. There may not be any cavil on this legal proposition relating to substantial law. It is well settled that the interpretation of provisions must depend on the text and context. The real intention of the legislature has to be gathered from the text and context. The amendment Act contemplates that the said amendment by way of ‘substitution’ would come into force on such day the Central Government may, by Notification in the Official Gazette, appoint and different dates may be appointed for different provisions of the Act, 1st October 2018 is the date appointed for the amended provisions to come into effect. As such, amendment to each provision whether it is procedural or substantial has to be examined dehorse the Act in general is construed to be procedural. 34. As observed by the Hon’ble Patna High Court, supra, though the Code of Civil Procedure in essence a law of procedure, nevertheless the right of appeal, provided for in the Code, being considered to be a provision conferring substantive rights on the parties, by necessary implication the sea change brought by amendment to Section 20, would be substantive in nature. Though the remedy of specific performance was not available to the party as a matter of right under the unamended provisions that was dependant on the discretion of the Court, the same was indeed a right or privilege enjoyed by the defendants. 35. It is well settled that if a right has crystallized before the repealing Act comes into force, by reason of repeal of the earlier statute, the right crystallized cannot be taken away. The real test for the applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 relating to an amendment by substitution would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Punjab supra. The real test for the applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 relating to an amendment by substitution would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Punjab supra. The intention of the legislature could be gathered from the Statements of Objects and reasons which suggest that the Amendment Act is remedial in nature on the other hand, do not indicate any intention to destroy the substantive right or privilege acquired or accrued under the unamended Act. Accordingly, we are of the view that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 would apply to the case on hand. As discussed earlier, the right or privilege accrued to the defendant/s under the unamended Act is a substantive right. Indisputably, such rights/privileges vested with the defendants at the time of breach of contract alleged, while filing the suit. Appeal is continuation of original suit. Thus, in our considered opinion, amendment to Section 20 being prospective in nature enforceable with effect from 01.10.2018, the same is not applicable to the pending proceedings governed and continued under the unamended provisions. xxx xxx xxx" Therefore, the amendment to Section 20 of the Act being prospective in nature enforceable with effect from 01.10.2018, the same is not applicable to pending proceedings. RE. POINT No. (ii) 15. In a suit for specific performance of contract wherein the plaintiff will be entitled only for specific performance of contract, if he is able to prove that the agreement is valid in law. The suit filed by the appellant/plaintiff against the defendants is for the relief of specific performance of contract, on the strength of Ex.P.1, dated 02.09.2008. Contention of defendant No. 1 is that, his consent was obtained by fraud, misrepresentation and he never intended to sell his property for consideration mentioned in Ex.P.1., i.e., Rs.1,80,00,000/-but it was for consideration of Rs.7,20,00,000/-and he had taken a defence that in the agreement drafted it was mentioned as Rs.7,20,00,000/-and after his approval, the same was taken back stating that there was some mistake with respect to property number and to rectify the same signatures of appellant/plaintiff and defendant No. 1 were obtained on blank paper, i.e, page No. 3 and the same was replaced. In this regard when defendant No. 1 disputes his consent, then it has to be necessarily examined as to what is consent. 16. Section 13 of the Indian Contract Act is as under: "13. `Consent' defined.-Two or more persons are said to consent when they agree upon the same thing in the same sense." Section 17 of the Indian Contract Act is as under: "17. `Fraud' defined.-'Fraud' means and includes any of the following acts committed by a party to a contract, or with his connivance, or by his agent, with intent to deceive another party thereto or his agent, or to induce him to enter into the contract:- (1) the suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true; (2) the active concealment of a fact by one having knowledge or belief of the fact; (3) a promise made without any intention of performing it; (4) any other act fitted to deceive; (5) any such act or omission as the law specially declares to be fraudulent. Section 18 of the Indian Contract Act is as under: "18. `Misrepresentation' defined.-`Misrepresentation' means and includes- (1) the positive assertion, in a manner not warranted by the information of the person making it, of that which is not true, though he believes it to be true; (2) any breach of duty which, without an intent to deceive, gains an advantage of the person committing it, or any one claiming under him, by misleading another to his prejudice, or to the prejudice of any one claiming under him; (3) causing, however innocently, a party to an agreement, to make a mistake as to the substance of the thing which is the subject of the agreement.". 17. Section 13 of the Act defines what is consent. As per Section 13 when two or more persons are said to consent when they agree upon the same thing in the same sense. This is to be applied to the facts and circumstances of the case. It is the case of the plaintiff that defendant No. 1 had agreed to sell the property for a total consideration of Rs.1,80,00,000/-. At the same time defendant No. 1 disputes that he had agreed to sell the property for Rs.1,80,00,000/-. This is to be applied to the facts and circumstances of the case. It is the case of the plaintiff that defendant No. 1 had agreed to sell the property for a total consideration of Rs.1,80,00,000/-. At the same time defendant No. 1 disputes that he had agreed to sell the property for Rs.1,80,00,000/-. As per the contention of defendant No. 1 talks were held to sell the property for Rs.7,20,00,000/-in the presence of Smt. Pushpanjali Reddy, Smt. Anjali Reddy and Sri. Ramesh Rao. As per the talks, appellant/plaintiff agreed to purchase the property for a total consideration of Rs.7,20,00,000/-. In this regard appellant/plaintiff has issued a chit which is produced at Ex.D.44. According to defendant No. 1 it is in the handwriting of the appellant/plaintiff and towards the transaction he had issued the said chit, wherein the consideration is mentioned as Rs.7,20,00,000/-. Defendant No.1 has produced certified copy of the sale deeds at Ex.D.12 to Ex.D.24 to show the value of the properties at HAL II Stage, Indira Nagar, Bengaluru, which is in close vicinity of area in which suit schedule property is located. Ex.D.12 is the sale deed dated 30.04.2008 which is pertaining to property at HAL II Stage, Bengaluru, wherein consideration shown is at the rate of Rs.14,451-42/-per sq.ft. Ex.D.13 is sale deed dated 30.06.2008 in respect of property situated at 12th Main, HAL II Stage, Bengaluru, wherein sale consideration is shown as Rs.16,818.18 per sq.ft. Under the sale deed dated 04.08.2008 (Ex.D.14) property situated at HAL II Stage has been sold and consideration shown therein is Rs.12,056/-per sq. ft. If these documents are cumulatively considered along with Ex.D.44, the value of the suit schedule property as pleaded by defendant was worth about Rs.7,20,00,000/-as on 02.09.2008. Appellant/plaintiff had not produced any document to show the market value of the property before the trial Court. Appellant has sought for production of guideline value issued by the Government with reference to the schedule property for the year 2008-09. As per the said document the guideline value of the property located at HAL II Stage, Bengaluru is Rs.3,500/-per sq.ft. However, it does not depict the actual market value. Appellant has sought for production of guideline value issued by the Government with reference to the schedule property for the year 2008-09. As per the said document the guideline value of the property located at HAL II Stage, Bengaluru is Rs.3,500/-per sq.ft. However, it does not depict the actual market value. The actual market value of the properties will be much more than the guideline value and the same can be seen by looking to Ex.D.12 to Ex.D.14 which pertains to the year 2008 which sale had taken place during April, June and August, 2008 i.e., just prior to agreement of sale in question which is dated 02.09.2008 (Ex.P-1). 18. As per Section 14 of the Contract Act, consent is said to be free, when the same is not given under coercion, undue influence, fraud or misrepresentation. Section 17 of the Contract Act provides that where one person or his agent or with his connivance with an intent to deceive other party or his agent or to induce him to enter into the contract, the suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true by one who does not believe it to be true; active concealment of a fact by one having knowledge or belief of the fact; a promise made without any intention of performing it and any other act fitted to deceive. Defendant No. 1 has pleaded with particulars of fraud in his written statement so also in his letter -Ex.D.41. 19. Appellant/plaintiff is a person who was in real estate business and he knew what was the real value of the property. There was a duty caste upon the appellant/plaintiff to state what was the real value of suit schedule property. But, by suggesting to defendant No. 1 the worth of the property as Rs.1,80,00,000/-he has committed fraud as defined under Section 17(1) of the Contract Act. Even if we consider that there was no negotiations for Rs.7,20,00,000/-and it was only for Rs.1,80,00,000/-and the same was reduced into writing as per Ex.P.1, then the appellant/plaintiff who was aware of the market value of the property, must have informed the worth of property to defendant No. 1. Even if we consider that there was no negotiations for Rs.7,20,00,000/-and it was only for Rs.1,80,00,000/-and the same was reduced into writing as per Ex.P.1, then the appellant/plaintiff who was aware of the market value of the property, must have informed the worth of property to defendant No. 1. Undue influence is said to be a subtle species of fraud whereby mastery is obtained over the mind of the victim by insidious approaches and seductive artifices as held in Mahboob Khan Vs Hakim Abdul Rahim reported in AIR 1964 RAJASTHAN 250. Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Mst.Kharbuja Kuer Vs Jangbahadur Rai & Others reported in AIR 1963 SC 1203 has held where a pardanashin lady under full confidence of the defendant who projected a false impression of the contents of documents, put the thumb impression on such documents, their consent is a vitiated one. His act of concealment of value of the suit schedule property and suggestion discloses that he had played fraud on defendant No. 1. 20. Section 18 of the Contract Act describes what is mis-representation. Appellant/plaintiff by misrepresenting the value of the property had entered into agreement with defendant No.1. The documents Ex.D.12 to Ex.D.24 shows how the land value is increasing in a fast track manner. Ex.D.12 which is dated 30.04.2008 shows that value of the property in that area was Rs.14,453/-per sq.ft. whereas Ex.D.24 which is dated 07.02.2018 shows the value of the property in that area as Rs.32,150/-per sq.ft. Within a span of 10 years the property value has increased 2-1/2 times. Defendant No. 1 by producing registered sale deeds of that area during agreement time has established that value of the property was four times of Rs.1,80,00,000/-. The agreement entered into by appellant/plaintiff and defendant No. 1 was not proved because it was not valid agreement as required under the Contract Act, where the consent is not given in the same sense between the parties and there is no free consent of defendant No.1, where fraud and misrepresentation was played on defendant No. 1, such contract cannot be a valid contract or it cannot be held that parties to the contract were ad-idem. 21. According to appellant/plaintiff supplementary agreement dated 18.12.2008 (Ex.P.3) came into existence because earlier to that defendant No. 1 made several allegations of fraud (Ex.D.41) and also lodged complaint to the Police. 21. According to appellant/plaintiff supplementary agreement dated 18.12.2008 (Ex.P.3) came into existence because earlier to that defendant No. 1 made several allegations of fraud (Ex.D.41) and also lodged complaint to the Police. It is the case of defendant No. 1 that after further discussion, the matter was settled amicably and defendant No. 1 by executing Ex.P.3 supplementary agreement had withdrawn the allegations made against the appellant/plaintiff. Defendant No. 1 contended that it got executed by the plaintiff by coercion and also by undue influence, because plaintiff had threatened to lodge a false complaint against him and if Police complaint was lodged, then he would not be allowed to go to New-Zealand and he was in urgent need to join his daughter where he had applied for permanent residentship. Under those circumstances even Sri. Ramesh Rao is also said to have advised defendant No. 1 to execute Ex.P.3. Under such circumstances, Ex.P-3 came to be executed under threat and coercion. Defendant No. 1 has produced documents to prove that plaintiff was very influential person and he was having lot of criminal cases against him and once he was declared as a rowdy sheeter. Ex.D.1 is the order copy of the writ petition which shows that plaintiff had filed writ petition to set aside the order of the concerned Police in listing him as a rowdy sheeter. A perusal of Ex.D.1 indicates that there were six criminal cases against the appellant/plaintiff and there were allegations that he was taking exorbitant interest and lodging criminal cases and hence, Police listed him as a rowdy sheeter and he had challenged the same before this Court and this Court after considering the material on record and also the provisions of law had set aside the order. But, the fact remains that there were cases against him and the person once listed in rowdy sheeter and a person who is aged about 36 years who is having well versed knowledge in the filed of criminal law against whom allegations of fraud is made by a person who is aged about 72 years and no one can expect that such person will go and approach defendant No.1 sophisticatedly to execute Ex.D.3 and it was executed at his request. Defendant No. 1 was in urgent need to go to New-Zealand where his daughter was residing. Defendant No. 1 was in urgent need to go to New-Zealand where his daughter was residing. In such a situation if a complaint was lodged, definitely his travel to New Zealand would have halted. Under such circumstances defendant No. 1 had executed Ex.P.3. Ex.P.3 was executed to enhance the time and also to withdraw the allegations made against the appellant/plaintiff in Ex.P.41. It is an unregistered document. When defendant No. 1 makes specific allegation against the appellant/plaintiff that his consent to Ex.P.1 was obtained in fraudulent manner and consideration amount was not Rs.1,80,00,000/-and it was Rs.7,20,00,000/-, surprisingly what was the exact consideration amount as per Ex.P.1 is not mentioned in Ex.P.3 and why there was need to extend time is also not mentioned. Since there is serious dispute with regard to consideration amount as per Ex.P.41 definitely it ought to have been mentioned stating that what was the consideration amount in Ex.P.3. But, avoiding of these things shows that Ex.P.3 had not come into existence as stated by appellant/plaintiff. It is also the case of appellant/plaintiff that defendant No. 1 had agreed to get no objection from his daughter. That is not forthcoming either in the original agreement or in the supplementary agreement. It also shows that Ex.P.3 had not come into existence as pleaded by the plaintiff. Even otherwise supplementary agreement dated 18.03.2008 (Ex.P.3) is not a valid document for the reason that it is an unregistered document which cannot vary the terms and conditions of Ex.P.1 which is a registered document. 22. In the case of Sunil Kumar Roy Vs. M/s. Bhowra Kankanee Collieries Limited and others, reported in AIR 1971 SC 75 it is held as under : "3. xxx xxx xxx It is well settled by now that a document which varies the essential terms of the existing registered lease, such as the amount of rent, must be registered. xxx xxx xxx" Further, in the case of Smt. Shanti Mishra Vs. Samuel, reported in AIR 2018 Allahabad 242 it is held thus: "39. xxx xxx xxx The reliance of the counsel for plaintiff on the judgment of M/s. A.R.C. Overseas Pvt. Limited (2008 (2) All LJ 663) (supra) and the judgment of Hamda Ammal (supra) for the purpose of substantiating his argument that unregistered document can be admitted in evidence for collateral purpose, it is required to be stated that unregistered receipts, paper Nos. 77ka/1 and 78ka/1, were not the documents to be received in evidence for collateral purpose but these documents varied the terms of the original agreement to sell between the parties and therefore, they did not served any collateral purpose but were direct evidence, evidencing variation of the terms of contract, of a registered document and the terms of a registered document cannot be varied by a unregistered document executed in future." In view of the aforesaid observations it is clear that Ex.P.1 being a registered document, terms and conditions of registered document cannot be varied by an unregistered document -Ex.P.3. 23. As per admission of P.W.1, before Ex.P.1 talks were held to purchase the property for Rs.1,80,00,000/- and at the time of negotiations Smt. Pushpanjali Reddy, Smt. Anjali Reddy and Sri. Ramesh Rao were also present. Advocate Sri. Madan Gopal is the person who drafted Ex.P.1. If everything had happened in a transparent manner, appellant/plaintiff should have taken the risk of examining Advocate Sri. Madan Gopal who drafted the document and Smt. Pushpanjali Reddy, Smt. Anjali Reddy and Sri. Ramesh Rao to prove that Ex.P.1 was executed by defendant No.1 in favour of plaintiff agreeing to sell suit schedule property for Rs.1,80,00,000/-. They are all material witnesses to prove Ex.P.1. But, plaintiff has not chosen to examine said persons. Ex.D.44 chit produced by defendant No. 1 reflects that property was agreed to be sold for Rs.7,20,00,000/-. Appellant/plaintiff in his legal notice has mentioned that it is a fabricated document and he had asked defendant No.1 to send copy of the same in order to take legal action. But, he has not taken any action against defendant No. 1 relating to Ex.D.44 and there is no single word whispered in the plaint that it is a fabricated document. Whereas, Ex.D.12 to Ex.D.24 makes it amply clear as to what was the worth of the property in HAL II Stage, Bengaluru and appellant/plaintiff during 2008. Plaintiff-P.W.1 during cross-examination has not denied that suit schedule property was worth more than Rs.7,20,00,000/-and affidavits produced by defendant No. 1 as per Ex.D.46, Ex.D.47 and Ex.D.48 of Sri. Ramesh Rao Smt. Pushpanjali Reddy and Smt. Anjali Reddy were also not denied by stating that they had not given the affidavits. In Ex.D.46, Ex.D.47 and Ex.D.48 they have stated that talks were held for purchase of suit schedule property for Rs.7,20,00,000/-. 24. Ramesh Rao Smt. Pushpanjali Reddy and Smt. Anjali Reddy were also not denied by stating that they had not given the affidavits. In Ex.D.46, Ex.D.47 and Ex.D.48 they have stated that talks were held for purchase of suit schedule property for Rs.7,20,00,000/-. 24. Learned counsel appearing for defendants/ respondents submitted that page No. 3 in Ex.P.1 was replaced after obtaining signature on blank paper. It is contended by defendant No.1 that original agreement was for Rs.7,20,00,000/-and page No. 3 was also containing the same thing. But, it was cleverly replaced by appellant/plaintiff after getting signature on blank paper stating that some corrections were to be made in page No. 3. On perusal of Ex.P.1 it is noticed that it contains page Nos. 1 to 7 and in page No. 3 only property number, consideration amount, particulars of payment are mentioned and in other pages nowhere the consideration amount is mentioned. It was very convenient to replace page No. 3 because in other pages no consideration amount and payment particulars are mentioned. D.W.1 by communication dated 01.12.2008 (Ex.D-41) addressed to plaintiff has narrated the chronological events that took place on 02.09.2008. It has been specifically narrated as under: "The Agreement was finalized by your lawyer. On 2nd September, 2008 you and your lawyer brought the Agreement, the first page of which was typed on stamp paper and the remainder on plain paper to my residency for signature. It was planned that thereafter we would go and have the document registered, which your lawyer said was a legal requirement. We signed the Agreement at my residence. You and your lawyer were present along with Mr. Ramesh Rao, Ms. Pushpanjali Reddy and Mr. A. vishwanath, who signed the document as witnesses. After it was signed, your lawyer read the Agreement and then you pointed out that there appeared to be a mistake at page 3 as regards the number of the property and the PID number. You also called your lawyer's attention to the same. Your lawyer then got a blank paper and asked both of us to sign on the same at the bottom, saying that it was getting late and that we had to go for registration and that he would reprint that page at his officer after making the corrections and bring the document directly to the registration office thereafter. Your lawyer then got a blank paper and asked both of us to sign on the same at the bottom, saying that it was getting late and that we had to go for registration and that he would reprint that page at his officer after making the corrections and bring the document directly to the registration office thereafter. You immediately signed the blank paper at the bottom and not suspecting anything at that time I also signed the same. I accompanied you to the registration office. Your lawyer came some time later with the document. He informed us that the correction had been made and that he would start the process of registration. I did not get to read the document again after the correction was stated to have been done. I had no reason to suspect either you or your lawyer. The document was registered and we returned home. Your lawyer informed us that it would take some time to get the original back and that thereafter he would give me a copy." To the extent that draft agreement was prepared by plaintiff's advocate as well as same was read by D.W.1 and he (D.W.1) not having affixed his signature to draft agreement and final draft print out of the agreement was obtained from the office of Sri K.S.Madangopal, Advocate is admitted by the plaintiff in his reply notice dated 09.12.2008 (Ex.P-30) to the following effect: "You had requested our client to get an agreement drafted as you did not have any contacts and therefore, an agreement was got drafted by our client through an advocate Sri. Madangopal and the draft was given to you. After you had approved the draft, without affixing any signatures thereon, the final print out of the agreement was obtained from the office of the said advocate and at that time, only the counsel Sri. K.S. Madangopal had signed on it." Therefore, the contention of defendant No.1 is more probable and deserves to be accepted. Ex.P.2 which is a receipt and consideration and payment ought to have been mentioned therein also, but not mentioned. That apart, Ex.P.3 is a very important document because plaintiff states that it is a supplementary agreement extending time and also withdrawing allegations made against him. If property is to be purchased for Rs.1,80,00,000/-then moot question that would arise is, what prevented the appellant/plaintiff to mention the same in Ex.P.3. That apart, Ex.P.3 is a very important document because plaintiff states that it is a supplementary agreement extending time and also withdrawing allegations made against him. If property is to be purchased for Rs.1,80,00,000/-then moot question that would arise is, what prevented the appellant/plaintiff to mention the same in Ex.P.3. No reasons are forthcoming and appellant/plaintiff, very cleverly has also evaded to mention the consideration amount in Ex.P-3. All these facts creates a cloud of doubt that consideration amount agreed was not Rs.1,80,00,000/-. 25. Ex.P.4, Ex.P.5, Ex.P.6 and Ex.P.7 are blank envelops. It is stated to have been written by defendant No. 1 to appellant/plaintiff. This shows that appellant/plaintiff was hiding something before the Court as all these covers are blank. As per Section 114(g) of Evidence Act if a party was to produce some documents and he withholds the same, then it is to be presumed that it goes against him. Ex.P.8 and Ex.P.9 are postal receipts and UCP and all the documents were pertaining to defendant No. 1. Appellant/plaintiff has not explained how he came in possession of these documents. If the contention of defendant No. 1 that appellant/plaintiff forced him to write letters to Sri. Madan Gopal, advocate, Police Commissioner and appellant/plaintiff, it is so probable, or otherwise appellant/plaintiff would not have possessed the postal receipts. Production of these documents from the possession of appellant/plaintiff proves that there was some sort of coercion on defendant No. 1 and the defence of first defendant probabalises said theory. 26. Ex.P.34 is special power of attorney executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of Sri. Ramesh Rao on 19.12.2008. It is the contention of learned counsel appearing for appellant/plaintiff that said document is draft of Ex.D.1 and he got it registered and therefore he voluntarily executed the said document after he withdrew the allegations made against the plaintiff as per Ex.P.41. When already there was a power of attorney executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of Sri. Ramesh Rao as per Ex.P.33, the moot question which would arise is as to what was the need or necessity for defendant No. 1 to execute similar power of attorney in favour of Sri. Ramesh Rao. It appears, that it was executed at the instance of appellant/plaintiff only to establish that it was executed after Ex.P.3. 27. Ramesh Rao as per Ex.P.33, the moot question which would arise is as to what was the need or necessity for defendant No. 1 to execute similar power of attorney in favour of Sri. Ramesh Rao. It appears, that it was executed at the instance of appellant/plaintiff only to establish that it was executed after Ex.P.3. 27. In a suit for specific performance of a contract plaintiff has to aver and prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract. Both readiness and willingness are different. Even if a party to the contract may be ready but not willing to perform his part of the contract and even if a party may be willing to perform his part of contract but not ready to perform, then it cannot be gainsaid both ingredients are fulfilled. First contention raised by plaintiff is that defendant No. 1 was to get no objection from his daughter to complete the transaction. This contention cannot be accepted for more than one reason. Firstly it is not the condition enumerated under Ex.P.1 and there is no mention that to conclude the sale transaction defendant No. 1 should obtain consent letter of defendant No. 2, i.e., his daughter. If the appellant/plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, then question that would arise is as to why he had not insisted for no objection or consent from daughter of defendant No. 1. In the absence of parties to contract being ad-idem on this issue, very existence of said claim has to be disbelieved. In Ex.P.1 it is clearly mentioned that defendant No. 1 was the sole and absolute owner of the suit property. It reads thus: "Whereas vendor is the sole and absolute owner of that Residential Property presently Municipal No. 619, allotted by the Bangalore Development Authority, HAL II Stage, Indiranagar, Bangalore, PID No. 74-1-619, hereinafter referred to as the "said property". 28. When first defendant is the sole and absolute owner of suit schedule property, then necessity for insisting on defendant No.1 should obtain no objection from his daughter does not arise at all. Even in Ex.P.3 this condition propelled is not enumerated. Appellant/plaintiff has not explained why this condition was not inserted in either Ex.P.1 or in Ex.P.3. What prevented the parties from inserting said condition under these two (2) documents i.e., Ex.P-1 and P-3 is not explained. Even in Ex.P.3 this condition propelled is not enumerated. Appellant/plaintiff has not explained why this condition was not inserted in either Ex.P.1 or in Ex.P.3. What prevented the parties from inserting said condition under these two (2) documents i.e., Ex.P-1 and P-3 is not explained. This conduct of appellant/plaintiff in insisting first defendant from obtaining no objection from defendant No. 2 in the absence of specific agreement clearly shows that plaintiff was never ready to perform his part of the contract, even if it is accepted that Ex.P-1 was duly executed by first defendant, which we have not accepted for reasons assigned herein above. Even in Ex.P.3 also, except extending time and withdrawal of alleged allegations made against appellant/plaintiff, no reasons are forthcoming as to why time is extended and there is no specific mention that time was extended to enable the defendant No.1 to obtain the documents. Ex.P.3 is dated 18.12.2008 and duration was extended till August, 2009 and it is not mentioned in Ex.P.3 why time was extended by eight (8) months. This aspect shows that appellant/plaintiff was never ready to perform his part of the contract and his sole aim was to buy time. 29. Appellant/plaintiff should not only aver but also prove his financial capacity before the Court to conclude the contract, but must also prove by cogent evidence and documents that he was having requisite funds available to conclude the contract within the stipulated period. Ex.P.1 agreement is dated 02.09.2008 and three months time was fixed for completion of sale. Appellant/plaintiff has not produced any material to show that within that three months he was in possession so much money. Except producing acknowledgement of income tax returns for the year 2009-10 he has not produced any other material to show that he had requisite funds. In cross-examination of P.W.1 at page No. 37 he has stated that he has made arrangements to obtain loan from the Bank and he was capable of mobilizing the funds. This answer goes to show that he was not having finances within three months from the date of Ex.P.1 -agreement. Appellant/plaintiff has not produced any letter issued by the Bank to show that he had applied for loan and same had been sanctioned. This answer goes to show that he was not having finances within three months from the date of Ex.P.1 -agreement. Appellant/plaintiff has not produced any letter issued by the Bank to show that he had applied for loan and same had been sanctioned. Appellant/plaintiff has not produced any Bank statement for having passed the consideration amount in his account and he has not examined any of his financiers to show that they had agreed to lend loan to the plaintiff. Further, plaintiff has not explained as to what was the need to avail loan from the Bank for purchase of suit schedule property when he claims that he was financially sound. 30. The agreement is dated 02.09.2008 and the suit is filed on 26.02.2011, after lapse of almost 2 years 10 months. The time duration fixed in Ex.P.3 was 3 months, which shows that same should be completed within three months. Appellant/plaintiff approached the Court after lapse of 2 years 10 months which shows his conduct that he was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract. In the case of Punny Akat Philip Raju, dead by LRs Vs. Sri. Dinesh Reddy reported in 2016 (3) KCCR 2372 it is held as under: "Plaintiff must produce some documentary evidence before Court by producing certain documents regarding his financial capacity or to raise loan from the concerned bank.". 31. The time for performance under the agreement -Ex.P-1 was three months and even if it is accepted for a moment that it came to be extended till August, 2009 and thereafter suit is filed on 26.07.2011, there is almost 2 years of delay in filing the suit. Though it can be said that it is within limitation, plaintiff's conduct shows that he was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract. In the case of Ferrodous Estates (Pvt) Ltd. Vs. P. Gopirathnam (dead) and others, Civil Appeal No. 13516/2015 decided on 12.10.2020 the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that Section 20 makes it clear that jurisdiction to decree the specific performance is discretionary; but that this discretion is not arbitrary but has to be exercised soundly and reasonably, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a Court of appeal -Section 20(2) speaks of cases in which the Court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance. Significantly, under clause (a) of sub-section (2), what is to be seen is the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into the contract. Even "other circumstances under which the contract was entered into" refers only to circumstances that prevailed at the time of entering into the contract. It has been further held by Hon'ble Apex Court as under: "42. Therefore there is an urgent need to revisit the principle that time is not of the essence in contracts relating to immovable properties and also explain the current position of law with regard to contracts relating to immovable property made after 1975, in view of the changed circumstances arising from inflation and steep increase in prices. We do not propose to undertake that exercise in this case, nor referring the matter to a larger Bench as we have held on facts in this case that time is the essence of the contract, even with reference to the principles in Chand Rani [(1997) 1 SCC 519] and other cases. Be that as it may. 43. Till the issue is considered in an appropriate case, we can only reiterate what has been suggested in K.S. vidyanadam [ (1997) 3 SCC 1 ]: (i) The courts, while exercising discretion in suits for specific performance, should bear in mind that when the parties prescribe a time/period, for taking certain steps or for completion of the transaction, that must have some significance and therefore time/period for taking certain steps or for completion of the transaction, that must have some significance and therefore time/period prescribed cannot be ignored. (ii) The courts will apply greater scrutiny and strictness when considering whether the purchaser was "ready and willing" to perform his part of the contract. (iii) Every suit for specific performance need not be decreed merely because it is filed within the period of limitation by ignoring the time-limits stipulated in the agreement. The Courts will also "frown" upon suits which are not filed immediately after the breach/refusal. The fact that limitation is three years does not mean that a purchaser can wait for 1 or 2 years to file a suit and obtain specific performance. The Courts will also "frown" upon suits which are not filed immediately after the breach/refusal. The fact that limitation is three years does not mean that a purchaser can wait for 1 or 2 years to file a suit and obtain specific performance. The three years period is intended to assist the purchasers in special cases, as for example, where the major part of the consideration has been paid to the vendor and possession has been delivered in part-performance, where equity shifts in favour of the purchaser. In the light of the above authoritative principles enunciated by Hon'ble Apex Court, the conduct of the parties at the time of execution of agreement acquires significance. In the instant case, the agreement of sale was entered into between the parties on 02.09.2008 wherein three months time frame was fixed to execute the registered sale deed. Thereafter Ex.P.3 supplementary agreement came to be executed on 18.12.2008 whereunder time was extended up to August, 2009. Undisputedly plaintiff got issued legal notice dated 26.08.2009 (Ex.P.31). However, suit in O.S. No. 5395/2011 was instituted on 26.07.2011 seeking for the relief of specific performance of contract. The reasons explained for the delay in instituting the suit are not satisfactory. Readiness and willingness contemplated under the Act is to be understood with expedition and the Courts would `frown' upon suits which are not filed immediately after breach or refusal. The failure of the plaintiff to prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract is being established, no exception can be found with the findings of the trial Court inasmuch as, the denial of remedy of specific performance in the facts obtained is justifical. RE. POINT No. (iii) 32. Appellant/plaintiff has filed I.A. No. 2/2019 under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC seeking leave of this court to produce guideline value issued by the Government with reference to the schedule property for the year 2008-09 as additional evidence. In the affidavit filed in support of application the appellant/plaintiff has stated that the guideline value of the suit property was Rs.1,50,00,000/-. The trial Court proceeded to hold that nothing was placed on record to hold that guideline value was Rs.1,50,00,000/-and to demonstrate the same, plaintiff has sought for production of the guideline value stating that it is a public document and it is a crucial document to ascertain market value of the suit property. The trial Court proceeded to hold that nothing was placed on record to hold that guideline value was Rs.1,50,00,000/-and to demonstrate the same, plaintiff has sought for production of the guideline value stating that it is a public document and it is a crucial document to ascertain market value of the suit property. It is further stated that non-production of the said document at the earliest stage was only on account of guideline value not being in dispute. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 in his statement of objections has contended that the power of the appellate Court to permit additional evidence either oral or documentary can be exercised only if the appellant is able to demonstrate that Court below had refused to admit the evidence which ought to have been admitted or if the appellant is able to demonstrate and establish that inspite of exercise of due diligence such evidence was not within his knowledge or inspite of due diligence could not be produced prior to the passing of the impugned judgment. It is further contended that appellant was cross-examined in detail regarding the market value of the schedule property in 2008 and the appellant had merely stated that he had enquired in the locality to ascertain the value. The appellant did not carryout any verification of the guideline value from 09.03.2008 till 15.03.2018 and therefore, he is not entitled to produce the said document in appeal. It is further contended that Ex.D.12 to Ex.D.24 -copies of sale deeds produced by defendant No.1 will show the actual market value of the suit property in the year 2008. With these submissions counsel for respondent-defendants has prayed for dismissal of the application. 33. Appellant/plaintiff had filed the present suit for the relief of specific performance in the year 2011. Since beginning defendant No. 1 had disputed the consideration amount mentioned in Ex.P.1 -sale agreement stating that market value of the suit property is of the year 2008 and consideration agreed was Rs.7,20,00,000/-. Appellant/plaintiff is a builder by profession and he was aware of the existence of guideline value. Appellant/plaintiff ought to have produced the said guideline value during the course of trial before the trial Court. Appellant/plaintiff is a builder by profession and he was aware of the existence of guideline value. Appellant/plaintiff ought to have produced the said guideline value during the course of trial before the trial Court. Appellant/plaintiff has now sought for production of guideline value on the ground that trial Court has made observation in the impugned judgment that appellant has not produced any document to show the market value of the schedule property. Appellant/plaintiff who is seeking production of document as additional evidence has to make out ground that in spite of exercise of due diligence it was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him when decree appealed against was passed. In the present case it is not the case of appellant/plaintiff that he was aware about the document sought to be produced. It is the case of appellant/plaintiff that since the guideline value was admitted, therefore he could not produce the guideline value. On looking to the pleadings of the parties it is clear that nowhere guideline value has been admitted by the parties. 34. The guideline value of the properties would be fixed by the Government for the purpose of collecting the stamp duty. Said guideline value does not depict the actual market value of the property. The guideline value fixed in the document sought to be produced is Rs.3,500/-per sq.ft. in the year 2008 in respect of a property situated in HAL II Stage, Bengaluru. On looking to the actual transactions that have taken place in the year 2008 i.e., Ex.D.12 to Ex.D.14 which are certified copies of the sale deeds depicting the actual market value of the property, it is evident that actual market value of the property at the relevant point of time was nearly four times the guideline value fixed. Therefore, the said document sought to be produced by the appellant/plaintiff will not assist plaintiff to prove the actual market value of the suit schedule property. The appellant/plaintiff has not made out any ground for production of additional evidence by way of document as required under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC and even otherwise, non-production of said document would not prejudice the right of appellant-plaintiff. RE. POINT No. (iv) 35. The appellant/plaintiff has not made out any ground for production of additional evidence by way of document as required under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC and even otherwise, non-production of said document would not prejudice the right of appellant-plaintiff. RE. POINT No. (iv) 35. The trial Court on considering the oral and documentary evidence and on appreciating the evidence on record has rightly arrived at a conclusion that appellant/plaintiff had failed to prove due execution of agreement of sale -Ex.P.1 and appellant/plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract. The trial Court has not granted refund of earnest money on the ground that same has not been sought for and it has based its findings by taking recourse to sub-section (2) of Section 22 of Specific Relief Act. Appellant/plaintiff has not even sought for the alternative relief of refund of earnest money even in this appeal. If the appellant/plaintiff had sought for refund of earnest money, then the trial Court ought to have considered whether the same is to be refunded or not by taking into consideration the damage and hardship caused to the defendants. Therefore, the trial Court has not committed any error in not granting refund of earnest money. On re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, we are of the considered opinion that judgment and decree of the trial Court does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity which calls for our interference. Hence, we proceed to pass the following; ORDER : I. Appeal is dismissed. II. Judgment and decree passed in O.S. No. 5395/2011 dated 29.11.2018 by the XII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru is confirmed. III. I.A. No. 1/2019 filed under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC is dismissed. IV. No order as to costs. V. Registry is directed to draw the decree accordingly.